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This thesis examines the 1972 miners’ strike as a class conflict. The strike’s 
immediate causes were job losses and stagnating wages leading to a high wage 
claim that sought to redress the decline but challenged the Government’s inflation 
control mechanism. It considers the overtime ban that prepared the miners for the 
subsequent strike, and shows that the picketing of stocks, which determined the 
strike’s outcome, was largely peaceful, and demonstrates that any hostile 
picketing was directed against the perceived strike-breaking role of officials and 
clerks who crossed the picket lines.  
 
The thesis assesses the growing disconnect between the miners and their 
leadership, whose collaborative policies implicated them in pit closures and wage 
restraint. It shows that the leadership’s instructions on picketing were often defied 
by the pickets, with decisions determined at local rather than national level. It 
demonstrates that instructions to continue safety cover and allow pit maintenance 
were openly dismissed and defied by the pickets, who saw, within the issue, the 
entire future of the industry. It also addresses the support won by the pickets from 
other trade unionists, which built upon links established between workers during 
the overtime ban and the strike, rather than between union leaders.  
 
The thesis shows that the Government, which had desired a confrontation with 
the public sector, was unprepared for the pickets’ swift success in curtailing 
movement of coal stocks, and that its defeat was largely due to its own 
complacency and belief that it had the upper hand. It demonstrates that the 
Cabinet was hugely frustrated at its inability to find a remedy to curb the mobile 
and mass picketing, which were largely legal, and led it to seek changes to the 
operation of the police and to the law to curb future picketing that it increasingly 
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1.1 Aims of the Thesis 
 
The 1972 strike has suffered in the historiography of the mining industry as the 
poor relation of two more prominent national miners’ strikes in the post-war era, 
primarily the 1984-1985 strike, which consumes a huge proportion of the column 
inches of writings about miners, and indeed on strikes in general. This is largely 
because it was a victory for the government and the last hurrah of organised 
working class resistance, but also because it was an attritional conflict that 
dragged out over a year, compared to the relatively brief 1972 strike. The second 
most high-profile was the 1974 miners’ strike, which merges in the memories of 
many with the 1972 strike, but is most remembered as the strike that brought 
down the Heath Government. The 1972 strike is arguably the most significant of 
the three, and paved the way for the other two. Having been beaten twice in quick 
succession the Conservatives were determined not to be beaten again and so 
ensured that the cards were more heavily stacked in their favour during the 1984-
1985 strike. The significance of the 1972 miners’ strike lies in it being the first 
official national stoppage by coalminers since the 1926 lockout that precipitated 
the General Strike. It was, more pertinently, the first official national strike under 
nationalisation and the opening conflict of a turbulent year that had major 
political ramifications for the Heath Government. This thesis addresses the 
conduct of the 1972 miners’ strike, which began at midnight on 8 January and 
ended when miners returned to work, victorious, on 28 February. It was called in 
pursuit of an above inflation wage claim that sought to redress a stagnation in 
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miners’ wages in relation to comparable industrial workers. This seven-week 
strike was preceded by a ban on overtime, which began on 1 November 1971 and 
made significant inroads into coal stocks whilst preparing miners for the 
subsequent strike. Prior to the strike, few commentators expected the miners to 
win or even to hold out for so long, in part because barely three fifths of 
mineworkers had voted for strike action.  
 
The conduct of the strike saw a largely disciplined approach to picketing aimed 
at curtailing the movement of fuel to and from the power stations. This involved 
well over five hundred establishments, many of these on a twenty-four-hour 
basis, by some forty thousand miners daily and over two hundred thousand 
miners in total.1 The strategy of the miners during the strike, in curtailing 
movement of coal and focusing on the power stations, proved very effective and 
stranded much of the coal stocks upon which the National Coal Board (NCB / 
Board) and the Government had relied at the outset. In this there was a broad 
recognition that the miners were in conflict not directly with the Board but rather 
with the Government itself, which was directing the Board behind the scenes. The 
miners were also, to a large extent, in conflict with the leadership of the National 
Union of Mineworkers (NUM / Union).  
 
Thus, the strike can be seen to have had four ‘actors’, which officially divided 
between the NCB and the Government on one side, and the NUM and the miners 
on the other. However, the Board and the Government did not entirely see eye-
to-eye, and the hands of the Board were tied in the wage negotiations by 
Government directives and its inflation control mechanism. The Government 
were also frustrated that the Board appeared willing to offer more than the 
arbitrary limit it had set. The Board were more aware than the Government about 
the growing mood of discontent amongst the miners and had warned it that to 
offer an amount that was restricted to the upper limit set by its mechanism would 
be sure to precipitate a strike. On the other side, the miners were increasingly 
frustrated at the collaborative approach of the NUM leadership during the 
preceding decade, which manifested in unofficial strikes in the two years prior to 
the 1972 strike and in the widespread disregard for the leadership’s directives 
during the strike. In addition, the NCB and the NUM were to a large extent 
 
1 HC Deb, 2 March 1972, vol.832 c.727; Labour Research, April 1972, pp.74-5 
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partners in the industry and agreed wholeheartedly on the need to undertake 
safety and maintenance work during the strike to protect the pits and so the future 
of the industry, though this was widely ignored by the miners.  
 
 
1.2 Thesis Plan 
 
Chapter One is an introduction to the thesis and considers its aims. It gives a 
summary of the strike and reviews the causes and political background to the 
dispute. It provides an overview of the literature relevant to this thesis and 
considers the nature of the sources utilised. Chapter Two considers the industrial 
background to the strike. It reviews the nationalisation process and its financial 
implications, and the subsequent rationalisation and contraction of the industry 
as the demand for coal declined. It considers the modernisation of the industry 
and the introduction of national wage bargaining, which had the unforeseen effect 
of unifying the miners and their grievances. It addresses the NUM’s role in 
facilitating pit closures and also the miners’ growing discontent, which turned to 
militancy as they began to challenge the leadership’s passive and collaborative 
approach, and manifested in ‘unofficial’ national strikes in 1969 and 1970.  
 
Chapter Three reviews the prelude to the strike from the 1971 NUM conference 
until the end of the overtime ban preceding the strike. It considers the wage 
proposals put forward at the conference that attempted to redress the historic 
decline in miners’ relative wage levels, and decreased the threshold necessary for 
official strike action. It assesses the ban on overtime preceding the strike that 
decreased coal stocks and demonstrated to miners how low their wages really 
were, in preparation for the vote on strike action. It considers the formation of 
liaison committees, which became strike committees and introduced an 
organisational element into the dispute. Chapter Four considers the wage 
negotiations and the historic decline in miners’ wages, and compares their wage 
claim to those of other public sector and manual workers. It assesses the 
Government’s desire to confront the public sector, its introduction of the N-1 Pay 
Norm that took no account of the merits of the miners’ case, and its role in 
dictating the terms and the time-frame of the negotiations. It considers the issue 
of arbitration, the Wilberforce Inquiry, and the role played by the leaders of the 
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NUM and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in negotiating behind the backs of 
the miners to contain the wage rise.  
 
Chapter Five considers the picketing against the movement of coal stocks and the 
extent to which the TUC statement at the beginning of the strike enabled the 
movement of coal to be so effectively minimised. It assesses the nature of the 
picketing and shows how this developed across the seven weeks of the strike. It 
reviews the divergence between the NUM’s national guidelines and their local 
interpretation, which often ran contrary to the wishes of the leadership. Chapter 
Six considers the picketing against clerical workers and officials that went against 
the directives of the NUM leadership, who had agreed to continue to provide 
safety cover at the pits during the strike. It considers the nature and extent of such 
picketing, the variety of tactics employed across the coalfields and their 
development over the course of the strike as the picketing became increasingly 
large scale and hostile. It demonstrates widespread disregard by the pickets for 
the directives of the leadership, both at national and Area level. It discusses the 
reasons for the miners’ decisions to curtail safety work, which exposes a deep 
anger and frustration felt by miners towards the betrayals of the leadership and 
towards those breaking the strike and reflected differing and divergent views on 
the future of the industry.  
 
Chapter Seven considers the distribution of coal stocks during the strike, and the 
supply of fuel to priority consumers. It shows that the power stations were thought 
to have sufficient stocks to outlast the strike, but that the pickets’ success in 
halting stock movement led to a downward revision of the timescale and 
ultimately to power cuts as many power stations ran short. It considers the supply 
of coal to vulnerable consumers, which was a key battleground in the 
manipulation of public opinion on both sides of the dispute, and assesses the 
differing outlooks in defining ‘priority’. Chapter Eight considers the support that 
the miners received during the strike, particularly from the transport unions, 
which was crucial to their success, and reviews the TUC’s statement at the outset, 
which was seen in some quarters as the cause of the effective mass trade union 
support for the strike. It considers the widespread support received from students, 
who were in their own dispute with the Government, and demonstrates that 
miners received significant support from the public, with public opinion 
remaining on the side of the miners throughout the strike.  
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Chapter Nine considers the mass picket which closed the Saltley coke depot with 
support from thousands of Birmingham engineering workers. It shows that the 
confrontation inflicted a severe blow to the Heath Government and marked the 
effective end of the strike, though it actually had little bearing on its outcome. It 
assesses the build up to the mass picket, the nature of the engineers’ support, the 
confrontation itself and the subsequent response. Chapter Ten considers the legal 
aspects of the strike, the nature of the policing, and the application of the Law. It 
considers the policing of industrial disputes, and the relationship between pickets 
and police. It addresses the allegation that the strike was ‘a victory for violence’, 
and the developing use of the term ‘intimidation’ during the strike. It reviews the 
legislative measures considered by both Labour and the Conservative 
governments to counter unofficial strikes, by strengthening the hand of the 
official trade union leadership, and considers the Industrial Relations Act. It 
demonstrates the Cabinet’s frustration at the effectiveness of the picketing and its 
attempts to seek grounds for prosecution and ultimately changes to the Law.  
 
 
1.3 Causes of the Strike 
 
The question arises: Why was there an official national miners’ strike in 1972, 
having not been one for over four decades? The answer lies both in the reasons 
why there was a strike in 1972, but also in the reasons why there had not been 
one in the preceding years. I will consider the second half of this equation first. 
In the twenty years or so after the nationalisation of the coal industry there was a 
strong feeling amongst miners that the nationalised industry was something to be 
proud of and thankful for. Many miners remembered the conditions under the 
previous private ownership, and felt that the industry now belonged to them as it 
belonged to the nation. NUM officials worked closely with the NCB from a 
political conviction that nationalisation should be made to succeed, and ideally 
through a Labour government. Coal was initially in high demand, and though 
conditions were still difficult and dangerous, miners supported the Board. The 
Union, as the pit-level defender of miners’ rights, was wholeheartedly supported 
by the vast majority of miners, and union identity was very strong. Given these 
conditions, where the NUM and the NCB (and indeed the workforce) worked 
closely together for the benefit of the industry, it was relatively easy for the NUM 
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leadership to exploit its relationship with its members and convince the workforce 
to refrain from taking industrial action as the demand for coal began to decline 
and the industry to contract. Under the early contraction, the Board was able to 
move miners to other pits, but these were increasingly further away from the 
miners’ home pit. The Union were able to convince miners that the contraction 
was necessary, and that protest was futile and would lead to further closures. This 
was aided by the disparate nature of collieries, particularly those under threat of 
closure, which were largely spread around the periphery of the coalfield, such 
that a pit closure was a local affair. The NUM leadership, allied as it is to the 
Labour Party, also sought to convince miners that things would get better when a 
Labour Government was returned and that they should therefore do nothing to 
undermine the prospects of getting Labour back in power, and then, when Wilson 
was elected, of the need to support ‘our’ Labour Government.2 The identification 
of Labour as ‘our’ government came from both the right and left wings of the 
NUM – Labour and Communist (Communist Party of Great Britain / CP). Miners 
were effectively warded off major industrial action by their defence of the 
nationalised industry, their support for the leadership of the NUM, their belief in 
a Labour government, and also by a leadership that persuaded them otherwise.  
 
In considering why the 1972 strike occurred, we must first assess the changes to 
the conditions set out above, the most significant of which was the restructuring 
of the wage system leading to national wage-bargaining. This saw the 
introduction of a day-wage system to replace both piece-work and task-work in 
1955, and later the introduction of the National Power Loading Agreement 
(NPLA) in the mid-1960s. The NPLA led, initially, to a stagnation of wages for 
many higher paid miners, as their pay rises were held back to allow the lower 
paid to catch up, and consequently increased discontent particularly in the higher 
paid central coalfield Areas. The discontent engendered by the NPLA played out 
on a national, rather than local, stage and led to increased unity amongst miners, 
who had previously been divided. In addition, the incoming Wilson Government 
introduced an Accelerated Closure Programme (ACP) as it moved away from a 
reliance on coal towards gas, oil and nuclear power, which led to the closure of 
many productive pits that appeared to have a future, and entailed a focus on the 
central coalfield at the expense of the periphery.  
 
2 Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, (London, 1984) p.2 
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The NUM continued to call for restraint and used its influence to head-off protest 
with an emphasis on working harder to save your pit, under a banner of the ‘new 
realism’ of modernisation. The changes associated with pit closures, and with the 
NPLA, had a profound effect on the outlook and consciousness of miners. The 
closures often entailed a forced migration of miners, who took with them different 
practices, attitudes, expressions and forms of industrial action, which served to 
break down the differences between one region and another, and encouraged a 
national, rather than a local, outlook. The increasing mechanisation of the 
industry, which had made the NPLA necessary, led to a growing sense of 
solidarity and unity across the coalfields, by standardising and rationalising tasks, 
and also to an increased awareness and consciousness associated with a 
heightened level of technology and attendant skill level.3  After the strike, a 
recognition of the unifying effect of the NPLA led the Board, the Labour 
Government and the right-wing of the NUM to reintroduce a productivity element 
to wages in the knowledge that those Areas which benefited from wider seams 
would earn more, and that this would serve to undermine such unity. This divide-
and-rule tactic was introduced in 1977 and was to play a significant part in 
dividing the miners in the 1984-85 strike leading to the formation of the 
breakaway Union of Democratic Mineworkers (UDM), which was focused 
primarily on the central Nottinghamshire coalfield.4  
 
The introduction of the ACP in the mid-1960s caused many miners to lose faith 
in the Wilson Government, especially as Labour had appeared to promise a better 
future for the industry in its 1964 election manifesto. This discontent was also 
felt by other trade unionists and grew when the Government sought to introduce 
legislation designed to curb the power of the trade unions, though its primary aim 
was to control the increasingly militant, ‘unofficial’ element of the workforce. 
Labour also introduced a statutory incomes and prices policy, with a primary 
focus on incomes, and a devaluation of the currency, both of which hit public 
sector wages. Thousands of Labour Party members felt betrayed and cancelled 
 
3 Rutledge, I, ‘Changes in the Mode of Production and the Growth of "Mass Militancy" in the 
British Mining Industry, 1954-1974’, Science and Society, Vol.41, No.4, Winter 1977-78, 
pp.421-4 
4 McIlroy, J., ‘Notes on the Communist Party and Industrial Politics’, in McIlroy, J., Fishman, N. 
& Campbell, A., (Eds.), The High Tide of British Trade Unionism: Trade Unions and 
Industrial Politics, 1964-79, (Monmouth, 2007) p.229; Richards, A., Miners on Strike: Class 
Solidarity and Division in Britain, (Oxford, 1996) pp.50-3 & p.67; Rutledge, ‘Changes in the 
Mode of Production’, pp.424-6 
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their memberships during the sixties in disappointment at Wilson’s policies.5 
Many trade unionists, including miners, began to lose faith with Labour, and also 
with the leadership of the NUM who were complicit in the ACP and were seen 
as a prop for the Government. Disillusionment with the leadership combined with 
discontent over the stagnation of wage rises led to unofficial national miners’ 
strikes in both 1969 and 1970, as miners sought to break the shackles of the 
NUM’s policy of restraint. These strikes emanated from Yorkshire, which had 
become radicalised under the effects of the NPLA, and were supported by the 
more militant peripheral Areas, primarily South Wales and Scotland. The Heath 
Government’s subsequent introduction of both the N-1 Norm wage restraint 
mechanism and the Industrial Relations Act (I.R.Act) arguably transformed these 
unofficial strikes into the official 1972 strike the following year.  
 
Some historians have argued that the cause of the strike, and indeed the cause of 
an upturn in strike activity broadly in this period, was the advent of left-wing 
leaders such as Lawrence Daly and Mick McGahey.6 This is putting the cart 
before the horse somewhat, and one feels obliged to consider how these left 
leaders came to power. They did not emerge out of the ether but were elected by 
an increasingly angry, militant and left-leaning workforce, and were 
consequently obliged to represent the views of those who had elected them, but 
nevertheless obliged to operate within the strictures of the Union. This led 
invariably to them espousing left phraseology and wage militancy, but containing 
anything that went beyond this, and heading off any challenge to the government. 
 
 
1.4 Summary of the Strike 
 
The thesis will show that the miners’ wage claim, which precipitated the strike, 
was the product of discontent due to comparatively low wages and job insecurity 
in the decade before the dispute. The combined effect of the ACP, introduced as 
part of the Wilson Government’s modernisation agenda, and the coincidental 
 
5 Davies, A.J., To Build A New Jerusalem: The British Labour Party from Keir Hardie to Tony 
Blair, (London, 1996) p.320 
6 Rutledge, ‘Changes in the Mode of Production’, p.412; Darlington, R. & Lyddon, D., Glorious 
Summer: Class struggle in Britain, 1972, (London, 2001) p.36; Taylor, A., The NUM and 
British Politics, Volume 2: 1969-1995, (London, 2005) p.1 
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moves towards national wage bargaining, which held back the wages of the 
highest paid miners, increased the discontent and had it play out on the national 
stage. This discontent was brought to a head by increasing frustration with the 
Government, the Board and the NUM itself, which had played a part in delivering 
a compliant and passive workforce. The thesis will demonstrate that the miners 
were subsequently less willing to listen to arguments for compliance with the 
strategy of the Board or with the actions of the NUM, who had argued that to take 
industrial action would only increase the contraction of the industry and lead to 
further job losses. The frustration with government increased with the advent of 
the Heath premiership, and in particular following the introduction of the I.R.Act 
and the N-1 Norm designed to hold public sector wage increases below the level 
of inflation.  
 
At their conference in 1971, the miners subsequently moved towards making an 
official strike more possible by lowering the threshold for industrial action, whilst 
putting forward a large, restorative wage claim combined with the threat of 
industrial action if it were not accepted. The claim was rejected, and a strike was 
subsequently called, to be preceded by a ban on overtime. The thesis will show 
that the ban had a number of purposes, but was primarily aimed at diminishing 
coal stocks, whilst also demonstrating to miners the true value of their wages 
without the addition of overtime. It was, to all intents and purposes, a part of the 
dispute and readied the miners for the subsequent strike, such that they were far 
better prepared than were the Board or the Government when the strike began. 
This is shown to be largely due to the operation of liaison committees that were 
established at every colliery, initially to manage the interactions between the 
various unions and trades during the overtime ban, though they also helped the 
miners to make contact with local trade unionists for assistance in the subsequent 
strike, in particular those in transport unions. These liaison committees 
subsequently became strike committees, which organised picketing rotas, and 
dealt with issues around the maintenance of the pits during the dispute. The thesis 
will show that the decisions of the committees on where and when to picket, and 
the numbers concerned, went beyond the directives of the NUM national 
leadership. This was particularly true of the picketing against officials 
undertaking maintenance and safety work in the pits during the strike, and against 
those clerical workers who continued to work in NCB offices and depots.  
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The thesis will show that the Government, which desired to win a strike in the 
public sector in order to assert its authority, was unprepared for the miners’ strike 
despite several previous warnings that its policies would provoke one. It believed 
it had the upper hand long after it was clear that it did not, and sought to control 
the negotiations, despite professing a desire to remain detached. All sides are 
shown to be aware of the importance of public opinion, but the Government was 
particularly so and both made and delayed decisions based upon this 
consideration. The issue of arbitration is one in which this is apparent, with the 
Cabinet not wishing initially to go down this road, but publicly blaming the 
miners for not doing so, and delaying the decision to undertake arbitration until 
it was forced to appoint the Wilberforce Inquiry to settle the dispute. The thesis 
will demonstrate that that the picketing during the strike was not primarily mass 
and militant picketing but that, rather, the majority of the picketing against coal 
movement was predominantly small scale and incident free often involving 
negotiations between pickets and those trying to cross picket lines. This picketing 
began on a small scale but subsequently diverged between small token pickets on 
the one hand and larger scale more interventionist picketing on the other where 
small-scale picketing was found to be ineffectual.  
 
The miners’ victory will be shown to have resulted from the curtailing of coal 
transportation, primarily the blockading of power stations, for which the 
Government was completely unprepared. The thesis will show that the supply of 
coal to priority consumers was an issue for all sides throughout the dispute and 
played a significant role in the manipulation of public opinion. The picketing 
against officials and clerical staff will also be shown to have been a source of 
divergence between the leadership and the pickets who widely disregarded the 
national directives, whilst serving to highlight differing views on the future of the 
industry. The miners received support from other trade unionists, students and 
members of the public, and the thesis shows this to have been invaluable, and that 
it largely arose following face to face interaction on the picket lines rather than at 
leadership level. The strike also effectively gained impetus from mass protests 
against the Heath Government’s Industrial Relations Bill the previous year. A 
numerically significant proportion of the support that the miners received derived 
from engineers in Birmingham during the confrontation at Saltley, which, though 
not instrumental in resolving the dispute, became the epitome of the strike and a 
sign of the strength of the organised working class. The thesis will consider the 
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charge that the strike was a ‘victory for violence’ and show that the picketing of 
coal stocks that won the strike was in fact largely peaceful, though with a small 
number of high-profile mass pickets, such as Saltley and Longannet. However, 
the Government came to identify mass picketing with intimidation, and 
intimidation with violence. It will be shown that this was part of a broader 
redefinition of ‘intimidation’, itself part of a move towards classifying strikes as 
inherently subversive.  
 
 
1.5 Political Background  
 
This thesis will examine the 1972 strike within the context of trade union and 
labour movement politics which, in Britain, is dominated by the Labour Party 
and, to a lesser extent, the CP. The leadership of the NUM is drawn from these 
parties and since its inception has been dominated by a coalition of right-wing 
(Labour) Areas - Yorkshire, Lancashire, Durham, Northumberland and 
Nottinghamshire - with a small left-wing (CP) minority primarily in Scotland and 
South Wales, and to some extent Derbyshire and Kent. Immediately prior to the 
strike the CP was still the major activist force in the Scottish and Welsh coalfields 
and there was a left group of eight members on the NUM’s twenty-six strong 
National Executive Committee (NEC). Labour controlled all the key NUM 
institutions whilst the CP twice won the post of general secretary but nevertheless 
operated within the constraints of the Union’s balance.7  
 
The period immediately prior to the strike saw the breakdown of the post-
nationalisation pattern of NUM politics based on cold-war divisions, which had 
dominated NUM internal political process, and in which the CP and the left of 
the Labour Party had been reluctant to work together.8 The thaw in these relations 
was primarily prompted by changes in the international position of communist 
parties, occasioned initially by Khrushchev’s exposure of Stalin’s crimes in 1956 
and later by the crushing of the Prague Spring and the stifling of the French 
general strike, both in 1968. These events discredited the Stalinist communist 
 
7 Howell, D., The Politics of the NUM: A Lancashire view, (Manchester, 1989) pp.9-10; Harman, 
C., The Fire Last Time: 1968 and After, (London, 1988) p.237; McIlroy, ‘Notes on the 
Communist Party’, p.229 
8 Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, pp.1 & 26 
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parties and created an existential crisis for the CP that saw a haemorrhaging of 
members and an upsurge of interest in its nemesis, Trotskyism, which represented 
a communism untainted by the crimes of Stalinism. The broader events of ‘1968’, 
including anti-Vietnam war demonstrations, radical student sit-ins and 
occupations, and general strikes involving the French and Italian working classes, 
had dominated world politics and radicalised students and workers alike. The 
discrediting of the CP in the global events around ‘1968’ led, in Britain, to a 
rightward realignment of the party towards a working alliance with the Labour 
Party on a Broad Left platform.  
 
The CP’s British Road to Socialism marked the ‘formal abandonment of a 
revolutionary path’, with its 1968 version proclaiming ‘that new political 
alignments will come about and create the conditions for the election of a 
Parliamentary majority and government pledged to a socialist programme’.9 This 
openly eschewed a revolutionary programme in favour of a peaceful road to 
socialism with a focus on ‘the people’ and the need for a ‘Broad Popular Alliance’ 
based on trade unions and the industrial working class, but also a mobilisation of 
the middle class.10 Whilst this document may have marked the CP’s formal 
abandonment of revolutionary aspirations, its actual abandonment of a 
revolutionary programme goes back to the 1920s and 1930s, in the period 
immediately after the death of Lenin. At that point the Communist International 
(Comintern / Third International), the umbrella organisation of communist parties 
globally, under external pressure from world imperialism, rejected 
internationalism and proclaimed a nationalist turn towards ‘socialism in one 
country’, which led to the discrediting and subsequent liquidation of any that 
disagreed with this policy, primarily the revolutionary current within the 
International, namely the Trotskyist Left Opposition. This nationalist turn by 
Stalin led to the communist parties throughout the world becoming appendages 
of the foreign policy of the USSR, which in turn affected their relationship with, 
and subordination to, the trade union bureaucracy and mainstream social 
democrats such as the British Labour Party.  
 
 
9 Communist Party of Great Britain, British Road to Socialism, (London, 1968) p.6, cited in 
Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, p.29 
10 McIlroy, ‘Notes on the Communist Party’, p.217 
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The Stalinist Comintern subsequently swung towards the ultra-left sectarian 
policies of the so-called Third Period, which represented a demoralised response 
to the rise of fascism, and in which social democracy was portrayed as the twin 
evil of the Nazis and labelled ‘social fascism’. The German CP was subsequently 
instructed not to join with the social democrats in opposing Hitler, in 
contradiction to the position of the Trotskyists; this split the working class and 
paved the way for the rise of the Nazis. This led the Trotskyists to reject the 
possibility of reforming the Comintern and became the impetus for the formation 
of the Fourth International. Within two years of the German defeat, Stalin rejected 
the Third Period policies and moved toward the class collaborationist position of 
popular frontism, which subordinated the CPs and the working class to the 
‘democratic’ bourgeoisie, i.e. the mainstream social democratic parties. This was 
to have particularly severe consequences in the Spanish civil war, where the CP 
transitioned from a nominal revolutionary party to an actual counter-
revolutionary and aided the social democrats in strangling the revolution. 
 
The wildly erratic policies of the Comintern and its changing view on and 
relationship with social democracy led to a fractious, distrustful and inconsistent 
relationship between the CP and the Labour Party for several decades. In Britain, 
whilst the CP continued to pursue a ‘wage militancy’ under its control, it fought 
against militants who challenged the system. For its part, Labour also wished to 
contain the militancy emerging in the ranks, an outlook it shared with the CP, and 
both parties sought to channel discontent towards the election/re-election of a 
Labour government. The CP and left-Labour subsequently effectively operated 
on a Broad Left platform as the centre-left wing of the Labour Party.11 In the 
period before the strike, the CP had been moving increasingly towards promoting 
Broad Left factions, as opposed to official CP groupings, within British trade 
unions in a drive to ‘get inside’ and operate the official machinery. In addition, 
its general support for militant policies within the workplace was subordinated to 
its electoral strategy, i.e. support for a Labour Government. The militant officials 
who were promoted and elected by the CP would often subsequently lose their 
militancy once in office, but the CP continued to defend them against criticism. 
This process promoted illusions in left-wing union leaders, and consequently 
disarmed workers at critical moments. By 1970 a cohesive alliance existed 
 
11 Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, p.26 
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between the CP and the Labour Party, ‘in which political allegiances only rarely 
obtruded’.12 Darlington and Upchurch argue that weakness of the CP’s Broad 
Left strategy was that it placed emphasis on winning left-wing control rather than 
on the building of strong rank-and-file organisation, whereas, they note, the 1972 
miners’ strike was won despite the right-wing leadership of Joe Gormley, 
primarily because 
 
the independent initiative and momentum from below… was so powerful. 
By contrast, the miners suffered their greatest defeats under the left-wing 
presidency of Arthur Scargill, arising from the relative weakness of rank-
and-file organisation within the NUM (and among trade unionists 
generally) by the early 1980s.13 
 
Darlington and Upchurch partly miss the point here in arguing that it was a 
‘weakness’ of CP strategy not to build strong rank-and-file organisations, since 
this assumes that the CP wanted strength in the ranks, whereas its history shows 
that it was striving for the opposite – strong Party control over the ranks, and a 
stifling of unofficial militancy, in order to promote its own agenda of 
accommodation with mainstream social democracy, including the peaceful road 
to a Labour Government. Within the NUM, the realignment of left politics in the 
period before the strike took the form of the development of an autonomous left 
group, which had formed initially in 1963 following discontent at the right-
Labour partisanship of the majority of the leadership. It was viewed as clandestine 
and possibly subversive by the leadership, and was led by CP members Will 
Paynter (general secretary) and Bill Whitehead (South Wales Area president) and 
involved Communists and academics, such as Vic Allen, who would later become 
a thorn in the side of the Thatcher Government. It held meetings in Yorkshire and 
Derbyshire and produced ‘A Plan for the Miners’ that was presented to the NUM 
annual conference in 1964 and set out future policies for the miners over a number 
of issues. By 1967 this important organisational innovation had expanded to 
become more broadly representative and included officials, such as Scargill, and 
left-wing activists and militants throughout the coalfield. It resolved to unite 
around Daly as the left’s candidate for general secretary against the right’s 
candidate Gormley who had been the NUM representative on the Labour Party 
 
12 McIlroy, ‘Notes on the Communist Party’, p236; Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, 
pp.29-30; Allen, V. L., The Militancy of British Miners, (Shipley, 1981) p.145 
13 Darlington, R. & Upchurch, M., ‘A Reappraisal of the Rank-and-File versus Bureaucracy 
Debate’, Capital & Class, 2011, Vol.36, No.1, p.87 
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NEC since 1963. Daly had been in the CP until 1956 and then played a leading 
role in the Fife Socialist League, a product of the New Left, before joining the 
Labour Party in 1962. He produced a pamphlet ‘The Miners and the Nation’, 
which criticised Labour’s failure to deliver on promises made whilst in opposition 
and advocated a more militant attitude in defence of miners’ interests including 
industrial action.  
 
The period of the Wilson Government coincided with a radicalisation of politics 
and an upsurge in political protest globally, which culminated in the events of 
‘1968’ and led to a discrediting of the politics of both the CP and of mainstream 
social-democrats such as the Labour Party. Thus, at the point when the industrial 
policies of the Wilson premiership were causing a growing discontent, their 
politics were also being discredited. Daly won the election, but subsequently 
subordinated himself to the NUM’s constitution and policy in denouncing the 
unofficial nature of the strikes in 1969 and 1970. This led to open hostility from 
his erstwhile supporters particularly in Yorkshire, who interpreted this as a 
betrayal. Gormley subsequently stood for and won the NUM presidency. He was 
hostile to the CP, and to the left in general, but recognised that he would have to 
adapt to the new climate. In campaigning for the presidency in 1970 he 
emphasised his agreement with Daly and sought a rapprochement with the left, 
acknowledging their influence and his belief that the Broad Left’s integration into 
the NUM political process was necessary, and that integration would also help 
control the left.14 His hostility to the left led him subsequently to liaise with MI5 
and warn Heath of its growing influence in the NUM.15 During the strike 
Employment Secretary Robert Carr saw a clear division between the ‘militant’ 
Daly and the ‘moderate’ Gormley, which he believed increased the difficulty of 
promoting new negotiations.16 However, there was less between them than 
perceived by Carr, and Daly, who was opposed to militancy if it operated outside 
of the rules, used militant rhetoric essentially to raise his credentials amongst 
miners disillusioned with his apparent betrayals during the unofficial strikes. 
 
14 McIlroy, ‘Notes on the Communist Party’, pp.228-9; Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, 
pp.32-3; Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, pp.8-9 & 139-41; Taylor, The NUM, Volume 
2, pp.27, 34-5 & 156; Howell, The Politics of the NUM, pp.19-20 
15 Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, p.217; BBC ‘True Spies’, Oct-Nov 2002,  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/true_spies/ 




1.6 Class Conflict 
 
This thesis will consider the conduct of the strike within the context of class 
struggle since an analysis of the 1972 miners’ strike - a dispute between the 
government and the one of the largest sections of the organised working class - 
is incomprehensible outside of an acceptance of the class nature of society. The 
miners, as workers in a nationalised industry undertaking manual labour in a low 
wage environment, were overwhelmingly working class and considered 
themselves to be so. This manifested during the strike in a number of ways: in 
their references to themselves as working class; in their identification as trade 
unionists in their appeal for support from other trade-unionists; in their claim to 
be the vanguard of the trade union movement in the struggle against the 
Conservative Government; in their admission of ‘blind loyalty’ to the Labour 
Party; in the students’ identification of the miners’ dispute as a working class 
struggle and the miners’ attempts ultimately to distance their struggle from that 
of the students; in the massive support miners received from the public even in 
the face of other workers being laid off; and in the Birmingham engineers 
identification of their joint struggle with the miners as a working class struggle. 
The identification of the strike as a class struggle manifests not only in identifying 
the government as the focus of the dispute in its role as employer, but also in 
seeing government policy as the focus of protest. The approach and actions of the 
government itself also identifies the dispute as a class struggle: in its legislation 
to control and contain the unofficial and militant element of the trade unions, and 
to strengthen the hand of the trade union leadership to undertake this role; in its 
identification of public sector wages as the root cause of inflation and the 
mechanisms it introduced to contain this; in the double-standard it applied to MPs 
wages, which appeared exempt from its inflation control mechanism; in the 
changes introduced and proposed for the policing of industrial disputes, which 
demonstrate an intolerance of the right to strike; in its view of strikes as 
subversive; and in the legislation introduced and proposed in relation to welfare 
benefits, which demonstrate a lack of compassion for the lowest paid and a further 
attempt to make victorious strikes less likely. Any one of these aspects can be 
dismissed, but in toto they amount to a clear view of this strike as a class struggle. 
 
Trade unions have played a crucial role in society in defending the rights of their 
members in the age-old conflict between employers and employees, and have 
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rightly come to be seen, by workers, as something to be defended. However, as 
Hyman notes, the central contradiction of trade unions is that they both make 
possible the consolidation and effectiveness of resistance but also make resistance 
more manageable and predictable, and can therefore undermine struggle.17 This 
thesis will argue that the desires and actions of the leaderships of trade unions, in 
particular the NUM, are often at odds with the desires and actions of the 
workforce that they represent. This proceeds from the view that the political and 
economic interests of workers and employers, or management, are distinct, and 
though there is some common interest, their essential interests are in conflict with 
one another. A union (and in particular the union leadership) operates as a liaison 
between workers and management representing the interests of one to the other 
and its interests and role are distinct from each of the others (this is discussed 
further below). The leadership of the NUM worked closely with the Board to 
promote the interests of the coal industry, even at the point when this ceased to 
be in the interests of the workforce. In the run-up to the 1972 strike, workers had 
begun to say that the interests of the industry, in contracting whilst keeping wages 
at competitively low rates, were no longer their interests, and they began to 
challenge the NUM’s view that to take industrial action would simply accelerate 
this process. During the strike there was a clear distinction between the operation 
and outlook of the national leadership of the NUM and that of the miners on the 
picket lines who, though varying in their politics and in their militancy, showed 
a tendency towards militant action in defiance of the leadership.  
 
 
1.7 Review of the Sources  
 
1.7.1 Unpublished Primary Sources 
 
This thesis has drawn on a wide variety of primary sources, both published and 
unpublished. The unpublished primary sources are largely those located at the 
National Archives at Kew, though other archives around the country have also 
been consulted. The sources at the National Archives were primarily those from 
the Cabinet Office (CAB series), the National Coal Board (COAL), the Home 
Office (HO), the Department of Employment (LAB), the Department of Energy, 
 
17 Hyman, R., ‘Class Struggle and the Trade Union Movement’, in Coates, D., Johnston, G. & 
Bush, R., (Eds.), A Socialist Anatomy of Britain, (Oxford, 1985) p.104 
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Electrical Division (POWE) and the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM). Within 
these the thesis makes particular use of the daily Progress Report on the Coal 
Strike produced by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which 
summarised for example developments, stock positions, picketing, press reports, 
and priority supply, and fed into the Cabinet. These are referred to within the 
thesis as ‘DTI report’, and within the footnotes as PRCS. The thesis also draws 
on the ‘Historical Note and Record’ of the strike produced by the DTI, which 
gives an in-depth analysis of the strike based on departmental records. A 
handwritten note on the cover declares that it to be ‘a valuable record’ which ‘will 
certainly be required in the event of any future strikes.’ It is referred to throughout 
the thesis as the ‘DTI post-mortem’. The thesis has also used (or ‘re-used’) 
existing oral history sources from several archives. 
 
 
1.7.2 Oral History 
 
I had initially considered undertaking oral history interviews with participants in 
the strike, but began by consulting existing oral sources that covered this period, 
in particular the Millennium Memory Bank, at the British Library and the 
National Mining Museum in Wakefield, both of which have a number of 
interviews with ex-miners. However, these essentially amount to a very brief 
review of each participant’s life in the industry, with almost no reference to the 
1972 strike, though there were some recollections which merged and confused 
the strike with the subsequent 1974 strike. What became clear was that the miners 
who were interviewed had scant memory of the 1972 strike, though the 1984-85 
strike remained a clearer memory for some. Had I undertaken interviews these 
would have been conducted from 2015, when the age of the participants would 
have ranged between circa sixty and ninety years old. My main interest in using 
oral history had been to include the experience of those involved in the strike, 
rather than a study in what was, or was not, remembered of that period. I therefore 
took a decision to use, or re-use, existing oral history, which had been undertaken 
when the memory of the events was still relatively fresh, that is to say interviews 
that were undertaken shortly after the strike. Clearly there are still problems with 
remembering the near past but these are considerably less of a problem, for my 
requirements, when compared to memories of the distant past. The thesis has, 
therefore, drawn on previously existing oral sources taken shortly after the strike, 
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primarily interviews conducted by the Banner Theatre of Actuality and the South 
Wales Coalfield History Project. The Birmingham based Banner Theatre of 
Actuality interviews, are held at the Library of Birmingham.18 Banner conducted 
interviews during 1973 and 1974 of a number of participants in the events at 
Saltley coke depot during the strike. These included miners from Yorkshire, 
South Wales and the West Midlands, and Birmingham engineering workers, and 
union officials, in order to create a stage production entitled ‘Saltley Gate’, which 
was first performed in 1976. Banner’s approach was to utilise the actual testimony 
of the participants, hence the term ‘actuality’, and it was intended as a celebration 
of the events at Saltley, and its representation as a working-class victory. The 
South Wales Coalfield History Project conducted interviews under the auspices 
of University College, Swansea. This, in part, fed into the production of a report 
and ‘initial history’ entitled ‘The Miners’ Strike, 1972: a report and initial 
history’, a copy of which is held in in the Charles Parker Archive at the Library 
of Birmingham.19 Interviews took place between December 1972 and April 1973 
with around twenty strike committees and union officials directly involved in the 
strike in South Wales in order to give an insight into the strike, which is viewed 
as ‘an important episode in the history of the British working-class movement.’  
 
Given the declared aim of both of these projects to celebrate the strike as a 
working-class victory, this presents potential problems in the re-use of these oral 
history archival sources. These include the perceived bias of the interviewers in 
both the selection of participants and in the line of questioning, and also the 
potential for subjective editing by the interviewers, though in the case of the 
Banner project the archive holds the original unedited transcripts. The testimonies 
themselves present some potential problems of memory, though both projects 
conducted interviews whilst the events were a relatively recent memory, and 
were, for example, prior to Scargill’s 1975 New Left Review interview, which 
coloured some later accounts.20 There is also a potential problem of whether 
participants in a mass protest such as Saltley, or in the picketing of officials and 
clerical workers, which included some aggressive behaviour, might alter their 
testimony to either minimise or enhance their own role in the events, or overplay 
the importance of working-class solidarity. 
 
18 Library of Birmingham (LB): MS1611, Banner Theatre of Actuality 
19 LB: MS4000, Charles Parker Archive 
20 Scargill, A, ‘The New Unionism’, Interview, New Left Review, Vol.1, No.92, Jul-Aug 1975 
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The debate surrounding the re-use of qualitative data is extensive, and a portion 
of this debate is discussed by Gallwey.21 Critics who have drawn attention to 
problems in the re-use of qualitative data include Mauthner and Parry, who argue, 
essentially, that ‘secondary analysis is fundamentally flawed because subsequent 
users do not possess the same level of knowledge as primary researchers about 
the context in which the data is originally collected’, and that even where 
supporting materials are provided the findings remain highly questionable. 
Hammersley has also highlighted the unique relationship between original 
researcher and primary data, and has thus reasserted the fundamental distinction 
between primary and secondary research and the indispensability of terms such 
as ‘secondary analysis’ and ‘re use’. Moore has challenged Mauthner and others 
within the social scientific community who are resistant to ‘re-use’ in arguing that 
data are being constructed in the process of a new research project, and that the 
methodological and disciplinary boundaries in the concept of ‘re-use’ should be 
collapsed in favour of speaking of how researchers ‘use’ data. Gallwey sees the 
arguments for and against ‘re-use’ in part as a division between two schools of 
thought, with the ‘positivist’ tradition of, for example Mauthner, against the 
‘phenomenological’ approach of, for example Moore. Bishop argues similarly 
about the debate surrounding re-use: ‘In some cases, I suspect that the primary / 
secondary debate has become a proxy for other debates: positivism / 
interactionism, realism / post-modernism, subjectivity / authorial authority, and 






21 Gallwey, A., ‘The rewards of using archived oral histories in research: the case of the 
Millennium Memory Bank’, Oral History, Vol.41, No.1, Archives, Spring 2013, pp.37-50 
22 Mauthner, N.S., Parry, O. & Backett-Milburn, K., ‘The data are out there, or are they? 
Implications for archiving and revisiting qualitative data’, Sociology, Vol.32, No.4, 1998, 
pp.733-45; Parry, O. & Mauthner, N.S., ‘Whose data are they anyway? Practical, legal and 
ethical issues in archiving qualitative research data’, Sociology, Vol.38, No.1, 2004, pp.139-
52; Parry, O. & Mauthner, N.S., ‘Back to basics: who re-uses qualitative data and why?’, 
Sociology, Vol.39, No.2, 2005, pp.337-42; Hammersley, M., ‘Can We Re-Use Qualitative 
Data via Secondary Analysis? Notes on Some Terminological and Substantive Issues’, 
Sociological Research Online, Vol.15, No.1, 2010, pp.1-7; Moore, N., ‘The Contexts of 
Context: Broadening Perspectives in the (Re)use of Qualitative Data’, Methodological 
Innovations Online, Vol.1, No.2, 2006, pp.21-32; Moore, N., ‘(Re)Using Qualitative Data?’, 
Sociological Research Online, Vol.12, No.3, 2006, pp.21-32; Bishop, L., ‘A Reflexive 
Account of Reusing Qualitative Data: Beyond Primary/Secondary Dualism’, Sociological 
Research Online, Vol.12, No.3, 2007, pp.1-14, all referenced in Gallwey, ‘The rewards of 
using archived oral histories in research’ 
31 
 
1.7.3 Police Telexes 
 
The thesis has made use of a significant primary source, which, to my knowledge, 
has hitherto not been analysed. This source is a bundle of telexes sent by the 
various constabularies in England and Wales to the Home Office during the 
strike, following the Home Secretary’s request for information on picketing in 
each force area.23 This request stated that the Home Office desired a report of any 
disorder or threat of disorder by pickets, and in addition a weekly general 
assessment of the location and extent of picketing.24 The telexes sent in response 
has created a very useful resource, which allows an analysis of the picketing that 
occurred, by place and time, by types of establishment picketed, and by the 
behaviour of the pickets. It also allows consideration of the differing responses 
by the various constabularies. The telexes are not a complete record, as the reports 
from some forces are no longer on record. This may be because the force 
concerned did not send a report each week, perhaps in part due to there being 
nothing to report, or that the report has gone missing, or has been sent elsewhere. 
The information provided varies widely, and perhaps represents the attitude of 
the relevant constabulary or the level of difficulty in garnering the information 
requested. The memo that relayed the request from F6 division of the Home 
Office, who were party to the Ministerial Committee on Emergencies meeting, to 
F4 division, who were responsible for contacting the chief constables (CCs) sheds 
light on this issue. Buttery (from F6) noted that at the meeting he had raised 
‘grave misgivings’ about the requirement for CCs to provide information on the 
nature and extent of picketing, but that he had been overruled and ‘sold down the 
river by the Metropolitan Police representative’, who had said that there would 
be no problem in providing this type of information.25 Buttery’s concern must, in 
part, have been based on a belief in the difficulty of gathering information on 
picketing, especially in larger force areas, or where there were many potential 
sites that could be picketed. This is borne out by the fact that the constabularies 
whose reports have least detail are those whose areas are geographically large 
and difficult to police or contain many collieries, namely South Wales, Dyfed 
Powys, or the Yorkshire county constabularies. In respect of the latter, the West 
Yorkshire Constabulary sent only very general remarks with little detail and the 
 
23 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English and Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 17 January - 14 
February 1972 
24 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Hilary to Chief Constables, 13 January 1972 
25 TNA: HO325/101, Memo, Buttery to Hilary, 12 January 1972 
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only other parts of Yorkshire that responded were the Sheffield and Rotherham, 
and Leeds City forces, which restricted reports to incidents within their city 
boundaries. This appears to confirm Buttery’s view that some of the 
constabularies would find it difficult or onerous to give the kind of assessment 
required by the Home Secretary. 
 
At least one hundred and thirty telexes were received during the following five 
weeks, from almost all of the constabularies in England and Wales, one hundred 
and sixteen of which are on record. There is evidence that some of the original 
telexes are missing: with five being absent but referred to on a subsequent telex; 
and nine missing for some weeks from forces that reported picketing activity each 
week. A reasonable assumption, therefore, is that there must have been activity 
in these intervening weeks, and thus also reports, though these reports are not on 
file. There are also forces, such as Nottinghamshire Constabulary, which is 
known to have had regular picketing activity, but where only one weekly report 
is present. In these instances, one might presume that there were reports issued, 
but I have not made any assumption on the content of the missing reports within 
my analysis or count, as there are no ‘intervening’ weeks on which to base this. 
In the first week two forces submitted ‘Nil reports’, despite Hilary’s note that this 
was not necessary, with Hampshire Constabulary noting ‘A negative report from 
all divisions’, and Bedfordshire and Luton Constabulary, reporting ‘No picketing 
or other incidents within this Force Area’. The one hundred and fourteen reports 
that did note picketing activity were sent from twenty-nine separate police forces, 
though not each force reported activity each week. This is particularly the case 
for those that were not in a coalfield area. The Home Office decided to 
discontinue the need for the constabularies to report after the fourth week, as it 
believed that it was learning nothing of importance.26 In addition to information 
on the nature and extent of picketing, the reports also detail protests and rallies 
that took place, and refer to the support that the pickets received from others, 
notably, power station workers, other trade unionists and students. The reports 
also shed light on the question of the pickets’ response to safety and maintenance 
of the pits during the strike, and on the question of the delivery of coal to priority 
consumers, such as hospitals, schools and the elderly.  
 
 
26 TNA: HO325/101, Note, McQueen to Hilary, 21 January 1972 
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The reports vary considerably with regard to detail, ranging from one of Durham 
Constabulary’s reports, which contains a daily assessment with named premises 
and picket numbers, to West Yorkshire Constabulary, whose reports, each week, 
simply state: ‘Picketing taking place at collieries, power stations and workshops 
throughout this Force Area. No major trouble being experienced.’ The one 
hundred and fourteen police telexes that report activity can broadly be divided 
into two types: ‘area only’ reports, which give no site details, but rather make a 
general comment on picketing activity within the force area; and ‘site specific’ 
reports, which give details on particular sites, or premises, that have been 
picketed. Even within these two broad types there is quite significant variation, 
and also some crossover, with a number of telex reports mentioning particular 
site activity, but also making general area comments. There are twenty-three ‘area 
only’ telexes, twenty of which report orderly picketing, two of which mention 
only that picketing continued to take place, with a presumption that there was, 
therefore, no disorder, and one which reports a general threat. There are eighty-
seven ‘site specific’ reports, seventy-four of which report no incidents, two that 
cite picketing activity with no comment on disorder, three which describe specific 
incidents, and four which have a combination of sites, some with disorder and 
others peaceful. There are nine hundred and forty-eight picketing ‘events’ 
mentioned over the five weeks of reporting, across three hundred and seventy 
separate locations. The picketing events consist of five hundred and seventy 
named sites, three hundred and five un-named sites, fifty-eight multi-day 
references, and fifteen additional site entrances picketed. It includes sites 
mentioned on several occasions (e.g. each week) but does not count a site more 
than once per week if it is included in a general weekly report, only if the report 
specifically refers to several days at one site. For example, a site that is picketed 
six days a week, is counted only once if mentioned within a general weekly 
report, but counted several times, if the report is set out as such, or if several dates 
are mentioned. Of these nine hundred and forty-eight events, only fourteen 
mention any level of threat or disorder.  
 
In formulating the spreadsheets that I have used to create the graphs and charts in 
this thesis, I have had to make certain assumptions. The detail on the numbers of 
pickets that was recorded in the telexes varied considerably, with some giving 
exact numbers when they were small enough to count but figures rounded to the 
nearest ten or fifty or hundred when they are larger. In terms of picket numbers, 
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some of the reports refer to the size of the picket without giving exact numbers, 
and use terms such as ‘small’, ‘token’, ‘few’, ‘limited degree’, ‘spasmodic’, 
‘reasonable’, ‘minimum’ or ‘normal’. In each of these cases I have assumed that 
the numbers are fewer than twenty pickets, though they are probably smaller still. 
Where the reports refer to ‘not more than…’ or ‘…max’, I have taken the cited 
figure. In general, and given the fact that the vast majority of sites displayed 
peaceful picketing, I have erred on the side of the smaller number in order not to 
further minimise the extent of incidents that took place by inflating the number 
of sites with peaceful picketing. In some reports no figures are given unless they 
are very large, implying that when the figure is not cited it is because it is not 
large. In respect of the types of establishment picketed, and the number of days 
that they were picketed in any week, I have also made some assumptions. Where 
power stations have been picketed and where reference is made to 24-hour 
picketing I have assumed the picketing took place seven days a week, as was 
requested by the NEC. In both these instances I have taken any mitigation into 
account. All other picketing is assumed to take place six days a week, which 
accords with the figures that are recorded. Therefore, comments such as ‘during 
this week’, ‘throughout this week’, ‘daily’, ‘pickets maintained’, have been 
counted as six days unless there is mitigation. Some reports refer to such 
mitigation as ‘at various times’, ‘periodical’, ‘sporadic’ in which case I have 
assumed half or three days, unless further mitigation. Similar assumptions have 
been made with respect to the sites visited. So, for example, where the reports do 
not give a daily breakdown of sites and numbers, they may make comments such 
as ‘some of the’, ‘various’, ‘several’ or ‘not all locations on any one day’. In these 
cases, I have assumed half of those previously mentioned, or for half of the time. 
Some reports refer to a plural, such as ‘depots’, ‘coal-yards’, ‘collieries’, and in 
these situations, I have assumed a minimum of two, and therefore counted two, 










1.8 Published Sources 
 
1.8.1 Overview of the Literature 
 
The published sources used in this thesis are largely secondary sources, though 
there are some primary sources included, notably Malcolm Pitt’s account of the 
strike from the point of view of a Kent miner, and the account by Vic Allen, an 
academic and active participant in much of the debate amongst miners. The 
secondary literature with a bearing on this thesis is wide and varied. There are a 
huge number of books and articles concerning the 1970s and the Heath 
Government27 and a vast historiography on trade unions and industrial relations, 
from general histories to specialised economic studies,28 though these tend to 
make little detailed reference to the 1972 strike itself. The literature relevant to 
this thesis can broadly be divided into four categories:  
 
General histories of the British coal industry since nationalisation 
Studies concerned directly with the 1972 miners’ strike 
Literature focusing on the history and politics of the NUM 
Reviews of the rank-and-file versus bureaucracy debate. 
 
 
1.8.2 General Histories of the Coal Industry  
 
General studies of the coal industry since nationalisation have tended to consider 
the challenges facing the industry: its initial struggle to retain the workforce after 
the war and to keep up with the demand for coal; its reaction to the decline in 
demand and the subsequent contraction of the industry; the competition from 
 
27 For example, Whitehead, P., The Writing on the Wall: Britain in the Seventies, (London, 1985); 
Morgan, K.O., The People’s Peace: British History 1945-1989, (Oxford, 1990); Ball, S. & 
Seldon, A., The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, (London, 1996); Beckett, A., 
When the Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies, (London, 2009)  
28 For example, Taylor, R., The Fifth Estate: Britain's Unions in the Seventies, revised edn., 
(London, 1980); Barnes, D. & Reid, E., Governments and Trade Unions: The British 
Experience, 1964-79, (London, 1980); Dorfman, G.A., Government versus Trade Unionism in 
British Politics since 1968, (London, 1979); Wigham, E., Strikes and the Government 1893-
1974, (London, 1976) 
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other fuels; industrial relations during the contraction; and the subsequent strikes 
of the early 1970s. Two works that can be considered histories officially 
sanctioned by the NCB are those by Ashworth and by Berkovitch. Of these, 
Ashworth’s work is the standard history and the fifth of a five-volume Oxford 
history of the coal industry, and covers the period from nationalisation up to 
1982.29 This vast study was initiated and supported by the NCB, and draws almost 
exclusively from NCB and government departmental records, with little use of 
trade union sources. Ashworth notes that nationalisation raised such high 
expectations within the industry, that it simply had to be made to work. Part of 
this process was modernisation, including the closure of uneconomic pits, and he 
argues that there was a general acceptance of this by the miners, and by their 
union leaders, in particular concerning the issues around pit transfer schemes, and 
the government and NCB’s commitments to meet the associated social 
obligations. The study takes a broad historical sweep, and therefore lacks detailed 
analysis of certain aspects including of the 1972 strike itself, which it views as 
following from the complicating changes in the wage structure that united the 
interests of the mineworkers in aggressive national action.  
 
A similar, though briefer, appraisal comes from Berkovitch, who worked as an 
advisor within the industry.30 He considers successive governments de-
prioritisation of coal in the face of growing competition from oil, gas, and nuclear 
power, and the subsequent decline in demand for coal, and sees the 1964 Labour 
Government’s modernisation agenda as producing a conflict between its pre-
election commitment to maintaining the size of the coal industry, and subsequent 
departmental pressures for a free market for fuel. Berkovitch gives a rather brief 
treatment of the 1972 strike, which he describes as ‘unfortunate’ in that it clashed 
with the 25th anniversary of nationalisation. He notes that the strike turned a 
prospective operating profit into an operating loss of £118 million, and that the 
Board made a number of vain attempts to find a compromise between the NUM’s 
demand and what it considered the commercial possibilities, in order to head off 
this severe setback for the industry. He cites the declining position of miners’ 
wages relative to other industrial workers as the cause of the strike, and their 
 
29 Ashworth, W., The History of the British Coal Industry, Vol.5, 1946-1982: The Nationalised 
Industry, (Oxford, 1986) 




success in the dispute as due to the picketing campaign throughout the country. 
He notes that the strike left the Board with three major problems: a ‘massive’ 
deterioration in its financial position; a fall in sales aggravated by a loss of 
reliability in supplies; and damaged industrial relations. Berkovitch 
acknowledges the Wilson Government’s willingness to provide funds to speed 
the closure of uneconomic pits, and blames the failure of the modernisation 
process on the decline in demand for coal, but fails to acknowledge that the 
decline in demand was itself the product of government modernisation agenda 
and the shift towards alternative forms of energy.  
 
An earlier study of the coal industry is provided by Jackson, who considers the 
changes in the ‘market’ position of the industry. It was written just after the 1974 
miners’ strike, and looks at the fortunes of the coal industry from the immediate 
post-war period when demand was growing to the subsequent shrinking of 
consumption from the mid-1950s.31 Jackson cites frustration in the rank-and-file 
at the NUM’s support for the NCB during the 1940s and 1950s, which contributed 
to a number of unofficial strikes in immediate post-war period. He notes 
significantly fewer strikes between 1959 and 1970 than in the earlier period, but 
believes that this was not due to greater support for the union, but rather to the 
reduction in the size of the labour force; the replacement of piecework with day 
wages; and to the run-down of the industry and miners’ fear of losing their jobs. 
He claims that despite the rank-and-file being stunned by the collapse in the 
industry’s fortunes from the late 1950s, there is little evidence to show an increase 
in hostility towards the NCB or NUM, and such discontent as existed, was 
directed towards the government. Jackson notes that production and consumption 
of coal fell consistently throughout the 1960s until the turn of the decade when 
there was a shortage. This coincided with the cost of oil starting to increase, due 
to problems of supply in the Middle East, which made coal far more competitive. 
Middle Eastern oil is widely discussed as a prime factor in the 1974 miners’ 
strike, but Jackson discusses it also in relation to the 1972 dispute. He argues that 
the miners, seeing an opportunity in the changed market conditions, pressed for 
their highest ever wage increases following the NUM’s 1970 conference. 
Unofficial strike action followed, which was a curtain raiser for the official strike 
that began the following year over an even higher wage demand. The industry 
 
31 Jackson, M.P., The Price of Coal, (London, 1974) 
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seemed to be enjoying an improvement in its market position - few felt that this 
would last, but nevertheless felt that they should take advantage of this upturn 
whilst they could. Jackson’s is a useful work though a little dated, not least in 
arguing that miners also benefitted from living in separate or isolated 
communities, as they were not therefore subject to any backlash from an enraged 
public, which they may have been if they had lived among the wider population. 
The hypothesis of the ‘isolated mass’ expounded by Kerr and Siegel, whom 
Jackson cites, has been subsequently challenged by Church, Outram & Smith (see 
below), and by Gilbert who describes the diversity of settings in which miners 
lived, noting that even by the 1920s ‘perhaps one in five of British miners did not 
live in single-industry mining towns or villages, and the proportion of miners who 
had to travel beyond their immediate locality for work increased as pits were 
closed.’32 
 
Church, Outram and Smith’s interdisciplinary study seeks to understand the 
nature of the solidarity shown by miners during the 1984-85 strike.33 It notes that 
this solidarity lends some credence to the Kerr-Siegel model, which sees working 
class solidarity deriving from a ‘largely homogenous undifferentiated mass’, but 
also challenges it in noting that the solidarity varied between and within regions.34 
The Kerr-Siegel model, they note, has been challenged on a number of bases 
including differing experiences internationally, and for its failure to provide 
causal links between isolation and strike activity, but has nevertheless continued 
to command widespread acceptance. The Donovan Commission helped to change 
the view of industrial relations and the propensity to strike in industries such as 
mining, where the prevalence of piecework and solidaristic work groups, 
combined with high union membership.   
 
Ackers and Payne’s revisionist article challenges the dominant narrative of the 
coal industry as one of inexorable, ubiquitous class conflict, and focuses on 
memories from moderate, profitable collieries, drawn mainly from the central 
 
32 Gilbert, D, ‘Imagined Communities and Mining Communities’, Labour History Review, 
Vol.60, Part 2, 1995, p.52 
33 Church, R.A., Outram, Q. & Smith, D.N., ‘Militancy of British Miners, 1893-1986 
Interdisciplinary Problems and Perspectives’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol.22, 
No.1, 1991, pp.49-66 
34 Kerr, C. & Siegel, A., ‘The Interdisciplinary Propensity to Strike: An International 




Midlands coalfields, ‘where, by and large, nationalization “worked” and 
industrial relations were good’.35 They argue that coal historiography should shift 
its attention from the declining, peripheral coalfields of Scotland and Wales, to 
the ‘more temperate zone’ of middle England where coal seams were thickest, 
industrial relations co-operative, and the future of the post-war industry lay. They 
believe that there are fragments of evidence for this state of affairs, not only from 
the widely stereotyped ‘moderate’ Nottinghamshire collieries but also from the 
Warwickshire collieries and many others nation-wide. As these supposedly 
‘exceptional’ fragments accumulate – individual miners, pits and coalfields – 
they call for a broader and deeper rethinking of social relationship in the post-war 
coal industry. In place of a militant majority ‘betrayed’ by small, isolated 
moderate minorities, they see a much closer contest, and the implication of this 
may be that historians should cease to regard Nottinghamshire as deviant and a 
marginal chapter in coal’s story. They concede that militant miners clearly did 
exist, in substantial numbers, and concentrated at certain collieries; and in parts 
of the geographical and often economic ‘periphery’ the picture was very different 
than in the Midlands. However, bitter memories, militant attitudes and archaic 
collieries that were relics of the hand-got era had little future in a modern, 
mechanised coal industry based on a smaller number of capital-intensive super-
pits where miners could earn high wages through incentive schemes. Ironically, 
they believe, the NCB’s heightened sense of social responsibility slowed the 
closure of these loss-making collieries, damaging the economic prospects for the 
industry as a whole and sustaining militant traditions within the NUM, while its 
generous relocation policy spread the culture of discontent from the ‘bad’ pits to 
the ‘good’ ones. They note, in particular, that the new militant NUM leaderships 
in areas like Kent and Yorkshire hailed from the ‘little Moscows’ of Scotland and 
South Wales and carried the mood of discontent with them, clearly implying that 
militancy would not have developed independently in the receiving pits. They 
concede that their approach is deliberately exploratory and impressionistic, and 
note that they draw from about fifteen interviews of their own, mainly from 
miners from Nottinghamshire and Warwickshire collieries. This is a rather small 
sample, and they subsequently show that these fifteen include four NACODS 
deputies, two colliery managers, an NCB Area director, and just three face 
 
35 Ackers, P. & Payne, J., ‘Before the storm: The experience of nationalization and the prospects 
for industrial relations partnership in the British coal industry, 1947-1972 – rethinking the 
militant narrative’, Social History, Vol.27, No.2, 2002, pp.184-209 
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workers and two NUM officials. They claim that they did not deliberately look 
for moderate individuals and that two of those interviewed were striking miners 
during the 1984-85 dispute. This thesis too will argue that Nottinghamshire 
should not be considered as different from the other Areas as it is often regarded, 
(following the formation of the Nottinghamshire-based breakaway union the 
UDM in the latter stages and aftermath of the 1984-85 strike), but for the opposite 
reason than that put forward by Ackers and Payne. In the 1972 strike, pickets in 
Nottinghamshire were just as militant and determined to win the strike as any 
other Area, and in fact some of the more active mass pickets, and hostile attitude 
towards NACODS strike-breaking, took place there. It was, in fact, the re-
introduction of the Area Incentive Scheme (AIS - the productivity component of 
wages) by the Wilson Government in 1977 that led to the militancy of the 
Nottinghamshire miners being diminished as they subsequently had more to lose. 
 
 
1.8.3 Studies of the 1972 Miners’ Strike 
 
Studies with a focus on the 1972 strike itself include Pitt’s personalised account 
of the strike from the point of view of the Kent miners, Darlington and Lyddon’s 
assessment of the strike within their appraisal of 1972 more generally, Hughes’ 
thesis comparing the 1972 and 1974 strikes, with a focus on the government’s 
contingency planning, and Phillips study of the mass picket of Longannet power 
station. Pitt’s account draws on his own experiences as a Kent miner who began 
work in 1972, and gives a passionate insider view of the strike.36 The Kent 
coalfield was under CP leadership, and Pitt himself was a CP member. He begins 
with a brief history of the Kent coalfield, which was a latecomer to mining and 
drew miners from all around the country who brought with them a variety of 
traditions. He notes the effect of mining on miners’ families, and the close bonds 
that develop amongst the miners in the dangerous conditions that pertain 
underground, where one might be reliant on workmates for one’s life. Pitt gives 
a vivid account of the Kent miners’ role in the strike, in which they were given 
prime responsibility for picketing the London power stations. He describes the 
development of the strike as the miners were obliged to first discover the depots 
 




and coal using facilities in their Area, and then seek to make contact with local 
trade unionists for assistance in curtailing stock movement, and halting imports 
to the Kent docks. He shows how the miners used their own initiative and 
resources to mount mass pickets at docks and railway stocking yards, and in 
particular to curtail the movement of coal to the London power stations.  
 
Darlington and Lyddon’s study of class struggle in Britain in 1972 is a useful 
work, which devotes a chapter to the miners’ strike, as one of the key disputes 
that year.37 The authors, both industrial relations academics and long-standing 
members of the Socialist Workers Party, take 1972 as ‘the high point of the strike 
wave in Britain during the years 1969-1974’. They cite below inflation wage rises 
- or actual cuts - and a national wage structure, which united miners for the first 
time in decades, as the causes of the strike. They see a key factor in the dispute 
as sufficient numbers of left-wing activists who believed in taking industrial 
action and making it work, and identify the main issues as the withdrawal of 
safety cover, the use of secondary picketing, and the solidarity action shown by 
other unions. They conclude that the miners were victorious due to several years 
of campaigning by the left within all levels of the union that had built the 
necessary strike majority, ‘the spirit of aggression and zeal displayed by rank-
and-file miners’ exemplified by the use of flying and mass pickets during the 
strike, and that this encouraged the massive practical solidarity received from 
other trade unionists. The work, whilst supportive of individual militant 
communists, is critical of the CP per se. They discuss the official union leadership 
and the role of the TUC across all of the disputes mentioned, believing that these 
were run mainly from below, by rank-and-file activists. They see the miners’ 
strike as an official dispute that went well beyond official NUM guidelines, with 
the picketing involving members on the ground making their own judgements as 
to what would make picket lines effective.  
 
Hughes’ thesis compares the 1972 and 1974 strikes, and examines both the 
manner in which the government’s handling of the strikes was affected by the 
structure of the civil service machinery for managing emergencies, and the way 
in which the strikes laid the foundation for an overhaul of Whitehall contingency 
 
37 Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer 
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planning.38 She contends that the government’s defeat in 1972 shook the 
government and the public’s confidence in its ability to maintain law and order, 
and argues that the government faced an acute series of economic, social and 
political problems, which placed great strain on it during a period of changing 
political and economic landscape, and for which it was unprepared and had 
inadequate policy instruments. She argues that Labour and the Conservatives 
drew different lessons from the strikes, with the Tories vowing never again to be 
beaten by the unions, and Labour concluding that one can only govern with the 
consent of the unions. Hughes argues that from the perspective of thirty years 
later, after the Thatcher reforms and the decline of manufacturing industry, it is 
understandable that more weight should be given to the view that trade unions 
were not really as powerful as they once appeared. However, she found great 
ministerial and official apprehension at the tremendous negative power of the 
unions in the early 1970s and fear of the threat posed by industrial action to 
essential services and the normal life of the nation. She reasons that from the 
autumn of 1970 there was a definite sense among ministers and officials that they 
needed to win a major battle on public sector pay and a distinct element of 
anticipation of a confrontation fed into the preparations for contingency planning. 
She correctly argues that, although the mass picket at Saltley was undeniably 
significant politically, it did not directly affect the outcome the strike and the 
focus on Saltley has tended to deflect attention from other aspects of the crisis. 
However, she incorrectly contends, along with Heath and Thatcher, that the 
miners’ victory was due to violent mass picketing. The thesis is generally 
sympathetic to governments per se, and to the Heath premiership in particular. It 
takes the 1972 strike as the starting point and does not consider the reasons why 
it took place. She assesses the Heath Government’s response to growing trade 
union power, with the latter seen as the beginning of the process, but fails to 
acknowledge that trade unions’ use of strikes was itself a response to previous 
government policy and legal changes.  
 
Phillips provides a case study of the mass picketing of Longannet power station 
during the 1972 strike, where thirteen pickets were arrested on the unusual charge 
 
38 Hughes, R.A., ‘Governing in Hard Times’: The Heath Government and Civil Emergencies – 
the 1972 and the 1974 Miners’ Strikes, PhD Thesis, Queen Mary, London, 2012 
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of ‘mobbing and rioting’.39 The miners generally viewed the arrests as vindictive, 
and one hundred and fifty gathered outside the court to protest the arrest and the 
refusal of bail. The mass picketing continued with some two thousand pickets 
facing around four hundred police officers. Social and political tension mounted, 
and there were eight further arrests. Fearing an escalation of events, the general 
secretaries of the TUC and the Scottish TUC appealed for calm, and Scottish 
mining MPs led a deputation to the Lord Advocate, the Government’s chief law 
officer in Scotland. He met the Crown Office and the chief constable, and secured 
an accelerated release of the miners the following day. Mass picketing and the 
blockading of power stations, such as that at Longannet, were a key feature of the 
strike, and Phillips argues that this show of force encouraged the view that trade 
unions wielded power irresponsibly, and that this was ipso facto a threat to public 
order. Phillips correctly takes issue with characterisation of the strike as ‘top 
down’ militancy enforced on an unwitting and unwilling rank-and-file, a view he 
claims was used to legitimise Conservative governments’ industrial relations 
legislation, and which is predicated on the ‘insecure premise’ that union leaders 
were largely responsible for strikes. He argues that strikes in most sectors were 
generally shaped more by the attitudes of union members than the inclinations of 
union leaders, who were obliged to respond to membership pressure to retain 
influence and credibility. Phillips concludes that authority was challenged at 
Longannet, but not seriously jeopardised, and even where order was threatened, 
relations were only strained rather than ruptured.  
 
 
1.8.4 History and Politics of the NUM 
 
The political background to the miners’ strike is considered in a number of works, 
some with a regional focus, such as those by Taylor, Howell and Catterall, others 
with a concentration on militancy and solidarity more broadly, such as those by 
Allen, Richards and Rutledge. Taylor, the son of the president of the Yorkshire 
miners during the 1984/85 strike, has written a number of works, notably a 
political history of the Yorkshire miners, and a two-volume work, of which the 
second volume covers the period 1969-1995 and can be considered an official 
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NUM history of the period. This latter study contains a detailed narrative of the 
1972 strike, and considers the causes of the strike to have been a legacy of pit 
closures, a sense of betrayal by the Labour Government, and the impact of wage 
restructuring, which had the effect of forging a national consciousness in the 
NUM that led to political change within the union and an increased level of wage 
militancy.40 Taylor discusses the 1968 election for general secretary of the NUM, 
which saw the left coalescing around Daly’s advocacy of a more militant stance 
from the union, in beating the right’s candidate, Gormley. He notes that 
subsequently, despite some pressure on Daly to support the unofficial strike in 
1969, he cited the need to work within the rules, especially regarding the required 
majority necessary for official strike action, which angered many of those on the 
left who had helped elect him. The 1972 dispute was, Taylor argues, the 
culmination of these political shifts which encouraged the emergence of a new 
leadership stratum that amalgamated elements of the old and new lefts in alliance 
with a national leadership that recognised the events of 1969-70 contained a 
danger of serious division unless the NUM could be quickly re-integrated. Both 
Gormley’s and Daly’s speeches to Conference in 1971 reflected growing 
frustration within the union. He notes also that a number of myths have gathered 
around Saltley, which was not typical of the strike and did not affect the outcome. 
He argues, correctly, that the crucial factor in the NUM’s victory was the support 
from other unions, which made the picketing of the power stations so effective, 
though he makes little mention of the overtime ban, which preceded the strike.  
 
Taylor’s study of the Yorkshire miners addresses their relationship with the 
Labour Party at local and national level, the role of the Yorkshire miners in the 
strikes between 1969 and 1974, and the question of how Yorkshire came to be 
seen as the militant core of the NUM having transitioned from the political and 
industrial right of the union in the period since nationalisation.41 He defines the 
right as those committed to a Labour Government, supportive of negotiation and 
conciliation, and keen to preserve the maximum number of jobs even if the cost 
were low wages. Whereas the left believed in industrial action to defend miners’ 
interests, were opposed to too great a reliance on party politics, and were 
concerned to defend miners’ standard of living believing that employment should 
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not, and could not, be guaranteed by low wages. The membership, he believes, 
could not be placed in either category, but tended to support the official 
leadership, though this was being eroded by the late 1960s. Taylor argues that 
there was strong pressure to abandon support for the Labour Government from 
1964 and a growing belief in the failure of moderation. He reasons that the 1969 
and 1970 strikes were as much against NUM policies as against the NCB, and 
that they witnessed the emergence of a new leadership prepared to use direct 
action against the government if necessary. The effect of these unofficial strikes 
was to push the NUM as a whole further to the left.  The Heath Government’s 
introduction of anti-union legislation helped the incipient unofficial militancy 
flower into official militancy, though the 1972 strike itself was organised and 
conducted by the membership and branch officials, and involved a wide-ranging 
intelligence network and contacts with other unions. Taylor argues that 
Yorkshire, as a part of the central coalfield, had not experienced the full impact 
of the closures until the mid-1960s. This, combined with the impact of wages in 
the Area being held back under the NPLA to allow other Areas to catch up, had 
caused growing discontent, which overcame the countervailing (moderate) 
tendencies in the region making its militancy all the more explosive. Despite its 
regional focus, this is a useful work, which gives an insight into the functioning 
of perhaps the most significant Area in the 1972 strike. 
  
Howell’s study is an interpretation of the politics of the NUM, with a focus on 
the North West (colloquially Lancashire), which was traditionally a right-wing 
Area and the initial power base of Gormley.42 The book was written in the 
aftermath of the 1984-85 strike and considers this defeat for the miners. Howell 
initially analyses the early part of the twentieth century, when the attraction of 
Labour politics within the Lancashire coalfield was not a choice for socialism but 
rather a political means of countering a coalfield divided significantly along 
religious and ethnic lines. Lancashire thereafter represented a cautious Labour 
politics similar to County Durham, and subsequently stood on the right within the 
NUM. It was a peripheral and numerically declining coalfield, which provided 
no significant national leader until the election of Gormley to the national 
leadership in 1971. Howell notes that the incoming Wilson government in 1964 
quickly crushed the miners’ hopes for the stability of the industry in its zealous 
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pursuit of the closure of uneconomic pits. Between 1960 and 1970 the Lancashire 
coalfield lost thirty-three pits and twenty thousand jobs, with six closures and five 
thousand eight hundred jobs in 1968 alone. Gormley developed a strategy of co-
operation with the NCB to fight off closures, denounced militancy as a sure-fire 
way to lead to more closures, and encouraged emergent protests to swing behind 
efforts to make the pits more competitive. The national leadership, under Sidney 
Ford, meanwhile supported the Labour Government who were making these 
‘difficult decisions’ about closures. By 1968 there began to be murmurings of 
discontent, with even traditionally moderate Areas such as Yorkshire voicing 
some criticism of the national leadership. As both the Lancashire representative 
on the NEC, and the NUM’s Labour Party representative, Gormley’s line of 
constructive criticism found support within these institutions, where his stock 
grew to the point of his being the leading right-wing candidate for elections to the 
national presidency in 1971, which he won. Gormley’s replacement as Lancashire 
Area president was his protegé Sid Vincent, who was similarly vigilant in 
stopping the development of a significant left opposition. Howell gives a brief 
treatment of the 1972 strike. He notes that the left within the NUM was heavily 
influenced by the closures of the 1960s, but that neither they, nor the NUM as a 
whole, developed an effective strategy for combating closures. He notes that any 
national action that did emerge did so in spite of, rather than because of, the 
structure of the NUM. 
 
Catterall’s thesis, which draws upon the themes developed in Howell’s work, 
concerns the nature of, and response to, industrial change (i.e. modernisation and 
rationalisation) in the Lancashire coalfield from 1945-1972.43 It gives a concrete 
analysis of the close relationship between the NUM leadership and the Labour 
Party at both local and Area level, and begins by explaining the requirement for 
the newly nationalised industry to modernise and to lead the modernisation of the 
British economy in the face of its post-war decline. In this process, coal was 
squeezed by government economic priorities, which favoured a multi-fuel 
economy. This change was largely accepted by industrial and political opinion, 
and also by organised labour. The thesis assesses the response of the NUM, the 
Labour Party, and the rank-and-file, to this challenge, in particular in respect of 
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the consequences of industrial change in the Lancashire coalfield. Catterall notes 
that expectations amongst miners were raised by the advent of the 1964 Labour 
Government, which, however, then de-prioritised coal and began an accelerated 
closure programme under the guise of a modernisation agenda. The political left 
and right (CP and Labour) within the Lancashire Area NUM (NUMLA) agreed 
on the need for change, and any subsequent debate concerned only the specific 
impacts and pace of change, especially with respect to closures. Catterall refers 
to this consensus as the ‘non-politics of industrial change’.44 The thesis considers 
the impact that the experience of industrial change had on political change and 
industrial militancy in the late 1960s. It also examines the relationship between 
NUMLA and the Labour Party in the coalfield, and how significant NUMLA was 
in managing and containing opposition to industrial change. This took the form 
of astute political and industrial manoeuvrings, in particular by heading off 
militancy via productivity campaigns to save collieries slated for closure, and 
through increasing the miners’ collaboration with the NCB. Catterall explains 
that, though the NUM’s hopes for favoured treatment by the Wilson Government 
were quickly dashed, this did not turn the leadership against Labour, who still 
regarded it as their party and their Government, and that since they accepted the 
rationale for modernisation they were obliged to be compliant in implementing 
Labour’s closure programme. He makes the point that there was really nowhere 
else for the miners, and the working class in general, to go but to the Labour 
Party. However, this led to a growing sense of betrayal and discontent, especially 
since closures were happening in spite of the co-operation and compliance 
afforded by the miners. 
 
Allen’s book concerns the political debate around miners’ militancy.45 The author 
was closely involved with the development of the autonomous left group of 
miners’ in the sixties and was an academic advisor on mining issues throughout 
the period. He also had close ties to the CP and its industrial organiser, Bert 
Ramelson, and would become a thorn in the side of Margaret Thatcher in the 
1984-85 strike. His polemic argues that the NCB, the NUM, and successive post-
war governments have all misled the miners, initially in telling them that they had 
a stake in the future of the industry and were participating in post-war 
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reconstruction, and again, following the fall in demand, due to the need to 
modernise the industry to compete against alternative fuels. He argues that miners 
were expected to show a depth of gratitude for nationalisation and for post-war 
progress. Allen is particularly hostile to Labour’s ‘slash and burn’ policy under 
Wilson, which led to many pit closures, and to the NUM’s collaboration with the 
NCB in implementing this. He sees no essential difference between the left and 
the right in the NUM, who both accepted the NCB’s view of the need for 
modernisation, giving an overwhelming belief within the union that industrial 
change was necessary for an efficient competitive industry. Allen’s approach 
leaves no room for disagreement between the government and the NCB who are 
seen as united in their view, and he gives little analysis of Labour’s political 
agenda on modernisation.  
 
Richards’ study, which emerged from a PhD in response to the 1984-85 strike, 
considers the basis and the limits of solidarity and class consciousness amongst 
striking miners based on interviews with over two hundred miners.46 Though 
primarily concerned with the later strike, it sheds some light on the 1972 dispute. 
Richards sees a collective, class-based identity amongst British miners, and 
argues that the obstacles to unity of the miners were severe, especially in times 
of industrial change. Solidarity was thus a fragile affair and was strongly 
localised, with the Areas retaining much autonomy following nationalisation. 
Both the localised identity of the Union, and its strength at pit level, acted as 
brakes on the development of a national union identity. Thus, any national 
leadership, whether militant or moderate, had to contend with the obduracy of 
Area traditions and, below these, the jealousy with which local interests and 
autonomy were guarded. Richards discusses the AIS productivity deal, which 
broke up the brief parity and national wage unity achieved under the NPLA, and 
which had underpinned the 1972 and 1974 strikes. He correctly sees this as a 
divide and rule tactic by Labour, that led to a divisive divergence in wages, broke 
up communities and undermined the union. Richards argues that the miners’ 
conception of the union was as a defender of rights, security and dignity in a harsh 
working environment, and that in many localities it acquired a pastoral role. He 
notes that miners facing the closure of their local pit were nearly always isolated 
- pit closures in the post war period were generally implemented one by one, and 
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that without a general threat of closure, the demise of a single pit was a rickety 
foundation on which to build any kind of collective resistance. Consequently pay, 
rather than closures, was a more tangible basis for solidarity, as something that 
affected everybody. 
 
Ex-miner Rutledge’s study developed from an article in Marxism Today.47 It 
begins by noting the mid-1960s sociological distinction between the new 
“affluent” working class (e.g. Midlands car workers), who were contented, 
individualistic and non-militant, and the so-called “traditional” working class 
(e.g. the miners), who were considered class-conscious and militant a la Marx’s 
model of the proletariat. The class consciousness of the latter was considered to 
derive from the close-knit working-class communities, often isolated from the 
rest of society. Since this type of society was recognised as declining due to social 
mobility and greater opportunities, it was believed that this foreshadowed a 
general reduction in class consciousness in Britain, and a diminution of socialist 
ideas among the working class. Rutledge takes issue with the sociologists’ 
‘premature’ view that the militant miner was an historical relic on the road to 
extinction. He references the wave of industrial unrest in the mining industry 
between 1969 and 1974, which inspired major acts of class solidarity from other 
groups of workers, and brought down the government. Rutledge, who witnessed 
this period of unrest as a working miner, argues that it represented both a 
heightening of class consciousness and a demonstration of mass militancy, in the 
sense of economic militancy on mass or industry wide scale as opposed to 
localised militancy. He attributes the re-emergence of miners as a vanguard group 
to the growth of a left-wing leadership within the NEC, the miners’ own 
realisation of the decline in their earnings, and the rigidity of Tory wages policy 
set against the background of changes in the mode of production in the industry. 
In 1955, just eleven percent of total output was produced by power-loading, but 
by 1969 this had risen to ninety-two percent.48 These changes called into question 
the old contract system of wages, based on piece work, and the need to move 
toward the NPLA. He notes that the piece-work system had served the old coal 
miners well, in that they only paid for what came out of the ground, but that the 
modern mechanised industry required a greater degree of co-operation and could 
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no longer risk minor stoppages jeopardising production as a whole. Rutledge 
notes that the NPLA led to an increase in the number of supervisors, which had 
been largely unnecessary under the piece-work system, and also that between 
1947 and 1972 the number of pits in Britain fell by about seventy-five percent 
leading to the virtual elimination of some busy communities as miners left the 
industry or were obliged to migrate to other coalfields. He reasons that if the 
earlier sociological assumptions were correct, then this would have seriously 
weakened their ‘traditional’ social values, especially since most of the new 
mining communities which absorbed the migrating miners were in mixed, multi-
industry localities. However, miners did not lose their fierce solidarity, class 
consciousness and radicalism, becoming if anything more militant. Rutledge 
argues that the destruction of the traditional mining communities may have 
played a part in the spread of mass militancy, since these communities in fact 
showed a certain narrow parochialism inconsistent with the development of real 
class consciousness. Migrating miners brought with them differing attitudes, 
forms of expression, union practices, forms of action, and political outlook, which 
served to break down the differences and traditional antagonisms between one 
mining region and another. This led increasingly to an outlook as a British miner 
rather than one loyal to a particular region.  
 
McIlroy, Fishman and Campbell’s edited work comprises a useful collection of 
articles on trade unions and industrial politics during this period, and is the second 
of two companion volumes, the other being a focus on the post-war 
compromise.49 The first section concerns male manual workers, women in the 
labour market, and trade unions and immigration; the second, a survey mapping 
industrial politics; and the third, case studies covering trade unions’ relationships 
with Labour, the Conservatives, the Communists and the Trotskyists, plus a study 
of the Upper Clyde Shipbuilders dispute, and a focus specifically on 1972. 
Contributors include the editors, plus various historians, sociologists, industrial 
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1.9.5 The Rank-and-File Versus Bureaucracy Debate 
 
The widespread use within the literature of references to the conflict between the 
rank-and-file and the leadership within the union, to the close relationship 
between the union and the Labour Party, and to the role played by trade unions 
in containing the anger and militancy of the membership, necessitates a brief 
consideration of these issues. There is a controversial historiography concerning 
the question of whether there are divergent interests between a union’s full-time 
officials (FTOs) and the rank-and-file members, which is generally termed ‘the 
rank-and-file versus bureaucracy’ debate. This emerged from debates on the left, 
in particular from Marxism, and from Hyman’s writings in the early 1970s in 
which he highlighted the way in which FTOs acquired interests that motivate 
them to channel union policies towards collaboration with employers and 
governments, leading to caution rather than risk-taking and concern for continuity 
and stability.50 He later distanced himself from his erstwhile position, and there 
continues to be argument on the extent to which the opposition is a useful 
analytical tool.51 In this there is some criticism for the implied binary opposition, 
because in many cases there is a more nuanced distinction between these 
‘opposites’ with many grey areas, not least the role of shop stewards and also of 
FTOs below national level. There is also some criticism for seeing little 
distinction within the leadership, or within the ranks. The following two papers 
address aspects of these questions.  
 
Darlington and Upchurch’s article provides a critical reappraisal of Hyman’s 
early analysis of the debate within trade unions from the perspective that he had 
previously held.52 They defend Hyman’s original position in arguing that the 
conflict of interest which exists between FTOs and rank-and-file members is a 
meaningful generalisation of a real contradiction within trade unionism. In the 
wake of Hyman’s analysis, they note that other commentators also criticised the 
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‘rank-and-filist’ perspective from a variety of viewpoints, arguing inter alia that 
there was no clear demarcation line between officialdom and the rank-and-file; 
that FTOs were responsive to their members; that left-wing officials had more in 
common with left-wing shop stewards than with their right-wing counterparts; 
and that FTOs did not necessarily tend towards conservatism or the members 
towards militancy.53 What united all of these critiques was the view that the rank-
and-file versus bureaucracy notion was insufficiently coherent or empirically 
grounded. In countering this position, Darlington and Upchurch stress that the 
emphasis placed by Hyman on the centrality of the bargaining function of FTOs 
to explain their moderate behaviour neglected or downplayed other important 
sociological and political factors within this model, such as their specific social 
role as intermediary and mediator between capital and labour, their substantial 
material benefits, and their political attachment to social democracy. Since the 
FTOs’ ‘mediators’ role is dependent on the development of ‘trust’ between 
employers, government and individual union leaders, it is necessarily sometimes 
bought at the expense of workers’ interests, with wage militancy, for example, 
suppressed in the ‘national interest’. They note that FTOs are not simply ‘fire 
extinguishers of the revolution’, but perform a dual role of tying their members 
to the system, and also bringing home limited benefits within it. If FTOs failed to 
articulate their members’ grievances or lead strike action that delivered at least 
some improvements, there would be a danger of losing support within the union. 
On the other hand, if they collaborated too closely with the employers / state, then 
the union officials’ power would be totally undermined because the only reason 
they are taken seriously is that they represent social forces that pose the potential 
for resistance. Endorsement of militant action or taking the lead in recommending 
a strike might appear to be the most prudent course, but sometimes this can be 
part of an exercise in ‘controlled militancy’, whereby the officials lead the 
struggle to some extent, at least, in order to keep control over its main direction. 
The authors concede that it would be wrong to exaggerate the homogeneity of the 
‘rank-and-file’, and also that one cannot assume a complete identity of interest 
between the minority of militant activists and the mass of members.  They argue 
that it is the exploitative social relations at the heart of capitalist society that 
provides the material basis for collective workers’ struggles which distinguish 
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them from FTOs. It is this that makes the idea of the ‘rank-and-file’ a term not 
devoid of analytical use.  
 
North’s pamphlet argues that the modern working class and its organisations 
emerged within the context of the historical development of the nation state, and 
that trade unions’ advances and prosperity were therefore largely dependent upon 
the industrial and commercial successes of their own national state.54 He notes 
that many on the ‘left’ still insist that the socialist movement is duty bound to 
acknowledge the trade unions as the form of organisation most representative of 
the social interests of the working class, and to question this position is 
tantamount to sacrilege. In this they see criticism of the trade unions as opposition 
to the working class citing their mass working class membership. However, North 
argues, it does not automatically flow from the mass working class membership 
of the trade unions that these organisations act in its interests and one is compelled 
to examine whether there is, within the trade unions, an objective conflict 
between the interests of the mass membership and those of the governing 
bureaucracy, and the extent to which the policies of the unions reflect the interests 
of the latter, and not the former. He argues that in seeking to understand the 
essential nature of trade unions, the real question is, ‘What is the relation of these 
organisations to the class struggle in general, and to the liberation of the workers 
from capitalist exploitation in particular?’ To the extent that there is criticism on 
the ‘left’ towards trade unions it is largely seen as a problem of bad or inadequate 
leaders, though this, he believes, avoids the real issue - that the characteristics 
and qualities of the ruling bureaucracies, are the subjective manifestations of 
objective social properties and processes. He argues that trade unions are a 
definite social form, that is, a historically-evolved connection between people 
organised in classes and rooted in specific relations of production, and that there 
is a particular relationship between this form and its content. This is such that 
when a group of workers forms into a trade union, it acquires through that form 
new and distinct social properties to which the workers are inevitably 
subordinated. Trade unions represent workers as the seller of their labour power, 
and the essential purpose of the trade union is to secure the best price for this 
under prevailing market conditions. On the basis of capitalist production relations 
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trade unions are, by their very nature, compelled to adopt a hostile attitude 
towards the class struggle, and, rather, are obliged to guarantee that their members 
supply their labour power in accordance with the terms of the negotiated 
contracts. Trade unions are thus organically opposed to the class struggle, and 
this opposition becomes all the more deadly at the point (such as during a strike) 
where it threatens the production relations of capitalism, that is, the socio-

















The 1972 miner’s strike was, in part, an outcome of the decline in demand for 
coal following an initial decade of expansion under the nationalised industry, 
which had been broadly welcomed by miners as an end to the exploitative and 
dangerous practices of the old mine-owners. Miners’ early optimism turned 
increasingly to discontent as the downturn in demand during the second decade 
was marked by lower wage increases and job insecurity, which in turn created 
more militant attitudes. This chapter will assess the nature of the industry’s 
contraction and the response to this by both the miners and the NUM leadership. 
It will begin by reviewing the nationalisation process and its financial 
implications, and the subsequent rationalisation and contraction of the industry 
as demand for coal rose and then declined. It will consider the modernisation and 
mechanisation of the coal industry, and the consequent need for the NCB to adapt 
wage bargaining arrangements by introducing a national day-wage system, which 
had the unforeseen effect of unifying the miners and their grievances. The chapter 
will address the relationships between the NUM and the NCB, and between the 
industry and government, and in particular the close relationship between the 
Labour Party and the NUM leadership. It will review the role played by the NUM 
in facilitating pit closures, and the miners’ growing discontent that turned to 
militancy as they began to challenge the passive and collaborative approach of 
their leadership. The chapter will consider the way in which this militancy 
manifested in ‘unofficial’ national strikes in the two years preceding the 1972 






On 1 January 1947, Vesting Day for the nationalised industry, the NCB inherited 
nine hundred and fifty-eight collieries, plus subsidiary assets including houses, 
farmland, wharves, railway sidings, brick-works and coke ovens. All coal 
deposits had been previously nationalised under the Coal Act (1938) and were 
being administered by the Coal Commission; these too passed to the Board. The 
compensation paid to the previous owners was the outcome of protracted 
negotiations and comprised the above assets, plus capital outlay refunds, the Coal 
Commission’s interest, additional overheads caused by severance, and additional 
compensation for the liabilities of the colliery companies which the NCB found 
expedient to take over. The decision to refund capital expenditure incurred prior 
to Vesting Day was designed to encourage such spending by the old mine-owners 
before nationalisation, though the assets subsequently claimed for had, in most 
cases, already been in use but the Board were obliged to bear the full cost without 
any allowance for depreciation. Compensation for the main colliery assets was 
set at £164.7 million, which was a ‘global sum’ for the industry as a whole and 
its division amongst the coalfield districts, and later among individual colliery 
companies, was determined by Valuation Boards appointed by the Government. 
Colliery companies received Government stock in satisfaction of their claims. 
The former owners of coal royalties dispossessed by the 1938 Act had received 
Coal Commission stock as compensation and the Treasury subsequently issued 
new stock in exchange to an initial value of £78.5 million. The overall 
compensation settlement to the previous owners came to around £394.4 million, 
and the Board became liable to the Government for the repayment of this capital 
with interest. These initial vested assets attracted interest at between two-and-a-
half and four-and-a-half percent and were repayable as directed by the Minister 
of Power:  
 
repayments of long-term debts should be made over a period of 50 years 
in the form of “terminable annuities” - fixed annual payments of which the 
interest portion will decrease and the capital portion will increase year by 
year. Where compensation to the previous owners takes the form of 
Government Stock, the rate of interest payable by the Board will be the 
rate of interest which the stock bears. Where compensation is paid in cash 
by the Government, the rate of interest due from the Board will be the rate 
at which the Government borrow the money to make the payment. Where 
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money is advanced by the Minister to the Board, the interest is normally to 
be the gilt-edged interest rate at the time of borrowing.1  
 
Subsequent advances to the Board were also initially made on the same basis, but 
in the mid-1950s these were replaced by advances with fifteen year or short term 
(circa two year) repayment arrangements.2  
 
Fig.2.1. NCB: Advances, Repayments and Liabilities, 1947-1972 (Millions).3 
 
On top of the compensation paid to the previous owners, the NCB increasingly 
borrowed from the Government to fund the modernisation of the industry. 
Between nationalisation and the 1972 strike, the Board borrowed around £1.4 
billion, and over this period it repaid some £1.3 billion, but still had an 
outstanding liability of around £724 million - despite £415 million of its ‘burden 
of capital debt’ having been written off by the Government under reconstruction 
of the industry following the National Plan (1965).4 In simple terms, the Board’s 
initial liability and its subsequent loans totalled circa £1.8 billion, whilst its 
repayments, write-off and outstanding liability totalled over £2.4 billion. Fig.2.1 
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3 Source: NCB Accounts, 1947-1971/72. The Board’s accountancy year end moved from 1 
January to 31 March in 1964 
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shows the accumulation of the board's liability over time. This shows that whilst 
the NCB inherited a significant liability at nationalisation, most of its liability, 
and the more onerous portion, came in the period after nationalisation as it funded 
the increasing mechanisation of the industry. The Board achieved a profit in most 
years, but the subsequent repayment of interest and interim income due to the 
Government (irrespective of its loan repayments) converted these profits into 
losses or effective break-evens in the majority of years (see Fig.2.2).  
 
Fig.2.2. NCB: Profit/Loss and Repayments, 1947-1971 (Millions).5 
 
The Government required the Board to undertake activities in the public interest, 
some of which involved them making a loss; for example, some loss-making 
coalfields were kept in operation because the national interest required the coal 
to be produced. It also encouraged the Board to keep the price of coal artificially 
low in order to encourage growth in production of domestic and export markets, 
and to supply the nationalised industries with low cost fuel. The Board noted that:  
 
A commercial enterprise is bound to adapt its policy so as to make profits, 
but profits for their own sake cannot be an object of the Board’s policy… 
The Board must seek every means of reducing costs not so as to produce 
profits but so as to benefit the community. 
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The Board had an obligation to ensure that ‘revenues were not less than sufficient 
to meet the outgoings properly chargeable to revenue account on an average of 
good and bad years’, which was broadly taken to mean that it was not necessary 
to make a profit and Barratt-Brown argues that the Board could have charged 
marginal and not average rates and garnered an extra £1 per ton and so generated 
an additional £200 million per annum.6 In the parliamentary debates on the coal 
industry during the strike several MPs pointed to the discrepancy between the 
‘pit-head’ price for coal to industry and the price consumers paid, noting that 
consumers paid between £15 and £20 per ton whereas the average price achieved 
by the NCB was £5.84 per ton, with much of that sold to power stations for just 
£3 per ton. Members argued that since the NCB was obliged to sell coal at less 
than its market value, this impacted on its ability both to make a profit and to pay 
the miners a reasonable wage.7 
 
 
2.3 Pit Closures 
 
In the period between nationalisation and the 1972 strike the size of the industry 
contracted and the Board closed the majority of the collieries that it had inherited. 
These closures can broadly be divided into three phases: those closed under the 
rationalisation of the industry during the first decade whilst demand was high; 
those closed due to the decline in demand for coal in the second decade; and those 
closed under an advanced scheme of closure during the first Wilson Government 
as coal was deprioritised in favour of a multi-fuel economy. In the first decade 
after nationalisation the Board was keen to maintain, and even grow, the size of 
the workforce, but this changed when the demand for coal declined in the mid-
1950s and it was obliged to make job cuts (see Fig.2.3). The first phase of closures 
followed the fact that many of the assets purchased from the previous owners 
were unwanted, a proportion of the pits were close to exhaustion, and a significant 
amount of the equipment was derelict. In the decade after nationalisation the 
Board rationalised these assets and closed some one hundred and fifty-eight 
uneconomic, exhausted and low productivity pits, and transferred the workforce 
to more economic neighbouring pits, whilst some new mines were also sunk. The 
 
6 NCB Accounts, 1946 & 1947; Barratt Brown, M., What Really Happened to the Coal Industry? 
The background to the miners' strike, (The Institute for Workers Control, Pamphlet no.31), 
(Nottinham, 1972), pp.5-6. 1 imperial ton = 1.01605 metric tonne 
7 HC Deb, 18 January, vol.829 c.266 
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Area most affected by closures in this period was South Western, which primarily 
constituted the Welsh coalfield, though all Areas were affected to some extent.  
 
Fig.2.3. Total Manpower and Collieries, 1947-1972.8 
 
Fig.2.4. Output of NCB Mines (Million tons).9 
 
 
8 Source: NCB Accounts, 1947-1971/72 

















The NCB’s immediate priority in the decade after nationalisation was to 
maximise output, but the main constraint was the size of the workforce, which 
the Board had problems maintaining let alone increasing. In 1947-8 around 
twenty thousand ‘Bevin boys’, who had been conscripted into mining rather than 
the army during World War II, left the industry, and in addition the lifting of the 
Essential Work Order, which had prevented miners leaving the pits during the 
war years, saw the exit of around seventy-five thousand miners. Between 1947 
and 1956 there was a shortage of energy and an excess demand for coal, which 
provided around ninety percent of the UK’s energy requirements. Inland 
consumption peaked at two hundred and twenty-one million tons in 1956 after 
which large coal consumers, such as shipping and rail, moved increasingly away 
from coal as new technologies were introduced, and were soon lost forever, 
though power stations increased their consumption of coal. The Board’s output 
fluctuated in the following period, but the trajectory was downward (see Fig.2.4). 
Coal’s share of the UK’s energy requirements dropped to eighty percent in 1957, 
to fifty-eight percent in 1966, to forty-seven percent in 1970, and was down to 
thirty-seven percent by 1973, whilst the share of the market for oil (coal’s main 
competitor) rose from nineteen percent in 1958 to forty percent by 1973.10  
 
Fig.2.5. Active Collieries by Area, 1957-1965.11 
 
10 O’Donnell, K., ‘Pit Closures in the British Coal Industry: a comparison of the 1960s and 
1980s’, International Review of Applied Economics, Vol.2, No.1, 1988, pp.65-6 
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The emergence of cheap oil led to a decrease in the demand for coal and the NCB 
responded by closing two hundred and sixty-four pits between 1957 and 1963 
with the loss of over two hundred thousand jobs (around thirty percent). Miners 
who had opportunities to leave the industry did so, and those who desired, or were 
forced, to remain in the industry were redeployed, though this was increasingly 
further afield and could be anywhere in the country. The closures in the second 
phase fell primarily on the peripheral coalfields and the remaining workforce was 
increasingly concentrated in the central coalfield Areas of Yorkshire and the East 
Midlands. The Scottish Area was most heavily affected in terms of the number of 
mines closed (see Fig.2.5), though in terms of job losses the worst hit Areas were 
South Western and Durham with sixty-seven thousand and fifty-two thousand 
jobs lost respectively. Over this period Yorkshire had an effective net loss of 
twenty seven percent of jobs (around half the national average) whilst East 
Midlands had just two percent.  
 
The third phase of closures occurred during the first and second Wilson 
Governments, whose 1964 election manifesto had promoted modernisation and 
envisaged a co-ordinated policy for the major fuel industries, expansion 
programmes for the nationalised industries, and the removal of restrictions placed 
upon them.12 Consequently, the incoming Labour Government was widely 
welcomed by miners though its National Plan (1965) and White Paper on Fuel 
Policy (1965) showed that the modernisation agenda actually implied a turn to 
more modern fuels, including nuclear power, and a relegation of the importance 
of coal. The White Papers noted that between 1960 and 1964 ‘six out of the eight 
coalfields made almost continuous losses after the payment of interest’. The 
central coalfield Areas were therefore, arguably, subsidising the peripheral Areas. 
The Government gave political commitments to protect coal as an indigenous 
industry, but not to the extent that it was uncompetitive or hampered the 
developing oil industry. It also noted that ‘nuclear stations, once built, must be 
operated at the highest possible load factor to get the full economic benefit from 
them’. It therefore envisaged ‘considerable loss of men’ from the coal industry 
with funds to be provided to speed up pit closures, to assist with ‘the human 
problems to which concentration gives rise’ i.e. re-deployment and re-settlement, 
and towards a write-off of a portion of capital debt. Coal was to be given a five 
 
12 Labour Party Manifesto, The New Britain, 1964 
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percent preference of price over oil in government establishments, and the 
electricity generating industry was also to continue to give a preference for coal. 
However, the legislation heralded an accelerated closure programme (ACP) 
which signaled a relegation of coal in favour of oil, gas and nuclear power.13 Two 
hundred and eighteen pits closed between 1965 and 1969, which affected all 
Areas including the central coalfield that had been largely unaffected by previous 
closures (see Fig.2.6).  
 
Fig.2.6. Active Collieries by Area, 1965-1969.14 
 
Many miners took opportunities to leave the industry until increasing 
unemployment closed these escape routes. More would have left if they had been 
able to, but stayed in the industry due to, for example, age or family commitments, 
and thus many who remained in the industry did so involuntarily and 
discontentedly, which was to have a marked effect on later militant attitudes. 
Those who left tended to be the younger and more physically fit and since there 
was almost no recruitment of youths, the average age of miners rose from forty-
two in 1955 to forty-four in 1969, with miners in the age group 25-40 falling from 
thirty five percent in 1950 to twenty four percent by 1968. More miners left the 
 
13 The National Plan, (1965) Cmnd.2764; Fuel Policy (1965) Cmnd.2798. Emphasis added; TNA: 
POWE52/74, Report, Economic Development Committee to Wilson on the Accelerated 
Scheme, 19 October 1965; Berkovitch, I., Coal on the Switchback: The Coal Industry since 
Nationalisation, (London, 1977) pp.137-8 
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industry between 1960 and 1968 than remained, and this exodus was 
accompanied by an increasing rate of redundancy as the Board were no longer 
able to relocate those who wanted to remain. Redundancy rose from around three 
percent in 1966 to around twenty-two percent in 1967 and peaked in 1968 when 
over twenty-one thousand miners were declared redundant.15 
 
 
2.4 Response to Pit Closures 
 
In the first phase of closures, under the initial rationalisation of the industry, full 
employment was largely maintained and the closure process found no opposition 
from the NUM, whose president Will Lawther told Conference in 1947 that 
nationalisation meant: ‘There are now no opposing sides in the industry.’ Under 
the second phase of closures, NUM officials advocated continuity in this policy 
of cooperation with the NCB in support of the nationalised industry.16 There was 
a strong belief that the nationalised industry was something to be defended and 
that industrial action was ‘an offence against the ethos of nationalisation’, an 
outlook that was increasingly exploited by the NUM leadership. The 
Conservatives were largely perceived as the natural adversary of the miners and 
of the NUM, but during the Conservative governments of the 1950s industrial 
action was discouraged by the Union, both from the point of view of defending 
nationalisation, but also because both Labour and NUM leaders promoted the 
idea that nothing should be done which might damage the electoral advance of 
Labour. Throughout this second period of closures, NUM officials argued that 
the only guarantee of stopping the decline and associated closures was to return 
a Labour government.17 Pit closures were implemented one by one and the lack 
of a general threat meant that miners at a pit facing closure were effectively 
isolated. Since the closures affected different areas to different extents there was 
little chance of unified resistance. The issue of wages, which affected everybody, 
would ultimately become a more stable foundation for solidarity and collective 
resistance.18 The NUM were broadly opposed to the rundown of the industry, in 
particular to the associated job losses, but the leadership had no intention of 
 
15 Allen, V. L., The Militancy of British Miners, (Shipley, 1981) pp.69-71 & 136 
16 Turner, R.L., ‘Post War Pit Closures: The Politics of Deindustrialisation’, Political Quarterly, 
Vol. 56, No. 2, April–June 1985, pp.168-9 
17 Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, (London, 1984) pp.2 & 306 
18 Richards, A., Miners on Strike: Class solidarity and division in Britain, (Oxford, 1996) p.85 
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resisting the closures; they were opposed to assertive trade unionism, considered 
questions concerning the size of the industry outside their sphere of influence, 
and believed that political decisions should be left to politicians.19 The NUM’s 
role in respect of closures was ostensibly restricted to the alleviation of hardship 
as the process of closing a pit was complicated and potentially devastating for a 
community. However, the NUM’s key role in the process was to facilitate the 
closures, which included demobilising any resistance that emerged. In June 1959, 
for example, there was a stay-down protest at Devon pit in Alloa, which was 
threatened with closure. The NCB promised to negotiate on condition that the 
protest ended, and the protesters were therefore persuaded to end the strike by 
local NUM leader Abe Moffat. The Devon pit subsequently closed.20 
 
The third phase of closures under the ACP had a demoralising effect on miners 
since the de-prioritisation of coal implied an obsolete industry, though the ACP 
also gave an impetus to rank-and-file militancy and marked the beginning of 
resistance to closures despite the efforts of the NUM leadership to contain it. 
Catterall’s thesis describes a number of pit closures in Lancashire under the ACP 
and explains how these were exploited by the North West Area NUM, of which 
Gormley was then president, arguing that the leadership were concerned 
primarily with attaining beneficial outcomes for the minority who remained in 
the industry and cared less about those forced to leave. At collieries threatened 
with closure the modus operandi of the leadership was to demand co-operation 
with the Board and extra effort from the miners in order to show that such 
collieries had a future. Catterall sees this as the familiar ‘kiss of death’ pretext to 
closure forcing miners to become pre-occupied in the ‘fight’ to save their pits, 
which dissipated any challenge to the NUM leadership. The ACP was thus sold 
to the miners on the basis of the need to accept Labour’s modernisation agenda 
because of the new realities facing the contracting industry. This ‘new realism’ 
promoted a common goal in the coalfield for Labour, the NUM, and the miners 
to work together to prove that coal could compete in a free market, though its 
effect was to undermine rank-and-file solidarity. The tactic of encouraging 
miners to work harder to save a doomed pit, Catterall argues, was part of a 
strategy of collaboration to smooth the closure process and ‘facilitated the 
 
19 Turner, ‘Post War Pit Closures’, pp.169-70 
20 Taylor, A., The NUM and British Politics, Volume 2: 1969-1995, (London, 2005), p.7 
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manipulation of “survivalist” mentalities’.21 New realists essentially argued that 
capitalism had fundamentally changed and they sought to replace class struggle 
with consensus politics.22 The attitude of the NUM leadership also turned the 
minds of miners away from protest by reinforcing the view that the industry did 
not have a future, and so encouraging miners to find alternative work and to look 
after themselves, with the NUM therefore effectively promoting individualism.23 
This chimed with the legislative manoeuvres of both Labour and Conservative 
governments, which promoted individualism as a means of undermining the 
strength of unions (see Chapter Ten). Most miners were unwilling to abandon 
their historic relationship with Labour and felt that it remained the party of the 
working-class. This was a crucial factor in preventing an abiding cleavage 
developing between the NUM and Labour.24 However there was widespread 
discontent amongst miners both with Labour and the pit closure programme 
during its tenure, and many later felt betrayed: 
 
I’d look on the Labour Party, if elected, as our government but I wouldn’t 
be prepared to tolerate the treatment we had last time, we wouldn’t get 
caught twice. 
 
We tolerated a lot under the Labour government that we wouldn’t have 
under a Tory government. 
 
What delayed the strike in my opinion was the blind loyalty that we had to 
the Labour government. 
 
We were too fair to the Labour Party, I am a Labour man mind, but we 
were too fair to the Labour government, especially that [Minister of Power, 
Richard] Marsh... all he could spout was atomic power. 
 
The awareness of the working class to the lack of difference between the 
Tories and Labour in regard to the miners’ struggle was such that people 
were saying, “What’s the alternative?”25 
 
 
21 Catterall, S.J., The Lancashire Coalfield, 1945-1972: The Politics of Industrial Change, DPhil 
Thesis, University of York, 2001, pp. 300-4, 324, 335-6 & 444 
22 Watters, F., Being Frank: The Memoirs of Frank Watters, (Doncaster, 1992) p.61 
23 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p.65 
24 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.98 
25 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, ‘The Miners’ Strike, 1972: Report and initial history’, Morgan, A., South 
Wales Coalfield History Project, Swansea University (Miners’ Strike), Appendix II, 
Interviews with Members of Dulais Valley Strike Committee (SC) (Dulais), Swansea Steam 
SC (Swansea Steam), Ammanford and Gwendraeth SC (Ammanford & Gwendraeth), and 
Emlyn Williams, vice-president South Wales NUM 
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These quotes, which resulted from oral history interviews taken immediately after 
the strike, reflect a discontent with the Wilson Government’s betrayal of miners’ 
interests that had fed into and fueled calls for industrial action. These views were 
to have a profound affect both on the miners’ relationship with the Labour Party 
and with the NUM leadership that had defended and supported the Government. 
 
 
2.5 Restructuring of the Wage System 
 
The closure of the majority of the collieries in the peripheral coalfield Areas led 
to the concentration of the labour force on the more productive central coalfield 
Areas (see Fig.2.7). This, combined with an increase in mechanisation, caused a 
sharp uplift in productivity, which rose from twenty-five hundredweight per man 
shift in 1957 to forty-four hundredweight in 1971, a seventy-six percent increase. 
At nationalisation just two-and-a-half percent of total output was produced by 
machines, which cut and loaded coal onto conveyors (known as mechanised 
production or power-loading), but by 1957 this had risen to twenty-three percent 
and by 1962 it was fifty-nine percent (see Fig.2.8).26 The rise in productivity 
faltered in 1969, and in early December Ezra announced that there was ‘not 
enough coal to meet requirements’, due largely to a failure to meet productivity 
targets. Whilst the NCB was working to a target of 9.6%, they had achieved only 
2.3%. Ezra put this down to mechanisation running into trouble on deeper and 
more inaccessible seams, and to a fall in the morale of miners.27 The existing 
contract system was incompatible with an increasingly mechanised industry that 
required a greater degree of co-operation and the elimination of minor stoppages 
which jeopardised production,28 and so, in the period between nationalisation and 
1955, the Board moved towards establishing a national wage structure for the 
industry, though it faced significant problems in doing so. The move toward a 
wage structure for miners to be paid on a day-wage rather than the previous piece-
rate, required the rationalisation of some six thousand five hundred local names 
for jobs in the industry; these were first classified under four hundred job 
 
26 NCB Accounts, 1965/66-1971/72. One hundredweight (cwt) = 50.8 kg 
27 Conservative Party Archives (CPA): Conservative Research Department (CRD)/B/15/1, Fuel & 
Power Committee briefs (FPC), (70)3, Ezra 2 December 1969 cited in briefing paper on Coal 
Industry Bill (1970), 6 April 1970 
28 Rutledge, I, ‘Changes in the Mode of Production and the Growth of "Mass Militancy" in the 




descriptions, and then placed into thirteen grades - five for underground workers, 
five for surface workers, and three for craftsmen. This new structure came into 
operation on 4 April 1955 for about four hundred and six thousand 
daywagemen.29 
 
Fig.2.7. Comparison of Collieries in Peripheral and Central Areas, 1947-72.30 
 
Fig.2.8. Mechanisation and Productivity, 1947-72.31 
 
29 Compound terms, such as daywagemen, pumpsmen, are used in the Thesis where these terms 
are common in the sources 
30 Source: NCB Accounts, 1947-1971/72 
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The Board considered this to be a great step forward in providing the industry 
with a coherent wage system instead of the haphazard and complicated 
arrangements that had existed previously. At this time, there were also about eight 
thousand weekly paid industrial staff (WPIS) in the industry. Many in this 
category were surface foremen but it also included assistant colliery engineers, 
colliery training and safety officers, and rescue brigade staff. Their wages and 
conditions of service were negotiated separately from those of mineworkers 
whom, in the main, they supervised.32 Over the following period the Board moved 
towards wage parity for those who worked on mechanised coal faces across the 
industry with the introduction of a National Power Loading Agreement (NPLA) 
by simplifying the various grades and job titles into essentially one job - power 
loader. This gave the Board greater control over wage costs and the production 
process, and this greater flexibility had disciplinary overtones as the NPLA could 
be used to move miners to less favourable tasks rate should management deem 
such a move necessary for production. The NUM leadership saw the NPLA as a 
means of taking power away from the Areas to the national centre, and of keeping 
the Union together by slowing the rate of closures in high-cost peripheral pits by 
subsidising their wages from the more economically viable, low-cost central pits. 
They hoped this would preserve mining communities, keep the maximum number 
of jobs, and maintain the membership of the NUM.33 
 
On 6 June 1966 the NCB and the NUM signed the NPLA for one hundred 
thousand workers on power-loaded coal faces. This established standard shift 
rates for power-loading teams on all new mechanised faces, except in Scotland 
and Durham where all mechanised faces came under the agreement. Initially there 
was a separate standard shift rate in each Area, but the intention was to introduce 
a uniform national shift rate for power-loading teams by the end of 1971, such 
that eventually a power-loader’s wage would be the same wherever he worked in 
the country.34 Both the NUM and NCB believed that the NPLA would reduce pit-
level conflict and improve industrial relations, which in turn would increase 
productivity and make the industry more competitive.35 Miners in the central 
coalfield were largely net losers due to wider coal seams there making coal easier 
to extract, which had given them higher than average wages under the old piece-
 
32 NCB Accounts, 1956, p.68-72 
33 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, pp.49-50, 86-8 & 204 
34 NCB Accounts, 1966-67, p.36 
35 Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, p.18 
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work system, and therefore smaller increases going forward as the lower paid 
Areas caught up. NCB Chairman Derek Ezra acknowledged that Nottinghamshire 
miners were ‘particularly sore’ because of this parity issue.36 In June 1971 the 
NCB and the NUM finalised the third national day-wage structure, under which 
the remaining fifty thousand piece-workers and task-workers were brought within 
the national wage structure. This was the last instalment of the wage 
rationalisation process begun in 1955.37  
 
The piece-work system had previously negated the need for overseers since 
miners were responsible for their own rate of work and were paid for what they 
produced. Under the NPLA deputies and overmen took on the role of ‘foremen’ 
and the number of these under-officials increased at a time when the number of 
miners was decreasing, which aggravated the growing discontent amongst 
mineworkers. In 1966-7 there was approximately one under-official per five face-
men but by 1970-71 the ratio was one to four. The NPLA led to a marked fall in 
local disputes but an increase in job control disputes particularly where 
supervisors sought to maximise machine utilisation, which caused friction with 
power-loading teams who had no incentive to do more than the standard task. 
Under-officials were organised in NACODS and miners’ discontent was 
worsened by the failure of NACODS members to support the miners in the 1972 
strike, though their pay was determined as a percentage above the miners’ rate.38 
The NPLA made wage-bargaining easier by removing grade and pit level 
negotiations and putting the NUM leadership in control of negotiating on behalf 
of all miners. This strengthened its hand on the national stage. However, neither 
the NUM nor the Board anticipated how wage determination under the agreement 
would become a means of unifying the miners themselves. South Wales miner 
Haydn Matthews drew attention to this effect:  
 
This became a unifying sort of thing then, the NPLA. It unified coalfield 
and coalfield, pit and pit. But it also unified the day wage men along with 
the piece-workers then. We were arguing for the first time ever as a 
coalfield with one voice. We were shouting the same thing.39 
 
 
36 London School of Economics (LSE): Hetherington/19/25, Points from a discussion with Derek 
Ezra (Ezra), 27 January 1972, p.2 
37 NCB Accounts, 1971/72, p.36 
38 Rutledge, ‘Changes in the Mode of Production’, p.419; Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, pp.23-4; 
Barratt Brown, What Really Happened, p.19 
39 LB: MS 4000/2/152/2, Plan for a book, MkI, ‘The Battle of Saltley Gate’, 1975 (SaltleyI), p.7, 
Haydn Matthews, Maerdy Colliery, South Wales 
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There were in fact a number of unforeseen consequences of the NPLA. It had the 
effect of equalising pay, but in doing so it ‘nationalised dissatisfaction’ over low 
wages, and also reduced unofficial conflict whilst making official conflict more 
likely since small scale pit level unrest proved to have been a valuable safety 
valve for industrial unrest.40 Miner Jock Kane noted that by removing power from 
branch level, the national leadership were initially able to use the NPLA as a way 
of heading off strike action, though this meant that it built up with no outlet:  
 
“Now,” they used to tell the colliers if they had a dispute after the NPLA, 
“it'll have to go to national level, you see. We've got the NPLA. What's the 
good of striking? The manager can't do anything about it even if he wanted 
to - it's got to go to national level… But you carry on working meantime.”41 
 
Kane’s comment points to the increasingly widespread belief that the NUM 
worked with the Board to head off strike action and encourage passivity amongst 
the miners. The NUM leadership were distrusted for collaborating with the NCB 
in the contraction of the industry, and for promoting the idea that the only way to 
stop further closures was to keep wages low and refrain from industrial action 
since militant resistance would merely speed up the process.42 Matthews observed 
that industrial action would have come years earlier but for the threat that they 
received from the leadership: ‘“You strike and you lose your pit, you lose your 
jobs!” And this created a hell of a lot of doubt in the minds of the men in the pits. 
They used this weapon until they wore the record out.’43 Miners feared that 
industrial action would lead to pit closures but increasingly realised that pits were 
being closed anyway, and therefore they may as well get the best out of it whilst 
they could. Wage levels also had a bearing on redundancy payments and it was 
therefore in miners’ interest to get paid more even if they lost their job.44 South 
Wales NUM president, Glyn Williams, conceded that the miners’ passivity did 
not in fact stop the closures: ‘Well, all right, we’ve been very moderate in our 
demands because of the possible social consequences of pit closures, but that 
didn’t stop pit closures.’45 The growing militancy amongst the miners led to the 
emergence of left-wing and militant leaders, and as the authority of the official 
 
40 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, pp.50, 86-8 & 204 
41 Kane, J., Parker, C., & Kane B., No Wonder We Were Rebels, The Kane Story: An Oral 
History, (Armthorpe Branch NUM, 1994) pp.50-1  
42 Taylor, R., The Fifth Estate: Britain's Unions in the Seventies, revised edn. (London, 1980) 
p.359 
43 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, SaltleyI, pp.1-2, Haydn Mathews 
44 McCormick, B.J., Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry, (London, 1979) p.193 
45 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Appendix II, p.14, Interview, Glyn Williams, president 
South Wales NUM  
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leadership declined that of the unofficial leadership increased.46 The election of 
Daly as NUM general secretary in 1968 coincided with the emergence of left-
wingers Hugh Scanlon and Jack Jones to the leadership of two of Britain’s biggest 
unions, though this new layer of left leaders were not the cause of the increased 
militancy of the period but rather an outcome of it. Barnes and Reid observed that 
union officers were aware of the growing dissatisfaction amongst the membership 
and were increasingly under attack from activists and militants and were therefore 
moving politically to the left and towards greater industrial militancy. 
McCormick too noted that the leadership was propelled into taking control of a 
groundswell of militancy which threatened to engulf it.47 
 
 
2.6 Unofficial National Strikes 
 
There remained some debate within the NUM between those who felt that any 
sort of industrial action would lead to further contraction and job losses, and those 
who felt that they must make a stand against low wages and job insecurity and 
that it would be better to have a smaller industry that paid better wages, than carry 
on under the prevailing conditions. The growing discontent over wage levels and 
job insecurity, and the increasing unity deriving from both the NPLA and 
widespread colliery closures, led to two unofficial national strikes in 1969 and 
1970. Yorkshire had been one of the better paid Areas until the NPLA when the 
wages of the higher paid Areas were held back to allow others to catch up, and 
Taylor argues that the combination of the ACP and restricted wages caused 
growing discontent, which overcame the more moderate tendencies in Yorkshire 
making its militancy all the more explosive.48 The 1969 strike was primarily 
concerned with the reduction of surface-men's hours, but began at Cadeby Main 
colliery in South Yorkshire over the issue of payments to ‘market-men’ - fully 
trained face-workers who covered for absentees, but were paid the full rate for 
their job even if they were transferred to a pit with a lower NPLA rate; a practice 
increasingly called into question by management in a cost-cutting environment. 
Cadeby had around two hundred men without a ‘face’ job following its merger 
 
46 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.205 
47 Dorfman, G.A., Government versus Trade Unionism in British Politics since 1968, (London, 
1979) p.15; Barnes, D. & Reid, E., Governments and Trade Unions: The British Experience, 
1964-79, (London, 1980) p.97; McCormick, Industrial Relations, p.189 
48 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.205 
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with Denaby colliery. The South Yorkshire Panel of the NUM refused to back 
the strike, awaiting the outcome of negotiations with the NCB, but the Area pits 
began to drift out from the end of September. A motion for strike action was 
carried by eighty-five votes to three in Yorkshire and by 14 October all the Area's 
pits were on strike and pressure grew for action from other Areas. In South Wales 
a strike resolution was defeated, but sixteen thousand miners came out on strike 
along with miners from pits in the Midlands and Scotland. At its peak around one 
hundred and thirty thousand miners from one hundred and forty pits were out 
across Britain. The 1969 strike was the first since 1926 to cross the boundaries of 
a coalfield, and in the second week of the strike Yorkshire miners crossed the 
Pennines to picket the Lancashire coalfield. On 17 October the NCB made a 
revised wage offer and Daly recommended acceptance and a return to work. The 
Derbyshire Area responded by passing a vote of no confidence in the leadership, 
and in Yorkshire there were demands for Daly and Ford to resign. Yorkshire 
voted to reject the offer and one hundred and twenty-eight pits were still out on 
strike on 20 October, but miners began to drift back to work.49 The discontent 
amongst miners continued to grow and the NUM conference the following July 
called for industrial action if the Board rejected the miner’s wage demands. The 
Composite resolution on wages was moved by left wingers McGahey and 
Scargill, who argued that a failure to adopt the resolution:  
 
will release an anger that will make last October look like a Sunday School 
picnic. No longer will our membership accept that a small increase is better 
than none. They are fed up with being asked not to rock the boat. They 
have been told to remain passive and what has that got us? Half the coal-
mining industry has been obliterated. 
 
No delegate spoke against the resolution, which was passed by one hundred and 
sixty-nine votes to one hundred and sixty though some criticised its implicit 
support for industrial action. Henry Daley, delegate from Yorkshire, warned: 
 
I think it is better that the NEC should organise such action rather than we 
have a break-out again by the branch officials such as myself supported by 
the rank and file. The mood is already there. Catch hold of it, if you will. 
Ignore it at your peril.50  
 
 
49 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, pp.180-1 & 191; McCormick, Industrial 
Relations, pp.190-4; Darlington, R. & Lyddon, D., Glorious Summer: Class struggle in 
Britain, 1972, (London, 2001) pp.34-5; Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, pp.28-33 
50 NUM Conference Report, 1970, pp.138 & 154-60; Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, p.36 
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In September 1970 the Board made a reduced offer against the NUM’s claim. 
The NEC rejected the offer but, following the experience of the previous year, 
agreed to ballot members on strike action, which resulted in a 55.5% majority in 
favour of a strike, but nevertheless short of the two thirds majority required under 
Rule 43 of the NUM’s rulebook. The largest votes came from peripheral left-
wing Areas, South Wales (eighty-two percent) and Scotland (seventy-seven 
percent), and when the NEC voted thirteen to eleven to accept the Board’s offer 
the Scottish Area rejected the decision, and there were strike calls from South 
Wales. On 30 October pits in Doncaster came out on strike despite an Area 
Council vote against such action. The strike spread to pits in South Wales, 
Scotland and Yorkshire, and peaked on 10 November with one hundred and 
sixteen pits out (including collieries in Kent, Durham, Derbyshire and 
Staffordshire). Around one hundred thousand miners were on strike at some point 
over the four weeks. Daly called for a return to work emphasising the need to 
follow the rulebook and was shouted down by angry miners when he visited 
Doncaster. A subsequent pit-head ballot accepted the Board’s offer by a margin 
of two to one, though the more militant Areas voted against. Following the failure 
of the 55.5% majority vote to secure an official strike the Derbyshire Area 
proposed that Rule 43 should be altered to enable a strike to be called on the basis 






The chapter showed that the liabilities with which the NCB began life increased 
as the Board undertook essential modernisation funded with government loans. 
The decline in the demand for coal in the second decade after nationalisation led 
to the contraction of the industry and encouraged further mechanisation, which 
in turn required further investment, and though productivity rose it was extracted 
from a decreasing pool of collieries and men. The price of coal was required by 
government to be low to aid the industry’s main industrial consumers, and both 
the Board and the government preferred to keep wages low in order to keep the 
price of coal at competitive levels. In this they were aided by the NUM leadership, 
 
51 Financial Times, 24 October 1970; McCormick, Industrial Relations, pp.194-6; Darlington & 
Lyddon, Glorious Summer, p.35; Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p.163 
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which consistently argued that higher wages would lead to a further contraction 
of the industry. The interests of the miners, conversely, were in achieving a 
reasonable living wage and job security though not necessarily in the coal 
industry if alternatives were readily available, which in many places they were 
not. The NUM historically sought to push wages up whilst maintaining 
competitive levels, and to maintain the size of the industry where possible. 
However, if the industry determined that collieries must close and jobs must go, 
then it was the leadership’s role to convey this to the members and make the 
process as smooth and compliant as possible, i.e. without any fuss or resort to 
strike action; essentially to maintain a compliant workforce in the face of a 
contracting industry. The leadership, at both national and Area level, played a 
consistent role in manoeuvring to contain discontent: in appeals to defend the 
nationalised industry; in the need to return a Labour Government; in claiming that 
militancy would lead to more closures; in appeals to ‘new realism’; and in 
encouraging the miners to work harder to save the pit. The Wilson Government’s 
relegation of coal and its introduction of the ACP led to growing discontent 
amongst miners and anger towards both the Labour Party and the NUM 
leadership, which supported Labour’s position. The introduction of a national 
day-wage system and the NPLA had a transformative effect; in unifying miners 
nationally with regard to wage-bargaining, in bringing discontent into regions 
where it had not previously manifested through the holding back of wage levels, 
and in bottling up discontent where it had previously had an outlet. The coal 
industry historically had been beset by numerous small-scale strikes over 
conditions and wages, but these were largely confined to individual pits or to 
particular grades and trades within a pit. It was not until the end of the 1960s, 
following the combined effects of the ACP and the NPLA, that miners’ 
frustration and anger spilled on to the national stage. This anger emerged from 
the ranks and was not directed by the NUM leadership, who rather sought to 
contain it. The ensuing unofficial strikes in 1969 and 1970 had the effect of 

















This chapter considers the wage claim that emerged from the 1971 NUM 
conference, its rejection by the Board, and the imposition of a ban on overtime 
including the establishment of liaison committees as the miners prepared for the 
strike. It will initially review the conference resolutions that, firstly, set the level 
of the wage claim and resolved to take industrial action if the claim were rejected, 
and secondly, lowered the threshold for strike action to fifty-five percent from 
the previous two thirds majority, a hurdle that had made the 1970 strike 
‘unofficial’. The resolution for lowering the threshold was proposed by the more 
militant Areas, who were frustrated by the unofficial strikes in the previous two 
years, and was resisted by the more conservative Areas and by the NEC. The 
subsequent vote for industrial action cleared the lower threshold and this chapter 
will review the vote and the interpretations of its implications including the 
Cabinet’s view that it was a close result and a sign of division amongst the miners; 
this would subsequently give it a confidence that was misplaced and informed its 
negotiating strategy in which it believed that both control and time were on its 
side. The chapter will assess the overtime ban that was implemented as 
negotiations broke down and served to prepare the miners for the subsequent 
strike ballot and the strike itself. The ban decreased the coal stocks and 
demonstrated to miners how low their wages were without the addition of 
overtime pay, which many had become used to getting. It also introduced liaison 
committees, which became strike committees and were responsible for the 
organisation of picketing and the oversight of safety and maintenance work 
during the dispute. The chapter will review the operation of the liaison 
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committees via case studies of Cronton colliery, Lancashire and of the collieries 
in Abertillery district, Monmouthshire. 
 
 
3.2 Higher Wages, Pit Closures 
 
Miners had consistently been told that to go on strike was to hasten the 
contraction of the industry, and both the NCB and the NUM had used this 
argument successfully to ensure the miners’ cooperation and compliance during 
the period of rundown under the ACP. Since their restraint had not in fact stopped 
the pit closures, miners’ frustration and anger fed into an increasing militancy and 
a belief that they should appeal for higher wages even if this meant further pit 
closures; their demand effectively became ‘then let them close, but let the men 
working in those remaining earn a decent wage’.1 Taylor claims that he heard 
miners say, on numerous occasions, that if the industry could not pay decent 
wages then the pits should be closed.2 In the Commons debate during the strike 
Sir Anthony Meyer noted that: ‘There is a rather curious conjunction of very 
radical elements in the union and extreme right-wing economists arguing that the 
beneficial effect of the strike is that it will result in a sudden and massive closure 
programme such as no democratic Government could embark upon.’3 He perhaps 
had in mind an article in The Economist, published on the eve of the strike, which 
was seemingly unaware of the conscious choice taken by the miners in its warning 
that a long strike would inevitably close more pits and that they ‘will have brought 
the closures wholly on themselves.’4 A similar sentiment was given towards the 
end of the strike by Heath’s economic advisor, Brian Reading, who issued an 
internal memo, which set out the employers’ argument, essentially:  
 
Mining is an unpleasant and dangerous and so to persuade anyone to do 
such a job you need to pay them above average rewards. But who wants to 
persuade them because the market does not, as it is easier and cheaper to 
use alternate fuels. What logic is there in the Government subsidising the 
miners to do a job which they don’t want to do and no-one else wants them 
to do? We should therefore make them choose between higher wages for 
the few or lower wages for the many.5  
 
 
1 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Morgan, p.19 
2 Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, (London, 1984) p.217 
3 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 c.315 
4 The Economist, 8 January 1972 
5 TNA: PREM15/985, Memo, Reading to Armstrong, 17 February 1972 
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Reading’s reasoning assumed that miners were demanding higher wages and no 
redundancies, and whilst this was arguably their ideal position, they were largely 
resigned to job losses in a contracting industry, but often had little alternative 
employment in their locality. Miners had effectively made the choice set out by 
Reading, and the Cabinet were already aware of their preference prior to his 
memo, since Carr had reported on 27 January that: ‘Some miners therefore argued 
that they would prefer additional collieries to be closed and the industry to be 
further contracted, but more highly paid, than to continue as at present.’6 Miners 
were in fact reacting to the Government’s continuation of the previous decade’s 
strategy of restraining wage rises whilst the industry contracted. Both were aware 
that the industry would continue to contract, the choice therefore was over the 
wage levels of those that remained in the industry.  
 
 
3.3 NUM Annual Conference 1971 
 
Miners’ frustration over low wages and steady job losses had created a growing 
mood of militancy, and NUM vice-president Sidney Schofield made this point 
directly to Carr during the dispute in noting that discontent had been building up 
over years and that the strike would have taken place even under a Labour 
Government.7 The NUM therefore met for its annual conference in July 1971 
under conditions where the growing anger of the membership was tangible with 
delegates knowing that there was an expectation that something must be done 
about wage levels.8 The demand for a wage increase was proposed as a Composite 
of resolutions by the main participants in the two unofficial strikes, namely 
Yorkshire, which had become increasingly militant in the period following the 
introduction of the NPLA, and Scotland and South Wales, which were CP-led 
and historically militant. Conference agreed to claim increases in minimum 
wages from £30 to £35 per week for face-workers (16.7%), from £19 to £28 for 
other underground workers (47.4%), and from £18 to £26 for surface workers 
(44.4%).9 The wage claim was presented on the basis of what were considered 
reasonable wages, rather than in percentage terms, and followed a period of 
 
6 TNA: CAB128/50/5, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 4, 27 January 1972  
7 TNA: PREM15/984, Notes of a meeting, Carr & NUM, 21 January 1972 
8 Pitt, M., The World On Our Backs: The Kent Miners and the 1972 Miners’ Strike, (London, 
1979) p.110 
9 Wilberforce Inquiry, Cmnd. 4903, February 1972 (‘Wilberforce’), p.1 
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relatively low increases for many since the introduction of the NPLA had held 
back wage increases generally. Godley has shown that the wage increase for 
miners over the period 1963-1969 lagged behind both the manufacturing sector 
and the public sector generally, and that the wage increase won during the 1972 
strike had the effect of equalising this discrepancy over the period 1963-1973 (see 
Fig.3.1). Wage increases for miners lagged behind those in the manufacturing 
sector during the previous decade also (see Fig.3.2), which had the effect of 
allowing manufacturing wages to close the gap on miners’ wages. Miners still 
held an advantage in 1963 with average weekly wages for men over twenty-one 
at £18 15s 0d for miners and £17 5s 9d in the manufacturing sector, though it was 
the narrowing of the differential that allowed frustration to build amongst miners. 
 
Fig.3.1. Comparison of Wage Increases: Coal Mining, Public Sector & 
Manufacturing, 1963-69 & 1963-73.10 
 
The final section of the Composite resolution called for members to be consulted 
on ‘various forms’ of industrial action in the event of a rejection of the wage claim 
by the NCB, reflecting the unease within the NEC at the visibility of strike 
action.11 Wallace Sykes, who moved the Yorkshire element of the resolution, 
warned delegates to take heed of the growing militancy amongst the members 
 
10 Source: Godley, W.A.H., ‘Inflation in the United Kingdom’, Table 3, in Krause, L.B. & Salant, 
W.S., Worldwide Inflation: Theory and Recent Experience, (Washington DC, 1977) p.469 












following the previous year’s unofficial strike: ‘we nearly saw a position… where 
the tail was wagging the dog…  this disenchantment has grown. It has grown 
double-fold since then.’12 Allen argues that at that time officials who had 
generally advised caution and compromise in the 1960s were now raising their 
hands with the militants, not because they had changed their political spots, but 
because they were having to be sensitive about the mood of their members.13  
 
Fig.3.2. Comparison of Wage Increases: Coal Mining & Manufacturing, 




The conference resolution on wages was based, in part, on what appeared to be 
better prospects for the future of industry as the NCB’s 1970-71 annual report 
had stated: 
 
The immediate and longer term prospects of the coal industry are now 
brighter than they have been since 1957. During the year a severe 
escalation in the cost of fuel oil… gave coal a general price advantage in 
the industrial market… Despite the rapid contraction of past years, the 
industry is now in good shape and is increasingly seen to offer a secure and 
promising future to recruits.15  
 
12 NUM Conference Report, 1971, pp.134-5 
13 Allen, V. L., The Militancy of British Miners, (Shipley, 1981) p.172 
14 Source: Ministry of Labour Gazette, various issues; NCB Accounts 1953-1964 
15 NCB Accounts, 1970-71, pp.5-6; Financial Times, 7 January 1972; Ashworth, W., The History 
of the British Coal Industry, Vol.5, 1946-1982: The Nationalised Industry, (Oxford, 1986) 














The brighter prospects were a temporary phenomenon based on a rise in oil 
prices. The Trans-Arabian Pipeline, which brought oil from the Persian Gulf to 
the Mediterranean for export to Europe, was broken in August 1970 and the 
Libyan Government took advantage of the shortage of oil to raise its prices. By 
mid-1971 major users were paying between £6.60 and £9.30 per ton for oil 
compared to between £3.30 and £6.00 per ton a year earlier. This rise made coal 
far more competitive as the pit-head price for industrial coal was between £4.75 
and £5.25 at that time. The Board responded by slowing down the contraction of 
the industry. It did this by increasing production, slowing the rate of pit closures, 
and announcing, at the end of 1970, a recruitment drive to fill eight thousand jobs. 
The Government also took action, through measures to increase the supply of 
coal by giving permission for the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) 
to move to a greater dependency on oil.16  
 
 
3.4 Rule 43 
 
Perhaps the most significant resolution passed at the 1971 conference was the 
reform of the NUM’s Rule 43, which had prevented the 1970 miners’ strike being 
considered ‘official’ since the 55.5% majority of the votes that were cast in favour 
of a strike fell short of the two-thirds majority necessary for a national strike to 
be called under this rule (see Fig.3.3). During that strike the Derbyshire Area 
proposed that Rule 43 should be changed to allow a simple majority to be 
sufficient to call a national strike, but the NEC rejected the proposal. At this 
subsequent conference two conflicting resolutions on the issue were put forward, 
one proposing that Rule 43 be eliminated and replaced by the ‘more democratic’ 
basis of a simple majority, and a counter-resolution put forward by Lancashire 
Area (of which Gormley had recently stepped down as president), which was 
subsequently supported by the NEC, suggesting a fifty five percent majority. The 
supporters of a change in the rule argued that the two-thirds majority was in 
reality unachievable, and that failure to follow a decision that had achieved a 
majority but that was nonetheless insufficient to legitimise industrial action could 
seriously undermine the NUM’s unity. Those opposed to a rule change reversed 
this argument and were concerned about the possibility of a large, near majority, 
 
16 Jackson, M.P., The Price of Coal, (London, 1974) pp.127-31 
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of disaffected opinion reflecting the experience of the 1926 General Strike and 
the need for a substantial majority to prevent a drift back to work.  
 




The initial resolution proposing a simple majority lost by one hundred and forty-
eight votes to one hundred and sixty-five (fifty-three percent against), whilst the 
latter resolution proposing a fifty-five percent majority passed by two hundred 
and fifteen votes to ninety-eight (sixty-nine percent in favour) and became the 
new threshold.18  Howell notes that the resolution passed against the opposition 
of some cautious Areas.19 Robert Taylor believes that the lowering of the 
threshold from two thirds to fifty-five percent was a ‘highly significant move at 
Gormley’s instigation’,20 though it could be argued that the Lancashire counter-
resolution backed by the NEC was designed to ensure that the lower (simple 
majority) threshold failed, and thus making the prospect of a strike marginally 
less likely. Hall believes that the hurdle was lowered to fifty-five percent largely 
to protect the union’s integrity in the aftermath of the unofficial strikes of 1969 
 
17 Source: TNA: COAL26/404, Strike Ballot Results, 1970-1971 Comparison 
18 NUM Conference Report, 1971, p.175; Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, p.51; Pitt, The World on 
Our Backs, pp.109-10 
19 Howell, D., The Politics of the NUM: A Lancashire view, (Manchester, 1989) p.38 














and 1970.21 Andrew Taylor concurs and sees the rule change as ‘a product of the 
unrest of 1970’, and that it laid the basis for the 1972 strike by removing the main 
obstacle which had made the earlier strike unofficial.22  
 
 
3.5 Overtime Ban 
 
On 14 September the NUM presented its case for wage increases to the NCB, 
who responded that the full wage claim could not be contemplated as the Board 
had only just broken even in the previous year. It stated that it could probably 
fund a £1.60 rise representing increases of nine percent for surface workers 
(against the forty-four percent claim) and eight percent for all underground 
workers, but with five percent to Kent and Nottinghamshire and six percent to 
Scotland and South Wales (against a claim of forty-seven percent for 
underground and seventeen percent for NPLA). The NEC rejected the NCB offer 
as ‘shabby and insulting’ and called a national delegate conference for 21 
October. In his memoirs Gormley recollects meeting with Ezra at a social 
gathering during this period where he told him over a ‘quiet drink together in a 
corner’ that an increase of £3.50 per week would be enough to get a majority on 
the NEC to accept it. He also claims that he kept his discussion with Ezra secret 
because some of his colleagues would have felt £3.50 to have been ambitiously 
high. Given that the NUM were actually seeking between £5 and £9 per week, 
this appears to be either a false memory, or perhaps a misrepresentation of the 
NEC’s views and of Gormley’s own role in suggesting a compromise between 
what he was being told the NCB, with Government direction, would offer, and 
what the NUM were demanding. Gormley also wrote of a desire to limit the 
influence of Daly and the McGahey, stating: ‘You can’t be too careful in 
negotiations and sometimes it pays to be a bit secretive, even with your own 
side.’23 At the NUM national delegate conference on 21 October, Daly made the 
case for a pay increase based on the miners’ productivity record, recruitment 
needs, and comparability with other industries. The NEC and Daly had been 
criticised during the 1969 strike by the Yorkshire strike committee for their 
refusal to recognise the miners’ traditional vanguard role in the labour movement 
 
21 Hall, T., King Coal: miners, coal and Britain’s industrial future, (Harmondsworth, 1981) pp. 
149–65 
22 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.214 
23 Gormley, J., Battered Cherub, (London, 1982) pp.85-7 
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and that the strike was a reflection of this position.24 In an attempt to restore his 
left credentials amongst the increasingly militant members, that had been 
tarnished by his refusal to back unofficial action over the previous two years, he 
portrayed the strike, possibly quite accurately, as a political challenge to the 
Conservative Government. He stated that the NUM was: 
 
in the vanguard, because a whole number of other Unions large and small 
are awaiting the outcome of the miners’ struggle and the miners’ 
settlement… we are fighting for the rest of the trade union movement, and 
on the basis of our struggle I believe it is possible to create a broad unity 
in the trade union movement that will smash Conservative economic policy 
and help to pave the way for the defeat of the Tory Government and return 
a Labour Government which will introduce economic policies that can 
receive the full support of the trade union movement.  
 
The conference called for a ballot on whether to proceed with strike action if the 
situation should warrant it, and for the ballot to be preceded by a ban on overtime 
from 1 November. Daly informed the conference that the NEC would make an 
approach to the TUC, and to the various transport unions, for support in the event 
of a strike to ensure that there would be no movement of coal. He also made an 
appeal to members ‘to set up liaison committees both at Area, colliery, workshop 
and plant level with regard to the implementation of the overtime ban.’ He noted 
that it was the Union’s intention: ‘to ensure that the overtime ban makes deep 
inroads into the stocks… so we can consequently strengthen the bargaining 
position of our Union in the coming weeks’.25 The key reason for the overtime 
ban was in order to run down coal stocks prior to beginning a strike, and it was 
estimated that the ban reduced deliveries to the power stations by about twenty 
percent. Another aspect of the ban was that it would have the effect of 
demonstrating how low were the real level of wages, since the vast majority of 
miners regularly worked overtime, and an overtime ban would therefore create a 
national sense of injustice and strengthen the miners resolve for the forthcoming 
vote and subsequent strike.26 A miner from Bedwas Lodge, South Wales observed 
this aspect: ‘Without the overtime ban the strike would not have been a success 
it was… they realized now what their wages were.’27 Within the NEC there were 
 
24 Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, pp.27-8 
25 Warwick University, Modern Records Centre (MRC): NUM Special Delegate Conference 
Report, 21 October 1971; McCormick, B.J., Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry, 
(London, 1979) pp.198-200; Pitt, The World on Our Backs, pp.111-2 
26 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, pp.216-21 
27 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Appendix II, p.15 Interview, Bedwas Lodge SC 
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three views of the rationale for the overtime ban: that it was ‘an act in its own 
right - an alternative to strike action; that it would make inroads into coal stocks; 
and that it was a delaying tactic that would allow time to campaign.28 There was 
a belief that if there were to be a strike it should start as soon as possible, but that 
it was first necessary to reduce coal stocks, and also that it would be 
psychologically better to strike after Christmas. There was also some hope that if 
the overtime ban were successful then there would be no need for a strike.29 The 
NEC set out six guiding principles of such a ban: that liaison committees were to 
be established to supervise the ban and to liaise with other unions; that no cover 
was to be provided for absentees; that no WPIS was expected to work overtime; 
that no overtime was to be undertaken except where it concerned the safety of the 
men or the preservation of the mine; that no activity was to take place during 
overtime, breaks or mealtimes; and that clerical overtime was permissible only 
for assistance to another member.30  
 
The decision on whether and how to proceed with the ban was taken at local 
branch meetings. In Kent the ban was widely welcomed as long-overdue national 
action, though there was some opposition from ‘big overtime men’. Pitt notes that 
a colliery is a circuit of production with each job relying on each other job, such 
that if one part of the circuit stops the whole circuit comes to a standstill. He 
describes how under normal conditions rules are bent and health and safety 
concerns often ignored in order to keep production going for the benefit of the 
whole production process, and repair jobs are therefore often undertaken whilst 
machine are still running or during break times or shift changes to ensure that 
production continues apace. However, during an overtime ban, everything is done 
according to the book, and repair work must only be undertaken during 
production time. Men become ‘walking editions of the Mines and Quarries Act’ 
and inform officials of what work can and cannot be undertaken, and what is 
unsafe or illegal. In response officials retaliate by strict application of meal and 
break times, keep men waiting to ride the lift, and implement a host of regulations 
that make life difficult for the miners. The division between colliers and officials 
therefore becomes more sharply defined.31 This widening of the demarcation 
 
28 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p.180 
29 Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, p.52 
30 McCormick, Industrial Relations, p.201 
31 Pitt, The World on Our Backs, pp.113-4 
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between miners and officials was to have a significant effect on the subsequent 
strike, and is discussed further in Chapter Six. 
 
 
3.6 Liaison Committees  
 
Daly’s statement instructed safety and maintenance work to be continued during 
the overtime ban. In normal conditions this tended to be undertaken during 
overtime, and therefore by banning overtime this essential work had to be 
undertaken during production time. The implementation of Daly’s instructions was 
undertaken by the local liaison committees, and therefore their interpretation was 
determined by the make-up, and the militancy or otherwise, of the local committee. 
This led to a variety of different approaches with some committees being more 
militant than the membership whilst others were more moderate. In some pits, 
attempts were made to stop overmen and deputies undertaking any safety work at 
all. As the strike progressed the liaison committees at some pits lost control of the 
rank-and-file entirely.32 Taylor notes that a novel feature of the strike was its high 
level of organisation, in particular the creation of liaison committees and a 
comprehensive network of contacts between the NUM and other unions to provide 
intelligence about when and where to place pickets.33 The committees themselves 
were not an entirely novel feature as left activists in Yorkshire during the unofficial 
1969 strike had organised strike committees and excluded Area officials that were 
hostile to the strike.34 The liaison committees in 1972 were established in part to 
regulate problems between the different parts of a colliery and in particular between 
the different unions’ interests especially over the question of undertaking safety 
and maintenance work in the pit. They were therefore comprised of representatives 
from NACODS, CAWU (Clerical and Administrative Workers’ Union) and COSA 
(Colliery Officials’ Staff Association) in addition to WPIS, NUM branch members, 
and tradesmen such as electricians. On 5 November NACODS members were 
instructed by their national leadership not to join the liaison committees, though 
some continued to participate at local level.35 
 
32 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, pp.215-7; McCormick, Industrial Relations, 
p.205-6  
33 NUM, AS Circular, 300/71, 30 December 1971; BS Circular, 5/1972, 6 January 1972, cited in 
Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.219 
34 Darlington, R. & Lyddon, D., Glorious Summer: Class struggle in Britain, 1972, (London, 
2001) pp.34-5 
35 Pitt, The World on Our Backs, pp.114-5  
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3.7 Liaison Committee Case Studies  
 
The liaison committee at Cronton colliery, Lancashire, was established early in 
the overtime ban and comprised three branch officials along with the 
representatives of the pit tradesmen, COSA and NACODS. All queries relating 
to the ban were subsequently addressed to the committee. It sanctioned the NEC 
guidelines and discussed matters arising during the overtime ban, including 
investigating the issue of belt maintenance work being undertaken at weekends, 
i.e. during overtime.36 Once the strike began, the liaison committee effectively 
transformed into a strike committee and dealt with all questions relating to 
maintenance and safety issues, and the organisation of picketing. It was 
concerned to ensure that it adopted comparable procedures to the other pits in the 
St. Helens Panel (district) and the branch agreed for the liaison committee to 
accept full charge of the dispute.37 It then met at the end of each strike week and 
agreed for two additional tradesmen (one electrical and one blacksmith) to 
participate. Each week there were calls for more pickets and decisions were taken 
about where to picket with the main focus being the power stations at Fiddlers 
Ferry, Warrington and Lister Drive, Liverpool. The committee agreed to refund 
pickets’ expenses at ten shillings per day for car users, plus bus fares for those 
who claimed. Later it was decided to hire a mini-bus for picket use, and to give a 
meal allowance of five shillings, and it was agreed that a claim should be made 
to the branch for extra expenses for picketing. The liaison committee also dealt 
with requests for coal to be supplied to pensioners and to local schools, which 
they agreed should be supplied subject to definite need. As stocks diminished the 
committee subsequently agreed to open the local landsale site to merchant 
wagons subject to: 1) a docket system, 2) no ‘blacked’ wagons38, 3) sufficient 
coal to be retained for emergency after the strike for mineworkers, and 4) that 
pickets are available to travel with the lorries to ensure coal for priority use only.39 
 
The issue concerning the undertaking of safety and maintenance work developed 
during the course of the strike. At the outset there were twenty-five men working 
for safety reasons, though at the first meeting on 14 January it was agreed that 
 
36 Knowsley Archives, Kirkby Library (KL): KA25/U/M11, Minute Book of NUM Committees, 
Cronton Colliery Branch 1967-72 (Cronton Minutes), pp.215-7 
37 KL: KA25/U/M11, Cronton Minutes, pp.228-9 
38 Banned or blacklisted 
39 KL: KA25/U/M11, Cronton Minutes, pp.230-6 
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Cronton should fall in line with other Lancashire pits and withdraw pumpsmen 
from 24 January. The following week (21 January) it was noted that two pumpers 
had been withdrawn so that no NUM men then worked underground, and that the 
position would continue to be reviewed weekly. There was a request for 
additional men to work on the powerhouse, but this was rejected, and it was 
agreed to stop using shaftsmen after forty-eight hours-notice had been given. At 
the branch meeting on 23 January the committee discussed withdrawing safety 
men, pumpsmen and shaftsmen, but the position was kept under review. The 28 
January meeting then discussed a letter signed by thirty-four men regarding 
whether to picket NACODS members undertaking safety work, and one of the 
COSA representatives reported on COSA’s decision to withdraw its own safety 
members. The meeting agreed that these matters be discussed at the general 
branch meeting on 6 February. At the 4 February committee meeting it was 
recommended: that all safety men be withdrawn except winders and those at the 
power-house; that NACODS should be approached and told that they should only 
do their own duties underground and not to undertake NUM jobs on the surface; 
and that a picket be established on NACODS to ensure that this was adhered to. 
These recommendations were subsequently accepted by a large majority at the 6 
February general branch meeting. The 10 February liaison committee meeting 
then reported that NACODS had agreed to do only their own duties.40 The liaison 
committee also organised for branch members to attend rallies during the dispute 
including a one-day strike and mass meeting organised by Liverpool Trades 
Council on 26 January, which members were expected to attend. It also requested 
full support from members at a demonstration on 11 February when Heath was 
due to be in Liverpool, and plans were made for the branch to be represented at 
the lobby of Parliament. The committee also reviewed the Wilberforce Report, 
and agreed to accept the NEC recommendation subject to clarification of details. 
It subsequently organised the pithead ballot on acceptance and agreed that if a 
return to work was agreed then it would negotiate this with management and 
would recommend to the manager that those who had undertaken picketing 
duties, where available, be given preference for weekend work (overtime).41 
 
The Abertillery district NUM in Monmouthshire represented lodges including 
Cwmtillery, Celynon, Arrael Griffin, Markham, Roseheyworth, Marine, Beynons 
 
40 KL: KA25/U/M11, Cronton Minutes, pp.230-6 
41 KL: KA25/U/M11, Cronton Minutes, pp.230-9 
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and Blaenavon collieries.42 Here the miners’ agent43 called a strike organisation 
meeting of all the lodges on the first Wednesday of the strike. Some, such as 
Markham, had already been picketing coal sites before then, but following the 
meeting a chain of command was established, and overlapping work was 
eliminated. The two key activities to be undertaken were picketing and the 
distribution of coal to priority customers. There was technically no strike 
committee, but operations were run from the Abertillery Miners’ Institute and 
manned by lodge officials, notably the secretaries of Roseheyworth and 
Cwmtillery collieries, which were based in the town. Instructions would be 
passed down from the agent to the Abertillery Institute and then relayed to the 
various lodge secretaries, who would organise picketing and coal distribution 
locally. The key task of the pickets was to close the open-cast coal sites of Darren, 
Blain Yr Un, Ryan’s Tip, Penybont, Christiani Chand and Cardiff Pend, which 
held about one hundred thousand tons of coal stocks between them, and pickets 
were also put on Llanwern Steel Works and Newport Wharf. Within a few days 
all movement of coal was halted and just one picket per site was needed. The 
pickets received rank-and-file support from TGWU drivers, and were informed 
by one that four non-union drivers were operating at the Ryan’s Pond site. Pickets 
subsequently forced these drivers to join the TGWU, in order to continue 
delivering priority coal. Priority deliveries followed a request from a customer, 
accompanied by a doctor’s note, which was then vetted by the lodge secretary 
and committee. If agreed the miners’ agent was notified, and he then gave the 
order to the coal yard which instructed a merchant using TGWU drivers, and the 
delivery was accompanied by a lodge member. Coal distribution was therefore 
completely controlled by the NUM lodges. The police telexes, however, show a 
slightly different picture of the picketing that took place;44 essentially more sites 
and more pickets than was remembered. The telexes show that in the first week 
that eight sites were being picketed by between eight and thirty-six pickets. In the 
second week, picketing continued at power stations, though with reduced 
numbers, and also at seven collieries, which each had around twelve pickets. The 
third week involved largely the same sites, but the numbers dropped significantly 
with a maximum of four pickets at almost all, and this was maintained in the 
fourth and fifth weeks when the number of sites halved to eight including the 
 
42 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Appendix III, Interview, Abertillery District SC 
43 The senior NUM Area repesentative 
44 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Gwent, 17, 24 & 31 January, 7 & 14 February 1972 
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power stations and just one colliery. The continuation of picketing at some 
collieries throughout the first five weeks of the strike implies the picketing of 
NACODS members, though may have included priority coal being sent out. All 
picketing was described as peaceful, with no incidents. 
 
 
3.8 Strike Vote  
 
A national ballot was held on 22 November as to whether to proceed to strike 
action with a result, giving a 58.8% majority in favour, announced 2 December. 
The NEC recommended a strike to begin from 9 January. Twelve of the NUM’s 
twenty-three Areas and groupings produced a majority above the required fifty-
five percent.45 The two largest Areas, which between them represented some 
thirty four percent of miners, had large majorities for strike action with Yorkshire 
at seventy-five percent and South Wales at sixty-five-and-a-half (see Figs 3.4 and 
3.5). 
 






45 There were fourteen mining Areas, and nine non-miner groupings comprising COSA members, 
cokemen, enginemen, mechanics, and power group workers 
























47 Source: TNA: COAL26/404, Strike Ballot Results, 1970-1971 Comparison 
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Most Areas saw an increase in the percentage voting for strike action in 1971 
compared to 1970, with the notable exceptions being the CP-led Areas of 
Scotland and Wales, which decreased from very high levels but still produced 
significant majorities for strike action in 1971. The percentage vote in the 
peripheral coalfields decreased between 1970 and 1971 whilst the central Areas 
saw an increase, in part due to the growing effect of the NPLA on their wages. 
The non-mining grouping, comprising enginemen, mechanics, clerical and power 
workers, also saw a percentage increase in votes in favour of strike action, but 
nevertheless acted to pull the overall total down (see Fig.3.6). 
 
Fig.3.6. Comparison of Peripheral, Central and Non-Miner Votes for Strike 




 If the non-mining grouping was excluded, the miners’ vote was in fact over sixty-
two percent. Given a total national vote in favour at 58.8% against a threshold of 
fifty-five percent (i.e. almost four per cent above), some historians have seen this 
as a close result,50 though one could argue that the winning margin was actually 
wider than this comparison suggests, as over one sixth more miners voted for 
strike action than against. The Government also read more into the margin of 
 
49 Source: TNA: COAL26/404, Strike Ballot Results, 1970-1971 Comparison 
50 Lyddon, D., ‘“Glorious Summer”, 1972: the High Tide of Rank and File Militancy’ in McIlroy, 
J., Fishman, N. & Campbell, A., The High Tide of British Trade Unionism: Trade Unions and 
Industrial Politics, 1964-79, (Monmouth, 2007) p.329; Beckett, A., When the Lights Went 
Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies, (London, 2009) p.63; Sandbrook, D., 




















victory than was warranted. Carr told Cabinet that support appeared: ‘to have 
been concentrated in the traditionally militant areas; and any strike, therefore, 
might not prove in the event to be on a national basis. Coal stocks were in any 
case high.’51 This was a misreading of the situation in several regards. Firstly, 
support was not concentrated in the traditional militant areas; it was strongest, 
both numerically and in percentage terms, in Yorkshire – a latecomer to militancy 
– and had increased by almost a third in the moderate East Midlands Area in the 
central coalfield. Secondly, the fact that the threshold had been reached meant 
that an official national strike was sanctioned, and therefore all Areas would 
participate. The only reason that the 1969 and 1970 strikes were restricted and 
not undertaken on a national basis, were that they failed to achieve the higher 
threshold and were therefore deemed ‘unofficial’. Lastly, coal stocks were not as 





This chapter showed that the 1971 NUM conference decision to seek a large 
percentage pay rise was a product of the discontent that had arisen during the 
previous decade, and was sanctioned by the NUM leadership primarily as a means 
of containing the growing militancy amongst the membership. The discontent 
was partly due to miners’ wages having been held back in order to stave off 
further closures in the industry, and the large wage claim was thus an attempt to 
redress the imbalance in their wages relative to comparable industrial and public-
sector workers. The claim was based on the temporary phenomenon of oil prices 
exceeding coal prices, and the subsequent illusion of better prospects for the 
industry suggested by the Board’s accounts. In making the claim, the NUM 
members were in defiance of the leadership’s advice that had served to simply 
hold their wages back since the industry had contracted in spite of their restraint. 
They were therefore prepared to make a stand to restore wage levels even if this 
entailed further contraction. The Government received advice implying that 
miners were selfishly seeking higher wages without job losses, whereas the 
Government’s contrary position - low wages and the continued contraction of the 
industry - was arguably the cause of the dispute. The chapter showed that the 
 
51 TNA: CAB128/49/61, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 4, 2 December 1971; Taylor, The NUM, 
Volume 2, p.53 
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conference decision to lower the threshold for strike action proposed by the more 
militant Areas, was intended to make it easier to call an official strike. The 
leadership had rejected the initial proposal and backed a counter-proposal, which 
though lowering the threshold, decreased it by a lesser amount and thus made an 
official strike marginally less likely. The subsequent ballot cleared the lower 
threshold, but by a relatively small margin, and was taken by the Government to 
mean that the miners would not be united in the conduct of the strike; this gave 
the Government a misplaced confidence and informed its subsequent negotiating 
strategy in which it believed that it had the upper hand. The chapter demonstrated 
that the overtime ban had a galvanising effect on the miners and prepared them 
for the forthcoming strike, by running down the coal stocks, forging a unity over 
the wage claim, and in particular by creating an organisational structure to deal 
with issues that arose. These liaison committees seamlessly transformed into 
strike committees that organised and controlled the picketing at a local level. 
They also demonstrated a disconnect between the national leadership, who set 
out the guidelines for the conduct of the strike, and the local branches who 
interpreted and implemented them. This led to significant divergence, particularly 
over the question of safety and maintenance work in the pits. The division 
between the miners and NACODS officials, who undertook this work, was 
exacerbated during the overtime ban and would grow into open hostility during 
















This chapter will assess the historic decline of miners’ wages and compare the 
NUM’s 1971 wage claim to contemporary claims of other public sector, manual 
and low paid workers, and will consider the issue of low pay more generally. It 
will assess the Government’s desire to confront the public sector and to control 
wage inflation, of which its ‘N minus 1 Norm’ (N-1), was a part. It will 
demonstrate that the application of N-1 was inconsistent and arbitrary, that it was 
largely ignored in the private sector, and that the Government took no account of 
the merits of the miners’ case. It will show that British inflation levels and wage 
settlements were comparable to those of other leading economies, and that the 
conditions pertaining in Britain were not untypical. The incoming Heath 
Government had promised a ‘quiet revolution’ that would take government out 
of the market place, and this chapter will compare the Government’s professed 
desire to remain detached from the negotiations with its actual role in dictating 
the terms and the time-frame within which the NCB could negotiate. The chapter 
will assess the various meetings between the Government and representatives of 
the NCB and the NUM and will consider the issue of arbitration, which was 
variously denounced and supported by both sides, and was used by the 
Government in an attempt to swing public opinion against the miners. It will 
further consider the role played by the leaders of the NUM and the TUC in 
negotiating behind the backs of the NEC and of the rank-and-file to contain the 
wage rise, and the distrust that this engendered and exacerbated amongst the 
miners. The chapter will review the Wilberforce Commission, which the 
Government established to settle the dispute when it came to the realisation that 
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it was not possible to maintain its restrictive pay norm, and will assess the miners’ 
ultimate return to work on better terms after further negotiations. 
 
 
4.2 Control of Wage Inflation 
 
Both Labour and the Conservatives desired to control inflation, which had been 
creeping upwards, and Labour’s National Plan (1965) introduced a limit on the 
extent to which incomes could rise; this was initially (1965-66) a voluntary policy 
and later (1966-70) a statutory policy. Following the 1966 Sterling crisis the 
Wilson Government introduced a six month pay ‘freeze’ followed by six months 
of ‘severe restraint’, which was imposed with the agreement of trade union 
executives. Incomes policies divided opinion within the labour movement, with 
some, particularly in the trade union leadership, seeing them as an impingement 
on the role of unions to secure the best possible deal for their members, but many 
others seeing them as a form of ‘socialist planning’ when undertaken by a Labour 
Government, and as a price worth paying for the social and economic benefits of 
price control.1 However the Wilson Government focused most closely on 
incomes, rather than prices, and at the NUM 1970 conference miners proposed 
the removal of the policy.2 The 1970 Conservative election manifesto promised 
to bring inflation under control, whilst placing the blame for it on public sector 
wages, stating: ‘We will subject all proposed price rises in the public sector to the 
most searching scrutiny. If they are not justified, they will not be allowed. In 
implementing our policies, we will give overriding priority to bringing the present 
inflation under control.’3 This pledge envisaged an incomes policy applied to the 
public sector with a vague hope that the private sector would also comply. Six 
months after winning the election the Heath Cabinet met at Chequers to discuss 
strategies for dealing with inflation and for handling the likely consequential 
industrial unrest, and where the need to both challenge the public sector pay 
awards and to win that confrontation was expressed. Carr suggested that the 
Government needed someone in a major sector to stand firm, take a strike, and 
 
1 Thorpe, A., ‘The Labour Party and the Trade Unions’, in McIlroy, J., Fishman, N. & Campbell, 
A., (Eds.), The High Tide of British Trade Unionism: Trade Unions and Industrial Politics, 
1964-79, (Monmouth, 2007) pp.135-6; Pelling, H., A History of British Trade Unionism, 4th 
edn., (Harmondsworth, 1987) pp.252-3 
2 Taylor, A., The NUM and British Politics, Volume 2: 1969-1995, (London, 2005) p.37 




not back down, and Heath saw this as an attractive option.4 The miners’ strike 
became such a dispute and the Guardian later observed that the Government saw 
it as ‘a battle it must not lose if it wants to maintain its control over the current 
level of wage settlements in the public sector.’5 To combat inflation, the 
Conservatives introduced a mechanism to restrain public sector wages in the 
spring of 1971, known as the ‘N minus 1 Norm’, where each annual wage 
settlement round in the public sector was required to be one percentage point less 
than the previous (N) settlement round. N-1 was presented, by the Government, 
as a fact of life which not even it could affect such that ministers could withdraw 
from wage bargaining whilst imposing their wishes.6 It urged private companies 
to follow the example of that being imposed on the public sector. Wigham notes 
that ‘there could hardly have been a more provocative policy’, and Barnett 
believes that the policy amounted to a direct attempt to reduce the standard of 
living of wage-earners and the working-class. Even the Chancellor’s assistant 
Brendon Sewill was rather sceptical calling it a ‘makeshift policy on pay’.7 David 
Watt, Financial Times political editor, writing during the second week of the 
strike, was critical of N-1 and in particular of its application by the Government, 
stating that it had ‘serious long-term drawbacks which arise from its lack of 
clarity and its lack of “fairness” as the man in the street understands that term.’ 
He went on to say that ‘a norm strictly and universally applied can be clear and 
fair… On the other hand a semi-public norm which changes constantly and which 
is apparently capriciously applied… may well leave behind a legacy of muddle 
and bitterness which it will take many years to clear up.’ He noted that if one 
suggests that the Government might adopt ‘a less embattled approach’ one is told 
that inflation must be brought under control first before exploring these 
possibilities. He concluded by saying: ‘It may be so, but I persist in wondering 
whether the political cost of beating inflation need be quite so high.’8  
 
 
4 TNA:CAB164/1158, Meeting Notes, Chequers, ‘Strategy for Dealing with Inflation’, 14 
November 1970; Taylor, R., 'The Heath government and industrial relations: myth and reality' 
in Ball, S. & Seldon, A., The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal, (London, 1996) 
pp.168-9 
5 Guardian, 17 January 1972 
6 Barnett, A., ‘Class Struggle and the Heath Government’, New Left Review, Vol.1, No.77, Jan-
Feb 1973, p.8 
7 Wigham, E., Strikes and the Government 1893-1974, (London, 1976) p.165; Barnett, ‘Class 
Struggle’, p.7; Darlington, R., & Lyddon, D., Glorious Summer: Class struggle in Britain 
1972, (London, 2001) p.11 
8 Financial Times, 21 January 1972. This article was in line with the general approach of the FT 
in demonstrating support for workers grievances and of holding government to account, or at 
least in reporting on these issues with some neutrality. 
98 
 
Following the Conservative budget in April 1971, when the unemployment figure 
was standing at eight hundred and fifteen thousand, inflation and unemployment 
rose sharply with inflation reaching nine percent in the winter of 1971/72, roughly 
three times what it had been in 1965.9 The relatively full employment in the post-
war period had weakened both the employer’s hand in relation to the unions, and 
the union leadership’s hand in relation to the militancy within the membership, 
allowing the latter to impose sanctions with or without the support of the 
leadership.10 A move away from full employment was desirable to many 
employers, and unemployment jumped around fifty percent between 1971 and 
1972, passing the one million mark in January 1972 for the first time since 1947.11 
Gilbert Hunt, chief executive of Chrysler UK, commenting on the passing of this 
milestone was ‘surprised that the shake-up of industry designed to produce 
greater efficiency had not resulted in 3 million unemployed, instead of just 1 
million.’ He believed that: ‘The unemployed should not be reabsorbed into 
manufacturing industry’ since ‘fewer, not more, industrial workers are needed’.12 
 
 
4.3 Low Wages  
 
In November 1969 the NCB agreed to a wage increase of 27s. 6d. per week for 
daywagemen, which raised the minimum adult wage paid to surface workers to 
£15 per week (10.1% rise), and that paid to underground workers to £16 per week 
(9.4%). It also agreed to an increase of 24s. per week (4.4%) to all those under 
the NPLA except the most highly paid such that those in the Nottinghamshire 
Area who received 20s. per week and those in Kent who received 9s. per week. 
In November 1970 the Board granted pay increases of £2.80 to £3.00 per week 
for daywagemen, which raised the minimum adult wage of surface workers to 
£18 a week (c.18.4% to 20.0%) and of underground workers to £19 a week 
 
9 Morgan, K.O., The People’s Peace: British History 1945-1989, (Oxford, 1990) p.323; Allen, V. 
L., The Militancy of British Miners, (Shipley, 1981) p.172 
10 Weekes, B., Industrial relations and the limits of law: The industrial effects of the Industrial 
Relations Act, 1971, (Oxford, 1975) p.186 
11 Phillips, J., ‘Industrial Relations, Historical Contingencies and Political Economy: Britain in 
the 1960s and 1970s’, Labour History Review, Vol.72, No.3, December 2007, p.225; 
Dorfman, G.A., Government versus Trade Unionism in British Politics since 1968, (London, 
1979) p.69 
12 New People’s History Museum, Manchester: CP/IND/RAM/02/03, Ramelson papers, Financial 
Times, cutting (undated, c.21 January 1972) 
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(c.17.2% to 18.8%). All those under the NPLA were given an increase of £2.37½ 
(£2 7s 6d) a week (5.5%).13  
 
Immediately prior to the strike Daly set out ‘The miner’s case’ putting their wage 
claim in the context of the low wages in the coal industry. He noted that eighty-
eight thousand NUM members had a gross wage below £20, ‘which puts many 
of them below the Government level for Family Income Supplement - the poverty 
line.’ He cited a miner whose take home pay was £13.60 and who would receive 
an extra £2 a week under the Board’s final offer of 7.9%, and he attacked ‘those 
who play the percentage game’ who argue that some miners are getting a forty-
five percent increase. Daly noted that such a percentage is based on miners taking 
home £13 or £14 a week or even less, and he claimed to have ‘told Mr. Ezra that 
we’ll gladly settle for three percent of his £20,000 salary.’ He argued that the 
‘percentage game’ can be played in a different way to show that overall 
productivity in the industry rose by fifteen percent between 1967 and 1971, but 
that the average miner’s real earnings were lower at the start of 1971 than in 1967. 
He noted that it would take an across the board increase of more than £5 to restore 
miners to the relative position of 1967.14  
 
Daly’s comments were taken up by the press with a New Statesman article 
referring to a ‘man in Leicestershire who said he was on strike because he was 
ashamed to hand over his pay-packet of £15 a week for work on the coal face, to 
a wife making £25 a week in a factory.’15 The DTI also made reference to the 
issue in an early Progress Report to the Cabinet, which noted that the NCB had 
analysed all payrolls for one week in December 1971, which showed that: ‘while 
it is true that some take home no more than £13 cash this is partly due to deduction 
at source of rent for (subsidised) NCB housing and of voluntary National Savings 
which are commonly made by miners even the lower paid.’16 During the debate 
in the commons, several MPs quoted from miners’ wage slips to show the level 
of take home pay. David Crouch, (Conservative) claimed to have a pay-slip from 
the previous week for a married miner from Betteshanger Colliery in his 
constituency, whose ‘gross pay is £18 a week and his deductions for tax and 
National Insurance are £3.40. His take-home pay is £14.60. He also has to pay 
 
13 NCB Accounts, 1969-70, p.35, & 1970-71, p.36. Both decimal and imperial figures used 
14 TNA: COAL31/383, Transcript, Daly, ‘The miner’s case’, 7 January 1972 
15 New Statesman, Vol.83, No.2130, 14 January 1972, p.34 
16 TNA: PREM15/984, Progress Report on the Coal Strike (PRCS) 2, 13 January 1972 
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£4.50 in rent for the council house in which he lives.’ He also cited the wages of 
other colliery workers: ‘a married electrician, with no children, whose gross pay 
is £19.40. His take-home pay is £14 a week… a surface worker aged 18½ whose 
gross pay is £15 a week. His take-home pay is £11.30.17 Don Concannon, 
(Labour) noted that even for the highest paid miners - NPLA men who were on 
£30 a week - the Board’s suggested raise would not amount to much. He noted 
that:  
 
Such a man with two children must pay £3.64 tax, £1.59 insurance and 35p 
other deductions, giving him a total take-home pay of £24.42. He is offered 
an extra £1.90 giving him a total of £31.90; his tax goes up to £4.21, his 
insurance to £1.63 and his other deductions stay at 35p, giving him a take-
home wage of £25.71, representing an increase of £1.29. How much of that 
increase would be lost automatically by the 11 per cent. rise in the cost of 
living.18  
 
The distinction between wages represented in percentage as opposed to absolute 
terms was highlighted by Hilde Behrend, an academic who undertook pilot 
studies and surveys in Britain and Ireland between the early 1960s and the early 
1970s. Her research noted that in a 1966 survey the great majority of male 
employees who were interviewed expressed their last pay increase as an amount 
per week and that only a small minority expressed it in percentage terms, unlike 
policy makers and negotiators. It also found that the majority of those who 
received a raise of less than £1 per week felt that it made little or no difference, 
whereas those who received £2 or more per week felt that it had made a 
difference. This ‘perceptual threshold zone’ of between £1 and £2 in the British 
survey 1966, was found to be between £2 and £2.50 per week in 1971, in a similar 
survey in Dublin. Those surveyed also expressed the view that the increase was 
‘small’ or was only just enough to catch up with ‘the cost of living’. Behrend also 
found a general lack of knowledge of inflation and income’s policy, noting that: 
‘In 1971, when the mass media had been stressing the acceleration in the rate of 
inflation for months, 37% of survey sample did not know the meaning of the word 
“inflation”’.19 The issue of wage increases for low paid workers, and the 
distinction between those represented in absolute, as opposed to percentage, 
terms was raised during the Parliamentary debates on the strike. Minister for 
 
17 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 c.301 
18 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 c.267 
19 Behrend, H., ‘Research into Attitudes to Inflation and Incomes Policy’, International Journal of 
Social Economics, Vol.5, No.3, 1978, pp.136-47 
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Trade and Industry John Davies backed the Board’s position by citing figures 
which showed: ‘that average adult earnings for the week ending 9th October, 
1971, were in excess of £30, including allowances in kind amounting to some 
£2.’ Mr. Hardy (Labour) observed that the figures cited were for the period before 
the overtime ban and so included overtime earnings.20 Baroness Bacon (Labour) 
also raised the issue of miners’ wages being bolstered by overtime pay and cited 
a statement issued by the Board purporting to show how well miners were paid. 
She noted that: ‘for the week ending October 9 the gross average wage for a 
surface worker was £25.10. But the basic rate for a surface worker is £18 a week, 
so they must have worked 12 hours overtime, or in other words 10 hours a day, 
in order to get the princely sum of £25.10.’21 Mr. Stewart-Smith (Conservative) 
noted that it was: ‘inaccurate to talk about percentage increases being adequate, 
because the base line was so low.’22 Several members also made comparisons 
between the wages being earned by miners and those earned by other low paid 
workers. Mr. Crouch (Conservative) claimed to have ‘been told by many miners 
that their wives and daughters earn more than they do.’23 Mr. Varley (Labour) 
quoted a striking miner who had told him the previous week that: ‘Dustmen and 
grave diggers are paid more than surface craftsmen, and, while I do not begrudge 
them their pay, miners should receive a fair wage as well.’24  
 
Miners were particularly frustrated because their wages had slipped relative to 
other comparable workers during the previous decade (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
The Wilberforce report noted that the information [in Table 4.2] indicated the 
relative decline in miners’ wages, but that the figures could be no more than 
illustrative since the precise dimensions of the relative decline vary according to 
the statistical series on pay that is used, and the base date that is chosen for 
comparison. It noted, however, that after careful study of a variety of alternative 
measures and base dates, the Inquiry was able to draw no conclusion other than 
that a serious fall had occurred in the relative pay position of the mineworkers, 
when compared with those in manufacturing industry. The apparent recovery of 
some lost ground in 1971 was partly to be explained by the 1970 settlement in 
coalmining which favoured some low paid workers, and also by the fact that 
 
20 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 cc.235-329 
21 HL Deb, 31 January 1972, vol.327 c.623 
22 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 c.279 
23 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 c.301 
24 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 c.329 
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earnings in manufacturing in October, 1971 were depressed below trend by the 
recession in business conditions.25 Table 4.2 is slightly misleading given that the 
minimum wages for adult mine-workers at the beginning of the strike, i.e. without 
the addition of overtime, were £30 per week for NPLA face workers, £19 per 
week for other underground workers and £18 per week for surface workers. 
 
Table 4.1. Comparison of Average Weekly Earnings in the Coal, 
Production, and Manufacturing Industries, 1960-1971.26 
 
Industry  1960* 1961* 1966* 1967* 1970* 1971*  
Coal Industry  15.96 16.87 21.60 22.60 27.70 28.00 
All Production (P) 14.10 15.06 20.25 20.55 26.80 29.70 
All Manufacture (M) 14.81 15.76 20.96 21.13 27.30 30.20 
Coal as % of  P 113 112 107 110 103 94 
Coal as % of  M 108 107 103 107 101 93 
(*April of each year, £) 
 
 
Table 4.2. Movement in the Relative Weekly Earnings in Coal Mining 
Compared to Manufacturing, 1960-1970.27 
 
Industry   1960* 1965* 1968* 1970* 1971* 
Coal Mining   16.28 21.21 24.12 28.01 31.65  
All Manufacturing  15.16 20.16 22.82 28.91 31.36 
Rank of Miners (1)  3rd 3rd 5th 12th 9th  
Coal as % of Manufacturing 107.4 105.2 105.7 96.9 100.9 
(* October of each year, £) 
(1) Out of 21 industry groups 
 
 
Government and NCB records demonstrate that both were well aware of, and 
discussed internally, comparative public sector wages, with regard to the miners’ 
claim. In September 1971 a memo from the Board’s industrial relations 
department set out various recent wage settlements which averaged over ten 
percent. Within this memo the most comparable settlements, i.e. those affecting 
public sector workers, were British Rail workers who had received between 
 
25 Source: Wilberforce, p.4 
26 Source: British Labour Statistics; NCB Reports and Accounts; Department of Employment 
Gazette, December 1971; Barratt Brown, M., What Really Happened to the Coal Industry? 
The background to the miners' strike, (The Institute for Workers Control, Pamphlet no.31), 
(Nottingham, 1972), Table 7, p.18  
27 Source: Wilberforce, p.5 
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thirteen and sixteen percent, Post Office engineers thirteen percent, London 
Transport maintenance workers eight percent, local government white collar 
workers eight percent, teachers ten percent, and Health Service workers eight-
and-a-half percent.28 A further NCB memo circulated during the strike noted that 
London dockers had received between six and seven percent and that most of the 
recent settlements had been between seven and eight percent (i.e. within the N-1 
norm). However agricultural workers received nine-and-a-half percent, and the 
lowest grade water supply workers over eleven percent.29 The DTI also 
considered the issue of comparative wage settlements and had received 
conflicting information concerning the appropriate level for a settlement. In line 
with N-1 the DTI noted that gas workers accepted a seven-and-a-half percent 
wage deal, which was ‘less than the offer made to the miners immediately before 
the strike’, and that power workers had received seven-and-three-quarters 
percent. However they acknowledged press reports that the average manual 
worker was earning £30.93 per week in October 1971, over ten percent up on the 
previous year, and that this strengthened the miners’ case, since it showed that 
the average manual worker earned as much as the highest paid miner.30 On the 
same day, Cabinet minutes noted that Chrysler had increased its offer to six 
thousand five hundred striking car workers to twenty percent over eighteen 
months, equivalent to an annual increase of about fourteen percent.31 The 
Financial Times political editor raised the issue of the validity of the miners’ case 
whilst warning of the dangers of ignoring it, noting: ‘people have an uneasy 
feeling that there is something wrong with a system in which people who are 
working in conditions of extreme discomfort and some danger down the pits 
should be paid less than production-line motor workers, dockers, overground 
electricians and many shorthand typists.’32  
 
 
4.4 Wage Inflation and the N-1 Pay Norm 
 
Despite this evidence the Government was determined to maintain its wage limit 
and during the negotiations the Board’s hands were tied by N-1, making 
 
28 TNA: COAL31/416, Recent Important Wage Settlements, 8 September 1971 
29 TNA: COAL31/383, Recent Settlements Affecting Basic Rates, (undated, c. January 1972) 
30 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/12, 25 January; PRCS/20, 3 February; PREM15/985, PRCS/23, 7 
February 1972 
31 TNA: CAB128/50/6, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 6, 03 February 1972 
32 Financial Times, 21 January 1972. See footnote 8, p.98 
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conciliation impossible. Against this background the miners’ claim was not 
discussed on its own merits, but rather in terms of its effect on other public-sector 
wage claims and of the Government’s overall policy, and Heath was prepared to 
confront the miners rather than breach N-1. The Government was not only aware 
of the risk of a strike, but saw it as a necessary move in defence of what it believed 
to be a crucial element of its overall economic strategy.33 Early in the second 
week, the Cabinet was concerned that, whilst accepting a degree of concession to 
the miners would become necessary, it did not want this to appear to have been 
won too easily for fear that this would damage the Government’s progressive 
reduction in pay awards by encouraging others to seek above inflation 
settlements.34 The miners’ 1971 claim confronted a settlement limit of between 
seven and eight percent against a retail price index of over nine percent.35  
 
In an internal review of the wage negotiations prepared for Heath in March 1972 
it was noted that the NCB had warned, during summer 1971, that an attempt to 
negotiate an eight percent settlement was likely to precipitate a strike, but the 
Government had then initially tried to impose a seven percent limit with the 
possibility of holding the settlement to seven-and-a-half percent. The NCB 
subsequently ‘strongly requested’ a higher negotiating limit and the Ministerial 
Committee on Pay noted on 5 October that for the Government ‘the risks of 
standing firm were very great’ and that a strike could drag on for many months 
with incalculable political and economic consequences. The review also made the 
point that Ministers did not sufficiently appreciate the ‘moral’ strength of the 
miners’ case until very late in the day but that given their preoccupation with 
maintaining N-1 it is doubtful that they would have regarded the miners’ claim 
as sufficiently compelling to justify a breach of the pay ceiling in any case.36 The 
Government was further determined to hold its position against the miners given 
the prospect of simultaneous strikes in three connected sectors - coal, gas and 
electricity. Thus, at the outset its key aim was to maintain N-1 against pending 
negotiations in the gas and electricity industries.37  
 
33 TNA: PREM 15/984, Note, ‘Coalmining’, Barnes to Carr, 6 January 1972 
34 TNA: CAB128/50/3, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 2, 18 January 1972 
35 Godley, W.A.H., ‘Inflation in the United Kingdom’, in Krause, L.B. & Salant, W.S., (Eds), 
Worldwide Inflation: Theory and Recent Experience, (Washington DC, 1977) p.454 
36 TNA: PREM 15/986, Report on Strike, Trend, 9 March 1972 
37 TNA: CAB128/49/63, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 3, 14 December 1971; CAB128/50/2, Cabinet 
Conclusions, Item 3, 11 January 1972 
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The day after the strike began, the Financial Times set out a comparison of wage 
increases for the world’s leading economies, which showed that the trend which 
was apparent in the UK was similar to that experienced in other leading 
economies, and that it was not simply the result of UK domestic policy or militant 
trade unions as had been argued. The article cited OECD (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) figures for annual percentage 
increases in hourly/weekly earnings in 1969-71 for selected leading economies 
compared with corresponding increases in 1963-69, and considered the fact that 
consumer prices had also seen an accelerated upswing in 1969-71 across the same 
economies (see Figs 4.1 & 4.2). The author reasoned that: 
 
If the sudden appearance of militant union leaders in the UK were the 
cause, then similar characters must have simultaneously and unpredictably 
appeared in these other countries. In sober fact, it is clear that some 
powerful world-wide economic force must have been operating… Whether 
prices or wages were the operative cause, there is no doubt of the 
simultaneous upswing as a world movement in 1969-71.38  
 
 
Fig.4.1. Comparison of Rise in Average Weekly Earnings of Some Leading 
Economies, 1963-69 & 1969-71.39 
 
 
38 Financial Times, 10 January 1972 












Fig.4.2. Comparison of Rise in Consumer Prices of Some Leading 
Economies, 1963-69 & 1969-71.40 
 
In the earlier period in the UK, the Retail Price Index rose from 2.1% in April 
1963 to 5.5% in April 1969, which, whilst more than doubling, kept the RPI 
within the relatively stable zone that had held for a decade and a half. However, 
the RPI then rose sharply over the following two years reaching 9.4% by April 
1971.41 This rise was in common with many of the leading economies and has 
been attributed to the boon of post-war reconstruction coming to an end and the 
hegemonic position of the USA being eroded leading to increasing 
synchronisation in economic fluctuations globally. The accelerated upswing in 
worldwide consumer prices and attendant wage levels thus marked an important 
break in the post-war economic experience and an end to the seemingly 
permanent path of rising prosperity and full employment.  This challenged the 
dominant Keynesian economic model and pushed the Phillips Curve of the 
relationship between inflation and wages outwards such that both models were 
reassessed and adapted over the next period as the RPI rose above 20%.42 
Darlington and Lyddon point to the diminishing rate of profits as the ‘world-wide 
economic force’ cited by the FT, and note ‘the increasing politicisation of 
industrial relations from the mid-1960s as governments tried to find solutions to 
 
40 Source: Financial Times, 10 January 1972 
41 Office of National Statistics, accessed on 29 October 2019 at https://www.ons.gov.uk 











companies’ squeezed profit margins, low economic growth, balance of payments 
crises, and rising inflation rates.’43 
 
 
4.5 Perception of Unfairness  
 
The Government’s inconsistent application of N-1 was highlighted during the 
dispute in relation to the large rises received previously by MPs and the Civil 
List, which were outside of the pay norm limit. These rises were large in both 
percentage and absolute terms and served to underline miners’ low wages and 
their perceived unfair treatment by the Government. During the parliamentary 
debates on the strike Mr. Lewis (Labour) noted that Parliament had been 
discussing whether £9 per week (£468 per annum) was too much of an increase 
for the miners but that some ministers would receive annual increases of between 
£5,000 and £6,000, and in addition ministers received an increase in their 
allowance from £1,250 to £3,000.44 Lord Balogh (Labour) said that the 
Government’s ‘yammering’ about the miners’ excessive demands showed ‘a 
peculiar and a louche priority of values’, and called it: ‘monstrous to enact tax 
laws which increase the top £50,000 salary by £6,803… and then to turn round 
and ask for restraint by people who hazard their life and health to get the country’s 
domestic energy and see their standards steadily eroded.’45 Mr. Joseph Kinsey 
(Conservative) speaking in Parliament just prior to the strike, pointed to the lack 
of even-handedness in this regard, and questioned: ‘the strategy of the 
Government in introducing an increase of this amount while asking the rest of the 
country to take lesser pay rises?’46 The Financial Times political editor drew 
attention to the discrepancy between the approach taken in determining MPs’ 
salaries and that being applied in the case of miners’ wages. He quoted from the 
report of the committee that determined MP’s salaries, which had stated that ‘the 
determination of an appropriate level of remuneration must in the end be a matter 
of judgment’ and had therefore arrived at salary levels which ‘fairly reflect the 
very heavy responsibilities carried by Ministers and importance of their role in 
the eyes of the nation.’ Thus, on the one hand an ‘arbitrary judgment of the 
“worth” of a job is accepted whereas in the case of the miners it is over-ridden by 
 
43 Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, p.7 
44 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 cc.349-51  
45 HL Deb, 31 January 1972, vol.327 cc.639-40 
46 HC Deb, 6 December 1971, vol.827 c.955 
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other considerations.’47 A leaflet produced by the South Wales NUM during the 
dispute made a similar point in stating: ‘The British Miners - are entitled to a fair 
wage... Her Majesty has been given 100% increase in her income, Members of 
Parliament 46%, the Government Ministers 50%.’48  
 
The perception of an unfair approach by the Government to the issue of benefits 
and expenses was further highlighted over the question of supplementary benefits 
and pickets’ expenses. The Government sought to apply financial pressure on 
striking miners and the NUM, by restricting the amount that pickets were allowed 
to receive in food and travel allowances. During the second week of the strike, 
the NUM confirmed that it was giving pickets who travelled away from their 
home town up to £2 a day towards local travel and food. The Department of 
(Health &) Social Security (DHSS)49 argued that some of this at least should be 
considered when assessing supplementary benefit for the miner’s family, though 
the deduction might have to be a small one, since very little of this amount will 
actually have been available to support his family. It considered £2 excessive for 
food and travel alone and that a reasonable figure for two meals away from home 
‘by a manual worker’s standard’ would be £1 (when compared to the 75p allowed 
for a junior civil servant for lunch, which included an allowance for home saving.) 
A reasonable figure for local travel and minor incidental expenses was deemed 
to be 25p, and it therefore decided that a flat rate deduction of £1.25 per day 
would be made to arrive at a net income for assessment purposes (see Table 4.3).50 
The DHSS concluded that this would make it ‘very difficult for the wife and 
children’, and told the NUM that it could make ‘such heavy cuts’ unnecessary 
either by the NUM giving less than the proposed £2 or by keeping pickets on duty 
for no more than two or three days at a time. If they refused then they would have 
to tell the pickets how the payments would be treated. The NUM subsequently 
decided to pay pickets no more than £1.25 per day with the effect of a nil amount 




47 Financial Times, 21 January 1972  
48 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Morgan, p.18 
49 Both DSS and DHSS are used in the sources 
50 TNA: CAB128/50/3, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 2, 18 January; LAB77/84, Notes for Carr on 
Payments to Pickets, 17 January; DHSS Note, Payment of Supplementary Benefit to pickets, 
19 January 1972 
51 TNA: LAB77/84, DHSS Note, Payment of Supplementary Benefit to pickets, 19 January; 
Letter, Wendt to Holland, 20 January 1972 
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Table 4.3. DHSS Calculation for Deductions to Supplementary Benefit.52 
 
Picket paid £2 per day for seven days    £14.00 
  deduct 7 x £1.25   £8.75 
  ‘Disregard’53 of £1  £1.00        -     £  9.75 
Amount to be set off against benefit the following week  £  4.25 
 
Typical amounts of benefit if rent of £3.00 is assumed: 
Man and wife and 1 child     £  5.35 
Man and wife and 2 children     £  7.35 
Man and wife and 3 children     £  9.35 
 
 
Table 4.4. Supplementary Benefits Paid During the Strike (£).54 
 
Week ended  Wives &  Single  
dependents    Men 
 
11 January 1972            600       - 
18 January 1972       68,607        21 
25 January 1972     969,047   3,049 
1 February 1972     891,157 21,761 
8 February 1972     920,659 31,709 
15 February 1972     971,158 35,749 
 




4.6 Private Negotiations 
 
At a coal industry function on 3 January Gormley told Ezra that the gap between 
their respective positions ‘was very much smaller than the press supposed’ and 
so Ezra arranged to meet Gormley and Daly the following day. Before the 
meeting Scargill, then a junior official on the Yorkshire NEC, warned: ‘There 
must be no sell out, otherwise the miners will never forgive the leadership of this 
Union.’55 Gormley had a discussion with Ezra, after Daly had left the meeting, 
and suggested two possible areas of movement: either by taking the claim to 
 
52 Source: TNA: LAB77/84, DHSS Note, Payment of Supplementary Benefit to pickets, 19 
January 1972 
53 The ‘disregard’ of £1 was itself a reduction from the previous £4.35, and had been reduced 
under the Social Security Act 1971. It is discussed further in Chapter Ten 
54 Source: CPA: CRD/B/15/1, FPC(72)4, Wilberforce Report files 
55 Morning Telegraph, 4 January 1972, cited in Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, 
(London, 1984) p.217 
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arbitration; or by an offer improved in three respects - an extra two or three days 
holiday during 1972, a productivity scheme, and that the numbers eligible for a 
£2 increase should be extended to all those covered by the day wage agreement 
(the lower paid) with the effect of bringing the increase to 7.83%, i.e. that it 
should be increased in such a way as to make the overall settlement appear 
higher.56  
 
Carr and Davies discussed Ezra’s report of the meeting and agreed that Gormley 
appeared to be seeking a way of avoiding a strike and that the issue at stake was 
therefore just how much extra would need to be offered to persuade the 
‘middleground’ of the NEC to turn against strike action. They believed that the 
NUM were not really prepared for a strike - it had not set up an organisation to 
conduct the strike and had not been able to gain support from other unions - and 
that this suggested a marked reluctance within the membership for a strike. 
Consequently, Carr felt that the Government had two options, either to get a 
settlement at eight percent without a strike or be forced in to a position of eight-
and-a-half to nine percent after a month’s strike. He feared that if Gormley felt 
that there was more on offer tomorrow, then the NEC would be looking for even 
more by the weekend and therefore it was better to delay a decision on the 
package until nearer the strike date. Davies communicated the Government’s 
preferred negotiating position to Ezra setting out its hope of getting the NEC to 
agree to a settlement below eight percent.57 The following day, 5 January, the 
Board put forward its final offer at 7.9%, i.e. just within the N-1 limit, which 
represented an increase of between £1.90 and £2.00 for adults, with comparable 
increases for juveniles. The offer also included five extra holidays and 
discussions on productivity bonuses, and it urged reference to the National 
Reference Tribunal (NRT) if informal talks were unproductive. Gormley 
recommended acceptance of the offer but the NEC rejected it by twenty-three 
votes to two.58 Students from London School of Economics (LSE) attending the 
subsequent picket line at Battersea power station noted the miners’ distrust of the 
NUM leadership, and of Gormley in particular, and made reference to his meeting 
with Ezra: ‘They’re all very cynical about the N.U.M. - “if you’re fighting 
 
56 TNA: PREM15/984, Teleprinter Messages, No10 to Chequers, 3 & 5 January; LAB77/84, 
Meeting Notes, Carr and Davies, 4 January 1972 
57 TNA: LAB77/84, Meeting Notes, Carr and Davies, 4 January 1972 
58 TNA: CAB128/50/5 Cabinet Conclusions, Item 4, 27 January 1972; McCormick, B.J., 
Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry, (London, 1979) pp.202-3; Taylor, The Politics of 
the Yorkshire Miners, p.217 
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someone, you couldn’t sit down and drink sherry with them.” There is a real fear 
that “Gormless” will sell out, and also a certainty that if he tried to, it would lead 
to much more direct militancy, and possibly a refusal to accept the settlement.’59 
 
 
4.7 Government Intervention 
 
In concert with Heath’s ‘quiet revolution’ the Government hoped not to be 
obliged to intervene directly in negotiations with the NUM on a pay settlement, 
but rather wanted N-1 to be applied and for the Government to be able to publicly 
distance itself from intervention whilst exerting a tight control over the NCB’s 
negotiating position. Carr stated that he intended to follow the procedure adopted 
in the previous year’s postal strike and invite both sides to see him on 7 January 
to inform himself of their position. He expected the gulf between them to be too 
wide to bridge but wanted to head off public criticism that the Government were 
not showing proper concern for a resolution to the dispute.60 The NUM refused a 
meeting with the NCB at the Department of Employment and on 11 January Carr 
reported to Cabinet that negotiations between the NUM and NCB had broken 
down and that the NUM had refused the industry’s arbitration machinery. Cabinet 
then agreed that:  
 
The Government should appear neither over anxious about the strike nor 
indifferent to promoting a settlement. So far as possible they should avoid 
becoming directly involved in a confrontation with the miners and should 
leave the day-to-day handling of developments to the NCB. But it must be 
their firm objective to secure that the ultimate resumption of work would 
be on the basis of concessions no greater than those on offer to the miners 
before the strike.61 
 
There was a widespread belief that the miners were in dispute directly with the 
Government who were directing the negotiations behind the scenes or were at the 
least imposing an upper limit to the settlement via N-1. A Financial Times article 
about Gormley on the eve of the strike stated that: ‘he sees the miners’ dispute as 
a battle with the Government: he is convinced, not without some justification, 
that but for the Government rigid insistence on its 7 to 8 per cent. “going rate” 
 
59 LSE: Beaver, No.116, 17 February 1972, p.5 
60 TNA: CAB130/553, GEN72(72), Ministerial Committee (MC) Coalminers’ Strike, 1st Meeting, 
6 January 1972 
61 TNA: CAB/128/50/2, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 3, 11 January 1972 
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for pay rises, a compromise could have been reached.’62 This viewpoint was 
backed by the Shadow Trade and Industry Secretary, Harold Lever, during the 
parliamentary debate in the Commons on 18 January, when he stated that:  
 
The Government have not attempted to influence negotiations from a sense 
of responsibility and a helpful and constructive attitude. They have 
attempted nothing less than a diktat on the Coal Board and the miners as to 
the limits of any advance that can be made in the miners’ wages... 
Everybody knows that the ceiling on the advance offered to the miners by 
the Board has been fixed by the Government.63 
 
LSE students on the picket at Battersea power station reported a recurring theme 
of their discussions with the miners that it was not the Coal Board they were 
fighting but the Government.64 Miner’s wife, Tina Dogherty, also explained with 
whom she believed the miners were actually in struggle: ‘To me it was the 
Government. I don’t think the Coal Board had anything to do with it... Mr Heath 
says never to Mr Ezra. Miners didna’ fight the Coal Board. Miners fought the 
Government.’65 The miners were also upset that the Government, despite their 
intervention, were not seeking to resolve the dispute and were disparaging of the 
miners’ plight. South Wales NUM general secretary, Dai Francis observed that: 
‘you had the Prime Minister after three weeks of the miners’ strike casting them 
aside and saying “Let them stew”: But within another three weeks he sent for 
us’.66 These comments make clear that it was a secret to no-one that the 
Government were orchestrating the negotiations behind the scenes, and were 





Throughout the dispute the NCB consistently promoted arbitration as a means of 
resolution, but both the NUM and the Government held contradictory positions 
on the issue with the latter in particular using it as means to sway public opinion. 
Most miners were generally suspicious of arbitration feeling that it favoured the 
employer and invariably led to lower settlements, and certainly lower than their 
 
62 Financial Times, 8 January 1972 
63 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 c.242 
64 LSE: Beaver, No.116, 17 February 1972, p.5 
65 LB: MS4000/2/152/3, ‘Saltley Gate’ Actuality transcripts (Actuality), Tina Dogherty, miner’s 
wife, Warwickshire 
66 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, SaltleyII, p.20, Dai Francis, general secretary, South Wales NUM 
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claim. The Government conversely were reluctant to accept arbitration believing 
that it would lead to a higher settlement than they were prepared to offer, but 
nevertheless publicly blamed the NUM for refusing to accept it. Given the gulf 
between the respective starting positions both opinions were in fact correct. On 2 
January the Guardian reported the NEC’s expectation that the NCB would offer 
arbitration, noting that voluntary arbitration was open to either party, but that the 
union leaders felt that they should wait until the strike was under way,67 
presumably believing that this would strengthen their position. Gormley however 
privately offered arbitration to Ezra following the 4 January meeting he and Daly 
had with the NCB.68 Carr and Davies met on the same day and agreed that 
arbitration was likely to lead to a high settlement (perhaps ten to eleven percent), 
which Carr was reportedly very anxious to avoid, and so they told the NCB not 
to offer arbitration until later in the week.69 However, in submitting its final offer 
the following day the Board offered to take the dispute to the NRT since a strike 
would necessarily lead to some form of arbitration. The full NEC rejected this 
offer believing that it would result in their getting a lower settlement with Daly 
noting that, in line with other trade unions, the NUM no longer had confidence 
that an arbitration tribunal would secure an unbiased hearing because 
Government directions had undermined the principle of free negotiation.70 It is 
not clear whether Daly was in disagreement with Gormley or whether he, as 
general secretary, was merely reflecting the wishes of the NEC. During the first 
week of the strike the Department of Employment continued to recommend a 
hard line internally and that in particular there should be ‘no attempt to set up any 
form of arbitration and no move towards an offer which offered more in total than 
the Board’s final offer’, i.e. that it should remain within the N-1 level.71 The 
Government, however, continued to give the impression that it was only the 
miners who were refusing arbitration. This was highlighted during the Lords 
debate when Conservative peer Lord Harvey of Prestbury, begged the miners to 
go to arbitration, stating: 
 
At the end of the day, it will be difficult to get these people to talk. Why 
cannot they go to arbitration? They are a strong body of fair-minded men. 
If there is a case - and I think there is for many grades of workers - surely 
 
67 Guardian, 2 January 1972 
68 TNA: PREM15/984, Teleprinter message, No.10 to Chequers, 5 January 1972 
69 TNA: LAB77/84, Meeting Notes, Carr and Davies, 4 January; PREM15/984, Teleprinter 
message from No10 to Chequers, 5 January 1972 
70 McCormick, Industrial Relations, pp.202-3 & 217, and author note p.232 
71 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/1, 9-12 January 1972 
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4.9 Withdrawal of the Offer 
 
On the eve of the strike Ezra warned the NUM that if the Board’s final offer were 
rejected and the strike were to go ahead ‘an entirely new situation will arise, and 
we shall be bound to withdraw all offers.’73 The NCB subsequently withdrew its 
previous offers and Davies, speaking during the Commons debate the following 
week, gave a rationale for this action:  
 
the Board withdrew its offer on the grounds that the financial situation of 
the Board must inevitably be damaged by the strike, that it could not expect 
therefore to be in a position to sustain the latest offer from such a worsened 
position, and that when the parties resumed their contact - as they 
inevitably must - the situation would have to be approached in the new 
conditions which would then be prevailing.74 
 
The following day, 19 January, TUC general secretary Vic Feather chaired a 
meeting between the NUM and the NCB. The Government had not discouraged 
the NCB from attending but did not yet consider it opportune for Carr to offer his 
department’s conciliation services.75 Feather reported back to Carr that he had 
found attitudes hard on both sides, particularly following the NCB’s withdrawal 
of its offer. With respect to arbitration Feather rejected the idea of a Court of 
Inquiry as ‘fatal and ill-advised’ as there was unlikely to be a resumption of work 
whilst it sat and no guarantee that its recommendations would be accepted.76 Carr 
then agreed to meet both parties separately on 21 January and his departmental 
briefing notes for these meetings expose the process to be more for public 
consumption than a sincere attempt to resolve the dispute. The department 
believed that it was too soon to be forced into a true reconciliation role, and thus 
the stated objective was that:  
 
 
72 HL Deb 31, January 1972, vol.327 c.635 
73 Guardian, 8 January 1972 
74 HC Deb, 18 January 1972, vol.829 c.233 
75 TNA: CAB128/50/3, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 2, 18 January 1972 
76 TNA: PREM15/984, Meeting Notes, Carr and Feather, 19 January; CAB128/50/4, Cabinet 
Conclusions, Item 3, 20 January 1972 
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The impression must be given that the meeting is a serious and purposeful 
attempt to explore the current position and attitudes of the Union… After 
both meetings, the desired outcome is - however regrettably - that the 
attitudes of both parties is such that no useful practical steps can at present 
be taken to resolve the deadlock. 
 
The document also advised that the Government should push for a joint meeting 
under Carr’s chairmanship, noting that arguments for this included: that it ‘would 
help to confirm the position of deadlock’, since there was little risk of any 
movement; that ‘the public would look for a joint meeting’; and that a ‘joint 
meeting for 24 January, with a statement to the House the following day, would 
freeze the position through next week.’ The argument against a meeting was ‘a 
risk, however slight, of movement by the parties.’77 This brief exposes a rather 
cynical approach by a Government more concerned for public opinion than 
dispute resolution, and also a belief that it was in control of events. Prior to the 
21 January meetings Ezra told Carr privately that the withdrawal of the final offer 
had hardened attitudes and that he was not happy about the decision to announce 
the withdrawal. Carr replied that he should not worry about this, that it was the 
right decision, and that extremists in the union were determined to have a strike.78 
This indicates that the initiative in announcing the withdrawal of the offer came 
for the Government rather than from the NCB, though Davies appeared to have 
laid the blame with the NCB two days earlier. At the 21 January meeting the NEC 
were unanimous that a Court of Inquiry was no solution and would not get the 
miners back to work, and that they had completely lost trust in the independence 
of arbitration. Daly confirmed that the withdrawal of the offer: 
 
had hardened feelings and led to rejection by an overwhelming majority of 
his members at large and well attended meetings of the Branches 
throughout the country. The men were now saying that the Government 
and the Coal Board had forced them into a strike and they would not come 
back before they got all they were claiming.79 
 
At the end of the following week The Frost Programme aired live from Blaen 
Rhondda miners’ social club and several miners taking part confirmed agreement 
with the views of the NEC in expressing their disillusionment with the arbitration 
process. Many also voiced their expectation of receiving the full value of their 
 
77 TNA: LAB77/84, Briefing Notes, Carr meetings with NUM and NCB, 20 January 1972 
78 TNA: PREM15/984, Meeting Notes, Carr and NUM, 21 January 1972 
79 TNA: PREM15/984, Meeting Notes, Carr and NUM, 21 January 1972 
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wage claim and drew comparisons with the recent increase in MP’s pay.80 The 
following day, Gormley phoned the NCB to say that, ‘during an intensive 
coalfield’, visit he was now having to cope with a growing mood amongst strikers 
that they are going to settle for nothing, or very little, less than the full claim. He 
said that he was not encouraging that sort of attitude, but was very worried about 
it.81 A few days earlier, at the end of the third week, Carr had suggested to Cabinet 
that conciliation might have some chance if it were left to the end of the fourth 
week [circa 4 February], because by then the miners might be more disposed to 
settle and the wage negotiations with the electricity workers would have been 
resolved, which would put the miners in a more isolated position.82 Towards the 
end of the fifth week, Cabinet discussed the form an acceptable wage offer might 
take at the forthcoming joint meeting of the NCB and NUM. It noted that it was 
important to secure an offer that was demonstrably reasonable and to make this 
known as soon as possible in order that, if it were rejected by the NUM, public 
opinion would appreciate where the responsibility for the continuance of the 
strike lay, particularly if at the same time power cuts and the general discomfort 
of the coal shortage were increasingly being felt.83 These discussions betray a 
lack of concern, on behalf of the Government, for the ongoing effects of the strike, 
and also its belief that it was still directing events well beyond the half way point 
of the strike. 
 
 
4.10 Compromising Proposals 
 
When Feather reported back to Carr on 19 January he proposed adding a 
‘productivity element’ to the settlement.84 This had been suggested by Gormley 
privately at his meeting with Ezra two weeks earlier,85 though at the 21 January 
meeting between Carr and the NEC, Gormley then said that there needed to be 
the ‘right atmosphere’ before productivity could be negotiated and such an 
atmosphere did not currently exist, and that only a hefty settlement would create 
it.86 A productivity scheme based on higher rewards for greater production would 
 
80 The Frost Programme, 30 January, cited in TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/16, 29-30 January 1972 
81 TNA: COAL31/383, Memo, Shephard to Ezra, 31 January 1972 
82 TNA: CAB128/50/5 Cabinet Conclusions, Item 4, 27 January 1972 
83 TNA: CAB128/50/7, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 3, 10 February 1972 
84 TNA: PREM15/984, Meeting Notes, Carr and Feather, 19 January 1972 
85 TNA: PREM15/984, Teleprinter message, No10 to Chequers, 5 January 1972 
86 TNA: PREM15/984, Meeting Notes, Carr and NUM, 21 January 1972 
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favour the Areas in the central coalfield with wider seams, because coal there is 
comparatively easier to extract making them more productive for the equivalent 
labour. Thus, the reintroduction of a productivity scheme would undermine the 
unity amongst miners over the issue of wages, that had been gained under the 
NPLA, by effectively reintroducing wage differentials. It would consequently 
also accelerate the closure of the peripheral coalfields, which would appear less 
productive. This must have been known to both Gormley and Feather, and one 
can only conclude that this was their motivation for suggesting a productivity 
element; that is, that they favoured undermining the strength of a united 
membership, which is less easy to control.  
 
At Feather’s meeting with Carr, Feather also stated his belief that both parties 
wanted to get away from the ‘annual confrontation’ and suggested that the 
Government might offer a settlement to the miners covering a period longer than 
twelve months.87 Carr brought this issue to Cabinet on 27 January, when he 
reported that a resolution of the dispute depended ‘on the ability of the NCB to 
make any new proposal appear significantly different’ from previous offers, 
‘though not exceeding [them] in total value’. In particular he felt that higher 
immediate cash benefits could be conceded in return for a pay settlement which 
would last for more than twelve months but less than two years, ‘an arrangement 
which would have the incidental advantage of changing the normal autumn date 
of negotiations to the spring or summer’, when coal was less in demand and 
therefore the union’s negotiating position weaker.88 Feather must have been 
aware of this ‘advantage’ of the extended settlement period that he had suggested.  
 
Heath met Maudling and Carr on 7 February and they decided that Carr should 
invite both parties for talks on 9 February, when a State of Emergency would also 
be declared. Carr thought a settlement unlikely and that the main purpose of the 
talks would be to influence public opinion, and possibly also to float the idea that 
any offer might run for a longer period, say eighteen months, which ‘would have 
the advantage, from the point of view of the NCB and the Government that the 
next round of pay negotiations would take place in the early summer.’89 Having 
cleared the issue with Ezra, Carr raised it at the subsequent meeting with the 
 
87 TNA: PREM15/984, Meeting Notes, Carr and Feather, 19 January 1972 
88 TNA: CAB128/50/5 Cabinet Conclusions, Item 4, 27 January 1972 




NUM, and Gormley said that the NEC had not discussed the notion of a larger 
settlement over a longer period and that he did not therefore have authority to 
agree, but that in principle he personally was not averse to such a deal, though it 
would need to be accompanied by a higher cash figure. The Department of 
Employment calculated, somewhat hopefully, that a suggested settlement figure 
of £80 million, over a period of eighteen months from the date of resumption of 
work, or from 1 February, would be just within the N-1 limit. If, however, it were 
backdated to 1 November it would be about a ten percent settlement.90  
 
It some senses, it seems remarkable that two high level trade union leaders - the 
general secretary of the TUC and the president of the NUM - should suggest and 
promote an eighteen-month settlement and also a productivity scheme, both of 
which would undermine the concurrent and future negotiating position of the 
NUM. However, this manoeuvring is in fact in accordance with a contention of 
this thesis, that one of the primary roles of union leaders is to compromise the 
demands of the workers to the interests of the employer. Following the meetings, 
further negotiations took place and the Board then made a further offer, for 
eighteen months from resumption of work, of £2.50 rising to £3.00 for surface 
workers (currently £18), £3.50 for underground workers (currently £19) and 
£2.75 for face workers under the NPLA (currently £30). The NEC rejected the 
offer but lowered its initial claim of £8, £9 and £5 respectively to £6, £7 and £4 
to run from 1 November 1971. The Board said that it was not able to contemplate 
such a settlement and the negotiations ended. A Court of Inquiry to settle the 
dispute was then proposed.91 The Inquiry subsequently suggested that a 
productivity scheme should be devised, and recommended a sixteen month 
settlement running from 1 November 1971, though not ostensibly in order to 
move the negotiating date to the summer, but rather because by then four months 
of the negotiation period had already elapsed, and therefore it would allow for 
everyone to focus on increasing productivity rather than resuming negotiations in 





90 TNA: PREM15/984, Meeting Notes, Carr and NUM, 9 February; LAB77/84, Note, Jamieson to 
Holland, 9 February 1972 
91 McCormick, Industrial Relations, p.206  
92 Wilberforce, pp.11-12 
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4.11 Wilberforce Inquiry 
 
On 11 February Carr appointed a Court of Inquiry under the Chairmanship of 
Lord Wilberforce (the Wilberforce Inquiry),93 which was tasked with inquiring 
into the causes and circumstances of the dispute. The Cabinet’s own internal 
review later criticised the decision to leave this appointment so late.94 Public 
hearings took place on 15 and 16 February with key representations by Daly, Ezra 
and Campbell Adamson for the Confederation of British Industries (CBI). The 
TUC were invited to give evidence but did not think it necessary to do so. Daly 
pointed to the harsh working conditions in the mines and the isolation of many 
mining communities and noted the miners’ cooperation in introducing 
mechanisation and in the ‘streamlining’ of production, i.e. in undertaking pit 
closures and redundancies, which had led to an increase in productivity. He noted 
that both the NCB and the NUM had welcomed the NPLA but that miners had 
suffered a relative loss in earnings compared to other industrial workers.  
 
The Inquiry noted that it was difficult to determine the precise dimensions of the 
relative decline due to varying measures and base dates, but that there was no 
conclusion other than that there had been a serious fall in the relative position of 
miners. It observed that this constituted an ‘exceptional situation’ which could 
only have occurred with ‘exceptional restraint’ on behalf of the miners, and that 
it seemed clear that ‘too much was asked of men as the price of the new wages 
structure.’ It noted the inability of the Board to meet the miners’ claim since its 
financial objective was to break even each year and it had a concurrent deficit of 
£35 million, and accepted that a proportion of its inability to pay derived from its 
interest liabilities, but that a maximum of £33 million of the £100 million claim 
could be gained by writing off its outstanding capital debt. It reasoned that the 
claim could be financed by raising the price of coal though a sufficient rise might 
lead to a loss of one third of the Board’s market with attendant contraction and 
job losses, particularly in the peripheral coalfields. If this were unacceptable then 
the Government would have to pay as the Court considered it unreasonable to ask 
miners’ wages to be held down to finance uneconomic operations. It also 
 
93 Wilberforce Inquiry, Cmnd. 4903, February 1972 
94 TNA: PREM15/986, Negotiations Review, Trend to Heath, 9 March 1972  
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considered that the miners’ claim should be given exceptional national (or 
‘special’) treatment.95  
 
Table 4.5. Summary of Court of Inquiry’s Wage Recommendations, 
(weekly).96 
 
     Previous  New 
     Minimum     Addition Minimum 
Face Workers NPLA  £30.00   £34.50 
   3rd Daywage 
     Grade A £30.00           £4.50 £34.50 
     Grade B £24.92½   £29.42½ 
     Grade C £23.20   £27.70           
Underground 1955 Daywage 
     Craftsmen £19.40           £6.00 £25.40 
          Non-Craftsmen £19.00   £25.00  
Surface    Craftsmen £18.35           £5.00 £23.35 
          Non-Craftsmen £18.00   £23.00 
 
 
The Court recognised two distinct elements to the miners’ claim. 1) a periodic 
increase, to take account of the cost of living and other considerations. 2) an 
adjustment factor, to correct a distortion or trend due for correction.97 It 
recommended increases of £5 per week for surface workers (27.8% rise), £6 per 
week for underground workers (31.6%), and £4.50 per week for face workers 
(15%), with all payments backdated to 1 November 1971 and to run until 28 
February 1973 (see Table 4.5). 
 
The NEC initially voted down the Wilberforce proposals. The Areas voting 
against were the traditionally wage-militant, CP-controlled, Areas of Scotland, 
South Wales and Kent along with North Derbyshire, which had led the calls for 
a change to Rule 43, and the central coalfield Areas of Yorkshire and Nottingham, 
whose wages had suffered most under the NPLA transition period.98 The Court 
left many unresolved issues for example: the payment of the adult wage at age 
eighteen; the length of time over which rent arrears could be paid; how holiday 
pay should be calculated; whether miners were entitled to guaranteed wages 
during the overtime ban; what should be done about insurance payments not paid 
 
95 Wilberforce, pp.1-8; McCormick, Industrial Relations, p.208 
96 Source: Wilberforce, p.13 
97 Wilberforce, p.9 
98 TNA: PREM15/986, NEC Wilberforce votes, 20 March 1972 
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during the strike. The NUM therefore did not immediately accept its 
recommendations as final.99  
 
On 18 February Cabinet met to discuss the NEC’s rejection of the Wilberforce 
report, which had been published that morning. The Government agonised over 
the courses of action then open to it and to the NUM, in which the issue of public 
opinion was paramount. Heath suggested that he could try to persuade the NEC 
that the NUM would lose public sympathy if it maintained its intransigent 
attitude, and Cabinet also hoped to prevent the members of the NEC ‘from taking 
a final decision until they had been subjected to the full force of public opinion.’ 
However, Cabinet deemed it impracticable to keep the NEC in play in this 
manner, and the alternatives therefore were either to negotiate further concessions 
beyond the Wilberforce recommendations or to stand firm. Either course was 
fraught with public perception difficulties. If the Government stood firm then the 
full weight of public opinion might not persuade the miners to concede, and even 
the use of servicemen and volunteers to distribute supplies or the use of imported 
coal, which might give a few weeks respite, would be over in a very short time at 
which point the Government would be forced to concede defeat. Public opinion 
would then censure them even more severely than if they were to negotiate with 
the miners immediately. On the other hand, it was inconceivable that, on the very 
day that the Wilberforce report was published, the Government should acquiesce 
in concessions going substantially beyond the Court’s recommendations. To do 
so would give the miners so clear a victory that the Government’s authority would 
be severely damaged and a fresh mandate might be required. ‘To fight and lose 
would be bad enough; not to fight at all would be even worse.’100 However, 
further talks on these issues were then held between the Government/NCB and 
the NUM and additional concessions were obtained. When the NEC then 
accepted the proposals, the right-wing called for an immediate end to picketing, 
which was agreed by fourteen votes to eleven though picketing continued in some 
places.101 A ballot on acceptance of the settlement was carried out on 23 February 
and received a majority of over ninety-six percent in favour. Miners subsequently 
returned to work on 28 February.102 
 
99 McCormick, Industrial Relations, p.208 
100 TNA: CAB128/50/9, Cabinet Conclusions, 18 February 1972 
101 Pitt, M., The World On Our Backs: The Kent Miners and the 1972 Miners’ Strike, (London, 
1979) pp.200-203 





This chapter considered the Heath Government’s introduction of the N-1 Norm 
as a means to control public sector wage inflation whilst proclaiming a desire to 
take on the public sector and contain strike activity. In this, it confronted a section 
of the industrial working class that was ready for such a confrontation following 
a period of pit closures and wage restraint that had caused significant frustration 
and unrest. It has shown that miners’ wages were low in comparison to other 
public sector and manual workers, and that their wage claim was an attempt to 
redress this imbalance. It has also demonstrated that British inflation levels and 
wage settlements were comparable to those of other leading economies, and that 
the conditions pertaining in Britain were not untypical despite suggestions that 
militant union leaders were the cause. The chapter showed that the NUM’s wage 
claim confronted the Government’s self-imposed limit on the level of public 
sector wage settlements, which was inconsistently applied and took no account 
of the merits of the miners’ case. The Government were shown to be aware that 
their imposition of the pay norm would provoke a strike, and that they not only 
ignored this danger but actively sought such an outcome and were dismissive of 
the plight of the miners and adamant about the merits of their own strategy in the 
belief that they were in control of the dispute. The chapter has demonstrated that 
the Heath Government’s ‘quiet revolution’ took the form of a professed desire to 
remain detached from the negotiations, but this was shown to be merely a public 
relations exercise since the it actually dictated the terms and the time-frame, 
within which the NCB could negotiate. The withdrawal of the NCB’s final offer 
was a decision imposed on the NCB by the Government, despite the NCB’s 
bearing the blame, and it hardened the resolve of the miners to get their full claim. 
The issue of arbitration was another in which the Government’s public 
pronouncements were at odds with its actions, and it was used in an attempt to 
swing public opinion against the miners. The chapter exposed the private 
negotiations undertaken by the leaders of both the NUM and the TUC in seeking 
to resolve the dispute on terms less favourable to the miners, showing the real 
role of trade unions not as defenders of their members but as liaisons between the 

















This chapter considers the picketing of coal stocks during the strike, to prevent 
their movement from colliery pit-heads, opencast sites and depots, and to stop the 
transport of fuel to and from power stations and to large industrial coal users such 
as steelworks. It does not concern the picketing of officials and clerical workers, 
which is discussed in Chapter Six. It will consider the NUM’s strategy of halting 
all movement of coal, and also the organisation of picketing, the ground for which 
had been laid in the contacts made during the overtime ban. It will assess the 
extent to which the TUC statement at the beginning of the strike initiated, 
encouraged, or facilitated picketing away from the collieries and enabled coal 
movement to be so effectively minimised. The chapter will consider the nature of 
mobile or ‘flying pickets’, and of mass picketing, and how this developed during 
the strike. It will review the divergence between the guidelines on picketing given 
by the national leadership, and their local, branch-level, interpretation, and show 
that the decisions on picketing were largely made by strike or liaison committees 
at branch level and were increasingly at odds with the NEC in that they were more 
militant and went further than the leadership desired. The weekly assessment of 
establishments being picketed, and the behaviour of the pickets, is primarily 
based on weekly telexes sent by the English and Welsh constabularies to, and at 
the request of, the Home Office,1 but draws also on the Board’s situation reports 
and the DTI’s daily progress reports on the strike. 
 
 
1 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English and Welsh Constabularies to Home Office 
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5.2 Picketing Strategy 
 
The preparations undertaken during the overtime ban allowed the miners to hit 
the ground running when the strike began on 9 January 1972. The strategy was to 
stop coal production and to restrict the use of existing stocks and, in preparation, 
the country was divided up and allocated to be picketed by particular mining 
Areas, for example the Midlands Area (including Kent) was allocated the power 
stations in London, and the South Wales Area was allocated the south west of 
England. In Yorkshire, which had a huge number of facilities, responsibility was 
distributed amongst its Panels: Doncaster – the major Yorkshire power stations; 
North Yorkshire – the Leeds and Wakefield region and intermediate power 
stations; South Yorkshire – the steel complexes and coke production plants of 
Sheffield and Rotherham; and Barnsley – the picketing of the power stations and 
docks in East Anglia, because Barnsley had spare capacity due to there being few 
coal-using installations in the Area.2 Each Area and branch were responsible, via 
the liaison committees, for recruiting volunteers for picket duty and for 
developing systems of communication, in particular strike-centres since the 
collieries themselves were no longer available. In the pit villages, where the 
majority of the local population were concerned with the colliery, welfare and 
working men's clubs were used, but in the towns, where miners were in the 
minority and often spread out amongst the population, certain pubs and clubs 
were nominated. The liaison committees also investigated the location of the 
various depots, power stations, docks, rail yards in their Area, to ‘feel the ground’ 
and assess the size and type of coal stocks on site, the number of site entrances, 
in order to plan any potential picketing and, if possible, make initial contact with 
local trade unionists, particularly from transport unions and power stations.3  
 
Turner writes, incorrectly, that ‘flying pickets’ emerged as a ‘new tactic’ in this 
strike,4 however, flying pickets had been used effectively by miners in unofficial 
strikes in both 1969 and 1970 and had also been used earlier than these disputes.5 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s there was a proliferation of car ownership 
amongst miners making mobile picketing easier to organise since it did not rely 
 
2 Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, (London, 1984) p.222 
3 Pitt, M., The World On Our Backs: The Kent Miners and the 1972 Miners’ Strike, (London, 
1979) pp.122 & 126 
4 Turner, A.W., Crisis? What Crisis?: Britain in the 1970s, (London, 2008) p.13 




solely upon the hiring of minibuses or coaches. Miners quickly realised what an 
effective weapon mobile picketing could be given ‘modern motorway 
communication meant possible mobilisation of different coalfields in united 
action and covering long journeys in a very short time’.6 Beckett points to the 
NUM’s lack of funds and the attendant need for a ‘brief, aggressive campaign’ 
and that this led to the strategy of focusing on ‘pressure points’ such as power 
stations and coal depots.7  
 
 
5.3 TUC Statement and National Guidelines 
 
On 10 January the TUC, in response to an NUM appeal for support, expressed 
solidarity with the miners but decided that since several transport unions were 
already supporting the miners, there was no need for official TUC instruction to 
do so. However, it gave assurances that ‘members would not pass picket lines’ 
and it was generally agreed that ‘it would be helpful if pickets were mounted by 
the NUM on those places from which they did not want coal to be moved’8 (this 
is discussed further in Chapter Eight). Following the TUC statement Daly sent 
out an instruction to the Area secretaries of the NUM to place pickets at ‘coal 
stock yards, open cast sites, Docks and Power Stations’. The following day he 
sent a further statement of ‘instructions to pickets’ stating that: ‘The aim of the 
NUM picket is to prevent the movement of coal and alternative fuels between 
power stations, coal depots and other coal consumers.’ Picket lines ‘should 
therefore be placed at strategic rail and road access points to prevent the 
movement of coal or alternative fuels’. The statement stressed that picketing 
should be peaceful, and that other workers not transporting fuel should be allowed 
to enter the various plants.9  
 
On 21 January, Daly issued a further circular setting out national rulings and 
guidelines. This noted that oil-fired power stations were now taking extra loads 
following the closures of coal-fired stations, and that deliveries of oil should also 
 
6 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Morgan, p.28; Allen, V. L., The Militancy of British 
Miners, (Shipley, 1981) p.191 
7 Beckett, A., When the Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies, 
(London, 2009) p.64 
8 MRC: TUC Archive, MSS.292D/24.1/5, Finance and General Purposes Committee (FGPC), 
Special Meeting, 10 January 1972 
9 MRC: TUC, MSS.292D/253.103/1, Daly to Area Secretaries, Circular AS17/72, 11 January; 
Instructions to Pickets, 12 January 1972 
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be stopped, though all equipment, particularly safety equipment, should be 
allowed through the lines. Twenty-four-hour pickets were to be mounted at all 
power stations except where firm assurances had been received from local unions 
that any movement of fuel would be notified. Daly noted that coke supplies to 
steelworks should also be stopped, and that the only coal allowed to move was 
that for priority consumers, in order that these supplies were not exhausted; any 
such movements should be accompanied by pickets to ensure correct delivery. 
The circular demanded, again, that all picketing should be peaceful and that there 
should be no provocation whatsoever, and that picket lines should be maintained 
throughout the strike, even as they become more effective and seemingly 
unnecessary. The circular allowed for local variation according to the situation, 
which arguably opened the door to divergence from these guidelines though local 
branches had already been diverging from national guidelines since the overtime 
ban.10 
 
McCormick alludes to the I.R.Act (discussed further in Chapter Ten), the full 
provisions of which were soon to become law, in noting that the elaborate 
instructions issued by Daly were due to the implications of the ‘uncertainties 
arising from changes in the law’.11 Darlington and Lyddon note that miners in 
many different areas had been creating their own solutions for several days before 
Daly issued his instructions, and the national leadership was therefore in fact only 
responding to the developments in the more militant regions whilst also setting 
minimum standards for the others.12 Taylor describes Daly’s 12 January 
statement as one of the most important documents in post-war British politics,13 
which appears to credit the NUM leadership with more of a leading role than is 
perhaps warranted. He acknowledges, however, that: the strike was led and 
organised by the membership and their immediate leaders; that the conduct of the 
strike was in the hands of the Area union branches and the Yorkshire Panels; that 
the various branches were liaising with one another; and that the organisation and 
deployment of flying pickets was not under the detailed direction of the official 
union leadership.14 The TUC statement therefore encouraged non-mining unions 
 
10 TNA: COAL78/1906, Daly to Area Secretaries, Circular AS35/72, 21 January 1972 
11 McCormick, B.J., Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry, (London, 1979) p.204 
12 Lyddon, D., ‘“Glorious Summer”, 1972: the High Tide of Rank and File Militancy’, in 
McIlroy, J., Fishman, N. & Campbell, A., (Eds.), The High Tide of British Trade Unionism: 
Trade Unions and Industrial Politics, 1964-79, (Monmouth, 2007) p.330; Darlington & 
Lyddon, Glorious Summer, p.45 
13 Taylor, A., The NUM and British Politics, Volume 2: 1969-1995, (London, 2005) pp.58-9 
14 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, pp.219-22 & 231 
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to respect the sanctity of the picket lines, or at least sanctioned their recognition, 
and also aided the divergence between the rank-and-file pickets and the NUM 




5.4 Picketing of Coal Stocks - an Overview 
 
The types of establishment picketed during the strike were primarily those 
advised by the NUM leadership, as was the generally peaceful approach of most 
pickets. There was some local divergence from these guidelines, and in particular 
the miners’ attitude, though remaining largely peaceful, grew increasingly 
frustrated and militant as the strike progressed. The picketing, for the most part, 
remained small scale or token, that is to say less than twenty pickets on any one 
picket line, and mostly less than ten. The larger scale picketing increased as the 
strike progressed, in particular against establishments that persistently defied the 
miners’ appeals. During the first two weeks of the strike collieries remained the 
establishments most picketed followed by depots then power stations. The 
following two weeks saw power stations overtake depots with collieries 
remaining first, though collieries slipped behind both in the fifth week. Though 
coal production ceased immediately at NCB collieries, they continued to be 
picketed for two main reasons: to prevent any movement of pit-head coal stocks, 
except for use by priority consumers (discussed further in Chapter Seven); and to 
attempt to prevent safety and clerical staff from entering, or to regulate their 
numbers (discussed further in Chapter Six). It is not always clear from the records 
whether the former or latter pertains, except where very large numbers of pickets 
amassed at collieries in which case it seems clear that this was for the latter 
purpose. In the case of opencast sites, the recorded picketing includes both the 
opencast mines themselves, but primarily the depots that stored the opencast 
mined coal; pickets attempted to prevent both the delivery of opencast coal to the 
depots, and the subsequent release of any coal stocks. Picketing at all other depots 
was primarily concerned with stopping the removal of fuel, except for use by 
priority consumers. The term ‘depots’ covers a host of different establishments, 
including NCB and privately-owned depots and yards, coke-stocking and coke-
washing sites, reclamation sites, merchants’ yards and storage quarries. The 
picketing of power stations was primarily concerned with stopping the delivery 
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of fuel and later also ignition oil and other supplies such as hydrogen, but the 
picketing was also used to prevent the transport of fuel out of those power stations 
that had excess stocks for delivery to those which had a deficit. Picketing at docks 
and wharves was concerned both with the delivery of imported coal, and with 
preventing the release of coal previously delivered or stored by coal merchants, 
who were themselves also picketed to ensure that they only delivered to 
customers on the priority lists. The miners quite quickly curtailed coal movement 
around the country, neutralising the stocks held in many depots and power 
stations, which were consequently unable to be utilised. 
 
 
5.5 Week One:  9 - 16 January 1972 
 
Police telexes for the first week of the strike report peaceful picketing throughout 
England and Wales in both mining and non-mining areas. No incidents were 
reported by the various constabularies regarding the movement of coal, and the 
vast majority of reports used descriptions such as: ‘no disorder’, ‘no violence’, 
‘no disturbance’ or ‘no intimidation’. Pickets were said to be acting: ‘reasonably’, 
‘in an orderly manner’, or ‘co-operating with the police’.  
 




15 Source: TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English & Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 17 
January 1972. ‘Depots etc’ covers all stocking areas including merchants’ and railway yards; 
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The telexes report that one third of the picket lines had ten or fewer pickets, and 
that eighty-five percent had below twenty; where they were larger than this, they 
rarely exceeded twenty-five.16 The only incidents that arose concerned pickets’ 
attempts to persuade safety and clerical staff to strike. Picketing outside of the 
coalfield areas took place at centres near to collieries, such as Rawmarsh power 
station in Sheffield (by South Yorkshire pickets), coal merchants and a depot in 
Liverpool (by Lancashire pickets), Nechells power station in Birmingham (by 
Derby pickets), and power stations and depots in London and the Thames estuary 
(by pickets from Kent, Coventry and Stoke).17  
 
 
5.6 Week Two:  17 - 23 January 1972 
 
During the second week of the strike the police telexes record the majority of 
the picketing remaining peaceful, though there was a marginal shift in the 
reporting, with comments on the nature of the pickets slightly moderated to, for 
example: ‘generally peaceful’, ‘reasonable temper’, ‘no major disorder’. Dyfed 
Powys Constabulary reported that the attitude of the miners had hardened 
somewhat from the previous week. There were a greater number of sites 
picketed than in week one including private coal depots and reclamation sites, 
particularly in South Wales. There were also moves towards the picketing of 
establishments not directly involved in the coal industry, for example large 
factories, such as British Steel Corporation (BSC) at Smith’s Dock in Teesside, 
Imperial Chemical Industries in Runcorn, Cheshire and Courtaulds in Flint, 
were all picketed, as were smaller firms such as Bretby Engineering in South 
Derbyshire and Spencer Steelworks in Gwent.18 It became apparent to the NEC 
during the week that power stations were conserving coal by burning extra oil 
instead. It was therefore decided to disrupt the flow of oil, and miners also began 
the picketing of flashing (lighting-up) oil to power stations, which in some cases 
rendered useless the coal supplies they still held.19 Picket numbers reported in 
the police telexes remained reasonably small in most areas (thirty-seven percent 
 
16 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English & Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 17 January 1972; 
Nine of twenty constabularies in Week 1 gave no attributable figures 
17 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Sheffield & Rotherham, Liverpool & Bootle, Birmingham City and 
Metropolitan Police, 17 January 1972 
18 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Dyfed Powys, Teesside, Chester, Gwynedd, Gwent and 
Derbyshire, 24 January 1972 
19 KL: KA25/U/Z5, NUM Conference 1972, NEC Report, pp.8-9 
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with ten or fewer and eighty-four percent with twenty or fewer), but rose in a 
few areas, some of this quite substantially, and there was a corresponding 
increase in militancy.20  
 
Fig.5.2. Types of Establishment Picketed, England & Wales: Week Two.21 
 
 
In the Durham Constabulary area seventy to eighty pickets arrived on Monday 
at Swalwell opencast depot (up from ten the previous week) to prevent drivers 
from delivering coal. This appears to have had some success, as the picket 
numbers dropped to four by the end of the week. Durham also saw a marked 
increase in militancy at the East Hedley opencast depot where seventy to eighty 
miners picketed on the Wednesday in an attempt to stop deliveries of coal. The 
following day another one hundred and twenty miners arrived from the 
Swalwell area to bolster the picket and placed stones across the entrance to 
block the roadway. The pickets were reportedly uncooperative until the Chief 
Superintendent attended and they became more cooperative and dispersed.22 In 
Liverpool, Lancashire pickets attempted to prevent coal merchants from 
supplying coal for non-priority use. This had begun peacefully on a small scale 
at two sites in week one; however, Martindale’s coal merchants in the city centre 
refused to agree, and the picket numbers there rose to fifty on the Monday of 
week two. Pickets reportedly pulled sacks of coal off vehicles leaving the yard, 
 
20 Nine of twenty-two constabularies in Week 2 gave no attributable figures 
21 Source: TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English & Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 24 
January 1972 
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which seems to have persuaded the coal merchant to comply with their requests, 
as just three pickets attended the following day.23 At the end of the second week 
pickets clashed with lorry drivers attempting to take coal from depots in Kent 
and Nottingham, leading the police to make arrests.24 The increase in militancy 
by the pickets in these situations reflects a frustration at the lack of success at 
their initial attempts at peaceful picketing. In addition to pickets stopping the 
supply and delivery of coal, they also protested establishments that had decided 
to permanently discontinue using coal. A peaceful demonstration of around one 
hundred miners was reported at the county council offices in Matlock, 
Derbyshire against the increasing number of council establishments changing 
from coal-heating to oil.25 This was clearly seen as an affront in a mining county, 
during a strike, in a general situation where coal was losing out to oil and gas.  
 
On the Monday of week two, forty-two pickets from the Barnsley Area 
established a temporary ‘flying picket’ headquarters at Norwich Labour Club, 
with picket numbers rising to around one hundred by the end of the week.26 
There is some discrepancy about these figures, as press reports gave the 
numbers of pickets in East Anglia as one thousand by the Thursday.27 The 
Teesside Constabulary also reported incidents of flying picketing in week two, 
both in the sense of pickets travelling to other areas but also in the speed and 
mobile nature of the picketing concerned. Fifty pickets from Whessoe Lodge, 
arrived at the BSC site at Smith’s Dock, they consulted with BSC union officials 
and then left after just thirty-five minutes. They then immediately went to North 
Tees power station and repeated the procedure; leaving after thirty-five minutes 
having consulted the power station superintendent. Four days later twenty 
pickets returned to the power station staying for forty minutes before leaving.28 
A similar process was reported by West Midlands Constabulary when forty-five 
pickets from Stoke arrived at Ocker Hill power station leaving after half an 
hour.29 The emergence of the use of highly mobile, lightning picketing shows a 
development of the tactics of flying picketing based on what appeared to be 
successful locally, and making use of the resources and picket numbers at hand. 
 
23 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Liverpool & Bootle, 24 January 1972 
24 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
25 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Derbyshire, 24 January 1972 
26 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Norfolk, 24 January 1972 
27 The Times, 19 January, Morning Telegraph, 21 January, Morning Star, 20 January 1972, cited 
in Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, pp.220-1 
28 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Teesside, 17 & 24 January 1972 
29 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, West Midlands, 24 January 1972 
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In a similar vein, Kent pickets began mass picketing on the Monday with one 
hundred and fifty travelling to a Brighton power station and also to Corrals coal 
depot in Shoreham, where they persuaded the owners to allow only priority 
domestic supply. On the Wednesday this mass picket moved to Gravesend 
where the pickets dispersed across three sites: Southfleet Junction rail depot; 
Swanscombe cement works; and Northfleet docks. They had some success at 
Southfleet Junction with TGWU drivers agreeing to tip their loads, and the 
picket then continued at Swanscombe cement works until the company agreed 
to use only TGWU drivers.30 
 
 
5.7 Week Three:  24 - 30 January 1972 
 
In week three, the picketing of stocks remained largely peaceful with most 
constabularies reporting, for example; ‘peaceful picketing’, ‘no disorder’, 
‘orderly and well behaved’. The majority of picket numbers reported in the police 
telexes remained twenty or fewer (sixty-six percent) though this showed a 
significant drop from week two. Those with ten or fewer pickets rose to forty-
seven percent, whilst those with over twenty more than doubled to thirty-four 
percent.31 This indicates that the picketing diverged during week three into small 
observational and token picketing on the one hand, and larger scale 
interventionist picketing on the other, though the latter almost exclusively 
concerned the picketing of safety and clerical staff. This concurs with Pitt’s 
observation that it become obvious to the miners that whilst token pickets were 
enough where a strong trade union organisation existed, they were useless against 
determined strike-breakers.32 The larger scale picketing included that at Cliff 
Quay power station at Ipswich docks throughout the week, primarily to halt the 
supply of oil. This began with six hundred pickets (far and away the largest 
recorded picket numbers to date) before dropping to a coach-load for each of three 
shifts by Friday.33 One hundred and fifty pickets also attempted to stop the 
removal of coal from Corrals’ depot in Dover, where the police reported 
threatening behaviour and assault, though no arrests were made, and one picket 
 
30 Pitt, The World on Our Backs, pp.144-8 
31 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English & Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 31 January 1972; 
Twelve of twenty-five constabularies in Week 3 gave no attributable figures 
32 Pitt, The World on Our Backs, p.136 
33 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Suffolk, 31 January 1972 
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was injured after being struck by a lorry.34 In Warwickshire, although picketing 
was reportedly normal with no incidents, it became hostile to everyone attempting 
to cross picket lines, which were up to fifty-strong at Coventry colliery and 
Keresley Home Fire plant.35  In Durham the police telexes show a significant 
upswing in the numbers of miners picketing this week with both a larger daily 
average and more large-scale picketing, with twenty-five occasions when fifty or 
more pickets attended a site. The sites picketed varied daily as did the numbers 
of pickets at each site. At the Burnwright Coal Company depot in Eldon, for 
example, picket numbers built during the week from ten on Monday up to fifty 
on Thursday before dropping back to six on the Friday, presumably following 
some success in stopping the movement of coal.36 The DTI noted during the week 
that pickets ‘have effectively stopped all movement of coal into ports on the South 
and East coasts around to the Wash’.37 At the end of the week the NCB reported 
that twenty-three depots had been closed: fifteen due to their location within the 
curtilage of the parent colliery, and eight due to both industrial and non-industrial 
staff being on strike.38 
 




34 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
35 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Warwickshire & Coventry, 31 January 1972 
36 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Durham, 24 & 31 January 1972 
37 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/11, 24 January 1972 
38 TNA: COAL31/300, NCB Marketing Report, 28 January 1972 
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In a letter to Industry Minister Sir John Eden at the end of the third week, Ezra 
noted that the NUM did not appear able to influence many of their local 
representatives, and cited a leaflet issued by the strike liaison committee at 
Calverton colliery, Nottinghamshire, which he believed appeared to assert the 
committee’s right to decide who shall enter the pit, and also that it did not restrict 
its actions to peaceful persuasion.40 This position was reflected in an NCB 
marketing report, which noted that the pickets at stocking depots were ‘without 
exception very determined to ensure that their terms (which in some cases are 
entirely different from terms agreed with the NUM at a higher level) are carried 
out to the letter.’41 These comments bear out the general sense that during the first 
three weeks local Areas, branches, liaison committees, and indeed picket lines, 
rather than the national leadership, made the decisions about what was the best 
course of action. These decisions included such issues as how many pickets were 
needed, upon which sites pickets should focus their attention, where picket lines 
should be placed, who should be allowed into the collieries, and what terms were 
considered acceptable locally. Discipline was also largely determined locally, and 
an NUM branch secretary reported that he was ‘like the coach of the football team 
who tells them to play hard but fair… keep out of trouble and if any one raises a 
fist to you, well you must defend yourselves, etc… I would be telling these men 
they’ve got to be disciplined and not to break the law.’42 
 
 
5.8 Week Four:  31 January - 6 February 1972 
 
In week four, the picketing of stocks remained largely peaceful with 
constabularies reporting for example; ‘no disorder’, ‘no serious incidents’, ‘well-
behaved pickets’, and almost three quarters of picket numbers reported were 
twenty or less.43 The larger scale picketing included eighty to one hundred pickets 
at Eston Jetty and BSC Coke Ovens (adjacent sites at Teesside docks), and 
seventy pickets at Burnwright Coal Company’s depot in Eldon, Durham.44 
Between twenty and fifty miners from South Wales and Somerset picketed 
Dunball docks at Bridgwater, Somerset over four days, but despite this presence 
 
40 TNA: COAL 31/300, Letter, Ezra to Eden, 27 January 1972  
41 TNA: COAL31/300, NCB Marketing Report, 28 January 1972. Emphasis in original 
42 Cited in Geary, R., Policing Industrial Disputes: 1893 to 1985, (Cambridge, 1985) p.122 
43 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English & Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 6 February 1972; 
Seven of nineteen constabularies in Week 4 gave no attributable figures 
44 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Durham and Teesside, 31 January 1972 
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two ships reportedly discharged eleven hundred tons of coal.45 In 
Nottinghamshire three hundred and fifty pickets tried to prevent loaded lorries 
from leaving Radiant Fuels Company depot at Boughton leading to skirmishes 
and twelve arrests,46 whilst in the south of the county the NCB reported light 
picketing with just eighty pickets in operation throughout the Area.47 The 
Barnsley ‘flying pickets’ continued to operate in East Anglia with Norfolk 
Constabulary reporting seven coach-loads of pickets being deployed across the 
counties of Norfolk, Suffolk, Bedfordshire and Lincolnshire.48 
 
Fig.5.4. Types of Establishment Picketed, England & Wales: Week Four.49 
 
 
There was an increase in the picketing of power stations during week four, and 
this moved beyond the picketing of fuel. The Daily Telegraph reported that 
essential chemicals, and even food and milk for power station canteens, were 
being picketed,50 whilst The Economist reported a shortage of ‘lubricating oil for 
the bulldozers that shift coal about’ at the power stations. The CEGB claimed that 
power stations were losing generating capacity of 3,000MV (5% of national 
capacity), not due to lack of coal but because pickets were stopping kindling oil, 
 
45 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Somerset & Bath, 7 February 1972 
46 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
47 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Report, 2 February 1972 
48 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Norfolk, 7 February 1972 
49 Source: TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English & Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 7 
February 1972 
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caustic soda, hydrogen gas and steel piping from entering power stations.51 The 
Board reported some success, with massive picketing having been avoided at 
Kilmarnock power station and oil deliveries achieved during Tuesday night. In 
the Northwestern Area, picketing was concentrated entirely on transport and the 
NCB noted that this had made work more difficult and that transport drivers might 
have to be laid off the following week.52 At the end of the week the NCB reported 
that picketing at the pits in Scotland was very light and rather appeared to be 
concentrated on the power stations and on river traffic in the Forth.53 Six pickets 
were arrested at power stations in Scotland, four for breaching the peace at 
Kincardine and one each at Longannet and Portobello in Edinburgh.54  
 
On 3 February, at the end of the fourth week, a picket, Fred Matthews, was struck 
and killed by an articulated lorry leaving Keadby power station, Lincolnshire, 
after workers there had refused to unload its cargo of alum. He was one of fifty 
pickets from Bentley colliery, Yorkshire on a twenty-four-hour picket.55 His 
death was raised by a number of MPs in the Commons, with Thomas Swain, MP 
for the mining constituency of Derbyshire North East, seemingly fearing a 
backlash by the pickets claiming that: ‘This could be the start of another Ulster 
in the Yorkshire coalfield’,56 with an obvious reference to the ‘Bloody Sunday’ 
shootings in (London)Derry four days earlier. The DTI report noted, however, 
that: ‘There were no subsequent hostile incidents by the pickets … as a result of 
the accident.’57 Sandbrook describes the incident as ‘a lorry accidentally ran over 
and killed a tipsy miner’, which appears to both downplay the incident and the 
reportedly dangerous driving of the lorry driver, and to elevate Matthews’ level 
of intoxication. The alcohol level in his blood was described at his inquest as 
being ‘above the level for drivers but below the critical level for intoxication.’ 
The pathologist also stated that she ‘did not think there would have been any signs 
of impairment of his faculties.’58 
 
 
51 The Times, 31 January; The Economist, 5 February 1972; Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire 
Miners, p.221; Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, p.50 
52 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Report, 2 February; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex 
S, June 1972 
53 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Report, 4 February 1972 
54 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
55 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/20, 3 February; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
56 HC Deb, 3 February 1972, vol.830 c.677 
57 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/20, 3 February 1972 
58 Sandbrook, D., State of Emergency. The Way We Were: Britain, 1970-1974, (London, 2010) 
p.121; The Times, 4 & 5 February 1972 
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5.9 Week Five:  7 - 13 February 1972 
 
In week five, the picketing of coal stocks remained largely peaceful with 
constabularies reporting, for example; ‘no disorder’, ‘peaceful’ or ‘no serious 
incidents’. The police telexes show a further divergence between smaller token 
and larger interventionist picketing with sixty percent of picket lines having ten 
or fewer pickets and thirty-three percent having over twenty.59 The majority of 
the larger scale picketing was concerned with safety and clerical staff, though 
there were some significant large-scale interventions to halt the movement of 
fuel. Picketing in most constabularies concerned power stations and coal depots, 
though with an increase in the picketing of opencast coal sites. In the Durham 
force area, the larger-scale picket lines were focused on preventing fuel 
movement from a number of private depots; two hundred pickets at Wades 
reclamation depot in West Auckland, sixty and fifty pickets respectively at 
Kirby’s and Bensons sea coal depots in Hartlepool, and fifty pickets at O’Toole’s 
reclamation quarry in Bishop Auckland. In Teesside, Stockton gasworks was 
picketed by thirty pickets daily and the Shell Mex refinery at Teesdock had two 
hundred and fifty pickets over two days. The police reported that militant 
elements were apparent at the latter, but that there was no serious incident and an 
agreement was reached between the unions.60 Around one hundred Lancashire 
pickets forcefully prevented the entry of vehicles to Fiddlers Ferry power station 
with seven pickets arrested for insulting behaviour and assaults on the police. 
Five pickets were also arrested at Charrington coal depot in North London for 
obstructing a footpath and refusing to move.61 At the end of the fifth week, the 
NCB reported that picketing remained a highly effective weapon with oil tanker 
drivers now refusing to attempt to cross picket lines. They noted, however, that 
going forward picketing would begin to lose its relevance because the disruption 
caused by the inability to move essential supplies would be eclipsed by the 
absolute shortage of coal.62 
 
Towards the end of the third week the Government had discussed the possibility 
of using helicopters to deliver essential supplies such as oxygen to the power 
 
59 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English & Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 14 February 
1972; Eleven of nineteen constabularies in Week 5 gave no attributable figures 
60 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Durham and Teesside, 14 February 1972 
61 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
62 TNA: COAL31/383, NCB Marketing Report, 11 February 1972 
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stations though, with one eye on public opinion, it considered it unwise to use 
them at that stage as their use might be seen as a sign of the miners’ success and 
so worsen rather than improve the chance of a settlement.63 A week or so later, 
during week five, the DTI recorded that the CEGB had requested the use of a 
Royal Air Force (RAF) helicopter to transport hydrogen supplies into Thorpe 
Marsh power station, but the DTI had not agreed in case it jeopardised 
negotiations with the NUM. The CEGB responded the same day to say that there 
appeared to be a misunderstanding as they had understood the issue to be in part 
the use of an RAF aerodrome, and insufficient advantage to justify the use of 
RAF hydrogen or RAF aerodromes. However, the CEGB informed the DTI that 
it had in fact begun to use the NCB’s own helicopter, usually used for inspecting 
power line faults in bad weather or difficult locations, and hoped that the DTI 
would not mind this use of its normally available transportation. The DTI 
subsequently responded that it had no problem with this arrangement.64 The 
following day, 9 February, the DTI noted a press report that hydrogen supplies 
had been delivered by helicopter to Thorpe Marsh on several occasions over the 
last few days and that power station workers were considering whether to use 
these supplies, but that their union had asked them to do so.’65 The DTI post 
mortem of the strike later reported that a helicopter had supplied hydrogen to 
Thorpe Marsh power station on 18 February ‘by crossing picket line’,66 which 
seems a rather odd way of phrasing it, but perhaps accounts for why the power 
station workers were unsure whether to use the supplies.  
 
The two most significant picketing events in week five were those at Longannet 
power station in Fife, and at Nechells gasworks in Birmingham. The picket of 
Longannet, which began in week four, was reported to have very large numbers 
with pickets preventing oil from being delivered to the power station from the 
Firth of Forth and also attempting to talk to power station workers on their way 
to work,67 presumably with a view to persuading them to refuse to handle picketed 
supplies. This picketing would come to a head in week six with the controversial 
arrest of pickets and the intervention of government ministers to ensure their 
 
63 TNA: CAB134/3485, E(72), Ministerial Committee (MC), Emergencies, 2nd Meeting, 26 
January 1972 
64 TNA: POWE14/2661, Letter, Garner to Hawkins, 8 February; Replies, 8 & 10 February 1972 
65 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/22, 5-6 February; PRCS/23, 7 February; PRCS/25, 9 February 
1972 
66 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
67 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 8 & 9 February; PREM15/985, PRCS/27, 11-14 
February; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
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release; it is discussed in more detail below. The picketing of Nechells gasworks, 
better known as Saltley or Saltley Gate, had taken place on and off over the course 
of the strike, but became the scene of a massive blockade and stand-off between 
pickets and the police this week, with the assistance of thousands of engineers 
from Birmingham, as well as students and members of the public; it is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter Nine.  
 




5.10 Week Six:  14 - 20 February 1972 
 
At the end of the sixth week the Home Office cancelled the need for 
constabularies to report picketing incidents in the belief that it was receiving 
‘nothing of any importance’ from the process. Consequently, the reports for that 
week, due on 21 February (the Monday of week seven), were not sent.69 The 
analysis for week six, to the extent that it is based on the police telexes, is 
therefore able to draw only on the picketing on the Monday of that week.  
However, at the beginning of the sixth week the NUM took the decision to reduce 
picket numbers generally,70 though liaison committees took their own decisions 
locally with regard to compliance. A Barnsley liaison committee member 
 
68 Source: TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English & Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 14 
February 1972 
69 TNA: HO325/101, Note, McQueen to Hilary, 21 February 1972; Telex, Home Office to 
Constabularies (undated, assumed 21 February 1972) 
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reportedly told the press: ‘I don’t care what the NUM says about the pickets, the 
strike committee here will decide when to reduce picket numbers.’71 The DTI 
reported that picketing to interrupt rail-borne supplies to power stations and to 
prevent rail dispatches from Shellhaven and Coryton refineries in Essex was 
continuing, but that road movement had to some extent compensated for this.72 
In London, two pickets used a boat and a loud hailer to picket Fulham power 
station from the Thames,73 and pickets also used a Thames pleasure steamer 
draped with banners and proclaimed it to be an official NUM picket boat; dockers 
and power workers from power stations on the Thames were therefore able to 
refuse to handle fuel by claiming that it had passed through an official NUM 
picket line.74 In Nottinghamshire, between five hundred and seven hundred 
pickets, over two days, tried to prevent loaded lorries from leaving Radiant Fuels 
Company depot, Boughton and pickets also obstructed lorries at West Burton 
power station; police made twelve arrests on obstruction and assault charges, and 
offences against the Public Order Act. Pickets used obstruction and force, 
including some stone throwing, to try to prevent lorries from entering Dunball 
wharf at Bridgwater, Somerset to load coal being delivered there; one picket was 
arrested and an agreement was reached with the dockers for subsequent ships to 
be unloaded but for the coal to be retained at the wharf. At Keadby power station, 
where picketing continued following Fred Matthews’ death, there were 
skirmishes between police and pickets; a few pickets were slightly hurt and one 
was arrested. At Thorpe Marsh power station two tankers carrying acid and 
caustic soda had tried to run the picket lines, and reportedly ‘it was necessary for 
pickets to lie down in the road to stop the lorries.’ Pickets were warned to check 
all tankers by turning on the tap, as one tanker claiming to be carrying distilled 
water entered Keadby and power workers later reported to the pickets that it was 






71 Doncaster Evening Post, 17 February 1972, cited in Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire 
Miners, p.228 
72 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/29, 16 February 1972 
73 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Metropolitan Police, 14 February 1972 
74 Pitt, The World on Our Backs, pp.161-2 




5.11 Longannet Power Station 
 
Picketing at Longannet power station began on 3 February and lasted for around 
two weeks, with a twofold strategy: to prevent South of Scotland Electricity 
Board (SSEB) employees and their vehicles from reaching the power station; and 
to prevent its supply of coal being used for any other SSEB power station, in 
particular Cockenzie on the other side of the Firth of Forth, the second largest 
after Longannet. Members of ASLEF had promised the NUM that once the strike 
began that they would refuse to carry coal from Longannet or anywhere else. The 
numbers of pickets varied but reached a high point during week six. On Monday 
14 February over two thousand pickets confronted some four hundred police 
officers who were attempting to keep the road open, though a number of cars 
were turned back by pickets. The action culminated in clashes between pickets 
and police with three police officers being hospitalised and one sustaining a 
broken ankle. The NCB also claimed evidence of sabotage since dirt was found 
in the power station lubricating system. Seven pickets were charged with breach 
of the peace, and thirteen were arrested on the unusual charge of ‘mobbing and 
rioting’ and held overnight. Many of the miners viewed the arrest of the thirteen 
as vindictive, and one hundred and fifty gathered outside the court to protest the 
arrest and the court’s refusal to grant bail. Police cleared the protesters and the 
accused were taken to Saughton prison, Edinburgh.76 The mass picketing 
continued during the week with over four hundred pickets each day and two 
thousand five hundred on the Thursday. There were a further eight arrests though 
on lesser charges of assaults on the police or breach of the peace. The leaders of 
the TUC and the Scottish TUC complained to the Scottish Office and a deputation 
of Scottish mining MPs appealed to the Lord Advocate, the Government’s chief 
law officer in Scotland. His intervention subsequently accelerated the judicial 
process from the normal several weeks to a matter of days. The accused were 
subsequently released on bail on 17 February, three days after their arrest, and a 
celebratory crowd of one thousand miners gathered in Dunfermline High Street 
to welcome them back. The Government intervention, to effectively overturn an 
earlier court decision, foreshadowed the use by the Heath Government, later in 
the year, of the Official Solicitor to accelerate the release of the dockers known 
 
76 Phillips, J., ‘The 1972 miners’ strike: popular agency and industrial politics in Britain’, 
Contemporary British History, Vol.20, No.2, 2006, pp.187-204 
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as the ‘Pentonville Five’, who were arrested under the I.R.Act legislation, leading 
to a massive trade unionist protest and the threat of strike action.77  
 
 
5.12 Week Seven:  21 - 27 February 1972 
 
Despite the official end of picketing on Saturday 19 February, and the subsequent 
lifting of restrictions on the movement of coal, the NCB reported that pickets 
were still active at depots in Scotland, Yorkshire, the Midlands and South Wales 
early in the week but that by Friday all pickets had been withdrawn, except at one 
depot in South Wales. Pickets in Yorkshire and the Midlands had disrupted the 
movement of bulk supplies from Wath and Warsop collieries and were still 
insisting on rigid adherence to priority lists, and for supplies from depots to be 
moved only by trade unionists.78 The DTI reported that acceptance of the NEC’s 
negotiated settlement following the Wilberforce Inquiry report was 
recommended unanimously, or by large majorities, in Yorkshire, Scotland, 
Wales, the Midlands, Durham, Northumberland and Kent. In Derbyshire the area 
council recommended acceptance but that the overtime ban should continue until 
the NCB had paid the wage arrears to miners dismissed under the previous 
overtime ban. The picketing of oil installations ended and there were no reports 
of picketing at oil delivery points. The DTI reported that if picketing continued 
in Scotland during the week, because of the Longannet arrests, gas supply 
problems could arise, and there was also a report of a threat that there should be 
a one-day strike when the thirteen miners were to be tried unless the charge was 
greatly reduced. Coal deliveries from existing stranded stocks began to resume 
nationally though initially somewhat sporadically and not at first to non-essential 
industry. By the middle of the week, supplies were reportedly getting through in 
all regions and by the end of the week the NCB reported that it had sent out around 





77 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972; National Archives of Scotland: HH 
56/96, Flaherty to Hole, 16 & 18 February, & Chief Constable, Fife, to Secretary of State for 
Scotland, 17 February 1972, cited in Phillips, ‘The 1972 miners’ strike’, pp.187-204  
78 TNA: COAL31/300, NCB Marketing Report, 25 February 1972 
79 TNA: PREM15/986, PRCS/32, 19-21 February; PRCS/33, 22 February; PRCS/34, 23 
February; PRCS/37, 26-28 February 1972 
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5.13 Conclusion  
 
Picketing during the 1972 strike was not primarily mass or militant picketing; the 
majority of the general picketing that took place was small scale and largely 
incident free. The former portrayal is based on two separate aspects of the strike: 
the increasingly militant and large-scale picketing of safety and clerical staff on 
the one hand (discussed in Chapter Six) and the mass picketing events at 
Longannet power station and at the Saltley depot (discussed in Chapter Nine) on 
the other. The picketing of the collieries, coal depots, power stations, opencast 
sites and docks mostly involved negotiations or discussions between pickets and 
drivers, power station workers, and dockers. This was not always successful but 
mostly did not result in aggression. The picketing over the weeks developed from 
small and medium sized picket lines into a divergence between smaller token 
pickets and larger scale more interventionist picketing. The innovative use of 
larger scale and even mass picketing developed in part where small-scale 
picketing was found to be ineffectual. In particular, appealing to non-unionised 
drivers, whose wages depended on a delivery or collection, was often found to 
fall on deaf ears: similarly, with appeals to dock workers paid on piece-work. 
Consequently, the miners found the need to increase the size of the picket lines 
in order, in effect, to blockade the site entrance where their appeals were not being 
accepted. Darlington and Lyddon make the point that mass picketing developed 
due to the miners’ observation of these facts: the ineffectiveness of small pickets 
and conversely the clear effectiveness of mass picketing.80 Power stations were 
the key, and Phillips argues that the miners’ victory was achieved through mass 
picketing and the blockading of power stations, such as Longannet, and that this 
show of force also encouraged the view that trade unions were undemocratic 
organisations who wielded power irresponsibly, and that this was a threat to 
public order.81 The Government were, despite much preparation, clearly 
unprepared for the way in which the strike played out. Secretary of State for 
Education, Margaret Thatcher, noted that the ‘possibility of mass picketing, 




80 Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, p.45 
81 Phillips, ‘The 1972 miners’ strike’, pp.189-90 
















Several unions, in addition to the NUM, operated in the coalfields: two clerical 
unions – COSA (an NUM affiliated section) and CAWU; the senior managers’ 
union BACM (British Association of Colliery Management); and NACODS, 
effectively junior management, who undertook specialist, safety and maintenance 
work and had an overseeing role in the pits. This chapter considers the picketing 
of members of these unions who continued to work during the strike. The NEC 
agreed with the NCB that it was essential to undertake maintenance work during 
the dispute and also that the miners should continue to provide safety cover at the 
pits, and gave national directives stating that this work was required to be 
undertaken by members of the NUM during the strike. In this sense ‘safety’ is 
taken to mean such action as is necessary to keep the mines safe from the build-
up of water and methane gas, to keep fans, pumps and winding equipment in good 
working order, and other similar work. The chapter considers the picketing that 
took place in defiance of the NEC’s directives, and assesses the nature and extent 
of such picketing, the tactics and strategies employed and developed, and the 
ways in which these varied across and within the mining Areas. It considers the 
development of this picketing over the seven weeks of the strike as it became 
increasingly large scale and militant, though with significant variation, and 
included some of the most hostile action during the dispute. The chapter 
demonstrates that there was widespread disregard amongst the miners on the 
picket lines for the directives issued by the union leadership, both at national and 
Area level. It discusses the reasons for the miners’ decisions to refrain from 
undertaking safety work, and for stopping others from doing so. This appears, on 
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the one hand, to have been a negotiating tactic in applying pressure on the NCB 
to resolve the dispute, but on the other hand, and perhaps more significantly, to 
have exposed a deep anger and frustration felt by miners towards the 
Government, the Board, and the NUM leadership but primarily towards those 
breaking the strike. The chapter shows that the decision to picket officials and 
clerical workers reflects differing and divergent views on the future of the 
industry held by the leadership and the membership.  
 
 
6.2 NUM Statement 
 
After rejecting the NCB’s final wage offer on 21 December 1971 the NUM, in 
preparation for the strike, issued instructions to the Areas stating that those 
expected to work during the strike included pumpsmen, winding-engine men, fan 
attendants and similar, including NUM members concerned with the safe 
operating of pumping, winding and ventilation machinery. Also, in the event of 
an emergency affecting the safety of the men or the pit, additional men would be 
allowed to deal with the situation; the liaison committees should allow only the 
minimum number of men on any shift to ensure the necessary degree of safety.1 
The NUM’s official position was that it considered it essential to maintain the 
physical integrity of the mines, for example from the risk of roof collapse, 
flooding, or fire (due to the build-up of methane gas). The NCB highlighted 
additional factors of concern, namely that roof collapses or movements 
underground might lead to capital equipment being trapped, damaged, or lost 
entirely and that the deterioration or loss of coal faces would lead to an increased 
delay in the recovery of output after the strike.2 The implication, therefore, of 
maintenance work not being undertaken was that if it was a long strike the mines 
could become unsafe or unusable in the future and that the survival of a colliery 
or indeed of the industry was potentially in the balance. In response to arguments 
that lack of safety cover could lead to pit closures the miners noted the large 
number of pit closures there had been since nationalisation whilst miners had 
refrained from industrial action, maintained the pits, and been compliant with the 
NCB’s productivity drives. Douglass argues that refusing maintenance work 
 
1 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 




implied ‘a fight to the finish’ and that it was ‘something quite unprecedented’.3 
Whilst the implication is correct, maintenance workers had in fact been 
withdrawn or picketed during other disputes in the early twentieth century 
including in South Wales (1910), in Yorkshire (1919) and during the national 
lockout of miners (1926), though none of these was on the scale of 1972.  
 
The action taken against safety workers had little effect on the outcome of the 
dispute, which was largely determined by the restriction of coal movement, 
particularly to the power stations, though Darlington and Lyddon argue that ‘the 
miners were not to know this at the time.’4 Their implication is that the primary 
intention of the withdrawal of safety cover and the picketing of NACODS was to 
apply pressure in the wage negotiations by allowing mines to deteriorate and 
machinery to be threatened with destruction. However, there were other factors, 
not least the sense that those who crossed the picket lines, even to maintain the 
pits, were nevertheless strike-breaking, and they received some of the most 
militant and hostile action of the entire dispute. The NUM stated at the time of 
the overtime ban preceding the strike that safety cover should be maintained and 
that the ban was ‘subject to safety and the provision of certain services to our 
members’. The DTI subsequently commented that it was ‘not now clear whether 
this meant the safety of members or the safety of the mines.’5 This implied the 
belief that the NUM were not concerned with maintaining the pits but only for 
their own safety, which rather misrepresents the intentions of the NUM 
leadership, though it is perhaps truer for the miners themselves. Yorkshire miner 
Tommy Mullany made a similar point in remarking that the term ‘safety’ was 
being misused as the Board wanted to save property not men, since men were 
safest out of the pits.6 Nottinghamshire miners interviewed by the New Statesman 
during the strike also drew attention to the dangers underground and to the men 
being safer out of the mines:  
 
You are scared every morning when you go down, every single morning… 
The longer you stay away, the harder it is to do. I was down for 36 years 
and never enjoyed a minute of it. It’s bad enough after the holiday. But 
now… it’ll take a lot to get them back, I’d say.  
 
 
3 Douglass, D.J., Strike, Not the End of the Story: Reflections on the Major Coal Mining Strikes in 
Britain, (Overton, 2005) p.20 
4 Darlington, R., & Lyddon, D., Glorious Summer: Class struggle in Britain 1972, (London, 
2001) pp.213-4 
5 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
6 Cited in Allen, V. L., The Militancy of British Miners, (Shipley, 1981) pp.184-5 
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We’ll stay out six weeks, six months if necessary… Six months out here is 





6.3 Hardening of Attitudes 
 
The NACODS leadership refused to support the miners’ dispute and the vast 
majority of its members stayed in work throughout the strike, which contrasted 
with the support the miners received from some other unions unconnected to the 
coal industry, in particular the transport unions (see Chapter Eight). This 
hardened the miners’ attitude towards safety cover and towards the officials 
themselves, which had already hardened somewhat during the overtime ban. A 
member of the Swansea Steam strike committee noted the contrast between the 
attitude demonstrated by NACODS and that shown by other trade unionists: 
 
They (NACODS) called the police to take them through the picket line 
which, you know, caused tremendous bad feeling because here we were 
now in a position getting full co-operation of the railway workers, the 
Transport and General, the power workers and everyone else and here now 
men we were working with every day within our own pit, within our own 
industry, called the police.8 
 
NACODS refusal to strike frustrated the miners for two reasons. Firstly, many 
members of NACODS had previously been miners, worked with the miners on a 
daily basis, and lived in the same communities. Secondly, and a key point of 
contention, NACODS own wages were directly linked to the outcome of the 
NUM’s negotiations, in that NACODS wages were based on a percentage over 
and above the highest miners’ grade. Therefore, if the strike led to the miners 
achieving a higher settlement then NACODS themselves would directly benefit 
from such a settlement. NACODS pay negotiations ran alongside those of the 
NUM and on 14 January, at the end of the first week of the strike, NACODS 
representatives met with the Board, which expressed its appreciation for the way 
they had responded to the dispute in putting the preservation of the pits 
uppermost. The NACODS representatives stated that the attainment of a bonus 
 
7 Adam, C., ‘The Other Price of Coal’, New Statesman, Vol.83, No.2133, 4 February 1972, 
pp.132-3 
8 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Appendix II, p.13. Swansea Steam 
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of one fifth of their weekly wage (rather than the previous one sixth) was their 
priority, and that discussions on the general wage claim should wait until the 
strike had ended. They requested that the settlement be back-dated to 1 November 
1971 and that the ten percent differential over the highest paid NPLA rate should 
be the accepted aim. The Board accepted the bonus claim and also the back-dating 
of the settlement, but could not guarantee the requested differential.9 It was thus 
in NACODS’ interest to demonstrate its loyalty to the Board and therefore to 
continue to work to preserve the mines and the colliery equipment, even at the 
expense of invoking the ire of the pickets, in order to guarantee the differential. 
When NACODS representatives met with the Board again following the 
Wilberforce Inquiry, several members of their committee stressed to the Board 
that the full claim should be granted, on this one occasion, and that members 
would be extremely dissatisfied if it were not.10 This dissatisfaction stemmed 
from the serious fractures that had developed between the miners and NACODS 
due to the officials having done the Board’s bidding. 
 
 
6.4 Safety Cover  
 
Instructions on the necessity of maintaining safety work were issued by the NUM 
nationally but the decisions on implementation were taken by liaison committees 
at branch and pit level and depended on the situation pertaining in each locality 
and the relative militancy or moderation of those concerned. It became 
immediately clear that the issue of safety cover was highly contentious. Allen 
notes that even amongst nominally left-wing leaders there was no consistent view 
on safety cover: some seeing it as essential to safeguard the pits because they 
belong to the miners; some stressing the importance of unifying behind the NEC; 
some believing that the branches should make the decisions; some saying that the 
mines were not worth saving if they could not provide decent wages; and others 
that the mines should be protected because to do so gave a favourable public 
image. Ultimately the miners’ attitude coalesced around one point: if the NCB 
seriously wanted to protect pits then the solution was simple, accept the pay 
claim.11 The Government’s view was that the refusal to allow safety work 
 
9 KL: KA25/U/Z5, NACODS Conference Report, 1972; Minutes, NACODS and NCB, 14 
January 1972 
10 KL: KA25/U/Z5, Report, NACODS NEC, 22 February 1972 
11 Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p.184 
149 
 
contravened the NEC’s pre-strike undertaking and was a plain sign that local 
officials rather than national leaders were directing events.12 The Times and The 
Economist noted that the refusal of the branches to undertake safety work 
revealed a depth of bitterness few thought existed.13 The Government and press 
viewpoints demonstrate that the divergence between the rank-and-file and the 
leadership was, at this point, clear for all to see. 
 
Estimates on the level of safety cover undertaken at any point vary, but 
universally show that cover began at a low level and then declined. The NCB 
gave figures for ‘full safety coverage’ in the first few days at fifty per cent of pits, 
dropping by the end of the week to just one quarter fully protected, one quarter 
partially protected, and one half with only NACODS cover. The DTI at the same 
time reported that two thirds of safety work was not being undertaken. At the 
beginning of the third week the NCB cited just thirty-four pits out of two hundred 
and eighty-nine (twelve percent) with full cover.14 The Times and Financial 
Times reported that less than half the pits were covered on day one and just forty-
six (sixteen percent) had full cover on day two. This figure fell to just thirty-eight 
(thirteen percent) at the beginning of the second week and to just thirty (ten 
percent) by the end of the strike. The same press reported that the number of pits 
with ‘absolutely no cover’ was just one hundred and thirty-three (forty-six 
percent), rising to one hundred and fifty-two (fifty-three percent) by the end of 
the third week.15 In Yorkshire the proportion was lower than the national average 
with only three out of the region’s seventy two pits (four percent) having any 
safety cover,16 despite Area secretary Sam Bullough's plea that: ‘These pits have 
to be kept safe until the men get back to work. This is one thing we have always 
done.’17 Bullough was mistaken, safety work had not always been undertaken, as 
discussed previously, but his comments betray the leadership’s frustration at the 
divergence of opinion with the rank-and-file on this issue.  
 
 
12 TNA: LAB 77/84, Holland, ‘Note for the Record’, 9 February 1972; Phillips, J., ‘The 1972 
miners’ strike: popular agency and industrial politics in Britain’, Contemporary British 
History, Vol.20, No.2, 2006, pp.198-9 
13 The Economist 15 January; The Times 14 January 1972  
14 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/1, 9-12 January & PRCS/11, 24 January 1972 
15 The Times, 10, 24 & 28 January & 21 February; Financial Times, 11 & 17 January & 1 
February; TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/4, 15-16 January 1972 
16 Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, (London, 1984) p.226 




6.5 Picketing of Staff - an Overview  
 
The progress of the strike varied across the Areas and a review of the picketing 
over the seven weeks shows marked differences in tactics, which were dependent 
on the relative levels of militancy or moderation, on greater or lesser levels of 
frustration and discontent and on what appeared to achieve the desired outcome. 
 
Distribution of Picket Numbers Against Officials and Clerical Staff,  
  England & Wales.18  
 
Fig.6.1. Week One: 9 - 15 January 1972 
 
 
Fig.6.2. Week Two: 16 - 22 January 1972 
 
 
18 Source: TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, English & Welsh Constabularies to Home Office, 14 
February 1972; COAL31/383, NCB Situation Reports; COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports 
























Fig.6.3. Week Three: 23 - 29 January 1972 
 
 
Fig.6.4. Week Four: 30 January - 5 February 1972 
 
 
Fig.6.5. Week Five: 6 - 12 February 1972 
 



































In week one, attention was focused on the withdrawal of safety cover, which was 
against the express directives of the NEC. Picketing was overwhelmingly small-
scale and peaceful with isolated incidents of hostility towards officials and safety 
workers. Picketing against clerks began, despite COSA members having been 
asked to stay in work to prepare the miners’ final wage packets. In week two, 
safety cover was reduced and the picketing of NACODS extended; this took a 
notably militant and large-scale turn in some Areas, and a tactic of limiting rather 
than stopping NACODS developed in others. COSA came out on strike but the 
clerks who remained in work faced some particularly aggressive picketing. In 
week three, the picketing of NACODS intensified and showed variation with 
compromises evident in some Areas but an increase in militancy in others; the 
NCB complained of this development, particularly in the more productive central 
coalfield. The picketing of clerical workers became more militant in some Areas. 
In week four, some pickets allowed maintenance men in to the pits to deal with 
safety issues that had arisen, whilst pickets in other Areas moved to further limit 
safety cover. There was an extension of mass and aggressive picketing, and there 
continued to be a divergence between Areas restricting officials and those 
attempting to stop them. The picketing of clerical workers eased, though with 
notable exceptions. In week five, safety cover was further withdrawn, whilst 
picketing eased though remained militant and heavy in some places. Restrictions 
on the numbers of NACODS members allowed through picket lines continued 
with the Board complaining of officials who seemed to have made little effort to 
gain entry. The picketing of clerical workers was at a minimum but included some 
COSA members picketing colleagues who remained in work. Fred Matthews 
funeral took place and some pickets appealed to NACODS to respect the 
occasion, though this met with mixed results. In week six, there was a decline in 
picketing though it remained heavy in some locations. NACODS were allowed 
in to some of the pits and the NCB was subsequently able to report a general 
deterioration underground but a reluctance on behalf of officials to do any more 
than inspect the pits. Some Areas continued to restrict NACODS and there were 
moves to extend these restrictions. In week seven, as the strike drew to a close, 
pickets were withdrawn and safety cover resumed at most collieries, though 






6.6 Picketing of Officials - Week One 
 
During week one, there was a widespread refusal to undertake safety work, 
despite national directives to do so, and several picket lines were established to 
prevent maintenance and safety work being undertaken. Decisions on the nature 
and extent of picketing were made by the liaison/strike committees at branch and 
district level, and NUM delegates from some Yorkshire branches attempted to 
force their leadership to withdraw all safety workers and demanded that the 
pickets stop NACODS, BACM and NUM winders from entering the pits.19 In 
Cumberland and Derbyshire, mass meetings of miners voted to withdraw all 
underground safety cover from the outset.20 Gormley appeared on the BBC’s 
Panorama programme on the second evening of the strike, and appealed for 
miners to provide safety cover and complained that ‘the men are being a damn 
sight more militant than we would like them to be’. On the third day the NCB 
met with the NUM leadership to discuss pit safety and to request that they allow 
small amounts of coal to be cut, two or three times each week, to stop the powered 
roof supports from becoming immovable and irreparably damaged by the 
immense pressure underground. The following day, Gormley again appealed to 
the miners for the pits to be kept in good working order, and noted that ‘some 
men have been over-ambitious in applying the strike’. On the same day, Ezra 
reported to a Cabinet committee that, whilst the NUM agreed to cooperate with 
regard to fire, gas and water hazards, they were not prepared to arrange for the 
occasional cutting of coal in order to move equipment. The maintenance of the 
pits, he noted, therefore depended on the co-operation of NACODS.21  
 
The NCB reported intimidation by pickets of men at workshops and garages at 
Bestwood colliery, Nottinghamshire, who then apparently refused to work 
despite police protection. At Shirebrook colliery, North Derbyshire, a winding-
engine man was assaulted by pickets and his car was damaged, whilst at Kennox 
colliery in Scotland a fan-attendant was assaulted leaving work, and at Coventry 
colliery an under-manager needed a police escort to get through the picket line.22 
These actions demonstrate the pickets’ immediate frustration at those who were 
 
19 Morning Telegraph, 8 January 1972 cited in Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.218 
20 Labour Research, April 1972, p.67; Allen, The Militancy of British Miners, p.184 
21 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/1, 9-12 January; The Times, 11 & 12 January; Financial Times, 13 
January; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972; Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, 
pp.38-9 
22 TNA: COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board Members, 17 February 1972 
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continuing to work and were crossing picket lines, and frustration was also felt in 
some quarters at NUM members who continued to undertake the safety cover 
requested by the leadership. Derbyshire miners crossed in to Leicestershire and 
attempted to stop the provision of cover at Measham, Donisthorpe and Ellistown 
collieries, but they were met with a hostile response.23 An underground fire broke 
out at Goldthorpe-Highgate colliery, Doncaster and miners at the branch refused 
calls for help to extinguish it. The fire turned out not to be as serious as first 
thought, but the pickets were unaware at the time, and the Area agent commented 
that miners had ‘been blackmailed long enough’.24 In addition to the miners’ 
growing refusal to provide safety cover, the pickets also began to stop NACODS 
members from undertaking safety and maintenance work with pickets restricting 
the number of officials to just eighteen at Calverton colliery, Nottinghamshire.25  
 
 
6.7 Picketing of Officials - Week Two 
 
During week two, some branches further reduced their safety cover and others 
increased the picketing of NACODS members to do the same, though pickets at 
Littlemill colliery in South Scotland assisted in clearing a mine fall, and the local 
NUM Area president considered assisting with roadway repairs at Dalkeith 
colliery.26 Scotland was largely under CP leadership, and so this action accords 
with Ezra’s comment that CP-led Areas were the most rigid in their adherence to 
Union directives in undertaking safety work.27 Picketing remained 
overwhelmingly small scale during the week, but there was a tripling of the 
number of picket lines reported and an increase in large-scale interventionist 
picketing since the smaller scale picket lines were proving to be ineffectual. 
Pickets at Easington colliery, Durham began the week by peacefully leafleting 
 
23 Griffin, C., The Leicestershire Miners, Vol. 3: 1945-1988, (Coalville, 1989) pp.156-7 cited in 
Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, pp.39-40. The collieries in Leicestershire and South 
Derbyshire were organised within the Leicestershire and the South Derbyshire Areas of the 
NUM. The Leicestershire Area's collieries were all within the geographical county of 
Leicestershire, whereas the South Derbyshire Area included collieries in both counties, 
Derbyshire and Leicestershire. The NCB’s administrative unit for all these collieries, and 
others elsewhere, was the South Midlands Area. Measham and Donisthorpe are pits in 
Leicestershire but fall within the South Derbyshire NUM Area. Derbyshire miners did not 
therefore cross the NUM Area boundary in approaching these two pits, but did so only with 
Ellistown, which is both in Leicestershire and in the Leicestershire NUM Area 
24 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.218 
25 TNA: COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board Members, 17 February 1972 
26 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Report, 21 January; COAL31/300, NCB to Board 
Members, 17 February 1972 
27 LSE: Hetherington/19/25, Ezra, 27 January 1972 
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NACODS members and imploring them to observe the strike, but this tactic 
clearly proved unsuccessful as sixty miners picketed the following day, and a 
mass picket of three hundred miners confronted the officials on the Friday.28 In 
South Yorkshire there was a mass picket of three hundred miners at Manvers 
Main colliery, and at Cadeby colliery NACODS faced two hundred pickets on 
Tuesday, one hundred on Wednesday and large numbers of pickets for at least 
another week such that no NACODS got through the picket line. In addition, 
NACODS were turned back at two other collieries in the Area, and at one in North 
Yorkshire, two in Durham, and two in Nottinghamshire, which had two hundred 
pickets on occasion during the week. 29 
 
In addition to a general increase in the picketing of NACODS, there was also an 
upturn in militancy. At a meeting of the Northumberland NUM Executive it was 
unanimously decided that more physical pressure should be brought to bear on 
members of NACODS to join the strike. A more militant element at the meeting 
reportedly suggested extending this to physically preventing vehicles from 
entering colliery yards, and further suggestions were made that such vehicles 
would be overturned if they attempted to enter. Similar militant sentiments were 
expressed at six collieries in Wales, where pickets threatened to overturn 
vehicles,30 and in North Derbyshire, where pickets broke the locks on the main 
gate at Langwith colliery and built a barricade behind them. In Nottinghamshire 
militancy was directed toward restricting the number of officials entering the pits 
rather than stopping them outright. Police assistance was required all week to 
enable NACODS members to enter Gedling colliery in the Area with picket 
numbers growing to two hundred on the Thursday and Friday, when pickets 
prevented officials from entering whilst it was still dark though thirty-three 
entered after daybreak aided by one hundred and twenty police officers. Officials 
were reportedly spat at and had their cars scratched, whilst threats were reportedly 
made to their wives and children and chanting took place outside their homes. 
The police reported that the picketing at Gedling was part of a campaign to dictate 
numbers allowed to work and they expected this strategy to spread to other local 
 
28 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Durham, 17, 20 & 24 January; COAL31/416, NCB Situation 
Report, 21 January 1972 
29 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Durham, 17, 20 & 24 January, Nottinghamshire, 24 January; 
COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board Members, 17 February; COAL31/416, NCB Situation 
Report, 21 January 1972 
30 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Northumberland, 18 January, Dyfed, 24 January 1972 
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pits since two were already restricted, another was seeking such restrictions, and 
at a further colliery pickets allowed only five BACM managers to enter.31 
 
 
6.8 Picketing of Officials - Week Three 
 
During week three, there continued to be a divergence of attitudes on the 
provision of safety cover between the national, and sometimes Area, leadership 
and those at branch or strike committee level. In South Wales the CP-led Area 
Executive recommended that their members should continue to undertake safety 
work, but in South Yorkshire safety-men and winders at Cortonwood colliery 
joined the strike, and pickets at Cadeby colliery refused an NEC appeal to help 
save four pit faces which led to sixty hydraulic jacks, worth £400,000, being 
crushed. Branch secretary Tommy Ryan commented: ‘We are prepared to let the 
mining industry decline if the Government does not think it is important enough 
to solve the problem for us.’32 NUM officials at Ollerton colliery, Nottingham 
made similar comments: ‘It’s a con: if we keep pits in good order they can keep 
us out for as long as they want... If they’re so worried about their bloody 
machines, let them make us a decent offer.’33 Ezra complained of the physical 
damage to the pits in an interview with the Guardian editor and claimed that 
essential maintenance was being undertaken at just thirty pits. He noted that the 
overtime ban prior to the strike had meant that maintenance work was already 
behind but did not feel that any pit had yet been so badly damaged that it would 
not reopen, though there were faces within pits which would not be worked again. 
The NCB separately reported that eighty pit faces were threatened by lack of 
maintenance.34 
 
The picketing of NACODS and BACM members intensified with officials being 
prevented from entering many pits in Nottinghamshire and Yorkshire,35 and NCB 
and NUM leaders noting that this was an ‘unauthorised extension of official strike 
 
31 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Report, 21 January; COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board 
Members, 17 February 1972 
32 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/11, 24 January; PRCS/13, 26 January; The Times, 25 January; 
Morning Telegraph 24 & 25 January 1972, cited in Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire 
Miners, p.227 
33 Adam, ‘The Other Price of Coal’, pp.132-3 
34 LSE: Hetherington/19/25, Ezra, 27 January; TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/11, 24 January 1972 
35 TNA: COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board Members, 17 February 1972 
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action’.36 The NCB’s industrial relations member, G.C. Shephard, wrote to 
Gormley on 24 January to complain about the NUM’s picketing of officials and 
the threat this posed to the safety of the collieries. He highlighted particularly 
collieries in the central coalfield, which were of most concern to the NCB being 
the most productive and integral to the future of the industry. Shephard noted that 
one hundred and forty-eight collieries were without any NUM safety cover, fifty-
three others had only winders, fifty-four had partial safety cover, and only thirty-
four had full safety cover.37  
 
Gormley replied on 27 January and, whilst noting that the NEC were making 
constant appeals to their members for the picketing to be peaceful and for 
adequate safety cover to be undertaken, he believed it was incumbent upon him 
to bring certain incidents to Shephard’s attention, which could account for the 
pickets’ attitude. Gormley noted that at Sacriston and East Heddon collieries, 
Durham, NACODS members, ‘with the connivance of management’, were 
reportedly ‘seen to be bringing up the colliery bags of coal, which they have filled 
underground with the intention of taking this coal for their own use’, and in the 
process received assistance from NUM apprentices. In addition, at Hawthorn 
colliery, Durham, a private lorry had reportedly gone through the picket line, 
‘with the connivance of BACM’, ostensibly to collect coal for hospital use but 
the coal was actually designated for BACM and NACODS members still at work. 
Gormley warned that incidents such as these would worsen the situation ‘and 
make the picket lines harder and harder, until we are the stage where anger will 
prevail.’ He alluded to the picket lines being infiltrated by persons unknown for 
the purpose of causing disturbances and discrediting the union to ensure media 
coverage, and noted that ‘cameras always seem to be on the spot at the same time 
as these disturbances take place.’ He accused the NCB of issuing ‘couped up’ 
[sic] photographs to the press showing damaged pit roadways allegedly caused 
by the pickets’ refusal to allow safety work, when these photos actually predated 
the strike and were due to ‘months and months of bad, bad management’. He 
claimed that the issuing of such photographs can only have been in order to 
discredit the NUM.38  
 
 
36 The Times, 28 January 1972 
37 TNA: COAL78/1906, Letters, Shephard to Gormley, 21 & 24 January 1972 
38 TNA: COAL31/383, Letter, Gormley to Shephard, 27 January 1972 
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Miners at Ollerton colliery, Nottingham made a similar accusation noting that 
‘many of the horror pictures of the so-called deterioration’ show sites that were 
just as bad before the strike and about which there had been previous 
complaints.39 These episodes highlight the growing frustration on all sides, with 
accusations and counter-accusations by both the NCB and the NUM leadership. 
In the case of the latter, though they were concerned at the growing militancy in 
the ranks, they clearly felt obliged to relay to the Board accusations of 
misbehaviour received from the liaison committees, to counter the accusations of 
violence reported by the Board. The episodes also point to the Board’s attempts 
to manipulate public opinion which is discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
 
The internal NCB report, upon which Shephard’s 21 January letter to Gormley 
was based, gave a summary of the situation at the pits in question and reflected 
discussions and resultant compromises having taken place between the pickets 
and officials at some collieries; in particular a restriction on the numbers of safety 
workers being allowed to work rather than an outright ban on officials entering 
the mines. At eight pits in Nottinghamshire the Board reported that there were 
initial attempts by officials to go into work, but that the pickets then issued an 
ultimatum that put a limit on the numbers allowed to enter, and subsequently this 
was generally accepted by NACODS. A similar process of negotiating a limit on 
safety workers occurred at four pits in South Midlands. Bans on management 
from entering the collieries, as opposed to under-officials, were largely lifted 
during the week, but the nature and effectiveness of the picketing varied; some 
of this was described as ‘heavy but not violent’, whilst at other pits abuse was 
hurled at those crossing picket lines with officials’ cars also reportedly being 
scratched. The NCB reported a different tactical approach in South Yorkshire 
with pickets at six pits stopping NACODS officials on one day and then 
NACODS getting through the picket lines the next day; there is no mention of 
agreed numbers being allowed through the picket lines, but rather a daily attempt 
by NACODS for all officials to gain entry and of pickets trying to prevent all of 
them from doing so, with varied success. The report noted that on occasion 
officials were turned back for the day shift, when most pickets were in attendance, 
but then they were able to gain entry for the evening or night shift, when few or 
no pickets were present. In North Yorkshire the report refers to heavy picketing 
 
39 Adam, ‘The Other Price of Coal’, pp.132-3 
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at one pit that prevented officials from entering, but the NCB gave an 
admonishment ‘that there was very little determination to pass the picket lines.’40  
 
In North Derbyshire there was mass picketing of NACODS at four pits, which 
intensified as the week progressed involving an average of two hundred at 
Markham colliery, where pickets obstructed the highway, and around one 
hundred and fifty at the other three pits. The police reported few incidents of 
actual violence here, but rather that the pickets maintained an attitude of 
‘truculence and determination’. There were also reports of significant picketing 
at sixteen collieries in Durham with picket numbers of up to two hundred at 
eleven collieries.41 Aggressive picketing was reported in South Yorkshire during 
week three, where one hundred and fifty pickets prevented NACODS officials 
from entering Dinnington colliery, and in South Midlands where up to fifty 
pickets were hostile to everyone attempting to enter Coventry colliery and BACM 
managers were prevented from entering Donisthorpe colliery. Officials at 
Lynemouth colliery, Northumberland were attacked with one man being dragged 
along the road and another hit by a bottle.42 At Langwith colliery, Derbyshire, 
black paint and grease were daubed on the houses of eighteen officials and 
winding-engine men who had crossed the picket line, and two hundred pickets 
prevented all but eleven officials getting in to work the following day.43 The 
differing approaches of the pickets between and within Areas, both in terms of 
numbers of pickets in attendance and in the relative levels of militancy, shows 
that tactics were being decided ‘on the ground’ and in the localities, rather than 
by the national leadership. Seemingly liaison/strike committees were basing their 
approach on what appeared to work in their locality, with pickets largely ignoring 
the directives of the NUM leadership to continue to provide safety cover and to 






40 TNA: COAL 31/383, Report, ‘NUM picketing of NACODS members’, 24 January 1972 
41 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Durham, 24 & 31 January 1972 
42 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Warwickshire, 31 January; COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board 
Members, 17 February 1972 
43 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Derbyshire, 31 January; COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board 
Members, 17 February; PREM15/984, PRCS18, 1 February; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, 
Annex S, June 1972 
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6.9 Picketing of Officials - Week Four 
 
During week four the response to the issue of safety cover continued to vary, with 
pickets responding to calls for assistance in dealing with emergency maintenance 
issues at some pits, but further reducing cover at others. The Government noted 
that the NUM had threatened to withdraw cover at the NCB’s coke ovens, which 
would subsequently crack and become unserviceable if they were allowed to 
cool.44 In Durham, winders at Seaham colliery went in to help with a rope-
capping issue, whilst at Blackhall colliery the cover situation decreased from part-
cover to winding-engine men only. In West Wales, cover was withdrawn from 
the fans and pumps at Coed Cae colliery leaving it without any cover at all, and 
at Deep Duffryn, Abercynon and Penrhiwceiber (Penrikyber) collieries in East 
Wales pickets reportedly increased pressure on winding-engine men to withdraw, 
which the NCB expected would result in a wider reaction from winders and an 
ultimate withdrawal of their services. The East Wales Area Executive came under 
pressure to withdraw all safety men and to bring pressure to bear on NACODS to 
restrict attendances by its officials. The increasing withdrawal of safety cover by 
the pickets led NACODS officials to begin to cover pits other than their own; 
underground heating issues at Newdigate and Rawdon collieries, South 
Midlands, were assisted by officials from five nearby collieries with the 
agreement of the NUM’s safety inspector.45  
 
Week four saw an upturn in mass picketing against NACODS officials. Heavy 
picketing was reported at Clipstone colliery, Nottinghamshire, with pickets 
facing two hundred police, though an alternative version cites two hundred and 
fifty pickets clashing with three hundred police. The DTI noted that there was no 
violence during the incident though miners interviewed by the New Statesmen 
claimed that the pickets were arrested ‘in a fight with deputies’, and explained 
that there was no need for one hundred men to go down a pit for routine gas-leak 
or water checks, as twenty would have been sufficient and the rest of them would 
surely do additional maintenance work if they were allowed in.46 NACODS were 
prevented from entering Clipstone colliery the following day because the police 
 
44 TNA: CAB134/3485, E(72), MC Emergencies, 3rd Meeting, 28 January 1972 
45 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/18, 1 February; PRCS/19, 2 February; PRCS/20, 3 February; 
COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 2-4 February 1972 
46 TNA: HO325/101, Letter, Allen to Departmental list, 1 February; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, 
Annex S, June 1972; Adam, ‘The Other Price of Coal’, pp.132-3; Darlington & Lyddon, 
Glorious Summer, pp.39-40 
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were not in attendance. This was reportedly because police did not want to split 
their forces and were instead concentrating on heavy picketing at Bevercotes 
colliery. This mirrored the miners’ own practice of concentrating pickets and 
placing them where they would be most effective. Later in the week NACODS 
officials at both Clipstone and Bevercotes came to an arrangement with the NUM 
to limit their numbers.47 In Northumberland there was mass picketing involving 
one thousand pickets at Ashington and Ellington collieries over three days, which 
prevented all NACODS members from entering. The Northumberland NUM 
subsequently agreed to call off pickets until the end of the following week to give 
NACODS time to consider whether to join the strike. In Durham, there was 
significant picketing on two days, with eight picket lines of between fifty and two 
hundred miners, and NACODS officials were prevented from entering 
Washington Glebe colliery over two days though they managed to get in at four 
other pits.48  
 
At Markham colliery, the largest in North Derbyshire, there was significant mass 
picketing on three days. Two hundred pickets prevented NACODS from gaining 
entry on Monday, and after a discussion on whether to defy the pickets they 
decided to go home and try again the next day. The Chief Constable reported that 
police numbers were sufficiently strong to see have them through but that 
NACODS had given three reasons for not entering: fears of reprisals at home; not 
wishing their actions to lead to the arrest of pickets; and not wishing their actions 
to lead to the police being assaulted. On Wednesday NACODS got through one 
hundred and twenty pickets with the assistance of sixty police officers, and on 
Friday picket numbers rose to around three hundred but NACODS managed to 
get through, though there were assaults on the police and a brick was thrown 
through an official’s car window. Mass picketing took place at several other pits 
in the Area, with two hundred and fifty pickets at Usworth colliery and around 
one hundred and fifty each at another four pits. Pickets in Derbyshire introduced 
the tactic of stopping buses that transported officials to work: at Renishaw Park 
colliery one hundred and twenty pickets forcefully took control of a bus; at 
Pleasely colliery a bus was held up at the bus station; and at Ireland colliery 
 
47 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 2-4 February 1972 
48 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Derbyshire and Durham, 31 January, Northumberland, 6 February; 
COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 2-4 February 1972 
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pickets prevented officials from changing buses in the town though they managed 
to get through in small numbers.49  
 
In Wales, twelve cars carrying officials were reportedly attacked and damaged at 
Penrhiwceiber colliery after which NACODS members at three pits said they 
would not work under any conditions. The NACODS Area secretary persuaded 
them to continue working and all officials got through on the Friday in special 
transport provided by the Board. There continued to be a divergence in tactics 
between picket lines attempting to stop all officials and those restricting their 
numbers to pre-arranged limits. In North Nottinghamshire restricted numbers 
were allowed in at seven pits during the week; at Thoresby this amounted to fifty 
officials, which the NCB deemed sufficient but noted that ‘there is no 
arrangement unless it is between NACODS and the pickets.’50 In South 
Nottinghamshire restrictions were in operation at eight pits, and at another two 
the local NUM threatened officials to make such an arrangement or face heavy 
picketing. The officials reportedly replied that they would not make any 
arrangement that was contrary to the requirements of the pit concerned. In South 
Midlands restrictions continued at two collieries, and in Wales NACODS 
officials at Penrhiwceiber agreed to work under a restriction following heavy 
pressure from the pickets.51 
 
 
6.10 Picketing of Officials - Week Five 
 
Picketing eased off in week five with many Areas reporting only light picketing, 
though it continued to be militant and heavy in some places. Safety cover was 
reduced further in Lancashire and Durham, and the Yorkshire Area council 
passed a resolution asking the NEC to ban all safety work including that 
undertaken by NACODS.52 In North Yorkshire there were over one hundred 
pickets at each of twenty sites including up to three hundred at Peckfield colliery, 
where they were reported to be strangers; the police subsequently concentrated 
 
49 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, Derbyshire, 31 January; COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 2, 3 
& 4 February; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
50 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 2, 3 & 4 February; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, 
Annex S, June 1972; Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, pp.39-40 
51 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 2, 3 & 4 February 1972 




their forces at several collieries where NACODS then had some success at getting 
through. In contrast, in the south of the county, there was light picketing, and at 
just six sites, in Doncaster and Barnsley. In Wales picketing was focused at just 
three pits where NACODS either did not report for work, or were refused 
peaceful entry, and went home. In Durham picketing was light and well behaved, 
with only two or three pits being picketed and students joining a picket seventy 
to eighty strong at Seaham colliery. It was reportedly quiet everywhere in 
Northumberland and Northwestern with just one colliery in each Area being 
picketed in any numbers. Light picketing was also reported at pits in 
Staffordshire, and in Scotland the situation went from very light to virtually none 
by the end of the week. Picket numbers were down in North Derbyshire, South 
Wales and Staffordshire due to miners making their way to the mass picket of 
Nechells gasworks (Saltley), Birmingham, with the police, the DTI and the NCB 
reporting that pickets were going there in large numbers.53  
 
Picketing to restrict NACODS numbers continued, particularly in the Midlands. 
One hundred and fifty pickets stopped officials from entering Bevercotes colliery, 
Nottinghamshire on Monday after which NACODS agreed to the restriction and 
just twenty-five men were then permitted in a twenty-four-hour period. NACODS 
continued to be restricted at nineteen other pits in the county. Restrictions also 
continued at three collieries in Derbyshire and at three in Leicestershire, where 
NACODS were required to sign in.54 The NCB complained of a growing number 
of cases where NACODS and BACM members made little or no effort to pass 
the picket lines, reporting that at three North Yorkshire collieries officials made 
no real attempt, despite the small number of pickets. A meeting of the NACODS 
Panel in the Area decided, by a narrow margin, not to pass picket lines if the 
police were present. The NCB reported that it was subsequently difficult to assess 
whether this decision was being applied, but that there was considerable 
deterioration in the situation by Friday when thirteen pits had no NACODS 
officials and at only one of these could picketing be said to have been heavy. The 
Board concluded that no real attempt was made to enter whether police were 
present or not. In Barnsley there were over two hundred pickets at Darfield Main 
 
53 TNA: COAL/31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 3, 4, 8-10 February; COAL31/383, NCB 
Situation Report, 11 February; HO325/101, Telexes, South Wales and Durham, 14 February 
1972 
54 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 8-10 February; COAL31/383, NCB Situation 
Report, 11 February; PREM15/985, PRCS/24, 8 February; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, 
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164 
 
colliery where NACODS officials approached but then went home; a tactic 
decided at a meeting between management and NACODS on the Monday. 
NACODS subsequently did not attempt to go through any of the picket lines 
despite a small police presence.55 
 
Picketing was heavy and militant in South Yorkshire during the week with fifteen 
hundred pickets in the Area on Monday and thirty-five pickets arrested on 
obstruction, breach of the peace, and damage to property charges at eight 
collieries. There were three hundred pickets and no police presence at Cadeby 
colliery, where a car was overturned and thirty officials entered the mine under a 
barrage of missiles, which smashed thirty windows in the pit yard. Pickets 
reportedly chased individual men within one mile of the colliery and officials 
including BACM personnel were attacked. At Cortonwood colliery over one 
hundred and fifty pickets chased officials into the village; four were knocked 
down and kicked and ten men were injured on the picket line before the police 
summoned reinforcements and took NACODS officials in to work. At Kilnhurst 
colliery police were in full strength, but a bonfire blocked the pit entrance and 
there were between one hundred and fifty and two hundred pickets who made 
threats to NACODS officials and their homes. On the approach roads to Manvers 
Main and New Stubbin collieries road blocks were assembled and defended by 
pickets, and at Silverwood colliery pickets prevented officials from entering the 
locker and lamp rooms, and there was street-fighting with pickets chasing 
deputies through the village. By the end of the week no NACODS were in at nine 
pits, of which at three they had said that they were not prepared to report for work 
unless police could guarantee their safety.56 
 
On Wednesday 9 February the funeral was held for Fred Matthews, the picket 
killed by a lorry leaving Keadby power station, Lincolnshire. An estimated ten 
thousand people attended the funeral with miners coming from all over the 
country including representatives from every pit in Yorkshire. Some pickets 
appealed to NACODS members to respect the occasion and refrain from going to 
work, which received a mixed reaction. At Calverton colliery, Nottinghamshire 
 
55 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 8-10 February; COAL31/383, NCB Situation 
Report, 11 February 1972 
56 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June; COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 8-
10 February; COAL31/383, NCB Situation Report, 11 February; Morning Telegraph, 8 & 9 
February 1972, cited in Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.227; Darlington & 
Lyddon, Glorious Summer, pp.39-40 
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NACODS officials reorganised their shift times to work two twelve-hour shifts 
‘so as to leave the pit virtually empty for part of today out of respect’, though 
reportedly ‘this was without Management’s prior knowledge.’ However, 
NACODS went in in restricted numbers at twenty pits in Nottinghamshire and at 
ten pits in Derbyshire. In South Yorkshire only six NACODS went into work at 
Kiveton Park colliery following a massive but quiet demonstration, whereas at 
Manvers colliery ‘NACODS refused to turn back peacefully, so bricks and turf 
were thrown and NACODS went home’. At six of the twenty-one pits in North 




6.11 Picketing of Officials - Weeks Six and Seven 
 
As the strike drew to a close, the NCB cited an improvement in picketing in week 
six but nevertheless a reluctance on behalf of NACODS officials to do any more 
than inspect the workings. They reported a general deterioration of conditions 
below ground and registered their concern that this would delay the resumption 
of normal working after the strike. Their assessment was that two hundred and 
fifty-seven faces (fifty-three percent) could start production within a week or so, 
two hundred and ten (forty-three percent) could not be productive within two 
weeks, and twenty (four percent) faced permanent closure.58 In some Areas 
NACODS were being allowed in by pickets to deal with deterioration issues, 
though in others safety cover was further decreased with two collieries reducing 
to winding-engine men only, and three withdrawing safety cover completely. In 
East Wales there were no officials at work at four picketed collieries, having 
reported and then gone home. The West Wales Area conference requested an 
immediate national delegate conference to consider withdrawing all safety men 
and discussed limiting NACODS to weekends only.59 This was rather late in the 
day to have been calling a conference to discuss such a move given that the strike 
was by then clearly in its final stages. Ezra had earlier noted that the CP-led Areas 
were the most disciplined in applying the Union directive to undertake 
maintenance cover, and this seems to have been a factor here for the Area 
 
57 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Report, 9 February 1972; Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious 
Summer, pp.56-7 
58 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/31, 18 February; PREM15/986, PRCS/32, 19-21 February 1972 
59 TNA: COAL31/383, NCB Situation Reports, 14, 15 & 17 February 1972 
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leadership to appear more militant to its rank-and-file, whilst not actually doing 
anything substantial.60  
 
The NACODS Yorkshire Area council met on Wednesday and decided that they 
would not seek police protection and would only enter the collieries if allowed to 
do so peacefully. Their members were instructed not to cross the picket lines if 
they met any resistance from pickets. Picketing in most parts of Yorkshire 
reduced as the week progressed but remained heavy in Doncaster, where officials 
were prevented entry at two thirds of the pits. There was heavy picketing at seven 
pits in Barnsley and up to two hundred pickets at fifteen pits in South Yorkshire 
with NACODS officials refused entry at half of them, including Silverwood 
colliery where miners were supported by students. In North Yorkshire there was 
only light picketing, and the NCB complained that NACODS had made a serious 
attempt to pass the pickets at just one colliery; pickets also kept out or restricted 
BACM staff at four collieries though the NCB believed that there appeared to 
have been no real attempt by them to get in to work either. In Durham there were 
four hundred pickets at each of three collieries and fifty at a fourth, though this 
generally diminished as the week progressed, as it did in North Derbyshire where 
NACODS officials were at work in all collieries by Wednesday. In 
Nottinghamshire light picketing ensured the continuance of restrictions at twenty 
pits, and NACODS were also limited at four pits in South Midlands and six in 
Yorkshire. In the final week of the strike, pickets were withdrawn from most 
collieries in most Areas with only slight variation. There was no picketing in 
Scotland or Kent, and pickets were withdrawn with NACODS officials in at all 
pits in Doncaster, Barnsley, Staffordshire, West Wales and Northwestern, and at 
all except two pits each in North and South Yorkshire, Derbyshire and East 
Wales. In Nottinghamshire pickets were withdrawn but NACODS remained 
restricted at sixteen pits. There were no pickets in the South Midlands except at 
Daw Mill, where the NUM provided some cover to help with an underground 
heating problem, or in Durham except at three pits including Herrington, where 
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6.12 Clerical Workers 
 
The picketing of clerical workers had some similarities to the picketing of colliery 
officials, and there was some crossover as a proportion of the clerks operated 
within the collieries and depots. However, the majority of clerks worked in the 
various NCB offices at regional level and normally had little or no contact with 
the miners at work. Clerical workers in the industry were represented by two 
unions – COSA, affiliated to the NUM, and CAWU, which became known as 
APEX (Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staffs) 
shortly after the strike. As an affiliate section of the NUM, COSA were integral 
to the working of the Union; COSA general secretary Les Story sat on the NEC, 
and Sidney Ford, previous NUM president, had also emerged from COSA, and 
was known disparagingly as ‘the office boy’ for never having been a miner.62 At 
nationalisation, the NUM had requested sole negotiating rights for clerical 
workers in the industry, within COSA, but the NCB declined this request for 
exclusivity and recognised CAWU and NACSS (National Association of Clerical 
and Supervisory Staffs - an affiliate of the TGWU) in addition to COSA. The 
matter was referred to the TUC but it was not properly resolved, as they 
recommended only that clerks at divisional level should be in COSA and that 
clerks at headquarters in CAWU. However, they made no recommendation for 
clerks at Area level or below, where the majority of clerks were employed. This 
led to both COSA and CAWU being represented at these levels and a degree of 
friction between them.63 The contraction of the coal industry in the 1960s under 
the ACP, which saw a decrease in pits and miners, also led to a decline in the 
clerical workforce. Between 1964 and 1972, twenty percent of the NCB’s clerical 
jobs were shed. There was a corresponding decline in trade union membership. 
COSA, which had increased its membership by eighty-one percent between 1948 
and 1964, declined by twenty-one percent between 1964 and 1970. CAWU, in 
line with other purely white-collar clerical unions, increased its membership by 
seventeen percent in 1969 and twenty-four percent in 1970.64  
 
 
62 Taylor, A., The NUM and British Politics, Volume 2: 1969-1995, (London, 2005) p.25 
63 Shaw, M.P., The Cinderellas of industry: the occupational and trade union identity of clerical 
workers, MPhil Thesis, Durham University, 1977, pp.101-2 
64 Bain, G.S., The Growth of White Collar Unionism, (Oxford, 1970) Table 3A.1, p 20; Lumley, R., 
White Collar Unionism in Britain, (London, 1973) p.16; Bain, G.S., ‘“Management and white 
collar unionism” in White Collar Unions - A Review,’ I.P.M. Information, Report II, March 
1972, p.10, all cited in Bowen, P., Elsy, V.E. & Shaw, M.P., ‘The Attachment of White‐Collar 
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Two studies have considered clerical workers in the mining industry, in the period 
immediately after the 1972 strike.65 There is a significant crossover between these 
studies, which involved the same researchers and the same NCB regional office, 
the Northern Area offices at Team Valley, Newcastle, the administrative 
headquarters covering the Northumberland and Durham coalfields. This was 
designated as ‘Beta’ in the first study and as ‘Earth Control’ in the second. It was 
described as being situated in an urban area at some distance from the pits and 
that its employees were not in close physical proximity to manual workers. The 
majority of its employees came from the Tyneside conurbation in which the 
offices were situated, though a sizeable minority were drawn from the smaller 
towns and villages of Northumberland and County Durham. There were eight 
hundred and ninety employees at the offices including four hundred and eighty-
six clerical workers (forty-one percent male, fifty-nine percent female). These 
were divided amongst COSA (fifty-nine percent), CAWU (twenty-two percent) 
and non-union (nineteen percent).66 The environmental reference groups of 
COSA clerks in the Beta survey were predominantly working-class in character, 
with the majority of their fathers being employed in skilled or semi-skilled 
manual work outside the mining industry. The clerks also chose to identify 
themselves predominantly (seventy-nine percent) as lower middle class or 
working-class.67 In the Earth Control survey half the respondents considered 
themselves to be working class, one quarter lower middle class, and one eighth 
middle class. Clerks in this study defined the protective function of a union as 
being as important to them as its role as a negotiating body, though women saw 
its protective function as slightly more important than its negotiating function, 
and around a quarter of both defined trade unions as a fighting body.68 In 
describing the disadvantage of union membership around a quarter of clerks 
chose the option of the ‘possible demands for militant action’, i.e. the fact that 
you might be expected to go on strike against your will.69 
 
The contraction of the workforce in the 1960s led to some of the office services, 
formerly provided at the collieries, being moved to regional NCB offices like 
Team Valley. Technical changes, such as computerisation, had a considerable 
 
65 Bowen et al, ‘The Attachment of White‐Collar’, pp.22-32; Shaw, The Cinderellas of industry 
66 Bowen et al, ‘The Attachment of White‐Collar’, pp.29-30; Shaw, The Cinderellas of industry, 
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67 Bowen et al, ‘The Attachment of White‐Collar’, pp.29-30 
68 Shaw, The Cinderellas of industry, pp.195 & 229-30 incl Table 2  
69 Shaw, The Cinderellas of industry, Table 3, p.236  
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impact on NCB administration, not least on the adaptation of office services 
towards computers, and an increase in shift working, both of which added to the 
contraction of the clerical workforce. The Earth Control survey analysed the 
nature and extent of the clerical work undertaken at NCB offices, which was 
wide-ranging, and it described the following organisation and administrative 
functions; Computer Services (including data processing, systems planning), 
House Manager (internal services, typing, mail, file storage), Purchasing and 
Stores (stock control, invoicing, contracts), Regional Marketing (sales, 
distribution), Staff Department (industrial relations, wages), Superannuation 
(pensions), Workshop (technical services), Regional Solicitors, Regional 
Accounts, Internal Audit, Public Relations Office, Geological Services and 
Regional Scientific Control. The largest department was Regional Accounts with 
one hundred and fifty clerks employed, followed by House Manager and 
Computer Services with around one hundred clerks each. Computer Services also 
sold its services (for example, computer time, data preparation, technical 
expertise) to outside clients.70 By 1966 clerical employment in Britain had 
become the most highly feminised occupational group, and women comprised 
almost seventy percent of all clerical employees.71 The Earth Control study shows 
that the NCB clerical staff were predominantly female, but that women were 
overwhelmingly in the lowest pay grades. The grading structure for clerical 
workers in the study showed twelve different grades covering three broad job 
titles; clerical officers, computer assistants, and typists/machine operators. The 
bottom five grades (general clerical and the four typing grades), which had 
broadly similar wages, comprised fifty-four percent of the male clerks but eighty 
percent of the female clerks. The top three grades (clerical officer grade 1, and 
computer assistant grades 1 and 2), comprised twenty-two percent of the men and 
just two percent of the women, whilst the top grade itself (computer assistant 
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Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol.10, No.3, November 1972, Table 10, p.378, cited in Bowen 
et al, ‘The Attachment of White‐Collar’, p.24 
72 Shaw, The Cinderellas of industry, Table 5, p.87  
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6.13 Picketing of Clerical Workers - Weeks One and Two 
 
In the 1972 dispute, COSA initially agreed to restrict overtime, along with the 
miners, and later to strike in support of the NUM’s wage claim, which was for all 
grades of its membership including clerical staff. Before the official ballot on 
strike action the NEC requested that certain COSA members work during the 
strike to pay ‘lying on wages’ (wages owing to the miners for the week before 
the strike began), and organise supplementary benefits and tax rebates. After the 
COSA Area general council meeting in January, it was decided that the NEC be 
informed that COSA were ‘insistent’ upon a ballot on strike action and that if the 
NUM required certain non-industrial staff to work, ‘they all would or none at all’. 
The NEC then advised the Area that this decision ‘went beyond what was deemed 
necessary’ and that there should be a minimum number of clerical workers 
detailed to work to conform to union policy. COSA members voted in the strike 
ballot overwhelmingly to remain at work. However, they were instructed to 
withdraw their labour in support of the NUM, and COSA informed the NEC that 
all clerical membership would do so from 15 January. Most COSA clerks 
remained on strike throughout the full period of the dispute, though 
approximately one-fifth of the membership left COSA during and after the strike 
in protest against the decision to withdraw their labour. Some of these attempted 
to join CAWU, whilst others became non-union members. Some of the ex-COSA 
members at Beta attempted to rejoin the COSA branch after the strike but were 
refused membership.73 Nationally, about nine hundred COSA members 
attempted to join CAWU during the period of the strike,74 though not all these 
were ‘in protest’, but rather that the option of membership of CAWU ‘and a quiet 
life was more advantageous than membership of COSA’. The transfer of 
members became a source of future friction between the unions.75  The CAWU 
NEC instructed its members not to enter offices if requested not to do so by NUM 
pickets, however, in a number of Areas, including the North East, some members 
ignored these instructions and continued to work.76 This led to bitter exchanges 
between the pickets and CAWU clerks, and also between the officials of CAWU 
and those of COSA, with a COSA official claiming, ‘CAWU must be cleared out 
 
73 Bowen et al, ‘The Attachment of White‐Collar’, p.31 
74 Northern Echo, 26 January 1972, cited in Bowen et al, ‘The Attachment of White‐Collar’, p.31 
75 Pitt, M., The World On Our Backs: The Kent Miners and the 1972 Miners’ Strike, (London, 
1979) p140 
76 Bowen et al, ‘The Attachment of White‐Collar’, p.31 
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of the industry. They have no allegiance to coal. We feel we shouldn't be working 
beside people like this who regularly break picket lines and blissfully carry on 
their work as if nothing was happening.’77  
 
The picketing of clerical workers began on the first day of the strike at NCB 
offices in Nottinghamshire, despite the clerks having been asked to remain in 
work. Picketing also took place that week at NCB regional headquarters at 
Anderton House, Lancashire and at Coleorton Hall, Leicestershire and at NCB 
offices in South Wales. At the end of the first week five hundred clerks at the coal 
industry research centre came out in solidarity action after a call from the pickets 
to support the strike.78 On the Monday of week two Story noted, somewhat 
disingenuously, that COSA members had decided unanimously to join the 
miners, and twelve thousand five hundred came out on strike though a minority 
stayed in work as did most of the five thousand five hundred members of 
CAWU.79 Picketing at NCB Area offices of those that remained in work 
expanded during the week, but largely without incident and a police presence was 
not deemed necessary at the offices in North Yorkshire or Northwestern. There 
continued to be peaceful picketing each day at Coleorton Hall and at the NCB 
offices in South Wales, however, in East Wales five hundred pickets physically 
prevented clerks from getting in to work, and only a handful of clerks managed 
to get to work at the North Derbyshire offices in Bolsover, though a police telex 
reports just two pickets.80 CAWU clerks at seven pits in South Wales were 
persuaded to go home on the second Monday. However, they continued working 
in NCB Area offices at Tondu, Llanishen and Ystrad Hengoed/Mynach, where 
on Tuesday four hundred CAWU clerks turned up for work but went home after 
talks with the pickets, and then returned to work on Wednesday, before being 
turned back again on Friday. In Nottinghamshire, both NCB Area headquarters 
were picketed, with police assistance over three days required to get clerical staff 
to work through heavy picketing, including two hundred on the first day at 
Edwinstowe. In addition to the picketing of clerks at pits and NCB offices, clerks 
 
77 Northern Echo, February 1972, cited in Bowen et al, ‘The Attachment of White‐Collar’, p.31 
78 The Times, 13 & 15 January; TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Lancashire, Leicester & Rutland and 
South Wales, 17 January 1972 
79 Financial Times, 13 & 17 January; Guardian, 24 January 1972; Francis, H. & Smith, D., The 
Fed: A History of the South Wales Miners in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1980) p.471 
80 TNA: COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board Members, 17 February; COAL31/416, NCB 
Situation Report, 21 January; HO325/101, Telexes, Leicester & Rutland, Derbyshire and 
South Wales, 24 January 1972 
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were also picketed at the central wages office in Pontardulais, West Wales, and 
at the NCB’s national computer centre at Cannock in Staffordshire.81 
 
The most significant picketing against clerical staff in week two took place over 
three days at the NCB’s Doncaster Area headquarters, whose computer also did 
wage calculations and processing for other companies in the town. The staff 
manager sent two reports of the events, the first of which (19 January) alleged 
that threats were made to the clerks along the lines of ‘you lot will be butchered 
tomorrow’, and many of the female staff were reportedly distressed with two 
being sent home.82 The following day one hundred pickets confronted one 
hundred police leading to a two-hour delay in getting the clerks into work.83 The 
second report (21 January) was forwarded to Gormley as part of a formal 
complaint. It stated that some five to six hundred miners had attempted to stop 
clerical workers going to work that day. The pickets had emphasised that they 
were not in dispute with BACM managers, but rather only with the CAWU and 
COSA clerks, and that if CAWU members would support the strike then they 
would let the managers in. This offer was rejected and the managers reportedly 
chose not to leave the clerks (many of whom were ‘young girls’) exposed to the 
pickets alone. The police subsequently led the clerical staff through the angry 
picket line, some two hundred yards long, where they were subject to obscenities 
and abuse and some were reportedly kicked, punched or spat upon. Subsequently 
almost every female member of staff reportedly collapsed in tears, were hysterical 
or otherwise physically distressed, and were given ‘first aid’ treatment (hot drinks 
and tranquillisers).84 Reports by two pickets point to some provocation by the 
office staff, and also by the police. The first claims that, despite the presence of 
BBC and ITN cameramen, police were discretely kicking the pickets, but that this 
was not recorded or shown by the television crews who focused instead on the 
hostile attitude of the pickets towards the ‘girls. Both pickets allege that, on the 
first day, CAWU workers inside the building poured tea leaves and hot tea out of 
the high windows on to the pickets (when there were about sixty of them). On the 
 
81 TNA: LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Appendix 1, pp.2-3; TNA: COAL31/300, Note, 
NCB to Board Members, 17 February; HO325/101, Telexes, Staffordshire & Stoke on Trent, 
17 January; Nottinghamshire, 24 January; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
82 TNA: COAL31/383, Report, Marsh to Straw, 19 January; HO 325/101, Letter, Hilary to 
Wright, 21 January 1972 
83 TNA: COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board Members, 17 February 1972 
84 TNA: COAL78/1906, Letter, Shephard to Gormley, 21 January; HO325/101, Letter, Hilary to 
Wright, 21 January; COAL31/383, Report, Marsh to Straw, 19 January; FV38/184, DTI Post-
mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
173 
 
second day there were about two hundred pickets, and there were reportedly a lot 
of women who had joined the pickets. Then the police came, and the office staff 
inside the building were making the ‘V-sign’ at the pickets and telling them ‘Take 
yer hook and go down the hole where you belong, you rats’. The third day there 
were about one thousand pickets, and the police escorted them through, and there 
was spitting and kicking and pushing.85 
 
Gormley responded by deprecating the incidents and enclosing, with his reply to 
the Board, a copy of an NUM circular entitled ‘Instructions to Pickets’ sent out 
to the Area secretaries the previous day. Given that the NUM circular and the 
NCB’s complaint have the same date it is not clear whether the former was in 
direct response to the latter or would have been dispatched in any regard.86 The 
assistant Chief Constable of Doncaster, who was in charge of policing on that 
day, appeared to disagree with the NCB version of events and gave a different 
account of the incident to Yorkshire Television stating that: ‘The behaviour of 
the strike pickets today has been splendid. I have nothing but praise for them’.87 
A Security Service report noted that the local police were shaken by the incident 
and alleged that the trouble was caused by Trotskyist militants of the Socialist 
Labour League (SLL).88 This report draws on an article from The Times, which 
mentions Trotskyists, but does not mention the SLL specifically, or indeed any 
political party. Given the widespread militant picketing of clerical and safety 
workers throughout the country, and throughout the strike, and the lack of any 
other mention of Trotskyists in this regard, it seems unlikely that the aggressive 
action here was led or instigated by them, though they may well have been 
present. Rather a combination of provocation, and pre-existing feelings of 
contempt towards those who cross picket lines, made the miners fell that their 
hostility was legitimate and justified. 
 
 
6.14 Picketing of Clerical Workers - Weeks Three to Seven 
 
The picketing of clerical workers expanded and became more militant during 
week three, and included some clerks picketing others who were still in work. 
 
85 Cited in Geary, R., Policing Industrial Disputes: 1893 to 1985, (Cambridge, 1985) p.72 
86 TNA: COAL26/404, Letter, Gormley to Shephard, 22 January 1972 
87 HC Deb, 2 March 1972, vol.832 c.728 
88 TNA: HO325/101, Letter, Hilary to Wright, 21 January; The Times, January 20 1972 
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Doncaster NCB headquarters was again the subject of a mass picket with police 
helping clerical staff past one hundred and fifty pickets. NUM leaders repeated 
their call for this sort of picketing to stop and miners then apparently desisted 
with the police reporting that ‘trouble at NCB Doncaster appears to have 
subsided’. However, local COSA leaders voted to continue the picketing.89 There 
was heavy picketing at both NCB Area offices in Durham, with between fifty and 
one hundred each day at Whitburn, and picketing over three days at Team Valley, 
with police escorting forty-nine staff through two hundred pickets on the second 
day, before a minimal picket on the third.90 In Lancashire, there were a dozen 
pickets at Anderton House and the NCB reported that ‘a coach load of COSA 
pickets’ toured all the depots in the Area to persuade members still working to 
stop, but that they only received a response at Ratcliffe depot where some joined 
the strike. The Board considered the effects of the COSA strike to have been 
negligible, with just four out of one hundred and thirty offices closed, though it 
continued to refer to the dispute on its internal documentation as ‘NUM/COSA 
strike’.91  
 
Shephard wrote to Gormley to complain of the aggressive picketing of clerical 
workers and cited angry scenes outside the Scottish North Area offices at Alloa 
that morning when around three hundred pickets confronted staff.92 In the process 
cars were reportedly damaged and six of the female employees were treated for 
shock, with one receiving medical attention for bruised ribs after being pushed 
against a fence. Shephard also noted that one hundred pickets had jostled staff 
entering the NCB offices in Tondu, Glamorgan that morning, despite a police 
presence, and that one ‘girl’ had been treated for shock and another for a foot 
injury. The following day police escorted clerical staff through three hundred 
pickets at Tondu, and the South Wales NUM leadership called for such picketing 
to be stopped, after which it was reduced to a minimum with no further incidents 
reported. Local police confirmed that clerks had been jostled over two days at 
Tondu that week, but reported that they had received no complaints from any 
source and that no arrests had been made. The police and South Wales NUM both 
 
89 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/11, 24 January; HO325/101, Telex, West Yorkshire, 24 January 
1972 
90 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Durham, 24 & 31 January; PREM15/984, PRCS/14, 27 January; 
COAL31/300, Note, NCB to Board Members, 17 February 1972 
91 TNA: COAL31/300, Marketing Reports, 28 January, 18 & 25 February; COAL31/383, 
Marketing Report, 11 February 1972 
92 DTI Post-mortem cites c.400 
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blamed ‘militants from other areas, including strikers who did not belong to the 
mining industry’.93 The DTI cited a police report which suggested that the ‘press 
have exaggerated the incidents arising out of picketing of offices in Wales and 
the North East.’94  
 
The allegations of infiltration of the picket lines in Tondu echoes Gormley’s 
allegations earlier in the week of similar infiltration in Durham. It is unclear who 
might have been responsible, or who was being blamed, or indeed whether 
infiltration actual took place at all. In terms of whom may have been in the frame, 
Gormley’s allegations implied that whoever was infiltrating also had the ability 
to influence television reporters to attend. He further linked his allegations to 
blaming the Board for its attempts to manipulate public opinion by issuing 
misleading photographs. This would appear to imply that Gormley was accusing 
the Board of having some influence over those who were accused of infiltrating 
the picket and therefore of it using agents provocateurs, which would be quite 
some allegation. In the earlier events at Doncaster NCB offices during week two, 
allegations were made by the press and security services that Trotskyist activists 
had infiltrated the picket, but there does not seem to be any sense of that here, 
and it seems unlikely that they would be able to call on television crews to attend. 
Students were also known to have been present on a number of picket lines, and 
could perhaps have been responsible here. It is recorded that they were generally 
less disciplined in their approach than were the miners, and this is discussed 
further in Chapter Eight. It would, though, not seemingly be in the interest of 
supporters of the miners, whether left wing activists or students, to call on 
television or the media to record scenes of picket aggression. There were 
allegations made later in the strike, in respect to the confrontation at Saltley, of 
the use of undercover agents posing as miners who infiltrated the mass picket 
(discussed in Chapter Ten), which would lend credence to the potential use of 
such agents in the events at Durham or Tondu. 
 
The picketing of clerical workers eased off in week four, though there were still 
some large and militant picket lines. In Durham, the offices at Whitburn had just 
 
93 TNA: COAL78/1906, Letter, Shephard to Gormley, 25 January; COAL31/300, Note, NCB to 
Board Members, 17 February; HO325/101, Telex, South Wales, 31 January; PREM15/984, 
PRCS/11, 24 January; PRCS/13, 26 January; PRCS/14, 27 January; PRCS/17, 31 January; 
FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 
94 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/18, 1 February 1972 
176 
 
three pickets on the Monday, after the heavy picketing the previous week, but 
there were one hundred pickets at Team Valley. At Coventry colliery pickets 
stopped all vehicles from entering with clerical workers refused entry and safety 
staff only allowed in after some difficulty.95 There was a mass picket at the NCB 
offices in Ystrad Hengoed, Glamorgan where only one third of the clerks got 
through and, according to the DTI post-mortem, some were pushed and had their 
hair pulled. The deputy Chief Constable of Wales reported that the problem was 
that, as at many places, police had come to an amicable arrangement with the 
pickets but that picket numbers were then augmented by militant flying squads 
who caught the police short-handed. This was then further aggravated by a 
number of the female employees, who, having seen their colleagues escorted 
through the picket lines, decided that they would also like to go to work and this 
consequently divided the police strength. He stated that: ‘No police officers saw 
girls’ hair being pulled and no complaints had been received from any of the 
girls.’96  
 
The picketing of clerks reduced in week five, as the strike began to draw to a 
close, but there were two dozen pickets at various times at the NCB offices in 
Whitburn, Durham and also picketing at Coventry colliery and Emley Moor 
colliery, Barnsley. COSA members also picketed CAWU clerks in Wales.97 In 
Scotland the NUM threatened to withdraw safety cover entirely at Monkton Hall 
and Bilston Glen collieries unless COSA members still at work were 
withdrawn.98 In week six, heavy picketing was reported at the NCB’s pension and 
insurance centres in Cardiff, whilst Edwinstowe, Nottinghamshire and Team 
Valley, Durham were also picketed, with COSA clerks at the latter picketing 
against non-unionised clerks working inside.99 In week seven, some clerks in 
Yorkshire, South Wales and Northwestern returned to work but the majority 
remained on strike.100 
 
 
95 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Warwickshire and Durham, 31 January 1972 
96 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June; HO325/101, Letter, Stevenson to 
McQueen, 1 February 1972 
97 TNA: COAL/31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 3, 4, 8-10 February; COAL31/383, NCB 
Situation Report, 11 February; HO325/101, Telexes, South Wales and Durham, 14 February 
1972 
98 TNA: COAL31/383, NCB Situation Reports, 11 February 1972 
99 TNA: COAL31/383, NCB Situation Reports, 14, 15, 17 & 18 February; HO325/101, Telex, 
Durham, 14 February; FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, Annex S, June 1972 





The chapter has demonstrated that the widespread disregard for the national 
directives on maintenance and safety cover shown by the pickets reflected a deep 
anger and frustration that had built-up over the preceding period, in particular pit 
closures and the rationalisation of wages. The national leadership of the NUM 
were implicated in these processes, which could explain why much of the 
frustration expressed by the pickets was in defiance of the leadership’s directives. 
This defiance built upon similar attitudes that began during the overtime ban 
preceding the strike, when miners began to refuse to undertake safety cover. The 
decision to withhold safety cover was in part a negotiating tactic, in that the 
miners’ attitude was that if the NCB and the Government cared so much about 
the deteriorating condition of the pits then they should meet the wage demand. 
However, the picketing of safety and clerical staff was not essentially due to the 
type of work that was being undertaken by them but rather was aimed primarily 
at their role as strike-breakers. This is particularly underlined by the picketing of 
clerical workers, which in itself had no real negotiating element. Also, the 
picketing against maintenance work primarily focused on NACODS officials 
rather than BACM managers (who get sparse mention in the records), implying 
miners’ identification of a struggle against those within their own community or 
class, which is true to a certain extent of the picketing against clerical workers.  
 
The pickets apparent lack of concern for the state of the pits, or the possibility of 
their deterioration, seems to reflect a realistic view of an industry in decline, 
which was contracting even when maintenance was undertaken, and miners were 
compliant and restrained. Consequently, a smaller industry paying better wages 
was perhaps an attractive prospect to many miners, who had not seen the benefits 
of their restraint and consequently had little stake in maintaining the pits on behalf 
of the Board. The variety of approaches to the picketing of officials and clerical 
workers, both within and between Areas, points to decision-making taking place 
locally rather than at national level. In this regard, the leadership of the union did 
not lead the strike, but rather responded to pressure from below as a means of 
containing the anger and frustration of the militant element. The way in which 
the picketing unfolded in a particular locality was a response to what appeared to 
work in that locality, coloured by the relative level of militancy and frustration, 
and the response they received from the officials and the clerks. Small scale and 
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peaceful picketing were arguably preferable for everybody and indeed this 
worked in many locations, but not in all. In the latter, picketing became more 
militant or larger scale, or both, in order to be more effective and to achieve the 
desired aim. In some places, a militant attitude achieved results early in the 
dispute and this became the form that was used throughout the strike. In others, 
mass picketing when combined with demands to restrict numbers achieved its 
purpose, and these restrictions then continued throughout the dispute.  
 
As the strike developed, NACODS own response reflected decisions taken 
locally with officials in some localities continuing to attempt to cross picket lines 
in accordance with their national guidelines, but in an increasing number of 
localities NACODS officials turned back at the first sign of resistance. This 
presumably reflects a preference not to have to confront the pickets’ anger on a 
daily basis and perhaps some sympathy for the miners’ cause. There was 
presumably also an awareness that they would all soon be back down the pits 
together, and therefore decisions were taken for the sake of future harmony. The 
Board’s exasperation at the apparent lack of determination by some officials to 
pass the picket lines reflected its own frustration at the progress of the strike, with 
















This chapter considers the stocks of distributed coal and the supply of fuel to 
priority and vulnerable consumers during the dispute. The overtime ban 
preceding the strike had made significant inroads into the NCB’s stocks with a 
loss of production of around five million tons, though the NCB nevertheless felt 
itself well prepared and able to withstand a strike primarily because it had stocked 
up previously such that when the ban began it had over thirty-four million tons, 
some eight million more than at the same point in the previous year.1 The chapter 
shows that the power stations, as the main consumers of coal and the main priority 
for the Government, were thought to have sufficient stocks to last around eight 
weeks and most commentators believed that the strike would be over prior to this. 
The main problem for the NCB and the electricity generating boards was that 
their calculations had assumed a degree of coal transportation being available to 
them during the strike, since not all stocks were where they would be needed. The 
chapter will show that the success of the picketing in stranding these stocks led 
to a steady downward revision of the timescale and ultimately to power cuts as 
many power stations ran short, some of these quite quickly. The supply of coal to 
priority consumers was a major issue for all sides in the dispute and played a role 
in the manipulation of public opinion. It became a key battleground, both between 
the NCB and the Government on the one side, and the NUM on the other, but also 
between the NUM leadership and the miners on the picket lines. The chapter will 
show that there were differing views about what was considered a priority, both 
 
1 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
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in terms of practical need and available coal supplies, but also at a local level. 
Miners were not keen to release pit-head stocks for priority use where there was 
a suspicion that stocks were being distributed by merchants to non-priority 
consumers. Schools became a significant area of dispute, with each side holding 
somewhat fluid views on whether they should be considered a priority, but with 
the pickets largely believing it important to keep them open. 
 
 
7.2  Coal Stocks at the Outset 
 
There were approximately nineteen million tons of distributed coal stocks at the 
beginning of the strike, including over fourteen million tons at the power stations. 
Stocks were higher than usual for the time of year, due to several factors: the 
winter had been milder than usual; big consumers of coal had been advised by 
Lord Robens, prior to his stepping down as NCB chairman, that a strike was 
coming and that they should therefore stockpile;2 and in addition three and a half 
million tons had been imported from Australia and America, in preparation for 
the strike. The NCB advised that it had enough stocks to last around eight weeks. 
However, the stocks at power stations were unevenly distributed with relatively 
high stocks in Scotland and the south of England, but an average of just seven 
weeks supply at power stations in the north and the midlands, which normally 
accounted for around eighty percent of CEGB burn.3 Almost three quarters of 
total output from the CEGB’s one hundred and forty-two power stations was 
produced by coal or dual coal/oil fired stations, and a disproportionate number of 
the very large fuel-efficient power stations were supplied by rail and were situated 
in or near the Yorkshire coalfield. These supplied nearly seventeen percent of 
total CEGB capacity compared to just three percent of national capacity in East 
Anglia,4 which drew more attention in the commentary on the strike due to the 
presence in the region of ‘flying pickets’ from Yorkshire. The first three weeks 
of the strike, superficially, had little impact on the stocks; temperatures were 
above normal and power station consumption was maintained. Total distributed 
stocks at the end of this period were still marginally higher than they had been at 
the same point in the previous year, but the successful picketing, which prevented 
 
2 King, C., The Cecil King diary, 1970-1974, (London, 1975) p.186 
3 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972; Allen, V. L., The Militancy of British Miners, 
(Shipley, 1981) p.185 
4 Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, (London, 1984) pp.219-21 
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the CEGB from being able to transfer stocks from one power station to another, 
led it to reassess its ‘effective’ as opposed to total stocks of coal; at the end of this 
period effective stocks were put at 6.4 million tons (around four weeks’ supply) 
as 1.7 million tons could not, by then, be utilised.5 By 27 January, towards the 
end of the third week, two small power stations in England had already closed 
and one in Scotland was expected to close the following week.6 
 
 
Table 7.1. Distributed Coal Stocks, 1972 (Million tons).7 
 
Week        Strike        Power Coke   
Ended       Week       Stations Ovens   Industry      Domestic        Total 
08 Jan - 14.28   1.59      1.43  1.25     18.97 
15 Jan       1 12.84   1.37      1.30  1.09     16.94 
22 Jan       2 11.37   1.21      1.09  0.85     14.77 
29 Jan       3   9.63   1.05      0.91  0.63     12.38 
05 Feb       4   7.69   0.92      0.74  0.45       9.92 
12 Feb       5   6.14   0.78      0.60  0.32       7.93 
19 Feb       6   5.40   0.64      0.51  0.23       6.86 
26 Feb       7   5.41   0.69      0.47  0.20       6.87 
04 Mar       -   6.01   0.86      0.50  0.21       7.71 
11 Mar       -   6.54   1.01      0.56  0.22       8.47 
18 Mar       -   7.38   1.19      0.63  0.27       9.65 




Table 7.2. Total Inland Coal Consumption, 1972 (Million tons).8 
 
Week        Strike        Power Coke   
Ended       Week       Stations* Ovens   Industry*      Domestic*      Total 
08 Jan - 1.73   0.32      0.27  0.37       3.01 
15 Jan       1 1.78   0.22      0.26  0.30       2.79 
22 Jan       2 1.72   0.19      0.23  0.25       2.59 
29 Jan       3 1.74   0.17      0.21  0.22       2.53 
05 Feb       4 1.82   0.15      0.20  0.18       2.47 
12 Feb       5 1.42   0.14      0.18  0.12       1.94 
19 Feb       6 0.91   0.13      0.11  0.09       1.30 
26 Feb       7 0.86   0.14      0.12  0.07       1.24 
04 Mar       - 1.02   0.26      0.15  0.14       1.75 
11 Mar       - 1.28   0.33      0.19  0.19       2.31 
18 Mar       - 1.07   0.38      0.21  0.22       2.21 
25 Mar       - 0.84   0.40      0.22  0.26       2.03 
 
 
* Excluding Northern Ireland 
Notes: 1) Industry includes consumers of 1,000 tons or more per annum 
 2) Domestic includes house coal, anthracite and dry steam coal 
 
5 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
6 TNA: CAB134/3485, E(72), MC Emergencies, 2nd Meeting, 26 January 1972 
7 Source: TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
8 Source: TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
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7.3  Dwindling Supplies 
 
As the NUM began to disrupt the flow of oil to power stations, which were 
conserving coal by burning extra oil, the CEGB and Scottish Electricity 
Generating Board (SEGB) used alternative fuels to a maximum, and therefore 
managed to conserve their coal stocks using about eighty percent of normal 
consumption, but nevertheless many power stations had exhausted their supplies 
by the start of February.9 In the fourth week of the strike the weather turned colder 
during a three-day spell (30 January to 1 February), which led to a surge in 
demand for electricity. This in turn caused an increase in both power station coal 
burn and the electricity sent out to consumers. Other sectors, including industrial 
and domestic, reduced their consumption but total inland consumption remained 
at 2.5 million tons per week. Total power station stocks fell by 2 million tons to 
7.7 million tons (a little over four weeks’ supply) but since the CEGB’s ‘blocked’ 
stocks increased to 2.5 million tons, effective stocks were down to 3.8 million 
tons (only two and a half weeks’ supply).10 The Home Office debated whether it 
should authorise the release of two hundred Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
generators to hospitals that did not have their own emergency equipment, and 
whether the Department for the Environment should issue over three hundred 
generators, which it had in store, to priority customers. The Home Office 
reasoned that the public would consider this a sensible precaution, and that the 
Departments should therefore be authorised to go ahead though it cautioned that 
the MOD generators would be delivered by soldiers in uniform, and so some 
publicity would be unavoidable.11  
 
During the fifth week, a State of Emergency was declared, and the Wilberforce 
Court of Inquiry was appointed. Electricity sent out by the CEGB dropped below 
the pre-strike rate for the first time, and total consumption of coal fell from 2.5 
million tons per week to 2 million tons as power stations reduced their burn.12 
Coal stocks at power stations as at 7 February was down to 6.1 million tons - of 
this 2.75 million tons were ‘not immediately available’, comprising excessive 
stocks at Aberthaw, Didcot and Tilbury ‘B’ power stations, plus ‘carpet losses’ 
 
9 KL: KA25/U/Z5, NUM Conference 1972, NEC Report, pp.8-9 
10 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972; KL: KA25/U/Z5, NUM Conference 1972, 
NEC Report, p.9 
11 TNA: HO325/101, Letter, Allen to Departmental list, 1 February 1972 
12 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
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at all stations without concreted stocking ground. Effectively, by 9 February, one 
month into the strike, the CEGB had 3.25 million tons of accessible stock, 
representing two weeks burn if it were evenly distributed. However, stocks were 
by then badly out of balance and several major power stations had already had to 
reduce their burn due to a shortage of coal. A complete shutdown was then only 
days away at some big Midlands power stations - Ratcliffe, Willington, High 
Marnham, and Rugeley - and the timing of the first power cuts was then 
dependent on the weather, given the mild spell at the time. By the end of that 
week the CEGB’s effective stocks were 2.5 million tons (only one and a half 
weeks’ supply).13  
 
 
7.4  Power Cuts 
 
The initial, unplanned, power cuts occurred on 10 February, with power 
reductions of nine to ten per cent introduced the following day. The NCB 
envisaged that these would have to be increased to twenty per cent reductions 
after one week, to thirty per cent a week later and to about forty per cent in the 
third week, i.e. by the end of February. The Government intended to ban 
electricity for advertising and floodlighting within a few days, and to spread the 
available power supplies evenly around the country after taking priority supplies 
into account. The amount of electricity consumption amongst consumer 
categories was, at that time, in the following proportions: 
 
  Industrial    41.6% 
  Domestic    38.0% 
  Commercial    15.1% 
  Combined Commercial/Domestic   1.5% 
  Farms       1.7% 
  Traction      1.3% 
  Public Lighting      0.8% 
 
Priority consumers included essential users such as hospitals, gas and water 
supplies, sewage pumping and also transport, since British Rail relied entirely on 
 
13 TNA: COAL31/383, NCB Marketing Report, 11 February 1972 
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CEGB for electric traction. The London Underground, though, had two of its own 
power stations, and so was not affected. Priority users also, ironically, included 
collieries, due to the need for pumping and ventilation safety measures. The NCB 
correctly made the point that, since the initial emergency regulations would make 
it illegal for only a very small proportion of commercial categories to use 
electricity, these savings would do very little to reduce overall demand, and 
neither would a ban on public lighting, which would be the next obvious 
measure.14 Drastic electricity cuts were imposed on industrial and domestic 
consumers from week six onwards. Total coal consumption was down to forty-
five percent of the pre-strike level, and electricity sent out was thirty percent down 
on the level of two weeks earlier. Industry was seriously affected and by the end 
of the week 1.6 million workers had been laid off. Crude steel production fell to 
sixty percent of the pre-strike level, and power station stocks fell to 4.4 million 
tons with effective stocks of about 2 million tons. The final week of the strike 
was a transitional one; the Wilberforce Court of Inquiry reported on 18 February, 
and although the miners were not back at work, and therefore not producing more 
coal, pickets were withdrawn in many places and coal was able to move from 
imported and pit-head stocks. The supplies proved to be just sufficient to meet 
the low consumption of 1.2 million tons and so the drain on distributed stocks 
was halted.15 
  
Table 7.3. Coal Dispute Stocks Summary (Million tons).16 
 
Loss of output: 
Overtime ban  1/11/1971 to 8/1/1972    5 
Strike  9/1/1972 to 26/2/1972  19.5 
Recovery period 27/2/1972 to 25/3/1972        1.5 
Total loss of output 1/11/1971 to 25/3/1972  26 
 
Reduction in consumption due to the strike  10  
Additional imports because of the strike     1  . 
Total ‘savings’ of coal 1/11/1971 to 25/3/1972  11 
 
Net loss of coal because of the dispute   15 
 
Total coal stocks at  30/10/1971   34.6 (26.3  in 1970) 
Total coal stocks at  25/3/1972   18.5 (19.8  in 1971) 
Total stock change    -16.1 (-6.5   in 1971) 
 
 
14 TNA: COAL31/383, NCB Marketing Report, 11 February 1972 
15 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
16 Source: TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
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7.5  Priority Supplies 
 
Domestic and industrial supply of coal for general use largely ceased as the strike 
began, though the miners were aware of the need to maintain supplies to 
emergency and priority consumers, and the issue of releasing priority coal 
became crucial in the battle over public opinion. A circular sent out by Daly to 
the NUM regions on 30 December stated that ‘essential supplies were to be 
maintained to, for example, hospitals’.17 The question of what was considered to 
be a priority exposed divisions between the NUM leadership and the membership, 
since the miners in South Wales and Yorkshire also immediately began allowing 
coal to be released to schools, against the directive of the NEC.18 The DTI’s own 
list of priority categories of domestic and essential public service consumers did 
not include schools, and was as follows:  
 
A)  All households which depend solely on solid fuel for cooking.  
B)  Those in the following health risk categories:  i) households consisting only 
of elderly persons, or where elderly persons are left alone for most of the day; 
ii) maternity cases booked for home delivery or early discharge after hospital 
confinement;  iii) families with children below school age;  iv) the chair bound 
or bedfast, sick or physically handicapped, and those whose mobility is 
severely impaired by virtue of handicap such as circulatory disease;  v) other 
households where the need for warmth has been verified by a doctor or local 
authority. 
C)  Health and welfare services including for example hospitals, clinics, 
residential homes for the elderly and handicapped, etc, which rely on solid fuel. 
D)  Essential public services (e.g. sewerage works) still dependent on solid fuel.19 
 
As with all aspects of picketing during the strike, decisions surrounding the 
release of priority supplies were taken by local branches and by the pickets 
themselves at each picketed site, and consequently varied considerably in part 
due to the availability of coal locally. The NCB and the NUM both saw the 
continuation of priority supplies as critical but also sought to blame each other 
for failing to allow it. Internal NCB correspondence during the first three weeks 
of the strike shows that it sought information from its regions concerning unmet 
 
17 McCormick, B.J., Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry, (London, 1979) p.202 
18 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/1, 9-12 January 1972 
19 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
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priority requests, the proportion of schools that had closed, and later also daily 
reports of the locations of hospitals, retirement homes and other welfare 
institutions which were in jeopardy.20 Perhaps expecting the miners to withhold 
all supplies, the police telexes record several instances of priority coal being 
released under the supervision of pickets.21  
 
By the end of the third week, efforts to reach an agreement between the NCB and 
NUM for release of stocks from Butlerfield site near Edinburgh, which had over 
forty thousand tons of fuel, had failed. Similar efforts at the Clock Face stocking 
site in St. Helens had also failed, though an agreement was reached to supply 
around one hundred and fifty tons per day from Templemewsom opencast site in 
Yorkshire to supplement dwindling stocks at Barnsley Main and Howroyd depots 
for supply to priority customers. Coal stocks and the flow of coal for priority use 
remained good in Yorkshire, whilst the situation in the Midlands had deteriorated 
with pickets stopping domestic priority supply from Hilton Main depot and 
Silverdale landsale in Staffordshire, and from Whitwick landsale in the South 
Midlands. Movement of all supplies from Glentaggart in Scotland had ceased 
entirely, whilst only twenty tons of coal remained at Niddrie depot in Edinburgh, 
which was to be reserved for domestic priority use only, with a maximum of one 
hundredweight per customer. In South Wales, the prospects looked better with 
pickets agreeing to the release of coal from Nantgarw, Bargoed and Penlan depots 
within a few days.22 In the fourth week pickets in the North East refused to allow 
coal to be released to three residential estates ‘despite official NUM approval’ to 
do so.23  
 
During the third and fourth weeks, the NCB undertook an assessment of supplies 
available to different categories of coal consumers. For domestic consumption, it 
found that there were still good stocks of coal south of a line between Bristol and 
The Wash for supply to all consumers (including non-priority), sufficient for 
another three to four weeks, but that there were virtually no stocks available north 
of this line for non-priority consumers and already difficulties in some areas in 
keeping priority consumers supplied. Local strike committees were co-operating 
 
20 TNA: COAL78/1903, Memo, Barratt to NCB Regional Marketing Directors, 12 January; 
Memo, Lane to NCB Regional Marketing Directors, 27 January 1972 
21 TNA: HO325/101, Telexes, Durham, 17 January; Gwynedd, 14 January; Derbyshire, 31 
January; Cumbria, 6 & 14 February 1972 
22 TNA: COAL31/300, NCB Marketing Report, 28 January 1972 
23 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/20, 3 February 1972 
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in releasing priority supplies through picket lines at the pit-head and opencast 
sites. However, in Derbyshire, Northumberland and East Wales, strike 
committees were less co-operative.24 During the fifth week the NCB reported that 
pickets at Killoch and Littlemill pits in Scottish South Area had begun stopping 
priority coal supply to hospitals and pensioners.25 At the end of the following 
week, in the last days of the strike, the NCB reported that there was no slackening 
of picketing with pickets still applying their own concept of priorities, which was 
much narrower than the Ministry’s list. Pickets were also continuing to insist on 
only one or two hundredweight deliveries (providing that lorry crews were union 
members). In the Northwestern region, an agreement was reached between the 
NCB and the NUM Area Executive to redistribute stocks from the Clock Face 
stocking site to other local sites where the stocks were exhausted, however local 
pickets would still not agree to allow this.26 
 
 
7.6  Coal Merchants 
 
During the third week of the strike a DTI report noted that South Wales Coal 
Merchants Federation had reported that its members in Newport, North 
Monmouthshire, Rhondda, Aberdare and Bargoed: ‘will make no further 
deliveries to priority consumers, even where they still have small stocks, because 
pickets in the area are now intercepting deliveries at merchants’ yards.’ The report 
noted that this was academic in view of the very small stocks left but that the 
interceptions were perhaps due to the pickets’ suspicion that coal may be being 
brought into the area ‘as we know may well be the case’. It also noted that the 
NCB expected similar trouble soon in South Lancashire and in those urban areas 
of Yorkshire where supplies were low unless the NUM and the local pickets 
agreed to release coal.27 At the end of that week, a DTI report noted that pickets 
in several regions were not following ‘the generally accepted line’ by withholding 
priority coal ‘even to hospitals’ in protest at the non-supply by the NCB of in-
arrears concessionary coal to miners (which was effectively a long-established 
part of their wages).28  
 
24 TNA: FV 38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
25 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Report, 9 February 1972 
26 TNA: COAL31/300, NCB Marketing Report, 18 February 1972 
27 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/13, 26 January 1972  
28 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/15, 28 January 1972 
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In addition to attempting to ensure that priority needs were met the NUM were 
also keen to ensure that no coal was released except for priority use. At the end 
of the third week of the strike Daly wrote to the Coal Merchants Federation of 
Great Britain (CMFGB) to complain about some coal merchants not abiding by 
the guidelines set out by both the NUM and the Government for coal supplies to 
priority customers. Daly warned that in future, merchants might be stopped from 
supplying even priority cases if deliveries to non-priority categories persisted and 
suggested the following procedure: deliveries to priority groups would be allowed 
to continue; such deliveries would require a certificate of authenticity concerning 
the nature and destination of the fuel; if deemed necessary by the picket organiser 
delivery lorries may be accompanied by an NUM member; a further certificate 
would be signed by the merchant at the delivery point to confirm the need.29 Early 
the following week Daly sent a letter to Social Services Secretary Sir Keith 
Joseph referring to his letter to the CMFGB and noting that no reply had been 
received. He informed Joseph that in the event that merchants were unable to 
supply these groups, people would be contacting the DSS for assistance and that 
he should therefore inform doctors of the NUM’s concern and tell them that they 
should contact their local NUM Area secretary who would assist doctors in 
obtaining coal to ensure the warmth and help of the priority groups.30 The 
CMFGB reply to Daly a week later noted that it was not a party to the dispute, 
that it had no control over its nine thousand member firms, but that these firms 
would continue to serve their customers and fulfil their obligation to provide coal 
to priority consumers.31 
 
 
7.7  Schools 
 
After the pickets released coal to schools during the first week the NCB noted 
that this was ‘an unexpectedly relaxed attitude on the part of men in some areas 
(notably Yorkshire)’.32 The DTI observed that: ‘Only one or two hundred out of 
many thousands of schools are coal heated.’ But they soon amended this to report 
that in fact nearly half of thirty thousand schools were coal-heated, but that under 
 
29 TNA: COAL78/1905, Letter, Daly to Coal Merchants Federation of Great Britain (CMFGB), 
28 January 1972 
30 TNA: COAL31/383, Letter, Daly to Joseph, 31 January 1972 
31 TNA: COAL78/1905, Letter, CMFGB to Daly, 9 February 1972 
32 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/1, 9-12 January 1972, 
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half of one per cent were presently in difficulty.33 The Government itself was 
immediately suspicious of the pickets allowing coal for schools, seeing this 
manoeuvre by the miners as an ‘unexpected early headline story’ and noting that 
the publicity achieved for the plight of schools was obviously helpful to their 
image but that schools are not a priority of life and health of the community in a 
full emergency. Towards the end of the first week of the strike, the NUM 
leadership began considering ‘whether to add schools to priorities they could 
recognise’, given the fact that the miners on the picket lines were already allowing 
this to happen.34 Daly’s statement of 21 January subsequently included schools 
on the list of priority consumers, though the attitude of miners locally continued 
to vary from day to day and locality to locality.35  
 
The first primary schools closed during the first week of the strike when miners 
in Ayrshire reportedly refused supply to schools despite plentiful stocks of 
priority coal.36 Supply to schools in Ayrshire began early in the second week 
following discussions with the local NUM.37 In this episode, Ayrshire pickets 
were initially strictly applying national guidelines, unlike many miners in other 
Areas, and this is perhaps accounted for by the more disciplined adherence to 
Union control of the CP leadership, which was raised later by Ezra,38 in 
containing any wayward militancy. Schools subsequently began to close in 
Yorkshire and South Wales and a DTI report noted that the number of closures 
was still small but that larger numbers were expected the following week in East 
Glamorgan, including twenty-three in Rhondda. The report also noted that these 
closures could affect the number of mothers who would have to stay at home, 
which could affect local industries and therefore miners’ family incomes, and also 
that school closures would mean that school-meals would normally stop.39 These 
comments appear to imply that as these schools were almost entirely in coal 
mining areas school closures would increase pressure on miners’ families. 
Whether this was stated from a position of concern or strategic interest is unclear. 
Schools in mining Areas, and indeed priority consumers in general, were more at 
risk of supplies running out than their equivalents in other regions of the country, 
 
33 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/1, 9-12 January; PRCS/2 13 January; PRCS/3, 14 January 1972 
34 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/2, 13 January; PRCS/3, 14 January; PRCS/4, 15-16 January 1972 
35 TNA: COAL78/1906, Daly to Area Secretaries, Circular AS35/72, 21 January; PREM15/984, 
PRCS/6, 18 January 1972 
36 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/3, 14 January 1972 
37 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/6, 18 January 1972 
38 LSE: Hetherington/19/25, Ezra, 27 January 1972 
39 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/8, 20 January 1972 
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because merchants in coal-producing areas were not obliged to hold as much 
stock since ordinarily it would be readily available from local pithead and NCB 
stocks. At the end of the second week the DTI noted that the NCB were starting 
to hold back coal for schools ‘although NUM would release’ [it], because the 
limited supplies of this industrial grade coal ‘must be husbanded for higher 
priorities.’ The report gave an expectation of more school closures in all coalfield 
areas but noted that since schools do not constitute a priority ‘some government 
statement to that effect may be necessary.’40 The following DTI report referred to 
a press article over the weekend, which noted that schools in Yorkshire are 
‘continuing to provide school meals although otherwise closed’ and that the NCB 
have not yet started refusing to supply schools where the NUM is permitting them 
but that this is imminent.41 During the fourth week of the strike the police telex 
report from South Wales Constabulary noted that ‘a number of schools in the area 
are closed through shortage of fuel.’42 
 
With schools continuing to close the Daily Mail reported that Sir William 
Alexander, secretary of the Association of British Education Committees, had 
sought talks with the NUM to persuade them to allow supplies to schools. The 
NUM responded that it had not intended to prevent supplies to schools and that 
they were sure these could be arranged. The DTI report again noted that the NCB 
were having to refuse fuel to schools, which it did not consider a priority, though 
the NUM would allow it.43 It would appear, from Alexander’s request, that the 
Government’s and NCB’s refusal to consider schools a priority had not filtered 
through to the public, or indeed to the education establishment. It is clearly 
possible, or even likely, that both the Government and NCB desired that the NUM 
should take the blame in the eyes of the public for causing unnecessary distress. 
During the following week the Department of Education and Science (DES) 
reported that possibly three hundred schools out of about twenty-six thousand 
were closed in England affecting some one hundred and five thousand pupils (out 
of around eight million) i.e. a little over one per cent. In South Wales the figures 
were, respectively, two hundred and ninety out of one thousand one hundred 
schools, affecting fifty-eight thousand out of two hundred and ninety thousand 
pupils, i.e. twenty per cent or more. Early in week five a DTI report estimated 
 
40 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/9, 21 January 1972 
41 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/11, 24 January 1972 
42 TNA: HO325/101, Telex, South Wales, 31 January 1972 
43 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS18, 1 February 1972 
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that four hundred schools in England were closed though none were closed in 
Scotland, and a week later it estimated that over one thousand schools were closed 
in England and Wales. By the end of the strike, the DES reported that possibly 
one thousand solid fuel heated schools had been closed in England (with a total 
number of one thousand five hundred schools out of about thirty thousand). In 
Wales it was reported that five hundred and twenty-six schools were wholly 
closed and seventy-eight partly closed affecting around eighty-six thousand 
pupils.44  
 
At the end of the first month of the strike, Gormley was quoted as saying that he 
was not too concerned about schools.45 That same day, Rotherham rural district 
council wrote to West Riding county council (WRCC), with a copy to Ezra, 
enclosing a recent press article, which pointed out that some eighty-five schools 
had closed in the area due to a lack of coal and that there were a further fifteen 
threatened with closure. The letter alleged that education authorities from other 
parts of the country, including Kent and Essex, were receiving coal supplies from 
South Yorkshire, and the district council therefore asked why these stocks could 
not be made available to local schools. Seemingly, schools in non-mining areas 
were being given preference over those in mining areas causing the latter to close 
early. The letter also highlighted the adverse effects that the closure of schools 
was having on miners’ children, some of whom were now eligible for free school 
meals and were consequently missing out on these. Ezra responded that the NCB 
were ‘doing all possible to keep schools going’, but noted that the Board was 
entirely dependent on open-cast production for priority supplies, and that schools 
were a lower priority.46 The NUM and NCB held a joint meeting with the WRCC 
on 14 February to discuss the allegation, at which the latter denied it had 
deliberately withheld or diverted coal, ‘but had to admit that their own appraisal 
(handed in) showed the effect complained of.’ The NUM made it clear that it 
believed that Yorkshire should have priority over other counties. The report of 
the meeting also included reference to requests received by WRCC from schools 
that had closed to allow their pupils to attend schools which were still open for 
the purpose of sharing dining arrangements. The WRCC said that it had no 
 
44 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/21, 4 February; PRCS/25, 9 February; PRCS/27(28?), 15 February; 
PRCS/37, 26-28 February 1972 
45 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/24, 8 February 1972 
46 TNA: COAL78/1905, Letter, Rotherham Rural District Council to West Riding County 
Council (WRCC) & Ezra, 8 February, & Ezra’s Reply, 14 February 1972 
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objection but that it would be at the discretion of the Heads of the receiving 
schools.47 Cynthia Brailsford, a Kent miner’s wife, speaking at the miners’ rally 
in London the previous week, drew attention to the economic importance of 
school meals to those on low income, and the recent withdrawal of free school 
milk under the Education (Milk) Act 1971. She noted that her family’s income 
had decreased following the NPLA, and had effectively been reduced further by 
price rises: 
 
Add to this the effects of other Tory Government policies. Two of my 
children have lost their school milk! – a free school dinner taken away! – 
and prices of the rest almost doubled. We are subject to vicious increases 
in rent, transport and electricity, and many other necessities of life. So you 




7.8  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that, though the NCB felt itself to be well stocked and 
able to withstand a strike, it confronted an eventuality that it had not foreseen, a 
growing problem of coal transportation being curtailed, which trapped stocks 
where they were not needed. The success of the picketing in stranding coal stocks 
led to a rapid deterioration in the position of useable stocks and a steady 
downward revision of the length of time that these stocks would last. It became 
clear quite quickly that the strike would outlast the stocks and that there would be 
a consequent need for power cuts as power stations began to run short, though the 
Government appeared quite late in coming to this realisation. The chapter showed 
that the supply of coal to priority consumers remained a key issue throughout the 
dispute. All sides clearly believed it important to look after the vulnerable in 
society, but the issue also played a significant role in the manipulation of public 
opinion with accusations that the other side were the ones responsible for any 
failings. The question of what, or who, was to be considered a priority served to 
highlight the differing outlooks between the NUM leadership and the miners on 
the picket lines, and demonstrated their own respective priorities. Although the 
release of priority stocks varied from week to week and from locality to locality, 
 
47 TNA: COAL78/1905, Meeting, NUM, NCB &, WRCC, 14 February 1972 
48 Cited in Pitt, M., The World On Our Backs: The Kent Miners and the 1972 Miners’ Strike, 
(London, 1979) p.170 
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pickets generally did not want to release pit-head coal stocks for priority use, 
especially where there was a suspicion that stocks were being distributed to non-
priority consumers, as some undoubtedly were. The evidence points to many 
miners considering schools to be a priority, and seemingly for several reasons: 
that when children were off school someone had to be at home to look after them; 
therefore children’s mothers might be unable to work during the strike and so 
might lose wages or their jobs; that schools were a safe and warm environment; 
that children eligible for school meals would be unable to get them; and perhaps 
also that education was important. This in itself speaks to differing outlooks 
between the sectional interests of the NUM leadership, and indeed of the NCB 


















The support that the miners received during the strike was crucial to their ultimate 
success. The key area of such support came from the transport unions, which 
enabled the pickets to limit the movement of coal. The miners received additional 
support from power workers who were in their own dispute with the Government, 
allowing them to restrict the use of stocks already at the power stations, and from 
other trade unionists, students and members of the public, who refused to cross 
picket lines, provided information on the movement of coal, and gave food, 
accommodation and financial support. This chapter will assess the support that 
the miners received during the dispute, which began when the NUM at national 
and local level had appealed to other unions for assistance during the overtime 
ban prior to the start of the strike. It will begin by considering a statement made 
by the TUC in response to the NUM’s appeal for assistance, in which it said that 
its members would not cross picket lines and that picket lines should therefore be 
placed where the NUM did not want coal to be moved. This statement has caused 
some controversy in being seen as both the cause of the effective mass trade union 
support for the strike, but also, conversely, as a weak response from the TUC in 
being the bare minimum that a trade union organisation might be expected to 
advocate. The chapter will consider the support that the miners received from the 
transport unions, in particular the railwaymen but also dockers and unionised 
lorry drivers, which was crucial in halting the movement of coal into the power 
stations. It will also address the support received from other trade unionists, 
except that given by the Birmingham engineers in the mass picket at Saltley coke 
depot, which is discussed in Chapter Nine. In most of these cases the support the 
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pickets received was achieved at local level, by the face-to-face interaction of 
fellow trade unionists, and very often went beyond that sought by the NUM 
leadership or the leadership of the other unions concerned. The chapter will 
consider the assistance and support that the miners received from students, who 
were also in their own dispute with the Government in respect of the financing 
and autonomy of student unions, which was part of a broader campaign against 
trade unions under the I.R.Act legislation. This support was widespread and 
innovative and injected a degree of exuberance that was ultimately quashed by 
the NEC, which felt it reflected badly on the miners’ own dispute. The chapter 
will demonstrate that the miners received significant support from their wives and 
from members of the public. It will show that public opinion remained on the side 
of the miners throughout the strike, despite attempts by the Government to 
manipulate it and even as the strike began to have a detrimental effect on the 
public, including many workers being laid off. 
 
 
8.2 TUC Statement 
 
Daly wrote to all of the NUM’s Area secretaries on 28 December 1971 noting 
that the National Union of Seamen (NUSn)1, the National Union of Railwaymen 
(NUR), ASLEF, the TGWU, and the Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
Workers (AUEW) had all offered assistance to the miners in the forthcoming 
dispute.2 On 6 January NUM leaders met with Feather, and formally requested 
‘that the TUC as a whole should formally support the NUM as the miners’ 
opposition to the pay norm was in the interest of the whole Movement.’3 Four 
days later the TUC’s Finance and General Purposes Committee held a special 
meeting to hear the NUM’s appeal, which expressed solidarity with the miners 
but decided that since the transport unions were already supporting them there 
was no need for official TUC instruction to do so. The TUC gave assurances that 
‘members would not pass picket lines’ and therefore that ‘it would be helpful if 
pickets were mounted by the NUM on those places from which they did not want 
coal to be moved’. The NUM subsequently announced publicly that they 
‘welcomed the TUC assurances that the Trade Unions would firmly instruct their 
 
1 NUSn used instead of NUS to distinguish the seamen from the students (NUSs) 
2 McCormick, B.J., Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry, (London, 1979) p.202 
3 TUC Press statements 10 & 11 January 1972, cited in Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire 
Miners, (London, 1984) p.218 
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members not to cross such picket lines in any circumstances.’ This was an 
enhancement of the TUC’s declared position but they did not contradict it.4 
Dorfman and Taylor observe that Feather and the TUC were doubtful whether 
the strike could have a successful outcome but were primarily anxious not to 
jeopardise the tripartite discussions on the economy, involving the TUC, the CBI 
and the Government, that were in their early stages, and which had begun in 
reaction to the fury aroused amongst trade-unionists by the I.R.Act.5 The TUC 
and union leaders in general were wary of open challenges to government 
following the experiences across Europe in the aftermath of the revolt of 1968, 
and were primarily concerned with containing militancy and they therefore ‘led’ 
strikes only as a means of doing so.  
 
There is some debate concerning the extent to which the TUC’s statement gave a 
green light for miners’ pickets to be placed so widely and effectively, or indeed 
whether it initiated the concept of flying pickets. In its review of the strike the 
Government saw the TUC instruction as crucial noting that the ‘hint was taken 
up by the miners who quickly put pickets where they would be most effective.’6 
The DTI post-mortem notes considerable speculation in the press at the time 
about the strength of support from other unions for the NUM but that ‘this TUC 
line proved to be the key factor in subsequent events.’7 McCormick and 
Berkovitch both see the TUC recommendation as instrumental in the miners 
sending pickets throughout the country to all major power stations, ports, coal 
depots and steelworks.8 Taylor claims that the TUC decision ‘was of crucial 
importance’ because whilst coal stocks were high they were badly distributed and 
therefore transport was a key issue, though, conversely, he sees the TUC as 
simply observing ‘the sanctity of the picket line’, which appears to give backing 
to the view that the TUC were doing, or asking, no more than would be expected 
of a conscientious trade unionist in these circumstances, i.e. not to cross a picket 
line.9 Pitt holds this latter view and sees the TUC response as the very least it 
 
4  MRC: TUC, MSS.292D/24.1/5, FGPC, Special Meeting, 10 January 1972; Darlington, R., & 
Lyddon, D., Glorious Summer: Class struggle in Britain 1972, (London, 2001) p.44 
5 Dorfman, G.A., Government versus Trade Unionism in British Politics since 1968, (London, 
1979) pp.76-77; Taylor, A., The NUM and British Politics, Volume 2: 1969-1995, (London, 
2005) p.58 
6 TNA: PREM15/986, Note (title redacted), 24 February; Allen to Armstrong, 25 February 1972 
7 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972 
8 McCormick, Industrial Relations, p.204; Berkovitch, I., Coal on the Switchback: The Coal 
Industry since Nationalisation, (London, 1977) p.168 
9 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, pp.218 & 233 
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could have done, noting that the ‘national leadership of the British trade union 
movement had limited itself to calling on trade-unionists not to blackleg!’10 A 
New Statesman editorial at the end of the first week made the same point: ‘The 
TUC has banned blacklegging - it would be odd if it had not.11 Reading 
University’s student newspaper, Shell, described the TUC refusal to organise the 
‘blacking’12 of the transportation of coal as a ‘major blow’ to the miners.13 
 
The TUC statement made clear that the NUM had garnered the assistance of the 
transport unions prior to its appeal. Since these unions were the most important 
in terms of curtailing the movement of coal this suggests that the TUC 
recommendation did not initiate the mobile picketing action though it may have 
given encouragement to the miners’ leadership, and to other trade unionists, that 
they had some national backing. The NUM’s 1972 conference report 
subsequently noted that, following the TUC’s assurances, ‘pickets were dispersed 
throughout the country’.14 The TUC’s statement raises the issue concerning the 
level of support the miners had within the trade union movement, both prior to 
the strike and as it developed. The archives show the Government holding 
contradictory opinions on this question. At the end of the first week of the strike 
a DTI report appears to minimise the TUC’s role noting that: ‘The TUC and 
individual unions have also in the main only reacted, doing no more than open 
the way for NUM to seek support at local level.’15 On 27 January, whilst noting 
that the TUC general council was appealing to members for help to fund the 
pickets’ expenses and to publicise their case, the DTI noted that the TUC 
‘continues to ignore the miners’ appeal for concerted trade union support.’16 At 
the end of the fourth week the DTI claimed that: ‘The NUM are receiving no 
more than moderate and grudging support from other unions’17 However, in the 
immediate aftermath of the strike, the Cabinet minutes claimed that: ‘The main 
reason for the pickets' success, however, lay in the instructions which other 
unions had given that their members should not cross picket lines.’18  
 
10 Pitt, M., The World On Our Backs: The Kent Miners and the 1972 Miners’ Strike, (London, 
1979) p.123 
11 New Statesman, Vol.83, No.2130, 14 January 1972, p.34 
12 Refusing to handle 
13 Reading University Library (RU): Shell, Editorial, 21 January 1972 
14 KL: KA25/U/Z5, NUM Conference 1972, NEC Report, p.7 
15 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/4, 15-16 January 1972 
16 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/14, 27 January 1972 
17 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/22, 5-6 February 1972 
18 TNA: CAB128/50/8, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 7, 17 February 1972 
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8.3 Transport Unions’ Support 
 
During the overtime ban, and in the run up to the strike, the NUM at national and 
liaison committee level had begun to make contacts with trade unions and 
individual trade unionists for assistance. Pitt refers to the differing methods 
employed by NUM leaders and by the pickets in their approaches. In a letter to 
Daly on 23 December Kent miners’ leader Jack Dunn noted the difficulties that 
he was having in garnering assistance from other unions because the letters he 
had sent to district and regional officers of various unions in the area had met 
with a cool response in that that they had stated that they were unable to support 
the miners until they had authority to do so from their headquarters. Pitt notes 
that this inertia at official level put the onus onto the pickets themselves to make 
these initial contacts with other trade unionists for support. During the overtime 
ban and throughout the seven weeks of the strike NUM members put the miners’ 
case at hundreds of meetings of trade union branches, trades councils, student 
unions, socialist groups, working men’s clubs, tenants’ associations and the like, 
and also to mass open air meetings at building sites, factory gates and docksides. 
Docks were subsequently picketed to prevent the import of coal and to restrict 
the movement of fuel previously unloaded, and as early as November 1971 the 
Dover branch of the NUSn pledged support to the NUM and asked their NEC to 
do likewise.19 Within a few days of the strike beginning, dockers in Swansea and 
Cardiff refused to unload coal,20 and Welsh pickets travelled as far as the tip of 
Cornwall to stop coal ships unloading at various small harbours, receiving an 
‘excellent response’ wherever they went.21 DTI reports during the first week 
noted the blacking of coal cargoes in South Wales and at other ports during the 
week, and that the NUM had enlisted support from other unions at local level and 
were having some success at preventing imports and movement of supplies.22 By 
the beginning of the third week the DTI noted that Swansea, Newport and Cardiff 
dockers were blacking imports, and the Government reasoned, correctly, that the 
blacking of imports and of fuel stocks by secondary unions had the benefit of 
freeing the miners from picketing those depots and so released them to go to other 
sites.23  
 
19 Pitt, M., The World on Our Backs, pp.119-20 & 167 
20 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Morgan, p.12 
21 LB: MS4000/2/152, SaltleyI, p.2, John Podmore, Maerdy Colliery, South Wales 
22 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/1, 9-12 January; PRCS/4, 15-16 January 1972 
23 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/11, 24 January; PRCS/14, 27 January 1972 
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The key support received by the miners in halting fuel movement came from the 
rail unions. On 6 January NUR officials instructed their members not to transport 
oil into power stations if these were to switch from coal to oil, and as the strike 
began ASLEF instructed its members not to carry ‘coal and other fuel which 
could have a bearing on the dispute’.24 The Government noted at the beginning 
of week two that the rail unions in Scotland would not allow more than normal 
supplies of oil into the two major oil-burning power stations, which depended on 
supplies by rail; these would not therefore be able to achieve maximum output to 
allow reductions in output from coal burning stations in the area.25 At the end of 
that week the DTI reported that railwaymen in Edinburgh had refused to unload 
either domestic coal or coal for a paper manufacturer,26 and a week later reported 
that most of the remaining rail wagons still in transit were held up at marshalling 
yards due to rail union blacking, with the odd wagon occasionally released to 
meet priority commitments.27 At the same time railwaymen in north London were 
said to have agreed to stop coal and oil deliveries to local power stations though 
the blacking action was undertaken by individual groups of trade-unionists 
outside of the control of their own officials. This is acknowledged by the DTI, 
which noted initially that: ‘In North London the NUR are said to have agreed to 
stop coal and oil deliveries to power stations.’28 Two days later it revised this in 
noting that: ‘The NUR said yesterday that the decision of its North London 
District Council to ask members not to move any more coal... had no authority.’29 
The DTI further acknowledged that there was no general support for the miners 
from ETU [sic],30 NUR or TGWU though individual members had responded to 
the pickets.31 
 
The NUM held an inter-union meeting in Scotland on 3 February with 
representatives from NUR, ASLEF, NUSn, and also power workers, to make 
arrangements for preventing supplies of oil reaching Cockenzie and Longannet 
power stations, and if this were successful then it was thought unlikely that they 
 
24 Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious Summer, p.43 
25 TNA: CAB134/3485, E(72), MC Emergencies, 1st Meeting, 17 January; PREM15/984, 
PRCS/5, 17 January 1972 
26 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/8, 20 January; PRCS/9, 21 January 1972 
27 TNA: COAL31/300, NCB Marketing Report, 28 January 1972 
28 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/12, 25 January 1972 
29 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/14, 27 January 1972 
30 Electrical Trades Union, became EETPU (Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and 
Plumbing Union) in 1968 
31 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/10, 22-23 January 1972 
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would proceed with picketing Grangemouth oil refinery, Falkirk.32 A few days 
later the DTI reported that ASLEF railwaymen and TGWU tanker drivers in 
Scotland were supporting this ‘concordat’ and refusing to deliver oil from the 
Grangemouth to any SSEB power stations, and that similar action was being 
undertaken by drivers and railwaymen in England and Wales such that no oil 
deliveries are now going by road to three quarters of coal-fired CEGB stations. 
There was also a threat of sympathetic action against supplies to oil-fired power 
stations from the Fawley refinery, Southampton and Shellhaven refinery, Essex.33 
The following week the DTI reported that no oil trains were moving in Scotland 
and that picketing was continuing to block rail despatches from Shellhaven and 
Coryton refineries (Essex) with additional rail movement from Stanlow refinery 
(Cheshire) to points normally supplied from Shellhaven blocked by ASLEF. 
Following discussions with ASLEF and TGWU there then began to be some 
relaxation at Thames-side refineries at the end of the sixth week and agreement 
was reached to lift restrictions on rail despatches from Shellhaven, except to 
power stations.34  
 
The DTI noted, with regard to the halting of oil and coal supplies to CEGB and 
SSEB power stations, that ‘in all cases the decision to support the miners has been 
taken by mass meetings of individual unionists and not at the formal instigation 
of their unions, hence... there is only a fragmented target for any legal action 
under the Trade Disputes Act 1967’, or, after 28 February 1972, the Industrial 
Relations Act35 (see Chapter Ten for further discussion on the legislation). The 
Government were similarly concerned about the actions of unionised lorry 
drivers. On 6 February Jack Jones, TGWU general secretary, addressed a miners’ 
rally and condemned the one hundred thousand non-unionised lorry drivers who 
were strike-breaking, whilst praising the TGWU drivers who were in solidarity 
with the miners, though making it clear ‘that sympathetic action is a matter for 
individual TGWU members’. This can be interpreted either as Jones failing to 
openly back the miners with full TGWU directed support, and therefore putting 
responsibility onto the membership, or, as the Government saw it, that by 
‘avoiding from the start any central guidance, he has effectively fragmented the 
 
32 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/19, 2 February 1972 
33 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/23, 7 February 1972 
34 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/29, 16 February; PRCS/30, 17 February; PRCS/31, 18 February 
1972 
35 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/23, 7 February 1972 
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target for any legal action’ under the 1967 Act; any legal action would therefore 
have to be pursued against individuals rather than against the union leadership,36 
and was perhaps a deliberate means for the unions concerned to avoid blame.  
 
 
8.4 Militancy and Restraint 
 
The evidence generally acknowledges a difference in outlook between the NUM 
leadership and the pickets regarding the extent of picketing. It is unclear whether 
this was because the leadership wanted to avoid legal action, as the Government 
believed, or whether their role as intermediary between employers and members 
behoved them to have a more restrained and conservative approach. The pickets 
were often prepared to go further than the leadership desired, or to act in defiance 
of its recommendations, and this was exacerbated by the fact that decision-
making took place at local level: the DTI reports refer to the situation in 
Newcastle where the ‘NUM area secretary appears to have lost confidence of 
members and all negotiations [are] on an ad hoc basis’;37 Morgan observed that 
the leadership were ‘not initiating the course of the strike but responding to a 
mood of militancy and determination’;38 and Dai Francis, South Wales NUM 
general secretary, pointed to the decision making coming from below, noting, 
‘This struggle was won by the rank and file, I would say that anywhere without 
hesitation, without reservation, it was the swell from below, the unity within the 
ranks.’39 Members of the Swansea Steam strike committee made similar points 
about the divergence between leadership and membership, noting that: ‘The 
support you had from their rank and file very often went a lot further than what 
their national leadership directed them to do.’ They also noted the lack of support 
from union leaders such as Graham Saunders (secretary of the TUC advisory 
committee), who considered crossing the picket line at Pontardulais during the 
strike: ‘... the question was put to the fellow you know, “Well are you going to 
cross our picket line?” And his answer was “Well it depends how many people 
are picketing.”’40  
 
 
36 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/22, 5-6 February 1972 
37 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/20, 3 February; PREM15/985, PRCS/27, 11-14 February 1972 
38 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Morgan, p.32 
39 LB: LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Appendix II, p.10, Interview, Dai Francis 
40 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Appendix II, p.13. Swansea Steam 
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A key area of support received by the miners during the dispute came from the 
power-workers, who were involved in their own wage negotiations. They agreed 
to black any supplies which crossed the picket line and began to advise the miners 
on stock levels and deliveries, and on where to place their pickets in order to be 
most effective.41 On 14 January, at the end of the first week, the four unions 
associated with electricity supply workers - TGWU, AUEW, NUGMW (National 
Union of General and Municipal Workers), and EETPU (Electrical, Electronic, 
Telecommunications and Plumbing Union) - gave notice of an overtime ban from 
1 February, if their own pay claim was not met.42 The Times noted that ‘their 
sudden militancy could not have come at a more embarrassing time for the 
Government’,43 and the Cabinet hoped, rather optimistically, that a successful 
outcome in these negotiations would tend to further isolate the miners.44 In 
defiance of their official leadership power workers in London formed an 
unofficial combine, which met on 19 January and agreed to work towards local 
liaison committees involving power-workers, gas-workers and miners. The 
following day, an unofficial demonstration by London power-workers outside the 
Electricity Council’s offices in Millbank was joined by Kent miners with banners 
declaring ‘Power and Mineworkers Unite’.45  
 
During the wage negotiations the TGWU urged the power unions to continue 
their overtime ban as an act of solidarity with the miners, but Frank Chapple, 
EETPU general secretary and right wing member of the TUC general council, 
refused this request arguing that to bring down the Government by industrial 
action would be counter-productive and would lead to a Conservative victory by 
a landslide majority. He therefore used his casting vote to accept the wage offer 
of just under eight percent.46 After this wage settlement was agreed, power 
workers at Battersea power station spoke with the miners on the picket line and 
told them that ‘they felt the miners had been sold out by it as much as they had 
themselves.’47 The interaction between miners and power workers during the 
strike shows a strong solidarity for one another’s struggles, and also demonstrates 
a similar disconnect between the outlook of the respective union leadership and 
 
41 Taylor, The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, p.222 
42 TNA: CAB134/3485, E(72), MC Emergencies, 1st Meeting, 17 January 1972 
43 The Times, 15 January 1972 
44 TNA: CAB134/3485, E(72), MC Emergencies, 2nd Meeting, 26 January 1972 
45 Pitt, The World on Our Backs, p.152 
46 The Times, 9 February; TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/23, 7 February 1972 
47 LSE: Beaver, No.116, 17 February 1972, p.1 
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of the rank-and-file. The fact that the Government was ultimate employer in both 
instances acted to further unify the struggle between them. 
 
 
8.5 Students’ Support 
 
Student numbers at universities, polytechnics and further education colleges in 
the UK doubled during the 1960s, which led to an influx of students from a wider 
variety of backgrounds and broadened the class background of the student body.48 
Globally, students in this period were associated with political radicalisation and 
with protest against injustice, including against government, which came to a 
head in 1968. Students at universities such as Essex, LSE and Oxford had 
participated in this action. Memories of these events was still relatively fresh in 
the collective mind, and students from these and other universities and colleges 
around the country supported the pickets. The role played by students during the 
strike was widely praised by miners. The Ministerial Committee on Emergencies 
noted, within the first few weeks of the strike, that picketing had been more 
effective than anticipated due in part to student participation.49 Students were 
involved in their own dispute with the Government over its intention to change 
the rules relating to the financing of student unions and to impose a Registrar of 
student unions akin to that proposed in the legislation to restrict trade union 
activity under the I.R.Act.50 The National Union of Students (NUSs) was also 
making overtures to the TUC at this time, with a view to affiliation.51 This, along 
with the echoes of 1968, fed into a view amongst students that the miners’ dispute 
was something that they should support. Some student newspapers also, in their 
calls to support the miners, drew attention, with embarrassment, to the role that 
students had played during the general strike and lockout in 1926 when they had 
been used by the government to assist with strikebreaking. This also raised the 
issue of how the students’ own struggle related to the miners, or to workers’ 
struggles more broadly, which was part of a pre-existing debate within left 
political circles.52 Joe Holmes, president of Kent NUM, made reference to the 
 
48 Davies, A.J., To Build A New Jerusalem: The British Labour Party from Keir Hardie to Tony 
Blair, (London, 1996) p.321 
49 TNA: CAB134/3485, E(72), MC Emergencies, 2nd Meeting, 26 January 1972 
50 MRC: NUSs Archive, MSS.280/78, Main Mail, 1/19, 1972, Memo to DoE on Consultative 
Document, December 1971   
51 MRC, NUSs: MSS.280/90/4, NUS Easter Conference 1972, CD14, Union Autonomy 
Campaign report  
52 RU: Shell, Editorial, No.325, 21 January; LSE: Beaver, No.115, 3 February 1972 
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difference between the student reaction to the 1972 strike and its role in 1926 
when he addressed the NUSs extraordinary conference on 30 January.53 Time Out 
also drew attention to the students’ attempts to link their own struggle against the 
Government to the miners’ dispute in its reporting on a thirty thousand strong 
student rally in Trafalgar Square on 23 January where in parts of the march 
‘placards reading “Victory to the Miners” were more numerous than “Hands off 
student unions”, and the main slogan was “Student Struggle, Miners’ fight, one 
struggle, one right”.’54 
 
In addition to students joining picket lines, collecting money and providing food 
and accommodation, they also helped keep checks on coal movements and 
provided a platform for miners at colleges and universities. Students at Aston 
Polytechnic used their initiative to create and distribute leaflets outlining the legal 
rights of pickets and offered legal advice in the case of miners who were 
arrested.55 The involvement of students was first mentioned in the DTI records 
on 20 January when large numbers of LSE and Essex University students joined, 
or effectively took over from, orderly NUM pickets at Dagenham and at 
Colchester-Rowhedge docks respectively, creating violent disturbances and 
halting the unloading of household briquettes from Holland. Colchester dockers 
were reportedly willing to handle the cargo but dockers at Dagenham refused to 
handle any further shipments though they had already unloaded half the cargo 
before the students arrived. The quantities involved were said to have been 
marginal but the DTI was concerned that such student activity could be part of a 
coordinated plan which might be extended to more vital targets.56 Essex students 
also provided lodging for pickets on university premises until the NUM 
leadership announced that it did not approve. Most of the men subsequently left 
the campus, though some reportedly took some convincing and one hundred and 
fifty to two hundred and fifty stayed on for some time. Essex students also 
assisted in the effective picketing of a domestic oil depot at Ipswich docks and 
Time Out reported the collaboration between students and miners in planning and 
executing the picketing, noting that the degree of solidarity between students and 
strikers ‘totally amazed everyone concerned.’ 57  
 
53 MRC, NUSs: MSS.280/87/13, NUS Extraordinary Conference Report, 29 January 1972 
54 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/14, 27 January 1972 
55 LB: MS4000/2/152, ‘The Miners’ Strike’, Morgan, pp.16-7 
56 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/8, 20 January 1972 
57 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/9, 21 January; PRCS/12, 25 January; PRCS/14, 27 January 1972 
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LSE students were said to have picketed ‘continuously’ at Battersea power station 
and raised money for the miners in various ways. LSE students’ union undertook 
to ‘adopt’ a branch of the NUM for the duration of the strike to give practical help 
to the NUM and encouraged other universities to do the same.58 Students from 
Reading University and University College Oxford also supported pickets at both 
Didcot and Battersea power stations.59 Reading students subsequently established 
a strike committee and began to attend the picket at Earley power station. They 
also accommodated pickets at the university and planned to donate £150 to the 
miners’ strike fund but, after objections that this amounted to an ultra vires 
payment, gave food and full communication facilities instead.60 Students at the 
University of East Anglia also accommodated pickets on campus,61 and the 
miners received additional sympathetic support from students at York, 
Canterbury and Oxford.62 Students in York also proposed making a financial 
contribution to the miners disguised as a lecturer’s fee.63 In Scotland students 
assisted in picketing three power stations and one of those charged with ‘mobbing 
and rioting’ at Longannet power station (discussed in Chapter Five) was a 
Glasgow student.64  
 
The NUSs dispatched a weekly mailout to all student unions, known as Main 
Mail, and this shows considerable support for the miners from the NUSs 
executive. The Main Mail dispatched after the NUSs extraordinary conference on 
29 and 30 January noted a resolution supporting the miners and an instruction for 
a donation of £1,000 from the NUSs to the miners’ strike fund, and it also sought 
contributions from associate student unions. The following week’s Main Mail 
enclosed two leaflets produced by Kent NUM for distribution, and also a joint 
statement by the NUSs and NUM, which made a direct connection between their 
respective struggles with the Government and stated that students’ support for the 
miners was fundamental to their own fight for the autonomy of student unions. 
The statement outlined concrete ways in which students could support the miners: 
it noted that the NUM were happy to provide speakers at student unions; it called 
on students to help on the picket lines and with the provision of accommodation 
 
58 LSE: Beaver, Nos.116, 17 February, p.1 & 117, 6 March 1972, p.8 
59 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/11, 24 January, PRCS/12, 25 January & PRCS/14, 27 January 1972 
60 RU: Shell, No.326, 12 February 1972 
61 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/14, 27 January 1972 
62 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/10, 22-23 January 1972 
63 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/9, 21 January, PRCS/14, 27 January 1972 
64 MRC: MSS.280/90/4, NUS Easter Conference 1972, Interim Executive report  
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for pickets, and provided a list of contact details for NUM Area secretaries to this 
end; and it called upon students to attend the miners’ demonstration in London 
on 6 February, where the NUM were allowing the NUSs to participate as an 
integral part of the march, with the NUSs’ hoping that this would demonstrate to 
trade unionists that students were not indifferent to workers’ struggles.65 
 
Support for the miners was not, however, universal amongst students and the 
agenda for the NUSs conference in April 1972 gave a flavour of the range of 
views within the student body. Bradford University students’ union initially 
submitted a resolution applauding the support given by students to the miners but 
rejecting attempts to subordinate the interests of the NUSs to a political 
campaign.66 This provoked a number of proposed amendments by other 
universities. Thames Polytechnic wanted to delete everything after the applause 
for the miners, and insert praise for those who made financial contributions whilst 
condemning the NUSs Executive for not having done so. Birmingham University 
proposed replacing the resolution with one that saw the miners’ claim as just, but 
argued that student attempts to make political points for their own ends would 
only hinder the miners’ struggle. Reading University sought to replace the 
resolution with one that congratulated the miners on their victory and recognised 
it as a victory of the entire working class over the Government and a timely 
reminder of the students’ own autonomy campaign. Royal Holloway College 
simply wanted recognition as the only student union to have contributed to the 
NUSs miners’ campaign fund. A message of thanks from Daly was read out at 
the NUSs April conference, which stated: ‘Next to the labour movement the 
support we received from NUS, from student unions and from students generally 
was the most valuable we received during our recent strike. For this, we are more 
than grateful. We could not have won without this support.’67 Scargill observed 
that the miners showed the students ‘a degree of discipline and organisation’ 
which they may have read about but had not previously witnessed.68  
 
At the end of January, the NEC announced that students were no longer welcome 
on picket lines and noted that students were reportedly ‘more enthusiastic than 
 
65 MRC: MSS.280/78/3-4, NUS Main Mail 1972 
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67 MRC: MSS.280/87/14, NUS Easter Conference Report, 10-14 April 1972, p.19 




accurate’.69 NUM representatives speaking to Reading students subsequently 
were keen to point out that there was not a conscious anti-student policy but that 
nevertheless the dispute should be, and be seen to be, a working-class struggle.70 
These points reflect concern amongst miners, and the NEC in particular, at the 
exuberance and indiscipline of students and how this reflected on the miners’ 
case. Post-graduate student Peter Tinsley was philosophical about this 
relationship noting that:  
 
The miners were the big problem as far as the police were concerned but 
the students always make a good headline. You know: student agitators 
running amok in working class struggles without having anything to do 
with it. [They] printed home addresses of students and they all came from 
places like Suffolk and Surrey and it didn’t look good and the miners 




8.6 Women in the Strike 
 
The role of women in the strike is under-represented both in the literature and in 
the sources. This is not to say that women were not present, but that their role is 
not well reflected. This is in part due to the dominance of men within the industry 
and within the politics of the time; there were no women on the NEC of the NUM, 
no women on the NCB, and just one woman in the Cabinet, Margaret Thatcher. 
In terms of employees, there were just eleven female industrial employees on the 
NCB’s books in 1971, compared to over two hundred and seventy-eight thousand 
men; they all undertook surface work and were aged between 40 and 60, but were 
known colloquially as ‘pit lasses’.72 As we saw in chapter six, the vast majority 
of female employees in the coal industry were clerical workers employed in the 
collieries and depots, and in regional and Area NCB offices. Approximately 
seventy percent of all clerks nationally were female, and, in the coal industry, 
they were represented in the COSA and CAWU unions. The majority of the 
twelve thousand five hundred members of the NUM affiliated COSA joined the 
strike, whereas the majority of the five thousand five hundred CAWU members 
in the industry stayed in work.  Some COSA members joined picket lines and 
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picketed against other clerks, both unionised and non-unionised who remained in 
work. Clerical workers, and women, were therefore to be found on both sides of 
the picket lines during the strike.73 
 
The key area of involvement of women in the strike was that of the miners’ wives, 
and though some had initially been reluctant for their husbands to go on strike, 
this soon changed. A member of the Ammanford and Gwendraeth strike 
committee tasked with recruiting pickets noted that, in the first few days of the 
strike, the response he received from some of the wives had been: ‘What the hell 
was he doing on strike, they couldn’t afford to be on strike’, but by the end of the 
first week the response at the same houses had become: ‘You mind you don’t go 
back to work until you’ve won the day’.74 There were nothing like as many 
women’s groups active in the 1972 strike as in the 1984-85 strike, though they 
did exist on a much smaller scale. Jean McCrindle recalls meeting miners’ wives’ 
groups in Kent during the strike, and Marsha, secretary of the Barnsley miners’ 
wives’ group in the 1984-85 strike, believed that, in the earlier strikes such as 
1972, women only got involved at a local level at their pit, which might have 
involved shouting at scabs,75 or knocking on their doors late at night. A key 
difference in the later strike, she believed, was that most women by then had 
telephones and a lot of them had cars, and could therefore organise a picket in 
another area relatively simply.76 In the 1972 strike, wives and daughters often 
attended the quieter picket lines, which were the majority, and became involved 
in other forms of support.77 For example, wives and families attended a picket 
and sit-down protest on 17 January at the NCB’s national computer centre in 
Cannock, Staffordshire to prevent access for clerical employees.78 Also in 
Staffordshire, miners’ wives at Rugeley left twenty children at the DSS office to 
be fed and cared for, in a protest at the level of benefits.79 The following week in 
Nottinghamshire, a three-day picket at the NCB Area headquarters at 
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Edwinstowe saw miners’ wives throw flour at clerical workers in protest at their 
crossing the picket line.80 This echoed similar action during the 1926 general 
strike when women in Glasgow threw flour at strike-breaking transport workers, 
which Hughes understands as representing a more informal, and spontaneous 
form of industrial militancy for those excluded from institutional forms of 
protest.81  
 
Women also became involved with appeals to the Government. On 18 January a 
contingent of miners’ wives from Kent and Derbyshire attended the first 
Commons debate on the strike,82 and the following day one hundred and thirty 
miners and their wives lobbied MPs at Parliament. Some of the wives then visited 
both 10 Downing Street, where they presented a petition, and the offices of the 
NCB, where a small deputation was seen by officials.83 On 27 January twenty 
thousand miners and their families marched through Cardiff to a rally in Sophia 
Gardens,84 and many miners’ wives and families also attended the rally at Hyde 
Park on 6 February. Tina Dogherty, from Warwickshire, explained that it was the 
women who had wanted to go to London to help make up the rally and to show 
‘the Government that the miners’ wives were at the back of them… that it wasn’a 
just miners but wives as well.’ She noted that a good few women were there on 
their own, and that not all pits had laid on buses for women or envisaged that they 
would want to take part.85 Nine hundred miners and their wives arrived by special 
train from Kent for the rally, accompanied by the Deal Girls Pipers, who led them 
on the march to Hyde Park. Cynthia Brailsford addressed the crowd, and a letter 
from the mother of Fred Matthews (the picket killed just three days previously) 
was read out, and in which she said: ‘It is vital that you fight to keep the trade 
union movement free against the most vicious Tory Government of this 
century.’86  
 
As we saw above, there was significant support from students during the strike, 
and whilst is not clear how these broke down from a gender perspective, it must 
be assumed that a significant number were female. In addition to student support 
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on the picket lines and in providing food and accommodation, LSE students also 
raised money for a ‘kids’ outing’ for the children of the Kent miners, whom 
students had met on the picket lines at Battersea power station.87 The final area 
of support given by women during the strike was during the confrontation at 
Saltley, which is discussed further in the following chapter. In addition to support 
from local political activists in providing accommodation, the key numerical 
support came from female engineering workers from Birmingham. Shop steward 
at SU Carburettors, Sylvia Sabin, recalled that many women joined the march: 
‘Married women my age, young women, women who really hadn’t got the time 
to do this, but because their sympathies were so strong with the miners they went 
down there on this march. We did literally march from the SU down to Saltley.’88 
Arthur Harper, president of the Birmingham East District AUEW, recalled the 
role played by the women on the march:  
 
Well, the women at SU Carburettor, well, they always are good, they’re 
marvelous, on any issue, on any demonstration, they are good, and their 
spirit was terrific on this march, they really went to town and they sailed 
into the police and they cajoled them, and well, made fun of ‘em if you 
like.89  
 
Clearly there was broad support from women for the miners on strike, in 
particular from their own communities, but also from other trade unionists. This 
reflected the broad support the miners received across the country and throughout 
the working class and general public.  
 
 
8.7 Public Support 
 
The miners received wide support from the public with donations of food and 
financial support towards the strike fund, and with offers of accommodation for 
pickets. There were reports of two ten-year old boys from Reading who donated 
their pocket money, and of pensioners contributing money out of gratitude to the 
NUM who were ensuring they still had coal delivered to them.90 Members of the 
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public accommodated pickets and gave assistance on picket lines and on 21 
January the NUM issued a statement giving instructions to pickets on how to deal 
with the casual help being offered by the public regarding attendance on picket 
lines, noting that: ‘This help should be accepted but there must be at least one 
NUM member in charge of the line at all times.’91 South Wales NUM reported 
that it received a deluge of supportive letters daily and from as far afield as 
Australia and the United States, which contrasted with no more than a dozen 
letters and phone calls opposing the strike.92 There was, however, some other 
opposition too, with Gormley, whilst speaking at a rally in Newcastle, claiming 
that there had been two bomb threats against the NUM headquarters in London.93 
The Government records reveal that it had evidence of other opposition from the 
public with a scientist, Dr. Davison, who wrote to the Scottish Home and Health 
Department and offered to drive supplies into power stations himself under police 
protection and for his firm to purchase hydrogen (in modest quantities) without 
its ultimate destination being guessed, if it were of help.94  
 
For its part the Government were primarily concerned at the level of public 
support for the miners that was maintained throughout the strike, and it was 
frustrated at anything that fed into this. At the end of the second week the DTI 
aired its frustration at the coincidental showing on television of two items: a 
documentary concerning the breaking of a clay-miners’ strike in Cornwall in 
1913 by police brought in from outside the area, which, it believed, may have 
coloured the public’s view on the role of the police; and a Review programme 
about elderly ‘Sunday painter’ miners, which was interspersed with pictures of 
miners crouched in narrow seams with pickaxes - presumably to illustrate the way 
in which mining had been undertaken when these men were working. The DTI’s 
concern here was the belief that this footage served to counter the impression of 
the modern, technologically sophisticated coal industry that should have been 
produced from the press coverage of the safety problems underground caused by 
pickets refusal to undertake this work.95 Public support stayed with the miners 
even after 1.2 million people were laid off due to the power cuts, with the 
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Department of Employment noting that: ‘So far there seems little evidence of any 
new disposition to put the blame on the miners.’96  
 
Public sympathy and support are essential in any major dispute, and the 1972 
miners’ strike was no exception with all parties, though perhaps more so the 
Government, aware of the need to have the public ‘on-side’. The Cabinet 
recognised on the third day of the strike that the miners commanded considerable 
public sympathy.97 A week later the NCB noted that: ‘The Union are winning a 
lot of public sympathy… There is a deep-seated, genuine support for the miners 
that has its roots in history. We are not going to be able to change that - even if 
we wanted to.’98 Public opinion was in fact on the side of the miners from the 
very beginning of the strike and even after the strike began to have serious effects 
on the public this did not diminish and rather the blame was placed on those who 
were refusing to give the miners their wage claim.99 Opinion polls undertaken by 
Gallup and by the Opinion Research Centre (ORC) all found that public opinion 
was with the miners. Gallup undertook polls in January, February and March 
1972 asking the public with whom their sympathies mainly lay, employers or 
miners. The results were: in January - employers sixteen percent, miners fifty-
five percent; in February - employers nineteen percent, miners fifty-seven 
percent; and in March - employers twenty percent, miners fifty-two percent. 
Thus, whilst some sympathy moved towards the employers, support for the 
miners stayed strong throughout the strike and its aftermath at more than half 
those surveyed, whilst the support for the Government was just one fifth or lower. 
After the strike Gallup asked whether the public approved or disapproved of the 
miners’ methods and found that thirty percent approved whilst fifty-nine percent 
disapproved.100  
 
Conservative Central Office commissioned its own research with two surveys 
undertaken by ORC on 1 and 14 February. Both surveys asked if coalminers were 
or were not justified in striking for a larger pay rise, with those agreeing that they 
were justified rising from fifty-four percent to sixty-six percent, whilst those 
disagreeing dropping from thirty-two percent to twenty-six percent. When asked 
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if they believed it to be justified even if this might mean price rises, those agreeing 
rose from forty-two percent to sixty percent, whilst those disagreeing dropped 
from forty-one percent to twenty-seven percent. The surveys also asked whether 
they considered that the Government was handling the dispute well or badly, with 
those believing it was doing very well or fairly well dropping from twenty-six 
percent to nineteen percent and those believing it was doing fairly badly or very 
badly rising from fifty-seven percent to sixty-eight percent. The ORC surveys 
concurred with the Gallup polls in finding a higher disapproval than approval 
rating for how the NUM were behaving during the dispute, though the divergence 
between these positions closed over the fortnight; those approving of the NUM 
methods rose from seventeen percent to twenty-nine percent, whilst those 
disapproving dropped from seventy-one percent to sixty-one percent.101 Clearly 
then, public support for the miners, and for their wage claim, remained strong 
despite disapproval of the methods that were employed. A key finding of the ORC 
snap polls, for the Conservative Research Department, was that a majority of 
those polled (56%) believed that the Government were right to stop wage 
demands in excess of ten percent. They took this to imply that much of the support 
for the miners was based on ignorance of their pay demand, and that the miners’ 
case would be severely weakened if the public were aware that the demand was 
for over thirty percent.102 
 
From the outset, all sides engaged in attempts to win and manipulate public 
opinion. On the eve of the strike the NCB circulated an advert in the industry 
press entitled ‘Message to all Mineworkers’, which explained that the NEC had 
rejected two proposals by the NCB, either of which would have averted the strike, 
and it claimed that the NUM had also rejected arbitration.103 This was designed 
to circumnavigate the NUM leadership and appeal directly to miners in order to 
sow discontent between the membership and the leadership, and so undermine 
the unity of the strike. However, this failed to take account of the fact that the 
leadership were tasked with negotiating on behalf of the miners and therefore the 
NCB’s actions could not have stopped the strike, it also appeared to proceed from 
the assumption that the leadership were the militant element, and that the 
members were more restrained. On 14 January, at the end of the first week, the 
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NCB public relations department sent out ‘factual information’ notes to all MPs, 
which it felt might be helpful in the forthcoming Parliamentary debate on the coal 
industry. These gave: a summary of the wage negotiations up to the beginning of 
the strike; an NCB press office report entitled ‘Arbitrate, not Fight’ concerning a 
speech by Ezra on 13 January urging the NUM to settle the dispute peacefully 
through negotiation; an opinion from an Industrial Relations academic at LSE 
concerning the historic referral of wages disputes to the NRT, a position which 
was altered in 1961 at the request of the NUM to allow either side to decline to 
undertake this. Most bizarrely, the ‘factual information’ also included an NCB 
press office note concerning the forced retirement of the remaining fifty-seven pit 
ponies from North Yorkshire, which, it alleged, followed directly from ‘the 
refusal of local NUM branches to allow horse-keepers to go down the pits to care 
for the ponies.’104 The latter press release was clearly intended to appeal to public 
sentiment, and to tap into the Great British public’s concern for animals. At the 
end of the second week, the DTI reports reflected the Government’s sense of 
frustration at press coverage of the dispute appearing to favour the miners, noting 
that pickets were widespread and generally peaceful ‘but with occasional local 
incidents, nearly all of which seems to be reported in the Press,’ and that 
‘considerable ingenuity seems to be exercised in identifying targets and 
synchronising action with arrival of press, radio and TV reporters and 
cameramen.’105 A week later the Government’s frustration was palpable:  
 
Pickets which are unsuccessful are for obvious reasons not reported by the 
strikers while those which are circumvented and the important centres not 
yet harassed obviously cannot be mentioned without risk of attack. The 
impression given by the press reports is therefore of an unimpeded 
accumulation of victories by the militants.106 
 
In interview after the strike, the Ammanford and Gwendraeth strike committee 
noted how, as the strike progressed, the media swung towards the miners’ cause: 
‘I would say that the longer it went on it was obvious we were going to be 
winners, and then the press and TV wanted to be on our side.’107  
 
As power cuts appeared likely in early February, TGWU shop stewards in 
Scotland threatened to break their solidarity position with the miners and send oil 
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tanker drivers in to Kilmarnock power station because they were concerned at the 
hardship that power cuts would cause to elderly people. The threat reportedly had 
the effect of pickets being withdrawn from Ravenscraig steel works.108 The 
following day local press in Derbyshire and Northumberland reported that miners 
were ‘forming mercy squads to deliver coal to pensioners and other needy people; 
in the latter case the miners were reported to have bought the coal themselves and 
to be hoping to extend the operation.’109 The Yorkshire Post also reported the 
setting up of ‘heat havens’ for the elderly in several centres in the Brownhills-
Walsall area of the West Midlands with a view to helping these people over a 
possibly extended period.’110 During the fifth week of the strike the Daily 
Telegraph reported a rather strange story that Kent miners had ‘offered to operate 
kidney machines etc by hand’ if they became affected by the strike.111 The same 
day The Times reported that Age Concern, in the North East, had blamed the fuel 
shortage for the deaths of seven elderly people from hypothermia during the past 
fortnight. However, a subsequent investigation by the DHSS found that none of 





This chapter has shown that the miners enjoyed broad support amongst trade 
unionists, which went beyond official support and largely comprised decisions 
taken by trade unionists on the picket lines and in mass meetings following direct 
contact with miners. The TUC showed itself unwilling to openly support the 
strike and restricted itself to assurances that trade unionists would not cross picket 
lines - the bare minimum a trade union organisation would be expected to 
advocate in the circumstances. In this, it was motivated by a desire not to 
jeopardise the tripartite talks with the Government and CBI, that were underway 
and were regarded as more important to the TUC leadership, in giving them equal 
status with the Government and employers, than advocating open support and 
assistance for the miners. The widespread support that the miners received from 
the transport unions was shown not to have been the result of the TUC statement, 
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since it had begun beforehand, though the statement was seen to have sanctioned 
the widespread placing of picket lines. The assistance of the transport unions, and 
also of the power workers, reflected both broad support for the miners amongst 
trade unionists and the wider working class, and conversely hostility towards the 
Government, which had been exacerbated by the protests against the I.R.Bill a 
year earlier. In most cases the support of trade unionists in refusing to cross picket 
lines went beyond that advocated by their respective union leaderships, and in 
that sense mirrored the actions of the rank-and-file miners themselves.  
 
We saw that the miners received significant and widespread support from 
students, who identified the miners’ struggle as akin to their own dispute with the 
Government, which was treating the student body in a similar way to that of a 
trade union. Students were also still influenced by the protests of 1968 and were 
undergoing something of a turn towards the working class at this time, with the 
NUSs hoping to be accepted as a constituent member of the TUC. Students used 
innovative methods in their support for the strike and were seen to be enthusiastic 
but less disciplined in their actions than were the miners. The NUM leadership 
praised their support but, with one eye on the battle for public opinion, asked the 
students to refrain from attending picket lines fearing that they were putting the 
miners’ dispute into a bad light. Support from students was shown not to have 
been universal and even amongst those who supported the miners dispute some 
did not want the students own dispute to be subordinate to it. The chapter has 
shown significant support for the miners from their wives who attended picket 
lines and played an active political role in speeches, on demonstrations and in the 
lobby of parliament. The miners also received substantial support from members 
of the public, and whilst this was not universal public opinion remained on the 
miners’ side throughout the dispute, despite majority disapproval for the methods 
employed in winning the strike. All sides were aware of the importance of 
winning the battle over public opinion and attempted to influence it. The 
Government was seen to have been frustrated by this battle being largely won by 
the miners and by the general support shown for their claim, even as the results 
of the strike led to power cuts and workers being laid off. This perhaps accords 
with Daly’s claim at the outset that the miners were in the vanguard of the struggle 
















This chapter considers the miners’ attempt to halt the supply of gas coke from the 
West Midlands Gas Board’s site in Nechells (Saltley), Birmingham in the last 
period of the strike. It assesses the confrontation that took place between pickets 
and police and the support that the miners received from thousands of 
Birmingham engineering workers who joined the miners in a mass picket that 
eventually closed the depot. This was by far the numerically greatest direct 
support that the miners received during the dispute, though it lasted for only one 
day. The closure of the depot came to be seen as the epitome of the strike though 
it actually had little bearing on the strike’s outcome, which was, rather, due to the 
curtailing of coal transportation and the stranding of stocks. This had already been 
achieved at the point when the depot was picketed. Nevertheless, the event has 
attained something of a mythological status primarily because, whilst not 
instrumental in the success of the strike, it marked its effective end and was a 
headline-grabbing confrontation that inflicted a severe humiliation on the Heath 
Government. In this it became revered on the left, and by trade unionists, and 
used as an example of the potential of the organised working class. This chapter 
will assess the nature of the subsequent accounts of the events, including the 
mythology that surrounded the mass picket. It will review the build up to the 
events, the mass picket, and the means of support given by the Birmingham 
engineers. It will consider the role of Scargill and the nature of the picketing, and 
will assess the aftermath to the closure of the depot including the contrast between 






The most significant numerical support that the miners received from other trade 
unionists during the strike was that from engineering and car workers during the 
mass picket at ‘Saltley Gate’ in Birmingham. There is much mythologising 
around this event, including its name, given that the confrontation did not actually 
take place at the gates of Saltley gasworks but on the opposite side of the Saltley 
Viaduct at the gates of the Nechells gasworks.1 The Nechells depot has gone 
down in history as Saltley Gate, or simply Saltley, and though the confrontation 
was a major public humiliation for the Government it had little direct bearing on 
the outcome of the strike, which was determined by the halting of coal stocks to 
power stations. Saltley was unquestionably politically significant but has tended 
to deflect attention from other aspects of the strike, and its mythological status 
has had a bearing on later disputes including the 1984-85 miners’ strike, which 
held it up in reverence as an event to be emulated. Much of the myth stems from 
a 1975 interview Scargill gave in the New Left Review, which presents it as the 
decisive event of the strike.2 At this point Scargill was a member of the NUM’s 
Yorkshire Area Executive as a representative from the Barnsley Panel, which was 
responsible for organising the picketing of East Anglia’s docks and power 
stations during the strike. Many accounts of the strike give undue focus to the 
events at Saltley. Clutterbuck, Whitehead and Beckett have all given it great 
prominence,3 whilst others have inflated the role of Scargill, given his later 
prominence in the 1984-85 strike; Robert Taylor cites ‘the Napoleonic style 
leadership of the young Arthur Scargill’, Pelling, Andrew, and Turner all credit 
Scargill with instigating and leading the action at Saltley: indeed Pelling credits 
Scargill with leading the entire strike.4 Morgan refers to ‘Scargill’s massed 
legions’, and Campbell to ‘Scargill’s flying pickets’. Beckett calls Scargill ‘a 
relatively junior member of the strike committee’ whilst giving him full credit for 
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leading the action at Saltley.5 Birmingham student Peter Tinsley commented, 
insightfully, on the dialectical effect of Scargill’s role: ‘Saltley made Arthur 
Scargill, but Arthur Scargill made Saltley.’6 He undoubtedly played a significant 
role, but History is not served well by reducing complex procedures, involving 
thousands of people, to an individual, who becomes a symbol or shorthand for 
the entire event.  
 
Some historians have minimised the role of trade unionists, other than those from 
the NUM, at the Saltley picket, with Morgan, Middlemas and Scranton failing to 
mention the presence of non-miners at the confrontation.7 Geary hugely 
magnifies the numbers of lorries that called at the depot under normal 
circumstances in stating that it was four hundred a day, which then doubled 
during the strike, whereas in fact there were just a few lorries a day, which 
escalated to hundreds during the strike.8 Scargill himself claimed there were a 
thousand lorries a day visiting the site, and that it contained an estimated million 
tons of coke.9 Taylor notes that the amount of fuel at Saltley and its significance 
have been exaggerated in many accounts. At the start of the strike there were one 
hundred and thirty-eight thousand tons of waste coke left over from the Nechells 
gasworks’ shift to North Sea gas. This had been reduced to one hundred thousand 
tons by the time of the confrontation, and was one of the key remaining stocks of 
gas coke in the country, but would be gone entirely within two weeks; there were 
only twenty thousand tons left by the end of the strike, according to the chairman 
of West Midlands Gas Board. Additionally, this could not have had a material 
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As the strike neared the end of the first month, and with picketing increasingly 
successful, fuel stocks were run down and the picketing of power stations and 
coke depots became the key battle-grounds in the dispute. The stockpile of coke 
at Saltley began to attract coal merchant’s lorries from all over the country. The 
Government grew increasingly desperate and was determined to win at all costs, 
and Saltley became the chosen site for a last ditch test of strength.11 The 
Government, which was determined to keep the depot open, allocated large police 
numbers who were instructed ‘that under no circumstances whatsoever are the 
gates of Saltley to be closed.’12 The depot was initially picketed by just a few 
miners from Staffordshire and Coventry, and Ernest Smith, a shop steward at 
Cartwright, who lived nearby commented: ‘I used to come past this pathetic sight 
of just these few pickets, against a mighty army of police.’13 Given the low level 
of stocks throughout the country the Government had made a request for the depot 
to supply priority customers only but noted that, whilst the depot supplied priority 
consumers first, it felt ‘under no obligation not to supply others.’14 In normal 
circumstances the depot had received around three coal merchants’ lorries daily 
but was suddenly receiving, and filling, hundreds of lorries per day from all over 
the country including Wales, Cornwall, Lancashire, Yorkshire, and Scotland, 
which queued along the roads to the depot for up to a mile. The Birmingham 
Evening Mail on 3 February estimated six hundred and fifty to seven hundred 
lorries per day visiting the depot and quoted a lorry driver from Bolton saying, 
‘I’m amazed they haven’t started picketing it already’.15  
 
As the number of lorries grew local pickets called for reinforcements and on the 
afternoon of Saturday 5 February the NUM in London phoned several regional 
NUM headquarters including the Barnsley Area NUM, which had become the 
centre for organising flying pickets to East Anglia, and asked for two hundred 
pickets to go to ‘Nechells Green’. Scargill admitted he had never heard of the 
place but set about redirecting Yorkshire pickets from East Anglia and contacted 
 
11 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Morgan, p.25 
12 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, SaltleyI, p.3, John Podmore 
13 LB: MS1611/B/9/2, Actuality, Ernest Smith, Shop steward, Cartwright, Birmingham 
14 TNA: CAB128/50/7, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 3, 10 February 1972 
15 Beckett, When the Lights Went Out, p.67; Darlington, R., & Lyddon, D., Glorious Summer: 
Class struggle in Britain 1972, (London, 2001) p.57 
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Emlyn Williams, South Wales NUM vice president, for additional help. Scargill’s 
recollection of their conversation has perhaps benefited from knowledge of 
subsequent events: ‘When I told him I wanted a thousand he said “Good God 
man! Do you realise bloody Wales are playing England?” And I said “Do you 
realise the working class are playing the ruling class in the battle of the 
century!”’16 Scargill redirected up to four hundred pickets to Birmingham, and 
then drove there himself that night arriving in the early hours of the morning. He 
went directly to the CP headquarters, where the Barnsley pickets had been 
accommodated by Scargill’s ‘old friend’ Frank Watters (CP district secretary in 
Birmingham, who had been an NUM activist in Yorkshire), and was briefed on 
the situation at the depot.17 Scargill established a command post opposite the 
depot gates on a small triangular traffic island, which held a public-toilet. From 
the roof of this the whole scene could be surveyed and lorries could be seen 
approaching. It was, incidentally, also the only public toilets in the vicinity and 
pickets and police were obliged to stand shoulder to shoulder at the urinals, before 
leaving to join opposite sides of the picket lines.18 Geary’s estimate of the growth 
of the picket is as follows: 
 
Table 9.1. Numbers, Injuries & Arrests at Saltley Depot.19 
 
Date    Pickets  Police     Injuries         Arrests  Lorries 
1972         Entering 
 
Fri 4 Feb.      200    48 (est) -     -   596 
Sat 5 Feb.      130    48  -     2   320 
Sun 6 Feb.      200    48  -     2     - 
Mon 7 Feb.   2,000  400   9 (8 police)   21     47 
Tue 8 Feb.   2,000  400 18 (6 police)   18     39 
Wed 9 Feb.   2,000  400   4 (2 police   25     43 
Thu 10 Feb. 15,000  800   1 (1 police)     8     10 
Total     32    76 
 
According to Government records, by 7 February about five hundred pickets were 
at the site (from Staffordshire, Derbyshire, Yorkshire, South Wales and Scotland) 
facing two hundred and fifty to three hundred police. Lorries from across Britain 
 
16 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, SaltleyI, p.3, Arthur Scargill, NUM Yorkshire Area Executive  
17 Scargill, ‘The New Unionism’, p.15 
18 LB: MS1611/B/9/2, Actuality, Peter Tinsley; Beckett, When the Lights Went Out, pp.73-4  
19 Source: Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, Table 7, p.77 
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were queueing when the gates opened but miners hurling pies, fruit and eggs 
turned most of them away. A picket lay down in front of a lorry but was hauled 
to safety by police. Seconds later he lay down again in front of a second lorry and 
was then arrested. In all there were more than twenty arrests.20 The DTI reported 
that on Tuesday 8 February that there were then one thousand pickets and around 
four hundred police, though the NUM in Barnsley had received a report on 7 
February that there were some six to seven hundred police at the depot.21  
 
Yorkshire miner, Arnold Cooke, recalled the nature of the conversation pickets 
were having with lorry drivers: ‘We’re picketing miners, we’ve been on strike 
now for seven weeks. We’re fighting for a living, same as you’ll be fighting for 
a living some day, and we shall help you out.’ From the Tuesday, larger police 
numbers allowed the police to prevent pickets from approaching lorries, and 
lorries were waved through instead of, as previously, the police allowing pickets 
the opportunity to speak with the drivers. Police instructed lorries to accelerate 
on approach to keep the traffic moving faster, and this greater speed put both 
pickets and police at risk. The huge numbers of pickets arriving created logistical 
problems, not least in the need to accommodate them. The TGWU premises were 
used as a clearing house and a number of trade unionists, students and local CP 
and Labour activists put up pickets in their homes, and they were also 
accommodated at the Working Men’s Club and the Irish Club in the city centre. 
Labour activist Moira Simmonds was tasked with finding sleeping quarters and 
she found private accommodation for two hundred miners, and also made use of 
student halls. She believed that by giving hospitality people felt they had a real 
stake in the strike. Sylvia Sabin, shop steward at SU Carburettors, and her 
husband, put up six pickets in their house. In addition to accommodation people 
also provided food, and mobile canteens providing tea, soup and hot pies turned 
up at the picket line, which raised the miners’ spirits. On Wednesday 9 February, 
the day before the mass picket, women from SU Carburettors bought up all the 
cigarettes, chocolate and crisps from the factory canteen and went down to the 
picket during their lunch hour and handed these out to the miners. Yorkshire 
miner, John Forrester, was taken with the show of support the miners received: ‘I 
was amazed. Utterly amazed at the consideration that other people were hurtling 
 
20 TNA: POWE14/2661, Internal news item, 7 February; PREM15/985, PRCS/23, 7 February 
1972 
21 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/24, 8 February; NUM: 1972 Strike File, Panel Report, 7 February 
1972, cited in Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, (London, 1984) p.224 
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out towards the miners. You know, they’re somebody they’d never seen in their 
lives before... Goodness was that easy to come by.’22 
 
 
9.4 Birmingham Engineers 
 
On 8 February Watters sought permission for the miners to address local shop 
stewards for help to shut the depot from Arthur Harper, member of Birmingham 
Trades Council and president of the AUEW East District.23 This was agreed and 
the following evening Scargill and other miners spoke at various meetings of the 
AUEW, TGWU, NUGMW and National Union of Vehicle Builders (NUVB), 
and the local CP and Labour Party. Scargill addressed a mass meeting of the 
AUEW East District committee, who were planning a one-day strike in their own 
wage dispute with the Government, and told them: ‘We don’t want your pound 
notes’… ‘Will you go down in history as the working class in Birmingham who 
stood by while the miners were battered - or will you become immortal? I do not 
ask, I demand that you come out on strike.’24 The AUEW shop stewards agreed 
to solidarity action between the unions after the West District committee met the 
following day. Delegations of miners also toured local factories and the Trades 
Council placed an advert in the Birmingham Evening Mail calling for support for 
the miners. John Mitchell, from Keresley colliery, Warwickshire, spoke at one 
meeting telling them: ‘It’s not the miners that are under attack, it’s the working 
class and the Trade Union movement of this country.’25 The appeal for assistance 
from the miners was the green light the Birmingham engineers needed to join the 
picket, Harper noted: ‘Scargill did come to the district committee and give 
permission, the go-ahead, ‘cos we couldn’t be accused of poking our nose into 
somebody else’s dispute, you know, the press’d make great play of this.’26 The 
response from the trade unionists and shop stewards put pressure on the local 
leadership to support the strike. From early on 10 February shop stewards at 
factory meetings across Birmingham put the proposal to support the miners to 
 
22 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, SaltleyI, p.4, Moira Simmonds, Birmingham Borough Labour Party; p.5, 
un-named miner; SaltleyII, p.12, John Forrester, Yorkshire Main colliery, Yorkshire; p.13, 
Arnold Cooke, Woolley colliery, Yorkshire; MS1611/B/9/2, Actuality, Arthur Harper, 
AUEW, Birmingham; Watters, F., Being Frank: The Memoirs of Frank Watters, (Doncaster, 
1992) pp.64-9 
23 Kellaway, Re-examining the Battle p.3; Watters, Being Frank, p.63 
24 Watters, Being Frank, p.71; Scargill, ‘The New Unionism’, pp.17-8 
25 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, SaltleyII, p.17, John Mitchell, Keresley colliery, Warwickshire 
26 LB: MS1611/B/9/2, Actuality, Arthur Harper  
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rank-and-file votes, which largely received majority support. Cartwright shop 
steward Ernest Smith recalled a huge support for solidarity action:  
 
we went to our members, very few - hardly any against it... there was a 
huge exodus, the factory emptied, and they were solid behind the banner. 
Everybody stopped work, make no bones about that, nobody worked, if 
everybody didn’t march - and we think nearly everybody did march, 
certainly work stopped.27 
 
Rover shop steward John Harris remembered being harassed by rank-and-file 
members to write a resolution in support of the miners, so that they could stop 
work and go and support the picket: ‘They were asking me what I was going to 
do about it... From there on in, until the factory closed down by everybody 
walking out, I didn’t get a minute’s peace’.28 The AUEW, NUVB and TGWU 
agreed to solidarity action, whilst EETPU and NUGMW rank-and-file activists 
tried to get their members out unofficially after their local leadership refused to 
call official action. The numbers of pickets sent by the Barnsley strike committee, 
and their approach in seeking support from Birmingham engineers, went beyond 
the NUM leadership’s intentions and showed that both Scargill and the pickets 
were operating independently of the NEC.29 Harper recalled fighting a losing 
battle in trying to encourage those with health issues to take transport down to the 
picket rather than to march there for fear that they may harm themselves:  
 
there were people there, you know, people that’d got bad hearts and 
shouldn’t, you know, exert themselves or so forth, and we went amongst 
‘em, weeding ‘em out, saying ‘Use your head, go down on the bus, or go 
down by car, if you want to go’... anyhow they told us where to go.30  
 
NUVB shop steward Bob Smith, who lost a leg during the war, was one of those 
encouraged not to march, but who had insisted on doing so. He recalled his 
reasons for marching:  
 
we were going to back the miners, right up to the hilt, we were going to get 
them gates closed... I was very proud and so were the boys, to support them 
 
27 LB: MS1611/B/9/2, Actuality, Ernest Smith 
28 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, SaltleyII, p.18, John Harris, Senior shop steward, Rover, Birmingham 
29 Phillips, J., ‘The 1972 miners’ strike: popular agency and industrial politics in Britain’, 
Contemporary British History, Vol.20, No.2, 2006, p.201; Darlington & Lyddon, Glorious 
Summer, p.59; Allen, V. L., The Militancy of British Miners, (Shipley, 1981) p.198; Watters, 
Being Frank, p.72 
30 LB: MS1611/B/9/2, Actuality, Arthur Harper 
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for the good cause they were fighting for, for humanity, and the right to 
good wages and a good living standard.31 
 
Police stopped coaches of Welsh miners en route to Saltley that morning and 
searched them for weapons as a means of delaying them, but the miners got out 
and walked the rest of the way to the depot, with some building workers leaving 
their sites and joining them along the way.32 Some forty thousand engineers 
walked out on a one-day strike and large contingents of these marched to Saltley 
with banners flying. The police report estimated a peak of fifteen thousand pickets 
from across the West Midlands.33 Harper noted the total support for action at the 
Tractors and Transmissions factory:  
 
The whole factory came out to a man, I should say around four thousand 
people, and we marched on Saltley… We marched up to that gate and 
stuck, solid, a solid wall of humanity, and the police were powerless. They 
was licked. They was licked and they know’d it’.34 
 
A collier from Maerdy described the arrival of thousands of factory workers at 
the Saltley depot: ‘They just come in and come in and come in until there was no 
more room for anybody. There was still people up the road.’35 According to 
Beckett, in addition to the trade unionists, ‘There were women holding shopping 





The confrontation at Saltley lasted around five days, during which fifteen pickets 
and seventeen police were injured (the DTI gives these figures as seven pickets 
and twenty police) and there were seventy-five arrests,37 though before the arrival 
of mass pickets the Birmingham Post reported that it had been almost completely 
peaceful with only four arrests in three days.38 On the day of the closure itself 
 
31 LB: MS1611/B/9/2, Actuality, Bob Smith, NUVB Shop steward, Birmingham 
32 Watters, Being Frank, pp.69-70 
33 LB: Birmingham City Police, The Miners’ Strike 1972. Picketing of West Midlands Gas Board 
Premises in Birmingham, (undated) cited in Taylor, The NUM, Volume 2, p.61 
34 LB: MS1611/B/9/2, Actuality, Arthur Harper 
35 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, SaltleyI, p.8, Un-named miner, Maerdy colliery, South Wales 
36 Beckett, When the Lights Went Out, p.82 
37 TNA: FV38/184, DTI Post-mortem, June 1972, Annex S, Schedule on picketing incidents; 
Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, Table 7, p.77 
38 Birmingham Post, 5 February 1972, cited in Kellaway, Re-examining the Battle, p.20 
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there was very little actual violence in part because when the engineers arrived it 
became impossible for any lorries to enter the depot. The mass picket from the 
Monday onwards led to pushing and shoving between pickets and police and 
reports of kicking on both sides, which led to some injuries and a number of 
arrests.39 Chief Constable of Birmingham, Sir Derek Capper explained that ‘in 
trying to hold back large crowds struggles develop, it is understandable that minor 
injuries occur to both the police and demonstrators’.40 Geary reasons that mass 
pushing and shoving ‘can be seen as a solution to the problem of making 
picketing effective without resorting to violence’.41 However, there certainly was 
some actual violence evident on both sides of the lines, though on the day after 
the closure the Birmingham Post remarked: ‘Behind the headlines of punch-ups 
and arrests - there has been good natured discourse between pickets and police 
outside the gates of Saltley this week and there has been humour full and 
unconditional’.42 A British Gas report later also found that until its climactic 
stages: ‘Notwithstanding the evidence of violence depicted in the media... 
relations between police and pickets on the whole remained friendly and low 
key.’43 Geary argues that the bulk of the picketing during the strike was peaceful 
but even in the exceptional cases where scuffles took place between pickets and 
police it amounted to little more than ‘spirited pushing and shoving’, and that 
whilst Saltley is often depicted as an extreme example of industrial violence and 
the ultimate manifestation of anarchy, the picketing amounted to ‘large numbers 
of strikers pushing against smaller numbers of police.’44 The nature of the 
policing and the accusations of violence are discussed further in Chapter Ten. The 
huge numbers of pickets forced Capper, to close the gates, both for safety 
concerns and because lorries were unable to reach them through the crowd. He 
recalled the events some years later:  
 
I decided that the situation was such that we ought to get the gates closed 
and avoid the use of excessive force to move them... if we’d decided to 
move them by force, there would have been a considerable amount of 
injury. And I quite honestly didn’t feel... with so few lorries wanting to get 
in, that it really required that use of force to move these people and causing 
that injury - which would have had repercussions for some years.45 
 
39 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, p.77 
40 The Times, 9 February 1972 
41 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, p.114 
42 Birmingham Post, 11 February 1972, cited in Kellaway, Re-examining the Battle, p.21 
43 Cited in Beckett, When the Lights Went Out, p.76 
44 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, pp.77-8 
45 LB: MS4000/2/152/3, Interview, Sir Derek Capper, Chief Constable, West Midlands, BBC1, 




Capper then asked Scargill to do him ‘a favour’ and disperse the crowd. Scargill 
agreed on condition that he could make a speech, which was accepted, and he 
then spoke, standing on the toilet-block, using a police loudhailer, and gave a 
speech to the crowd, thanking them and telling them that it was the greatest 
victory of the working class in his lifetime.46 Bob Smith and Peter Tinsley 
recalled a change in the attitude of the police after the gates had been closed:  
 
Well the attitude of the coppers when we got there. Well they were a bit 
rough, they were pushing and they couldn’t care less whether you were a 
cripple or what you were, but we did close the gates. That was it. Their 
attitude changed then - friendly, “You’ve done a good job, boys”, yea, but 
they were disgusted, that we’y’d beat.  
 
The policemen pushed you around on the first three days and then … the 
policemen sort of directed us onto the pavement, “Would you mind 
walking on the pavement, Sir.” And that’s the first time any of us had been 






The Cabinet were told that Capper had been obliged to close the depot and 
concluded that this outcome ‘represented a victory for violence against the lawful 
activities of the Gas Board and the coal merchants’ and ‘provided disturbing 
evidence of the ease with which, by assembling large crowds, militants could 
flout the law with impunity’.48 The events at Saltley, and the strike in general, led 
to a reassessment by the Government of its approach to the policing of such 
events. The Cabinet had already discussed possible changes to the law on 
picketing and the events at Saltley gave this process further impetus (discussed 
in Chapter Ten). The mass picket at Saltley shook the Government to its core and 
Ministers in general felt that the flagrant breaches of the law had so undermined 
the Government’s and police’s capacity to enforce it that they were alarmed at a 
new and disturbing attitude among some sections of society towards laws with 
which they disagreed.49 Thatcher later wrote:  
 
46 Scargill, ‘The New Unionism’, p.19; Watters, Being Frank, p.70 
47 LB: MS1611/B/9/2, Actuality, Bob Smith & Peter Tinsley 
48 TNA: CAB128/50/7, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 3, 10 February 1972 




For me what happened at Saltley took on no less significance than it did 
for the Left. I understood as they did that the struggle to bring trade unions 
properly within the rule of law would be decided not in the debating 
chamber of the House of Commons, nor even on the hustings, but in and 
around the pits and factories where intimidation had been allowed to 
prevail.50 
 
The Government’s disgust at the events at Saltley contrasted with the views of 
those who took part. Yorkshire miner Ian Ferguson felt that the significance of 
Saltley was that it showed: ‘how the struggle of the miners had the involvement 
of other sections of the working class, other industries, it’s a sort of a record that 
we must have - a working class record... it’s a question of class loyalties.’51 
Engineers and miners both found it to be an emotional and unifying experience:  
 
I was very proud, that everybody, all nationalities was there, Irish, Scotch, 
Welsh, the lot - and they were united. 
 
it was a massive exhibition, an emotional exhibition, there’s no doubt about 
that. I saw miners crying - but I saw car-workers crying, you know, as well 
as miners. 
 
I felt proud to be a part, that particular day, of the working class, who 
showed all the finer things of human nature. 
 
the miners did us a good turn in Birmingham, that day, cos they united the 
trade union movement of Birmingham, of all Trade Unions, that’d been 
falling out with one another, and this day, they united Birmingham.52 
 
Therein lay the true historical significance of Saltley. It was not an event that was 
instrumental in the miners’ victory, but it was hugely significant in its symbolic 
importance. It served to demonstrate the strength and potential of the organised 
and unified working class. In these respects, it alarmed the Government, and 







50 Thatcher, M., The Path to Power, (London, 1995) p.218 
51 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, SaltleyI, p.1, Ian Ferguson, NUM, Yorkshire 





This chapter reviewed the events around the mass picket of the Nechells depot in 
Birmingham, known colloquially as Saltley. This saw miners receive substantial 
support from thousands of Birmingham engineers and car-workers, on a one-day 
walkout and march to Saltley that forced the closure of the coke depot. Whilst 
this confrontation did not actually play a part in the miners’ victory, it was seen 
to have inflicted a major defeat on the Government, which had chosen to ensure 
that the depot remained symbolically open in a last-ditch test of strength. The 
support that the miners received was sought at mass meetings of engineering 
workers and shop stewards, who then put pressure on their respective leaderships 
to walk out. This support had its roots in the ideals of trade union solidarity, and 
both the miners and the engineers themselves identified it as a unifying and 
emotional experience. This was in part due to the Conservative Government 
being the focus of the revolt, and built upon the previous year’s demonstrations 
by trade unionists against the I.R.Act legislation (discussed in Chapter Ten). The 
Government, which had put great store in the symbolism of keeping the gates 
open, knew that the closure of the depot marked their effective, public, defeat in 
the strike, and that it had become a symbolism of a different kind. The 
confrontation led them to concede the miners’ demands following the 
Wilberforce Inquiry, which was appointed the day after the closure.  
 
The significance of the role played by Scargill in the events at Saltley is a little 
difficult to unpick. Some reports, not least his own, give him full credit and 
responsibility, others downplay both his significance, and indeed the significance 
of the Saltley mass picket itself. It is clear that he played an instrumental role in 
a number of respects: in diverting South Yorkshire pickets from picketing in East 
Anglia towards Birmingham as part of his role as organiser of the Barnsley flying 
pickets, which went beyond the numbers sought by the NEC; in making direct 
appeals to the Birmingham engineers, via his links to the CP organiser Watters, 
to join the mass picket; and in his impassioned speeches. However, his role has 
been magnified by his New Left Review interview, which many subsequent 
accounts have drawn upon, and, primarily, by his subsequent leadership of the 
NUM during the 1984-85 strike, which led many to seek the roots of his later 
leadership in his earlier actions. The significance of the confrontation at Saltley 
itself is also nuanced. It was not at all significant in the miners’ victory in the 
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strike itself, which had already been decided elsewhere by this point, however, it 
was very significant as a signal of the Government’s defeat, and as an emblem of 
the united working class. It came to be revered and held up as an example of the 
possibilities for a future repeat if the working-class and/or trade union movement 
could become similarly organised and motivated. This arguably had disastrous 
consequences in 1984-85, not least because Saltley itself was not a strategy for 
winning a strike. That required the kind of rank-and-file organisation seen in the 
1972 strike, but which was largely absent from the later strike, not least because 
Scargill himself did not wish to transform the dispute into a wider working-class 














10.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter is concerned with the legal aspects of the strike, in particular the 
nature of the policing and the application of the Law. It will consider the relations 
between the pickets and the police, which was initially largely good natured, and 
assess the balance of responsibilities that the police had to weigh in protecting 
both the rights of the pickets and of those who wished to work. It will consider 
the changes to policing in the period before the strike, and the change of tactics 
as the strike developed, in particular with respect to the co-operation between 
police forces known as ‘mutual aid’. The chapter will address the Heath 
Government’s allegation that the miners’ success was ‘a victory for violence’, an 
allegation belied by the Government’s own earlier statements and by evidence 
from a number of sources, which demonstrates that the picketing was largely 
peaceful and legal. It will consider the notion of ‘intimidation’ and the way that 
its use developed during the strike. The chapter will review the industrial relations 
legislation introduced by the Heath Government and the considerations that both 
Labour and the Conservatives gave to the incidence of unofficial strikes and the 
consequent desire to counter these, in what Wrigley and Philips call ‘the 
politicisation of industrial relations’.1 It will show that governments of both 
stripes sought, primarily, to strengthen the hand of the official trade union 
leadership against the militant or ‘unofficial’ element, and that Government plans 
consequently won the approval of the official leadership, and that opposition to 
 
1 Wrigley, C., (Ed.), Documents in Contemporary History: British Trade Unions 1945 – 1995, 
(Manchester, 1997) p.28; Phillips, J., ‘Industrial Relations, Historical Contingencies and 
Political Economy: Britain in the 1960s and 1970s’, Labour History Review, Vol.72, No.3, 
December 2007, p.227 
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the legislation came largely from militant sections of the rank-and-file. The 
chapter will consider the Industrial Relations Act as a part of the Heath 
Government’s desire to confront the public sector and contain wage rises in 
pursuit of its attempts to rein in inflation. It will demonstrate that the Cabinet 
became frustrated at the effectiveness of the picketing and its own inability to 
curb this, which led it to seek grounds for prosecution and ultimately changes to 
the Law. The chapter will consider the changes sought by the government in the 
aftermath of the strike to strengthen the effectiveness of the police, in an 
atmosphere where picketing was being seen as subversive. It will review the 
changes made and planned by the Heath Government with regard to welfare 
benefits for those on strike, and will show that this was intended to put financial 
pressure onto both the unions and the strikers. 
 
 
10.2 Pickets and Police  
 
Relations between pickets and the police during the strike, and prior to Saltley, 
were largely good, with Morgan recalling that in the interviews he undertook 
there were few complaints about the police and sometimes praise for their 
behaviour.2 Beckett cites a police officer who identified with the pickets’ plight 
in saying that the police ‘were on poor money too, so we… had sympathy with 
the miners.’3 Warwickshire miner’s wife Tina Dogherty recalled that during the 
miners’ rally in London, she was a bit frightened by the crowd: ‘I walked beside 
the policeman all the time I was there. I kept telling him, “if anything happens 
don’t you run away and leave me, cause my man’s way up front.” He was 
laughing... he sang songs with us.’4 However, a survey of police attitudes towards 
trade unionism, undertaken by Reiner, found that rank-and-file policemen felt 
that senior officers often restrained them from fully enforcing the law during 
industrial disputes.5 Geary notes that Superintendents he spoke with were aware 
of the frustrating effect policing such disputes had on junior officers, and the 
problem of maintaining morale and good spirits, given the long hours worked 
away from home and families. However, they also noted that ‘you cannot do a 
 
2 LB: MS4000/2/152/2, Miners’ Strike, Morgan, p.26 
3 Beckett, A., When the Lights Went Out: What Really Happened to Britain in the Seventies, 
(London, 2009) p.78 
4 LB: MS4000/2/152/3, Actuality, Tina Dogherty 
5 Reiner, R., ‘Police and Picketing’, New Society, 7 July 1977, p.14, cited in Geary, R., Policing 
Industrial Disputes: 1893 to 1985, (Cambridge, 1985) p.125 
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policeman’s job and remain an angel. If you do a policeman’s job you are bound 
to know all the dirty tricks.’6 This points to senior officers weighing the police 
role as keepers of the peace, against their role as enforcers of the law, which 
highlights the problems faced by the police in balancing responsibilities and 
obligations. The Home Office noted that the enforcement of the law in any 
particular case is entirely a matter for the police, that each police force will have 
its own instructions, and that the enforcement of the law relating to picketing is a 
delicate task; the police are expected to demonstrate strict impartiality between 
the pickets and those who wish to continue to work, and it is commonplace to 
receive complaints from a single incident that the police were both too lax in 
enforcing the law and also unduly oppressive.7 Geary notes that the obligation of 
the police to balance these conflicting rights are fine in theory,  
 
but bear little relation to the reality of a strike situation. A non-union driver 
being paid high bonuses precisely to drive through picket lines is hardly 
likely to listen to peaceful persuasion, while picketing entirely within the 
law is likely to be wholly ineffective.8 
 
The Home Office sent a circular to all Chief Constables in England and Wales 
during the first week of the strike, which reminded them of the law on picketing 
and required them to submit immediate reports of any disorder or threat of 
disorder connected with the strike, and also weekly reports containing a general 
assessment of the extent and location of picketing in their Areas.9 This was 
undertaken largely with a view to finding grounds to prosecute pickets, both to 
undermine the picketing, and therefore the strike, but also with one eye on public 
opinion. The telexes submitted by the police in response catalogue just fourteen 
reports of disorder, or threat of disorder, out of nine hundred and forty-eight 
picketing ‘events’ (1.5%). The vast majority of the reports talk of; peaceful 
picketing, no disturbances, no disorder or threat of disorder, no untoward 
incidents, and many also report that relations between the police and the pickets 
are good or even excellent.10 In his memoirs, Heath was critical of the police 
whom he described as ‘weak, and frightened of a scrap with the pickets’ and he 
 
6 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, p.113 
7 TNA: HO325/99, E(72)1, Note on Picketing, Chairman, OC Emergencies, 14 January; Note, 
Hilary to Evans, 25 January 1972 
8 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, p.74 
9 HO325/99, E(72)1, Note on Picketing, Chairman, Official Committee (OC) on Emergencies, 14 
January; Note, Hilary to Evans, 25 January 1972  




further condemned their ‘softly, softly approach’ as ‘disastrous’.11 Coal 
merchants were also reportedly calling for ‘sterner measures by the police’, and 
for ‘stronger police protection from pickets’, though the Government countered 
that the ‘police are of course neutral.’12 The Board approached the police early in 
the strike to request assistance in maintaining supplies to priority consumers, if it 
should be needed, but was later critical of the police priority for keeping the peace 
at the cost of practical disregard for the rights of those who wanted to go to work. 
It criticised an ‘excess of caution’ in police actions and a lack of appetite for 
confrontation: 
 
It is possible that a greater determination might have succeeded in many 
places and it is idle for the Police to speak of the absence of serious bodily 
injury as a measure of success. Yorkshire has seen a virtual breakdown of 
law and order and the Police have only escaped defiance by lack of 
determined action. This is failure, not success.13 
 
The police also faced practical difficulties when making an arrest in deciding the 
appropriate moment at which to arrest selected pickets who broke the law, and 
particularly in obtaining eye witnesses to give evidence.14 The NCB recognised 
the difficulties faced by the police but noted that the issue lay primarily in 
enforcement, since the police would have to be willing to prosecute. The Board 
believed that this willingness varied widely and was ‘particularly low in areas 
where the police were drawn from and based on mining districts.’15 It noted that 
action was a matter for the police and that their concern, primarily, was to keep 
the peace, but it felt that it should encourage the police to keep picket numbers 
down, not to ignore flagrant breaches of the law, and if possible to concentrate 
on ‘ring-leaders’. The Board considered that it only made sense to pursue 
individuals for prosecution if it would make a significant difference, that is, ‘if it 
removed from the picket line leaders whose presence would make a real 
difference. It is no good getting an injunction against “A” if his place would 




11 Heath, E., The Course of My Life, (London, 1999) pp.350-353  
12 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/6, 18 January; PRCS/7, 19 January 1972 
13 TNA: COAL78/1908, Letter, Menheneott to Roy, 14 January; COAL31/300, Letter, Glover to 
Brass, 28 January 1972 
14 TNA: CAB134/3485, E(72), MC Emergencies, 3rd Meeting, 28 January 1972 
15 TNA: COAL31/300, Letter, Glover to Brass, 28 January 1972 
16 TNA: COAL31/300, Letter, Jeffries to Board members and regional directors, 31 January 1972 
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10.3 Changes to Policing 
 
Legislation governing police forces in England and Wales had been updated 
under the Police Act 1964, which constituted new police authorities and allowed 
for the amalgamation of existing forces into more efficient units. Between 1965 
and 1969 the number of police forces in England and Wales was reduced from 
one hundred and seventeen to forty-nine. The new forces were under the control 
of a Chief Constable, and were primarily based on counties. Consequently, the 
number of police officers were spread over much wider force areas than 
previously. The larger size of individual forces militated against local control and 
increased the influence of both the Chief Constables and the Home Office. During 
the period of the strike police numbers were considered to be under-strength by 
an estimated 13,454 (12.3%) in 1971 and by 11,847 (10.7%) in 1972. In addition, 
officers had no recent experience of industrial unrest on the scale of the miners’ 
strike. The centralisation process had the effect of constraining police reaction to 
industrial disorder and led to ‘the development of such non-violent tactics as ‘the 
cordon and the wedge’, which allowed the police to enforce the law without 
overstepping political limitations. 17  
 
Both the miners and the police adapted their tactics as the strike progressed, in 
response to each other and the developing situation; the miners’ tactic of moving 
a large force of pickets from one pit to another to concentrate their effectiveness, 
led to police doing the same, with the police, for example, deploying their forces 
strategically during the fourth week in Derbyshire and Yorkshire,18 and in 
particular at Saltley. The Police Act had made particular provision for assistance 
to be given by one force to another ‘to meet any special demand on resources’, 
which came to be known as mutual aid, and this developed during the strike as 
and when required.19 Home Office officials later noted that: ‘The concentration 
of large numbers of pickets at certain places calls for well-organised mutual aid 
between police forces. The dispersal of some thousands of resisting pickets would 
be a task beyond the resources of any single force outside the metropolis.’20 Each 
force was responsible for the way in which police in any particular situation dealt 
 
17 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, p.125; Taylor, A., The NUM and British Politics, Volume 
2: 1969-1995, (London, 2005) p.64 
18 TNA: COAL31/416, NCB Situation Reports, 3, 4 & 8 February 1972 
19 Police Act (1964), pp.8-9 
20 TNA: HO325/103, Picketing and Secondary Industrial Action, Note by Officials, 18 May 1972 
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with pickets, and the Government were keen to learn what had worked best so 
that it could be applied to other forces both at that time and in future disputes. 
The Ministerial Committee on Emergencies, meeting at the end of the third week 
of the strike, noted that: 
 
The arrangements made by some Chief Officers of Police to establish with 
the pickets clear limits to the conduct they would consider admissible had 
proved successful in improving police control and in keeping down the 
numbers involved in picketing; and the Home Office would consider if this 
experience could suitably be brought to the attention of the police in other 
areas.21 
 
A month after the strike the Home Office contacted police headquarters about 
‘the need for more (albeit discreet) training in the techniques of crowd control.’ 
It noted that it might also be necessary, in some future emergency, ‘to organise 
mutual aid on a larger scale than had hitherto been contemplated’ particularly if 
there were a need to secure certain government objectives in the national interest, 
and hoped that this might be discussed at the Association of Chief Police Officers 
conference.22 The police responded following the conference to say that Chief 
Constables had accepted the proposals for a National Mutual Aid scheme, but 
hoped that it would never have to be put into operation.23  
 
 
10.4 A Victory for Violence? 
 
The strike was denounced as ‘a victory for violence’, initially by Maudling in 
Cabinet on being told of the closure of the gates at Saltley, then by Heath publicly 
in the strike’s immediate aftermath, and some years later by Thatcher in her 
autobiography.24 New Statesman saw Heath’s speech as one ‘deliberately 
designed to create an atmosphere of unease’ and an attempt to explain away the 
Government’s defeat by implying that ‘the chief characteristic of the strike had 
been violence at the power stations’, which it believes ‘could hardly be further 
from the truth.’25 There are disagreements in the literature regarding the extent of 
the violence that occurred in the strike. Phillips challenges the view that it was ‘a 
 
21 TNA: CAB134/3485, E(72), MC Emergencies, 3rd Meeting, 28 January 1972 
22 TNA: HO325/103, Letter, Allen to White, 23 March 1972 
23 TNA: HO325/103, Letter, White to Allen, 17 April 1972 
24 CAB128/50/7, Cabinet Conclusions, Item 3, 10 February; PREM15/986, PRCS/37, 25 
February 1972; Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, (London, 1995) p.340 
25 New Statesman, Editorial, Vol.84, No.2137, 3 March 1972, p.258 
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victory for violence’, seeing it rather as a straightforward industrial dispute.26 
Ashworth, drawing on NCB records, writes that all ‘mass actions during the 
strike’ involved ‘breaches of law and bore little resemblance to peaceful 
picketing.’27 Ledger and Sallis state that the police were frequently outnumbered 
by large crowds of pickets shoving and pushing and throwing stones at lorries.28 
McCormick contends that, in relation to the number of picket lines, the amount 
of violence was slight.29 Geary notes that ‘many of the objections against alleged 
violent picketing are really objections against effective strike action itself.’30 
Violence is defined as behaviour involving physical force intended to hurt, 
damage, or kill someone or something, or as the unlawful exercise of physical 
force or intimidation by the exhibition of such force.31 Little of the action during 
the strike falls into either of these definitions, and none, or almost none, of it into 
the first category; the hostility shown towards the officials and clerical staff 
crossing the picket lines comes closest, but the intention there was clearly to stop 
strike-breaking rather than to physically hurt anybody and thus falls more into the 
second category than the first. The key area of picketing regarded as controversial 
was the use of mass picketing, which was not inherently violent but can be said 
to have been intimidating. Geary notes that picketing in the late 1960s and 1970s 
generally, involved some illegal behaviour such as intimidation, obstruction and 
the immobilisation of vehicles, but that recourse to actual violence was rare and 
rather amounted to some pushing and shoving, though this only took place during 
mass picketing, whereas the majority of picket lines were small scale and 
peaceful.32 This appears to have been the case in this strike. 
 
There is some discrepancy concerning the number of pickets in action during the 
strike, the number of arrests, and the extent of any intimidating behaviour. At the 
beginning of February 1972, the Guardian cited an NUM estimate of some fifty 
to sixty thousand pickets in action,33 whereas a week later, Labour MP Eric 
Varley cited figures during a Commons debate, of one thousand picket lines in 
 
26 Phillips, J., ‘The 1972 miners’ strike: popular agency and industrial politics in Britain’, 
Contemporary British History, Vol.20, No.2, 2006, p.202 
27 Ashworth, W., The History of the British Coal Industry, Vol.5, 1946-1982: The Nationalised 
Industry, (Oxford, 1986) p.340 
28 Ledger, F. & Sallis, H., Crisis Management in the Power Industry: an inside story, (London, 
1995) pp.47-50 
29 McCormick, B.J., Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry, (London, 1979) p.205  
30 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, p.114 
31 Oxford English Dictionary definition 
32 Geary, Policing Industrial Disputes, pp.91-3 & 114 
33 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/19, 2 February 1972 
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operation during the strike involving nine thousand miners but only about twelve 
violent incidents and about forty-eight arrests.34 The NUM 1972 conference 
report backs the figures cited by Varley in claiming that picketing was generally 
peaceful and that, with over a thousand picket lines in operation across the 
country for six weeks, there were no more than a dozen incidents of violence 
reported and with many thousands of pickets on duty each day the numbers 
involved in violence and arrests were insignificant. The Home Office confirmed 
the relatively low level of violence, reporting that by 7 February, ‘61 picketing 
incidence [sic] had occurred in England and Wales, 37 at pits, 5 at power stations, 
19 elsewhere; 130 arrests made; 1 picket killed, 4 police and 6 pickets reported 
injured.’35 It seems likely that the ‘violence’ that occurred was limited to hostile 
picketing at a small number of locations, except for the picketing of clerical and 
safety staff, which was more widespread (see Chapter Six), and the high-profile 
mass picketing such as at Saltley and Longannet.36  
 
Government and NCB reports suggest that violence was minimal, and that such 
violence as occurred did not emanate only from the pickets. The first violent 
incident noted in the DTI reports, which was within the first few days, took place 
at a Coalite smokeless fuel works in Grimethorpe, South Yorkshire and involved 
a ‘non-union’ driver who refused a request not to enter the works and drove at 
speed towards the picketed gates, running over a picket’s leg and slightly injuring 
two other men.37 Lorries moving fuel at the site were subsequently pelted with 
coke, and by the end of the first week, as picket numbers grew, coal was also 
being thrown at police.38 At the end of the third week, towards the mid-point of 
the strike, the Board reported that ‘there is no evidence of violence by pickets at 
depots’, whilst the DTI reports spoke of some violence and intimidation by a 
limited number of pickets, and the involvement of militant non-miners. The press 
meanwhile reported the Government’s concern about hostile incidents on the 
picket lines, though police reports received by the DTI ‘suggest that picketing has 
in general been peaceful and that press have exaggerated the incidents arising out 
of picketing of offices in Wales and the North East.’39  
 
34 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/25, 9 February 1972 
35 TNA: PREM15/985, PRCS/26, 10 February 1972 
36 KL: KA25/U/Z5, NUM Conference 1972, NEC Report, p.8 
37 TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/1, 9-12 January 1972 
38 Morning Telegraph 12 January, cited in Taylor, A., The Politics of the Yorkshire Miners, 
(London, 1984) pp.219-20; TNA: PREM15/984, PRCS/2, 13 January 1972 
39 TNA: COAL31/300, Situation Report, 28 January; PREM15/984, PRCS/15, 28 January; 
PRCS/16, 29-30 January; PRCS18, 1 February 1972 
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At the conclusion of the strike, and the day before Heath’s speech denouncing the 
violence on the picket lines, Maudling said in the Commons that ‘the vast mass 
of the picketing was entirely legal’ and that ‘the union involved certainly did 
nothing to countenance violence or illegal activity.’40 He makes a clear distinction 
here between the moderation of the NUM leadership, and some militant activity 
by those on the picket lines. The NCB also made a distinction between the NUM’s 
decision-making at national and at local level. The Board wrote to its regional 
directors mid-way through the strike to set out its concerns at the extent of 
picketing and its thoughts about what legal remedy might be available to curb 
this. It noted that the NUM national leadership had issued instructions to pickets 
concerning the need for peaceful picketing, but that these had seemingly been 
ignored: ‘The most charitable interpretation that can be put upon the facts of the 





The use of the term ‘intimidation’ in relation to picketing developed during the 
strike. A DTI report at the end of January spoke of some violence and intimidation 
by a limited number of pickets.42 The NCB’s legal opinion at the same time noted 
that the term ‘picket’ was derived from military use as an outpost and that a 
‘picket line’ was therefore a contradiction in terms; if pickets ‘form themselves 
into a line and are formed up in depth’ then this cannot be said to be for peaceful 
persuasion but, rather, would be to physically prevent people from going to work 
and that this amounts to intimidation. Similarly, any more than two or three 
pickets being allowed to approach the driver of a lorry for the aim of peaceful 
persuasion would amount to intimidation.43 The Attorney General, Sir Peter 
Rawlinson, also used the term in relation to numbers when speaking at the time 
of the Saltley confrontation, in stating that most of the picketing during the strike 
had been lawful except in circumstances where there was intimidation, and that 
such intimidation arguably concerned merely the number of pickets attending 
rather than their behaviour.44 A note by Home Office officials some three months 
 
40 HC Deb, 24 February 1972, vol.831 cc.1486-7 
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after the strike stated that: ‘The very presence of excessively large numbers of 
pickets is itself a form of intimidation.45 The mass picketing, particularly at 
Saltley, was therefore equated with intimidation and since intimidation was 
equated with violence, ergo mass picketing was necessarily seen as violent 
whatever the actual behaviour of those involved. Maudling noted that: ‘It is 
difficult to know in any particular set of circumstances when the right of people 
to persuade others not to go into a factory becomes intimidation.’46 Leslie 
Huckfield (Labour) drew attention to the political convenience of seeing 
successful picketing as intimidation in noting that: ‘If pickets just stand 
harmlessly and aimlessly by the roadside, that is called peaceful picketing. But if 
they are successful in turning round a few lorries that is intimidation, in the 
definition of Conservative members.’ Huckfield had attended the mass picket at 
Saltley and pointed to alternative definitions of intimidation: ‘Lorry drivers were 
telling us time and again that if they did not get a load out of Saltley they would 
get the sack when they returned… When a driver is told that unless he returns 
with a load he will get the sack, I call that intimidation. I call that an illegal 
practice.’47 The merging of the terms intimidation and violence in part explains 
the Government’s use of the phrase ‘a victory for violence’ in describing the 
outcome of the miners’ strike. 
 
 
10.6 Policing at Saltley 
 
In his memoirs Heath described the use of mass pickets, particularly at Saltley, 
as ‘the most vivid, direct and terrifying challenge to the rule of law that I could 
ever recall emerging from within our country’.48 His denunciation of the strike as 
a ‘victory for violence’ was to a large extent based on the events at Saltley, though 
there is some disagreement as to the extent of the violence that actually took 
place, and where this violence originated. Scargill’s own recollection was that the 
pickets were on the receiving end of some forceful police behaviour.49 Brian Bird 
shop steward at Rover, noted: ‘Without doubt brutality was taking place. People 
 
45 TNA: HO325/103, Note by Officials, ‘Picketing and Secondary Industrial Action’, 18 May 
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were being kicked and things like this. We thought it was terrible.’50 A member 
of the Llantrisant and District strike committee recalled: ‘As we got around him 
(the lorry) the police started to kick. I said, “There’s no bloody need for that, we 
all play Rugby, we can all kick if we want to, we just want to talk to him.”’51 A 
report from The Times suggested that there was aggression on both sides: 
‘Birmingham police, more used perhaps to dealing with their own at the car 
factories, appeared to be severe with the miners.  Equally, it could be said that 
not a few officers now bear the marks of pit boots on their shins.’52 Student Peter 
Tinsley recalled previous demonstrations that he had been on where there had 
been some forceful police activity against students who were not able to resist. 
However, at Saltley: ‘the miners came down and the police were backheeling 
them… but the miners have got big boots, and after they’d used their boots a bit 
there wasn’t much violence, not against people as a mass.’53 Perhaps the most 
significant element of the policing at Saltley was the use of enhanced methods 
including the use of snatch squads and what some miners believed to have been 
provocateurs in the crowd. Whilst the use of the latter had been suggested earlier 
in the strike, at NCB headquarters in Tondu and Durham (see Chapter Six), there 
were several accounts of the use of such methods at Saltley. Harper and Tinsley 
both recalled the operation of police snatch squads:  
 
... what the coppers was doing, was sorting the big lads out from the crowd, 
and sending four blokes in, you know, they’d all say we’re spies in the 
crowd, and they were sending teams of four or five, to pull the big lads out 
of the crowd, to rope ‘em in. 
 
You saw people being pulled out of the crowd, basically a random 
process... Towards the end I often got the impression they were going for 
the young faces, ones in beards, the ones who tended to look as though they 
were students. They were the ones who certainly came up in court.54 
 
Several Maerdy miners noticed infiltration of the picket by unknown forces; Alun 
Jones observed that ‘someone or somebody was trying to push us into a battle 
with the police’ and Mike Richards that ‘A young fellow on a picket, well, I mean 
he could be a student, he could be anyone.’ Picket organiser John Podmore 
claimed: 
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Quite a number of men were coming down there in boiler-suits and they 
were drivers from such and such a firm - but we were rather suspicious. 
Because the funny part about it was they were all big men. There was no 
small men amongst them... Whether they were there against us, or whether 
they were looking for problems with Trotsky groups, I don’t know. But 
they were there, the police. It’s complicated and it can be very dangerous 
if you don’t know who’s who.55 
 
Scargill recalled seeing plain clothes officers in the crowd with ‘a copy of The 
Morning Star in one pocket and The Workers’ Press in the other, shouting: 
“Shove the Bastards!” and as soon as you did you were arrested.’56 Colin Fitzer 
and John Forrester both pointed to a more organised and provocative approach 
by the police:  
 
the police at the back would push you towards the row of police at the front. 
And they themselves would push back, and kick back, and so it was like 
cattle hemmed in, really, and of course the obvious reaction then was for 
you to push back and led to scuffles and fights but it ... all sort of seemed, 
somewhat prearranged, and all conceived as a provocative manner.57 
 
The police were there to suppress miners from doing any lawful bloody 
act. It made no difference what you were going to do, just stand there 
hollering or stand there keeping your mouth shut, they were going to 
agitate you into a situation where they could do something about it, to try 
and get you going.58 
 
The oral history evidence cited above points to a change in police tactics, but also 
to the involvement of forces beyond normal policing, perhaps Special Patrol 
Group forces. The decision for this change in approach must have come from the 
Home Office. Geary believes that there is little doubt that the Government 
influences the policing of industrial disputes, in overall approach and in particular 
decisions, despite official claims of police neutrality. A Chief Constable told him 
that, given the Heath Government’s credibility depended on them making a stand 
against the miners, particularly at Saltley, [Chief Constable] ‘Capper must have 
been under tremendous political pressure to keep that Saltley depot working.’59 
Policing, and the control of civil and industrial unrest, was in part informed by 
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the views of the wider security forces, in an environment in which ‘the Troubles’ 
in Northern Ireland were coming to the fore. A few months after the strike The 
Times interviewed a number of officers at the UK land forces headquarters in 
Wiltshire. Brigadier Brian Watkins told the paper: 
 
The whole period of the miners’ strike made us realize that the present size 
of the police force is too small. It is based on the fundamental philosophy 
that we are a law-abiding country, but things have now got to the state 
where there are not enough resources to deal with the increasing numbers 
who are not prepared to respect the law.60 
 
These views fed into Government thinking, particularly Heath’s own obsession 
with subversion in the unions and his difficulty in believing that the way that the 
strike had developed was not planned conspiratorially.61 This process led to a 
further politicisation of industrial relations as the Government sought to 
disempower, and even criminalise, effective picketing. 
 
 
10.7 Changes to Welfare Benefits  
 
The politicisation of industrial relations also took the form of financial pressure 
applied by the Heath Government to those on strike. This was initially contained 
in the Social Security Act 1971, which introduced ‘more stringent rules’ with 
regard to the assessment of eligibility to supplementary benefit ‘whereby the 
benefit covers the requirement of a striker’s family but not of himself’. Prior to 
the Act, strikers were allowed £4.35 per week of strike pay plus tax refunds, and 
this would not result in any penalty or deduction of supplementary benefit 
claimed by their family, though amounts above £4.35 were subject to a one 
hundred percent deduction. The Act reduced the £4.35 ‘disregard’ to just £1.00 
per week. Cabinet minutes during the strike refer to reports of ‘miners’ surprise 
and dissatisfaction at the level of benefits actually paid’, since the effect of the 
change in law had ‘not previously been felt in a strike’.62 The Government sought 
to claw back supplementary benefit from any miner’s family who received or 
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benefited from allowances paid by the NUM in respect of the miner’s picketing 
duties (see Chapter Four).63  
 
As the strike drew to a close the Cabinet went further and classified ‘strikers 
applying for social security benefit to which they were not properly entitled’, as 
a form of intimidation.64 This was a further extension of the use of ‘intimidation’ 
and seems an odd use of the term, though shortly after the strike this tone was 
developed when Cabinet again discussed supplementary benefit for strikers and 
the need for a review of industrial policy. This was to include: ‘Action against 
industrial indiscipline – in the sense of measures… designed to alter the balance 
of industrial power by providing additional restraints on industrial lawlessness’ 
including a ‘review of Social Security benefits payable to strikers and their 
families’.65 This theme was further developed a month later when Heath sent an 
internal minute to Carr, which suggested that the Government ‘may need to be 
ready at short notice with specific proposals for further safeguards against the 
misuse of trade union power.’ This would include ‘our thinking on the scope for 
reforming the law on picketing and on the scope for curtailing the payment of 
supplementary benefit to strikers’ families (possibly at the same time making the 
payment of strike pay by unions compulsory).’66 The DTI circulated a memo at 
the end of February concerning the law on picketing, which discussed the issue 
of supplementary benefit to those on strike. It noted that if a striker were in receipt 
of strike pay from the union then ‘this would be offset against the family benefit 
requirement, as would any current refund of PAYE.’ It noted also that the NUM 
were careful to avoid either form of payment from reducing the benefit receivable 
by around one hundred and eighty thousand striking miners. It concluded that the 
NUM’s ability to free strike funds from use for strike pay enabled it to pay 
subsistence allowances to pickets at levels which did not affect family benefits.67 
It seems that the Government intended to make it more difficult for both striking 
miners in this instance, and strikers in general, and also the union concerned to 
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10.8 Miners’ Success  
 
The Home Office noted three areas where the police had found difficulties during 
the strike: mass picketing (or ‘intimidation by numbers’), as at Saltley, due to the 
participation of overwhelming numbers of non-pickets who could not be cleared 
from the scene without risk of serious danger to life; the extension of picketing 
to establishments not directly concerned in the dispute, which made it difficult 
for the police to concentrate their resources efficiently; and (where the police 
were most helpless) the doctrine of the ‘sanctity about the picket line’, with the 
strike demonstrating that this ‘myth’ is now being taken even further and that 
trade union instructions not to move goods ‘can be just as effective in stopping 
the economy as picket lines.’68 The DTI post-mortem concurred, arguing that a 
key reason for the miners’ success was ‘other unions respecting picket lines rather 
than the violence and intimidation which undoubtedly did occur at some 
places.’69 At the end of the strike The Times wrote on the legal basis of picketing 
and reasoned that the NUM’s behaviour was scrupulously constitutional and that 
the placing of pickets was within the law. It pondered whether it would be 
desirable in the future to confine lawful picketing to the strikers’ place of work, 
but argued that the miners’ success arose not from individual acts of violence, nor 
from mass pickets, but rather ‘essentially because members of trade unions in 
general respected their presence.’70 The DTI circulated a minute concerning the 
law on picketing, which referred to The Times article and summarised its outlook 
as, that no change in the law ‘would affect the sympathetic reaction of other 
unions to appeals, especially from miners, not to cross legal, peaceful picket 
lines.’ It noted that the precise guidance given to other unions by the TUC and by 
NUM was unclear, but that TGWU leader Jones had made an ‘adroit evasion of 
legal liability’ by expressing merely general support for the NUM whilst leaving 
local action up to individual members, and not even local branches.71 This refers 
to Jones’ speech in early February when he railed against the thousands of non-
union lorry drivers who were crossing picket lines, and in support of members of 
the TGWU who were backing the miners. The DTI report at the time had made 
the point that:  
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By making it clear that sympathetic action is a matter for individual TGWU 
members and avoiding from the start any central guidance, he has 
effectively fragmented the target for any legal action under the Trade 
Disputes Act 1967 (or after 28 February the Industrial Relations Act 1971), 
making it necessary to pursue any action against the individual members 
rather than union leadership.72  
 
The DTI minute also noted that ASLEF had sought a different means to avoid 
prosecution in its support for the miners, and that it may have encouraged NUM 
pickets to ‘have been brought in to legalise the union’s own decision to black oil 
freight.’ The actions of the TGWU and ASLEF point to the uncertainty that 
unions and in particular union leaders felt about the changes to the legal position 
of picketing under the I.R.Act, which was soon to become law. 
 
 
10.9 Industrial Relations Legislation 
 
Concerned about growing militancy in industrial relations and ‘unofficial’ strike 
action, both Labour and Conservative governments had sought to introduce 
legislation in the period before the strike to strengthen the hand of the official 
union leaderships in order that they might contain the unofficial element. The first 
Wilson Government appointed a Royal Commission on Trade Unions and 
Employers’ Associations in 1965 chaired by Lord Donovan, which took 
soundings from trade unions, academics and industry, and issued its report 
(‘Donovan’) in 1968.73 This highlighted three key features of British industrial 
relations: recorded strikes (other than mining) had trebled from the mid-1950s to 
the mid-1960s; almost all of these were ‘unofficial’- (lacking union leadership 
approval); and they were invariably unconstitutional - (in breach of procedure). 
Donovan resisted statutory measures and noted that the transformation of 
industrial relations in the 1960s and had led to a huge increase in shop stewards, 
who were not generally seen as ‘troublemakers’, but as ‘more of a lubricant than 
an irritant’. It recommended that they be further integrated into the trade union 
machinery, and for the union to police the rank-and-file more effectively.74 The 
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Conservative opposition’s response to Donovan, Fair Deal at Work,75 pre-empted 
the report by publishing a month earlier but shared many of its concerns 
especially the curbing of unofficial strikes. Following criticism of Donovan by 
both industry and the Conservatives, Labour’s own response, In Place of Strife,76 
accepted much of Donovan whilst arguing that statutory measures were required. 
Minkin argues that the trade unions saw In Place of Strife as an attack on their 
rights, and a contravention of the ‘rules’ of the relationship between the Labour 
Party and the unions in that it traversed the boundary between ‘political’ and 
‘industrial’ matters. Opposition to the White Paper grew within the trade unions, 
though Panitch argues that the main challenge came from ‘the more militant 
sections of the rank-and-file rather than the union leadership’. The parliamentary 
Labour Party was concerned about the damage the proposals might cause to the 
labour movement, not least the unions’ ability to control the working class, with 
several cabinet ministers, including Home Secretary Jim Callaghan, voicing 
concern.77 
 
Building upon Fair Deal at Work, the Conservatives 1970 election manifesto 
proposed industrial relations legislation as a solution to the trade union problem.78 
The Conservatives had spent time in opposition rethinking their attitude towards 
the trade unions and met at the Selsdon Park Hotel in January 1970 to tie up the 
loose ends of their policies, where Carr stated: ‘We need someone in a major 
sector to take a strike and not wilt’, at which Heath warned: ‘Better not to talk 
about it. Even Cabinets don’t.’79 In November 1970, during a strategy meeting at 
Chequers, Chancellor of the Exchequer Anthony Barber argued that: ‘the 
Government must stand up to a strike, perhaps to more than one strike, in the 
public sector and be seen to be allowing the consequence of management to work 
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through to bankruptcy in one or two striking cases.’80 Despite a desire to stand up 
to the public sector, Holmes believes that the Conservatives genuinely wished to 
strengthen the trade union leadership in relation to the power of the shop stewards 
that had emerged in the 1960s,81 and Heath saw the trade unions as potential allies 
for his modernisation agenda.  
 
The premise of the Industrial Relations Act,82 introduced by the Heath 
Government, was that British industrial relations suffered from union leaders’ 
political motivation and that there would be fewer strikes if ordinary members 
were in control. It was consequently infused with the promotion of individualism 
as a means to counter the power of united action.83 Ultimately it had contradictory 
aims in that it sought to extend the control individuals exercised over the union, 
but also to increase the responsibility and control that union officers had over the 
unruly (unofficial) elements of the membership.84 This reflected differing and 
transitional views within the Conservative Party: for example, Carr saw a real 
need ‘to strengthen the authority of the democratically elected trade union 
leadership’,85 while Heath insisted, that the authority of properly elected and 
appointed trade union officials should be strengthened, if only to make it easier 
for them to cope with the unofficial element.86 Timothy Raison (Conservative 
Political Centre), however, argued against working with the unions and for an 
assault on One Nation Toryism and its obsession with stability. This entailed a 
‘firmer but not unfair’ approach to the unions, involving the law. Ideally changes 
would be negotiated with them, ‘but if agreement’s impossible they must be 
achieved without it. Again this may arouse accusations of class warfare, but that 
cannot be helped – the sores of our economy must not be left to fester indefinitely, 
even if it hurts to cure them.’87 
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The TUC was opposed to legislating on industrial relations, fearing the 
undermining of its authority or the outlawing of activities essential to the pursuit 
of legitimate trade union aims. It was upset at the Government’s refusal to 
negotiate on the legislation and the short time scale given to complete the process, 
and Carr later conceded that he was unwise to have refused to compromise.88 He 
believed that the unions would oppose the plans ‘until they became law’, as union 
leaders had advised him they would, and so there seemed little point in extending 
the consultation phase.89 The hurried nature of the legislation’s introduction, and 
its non-negotiability, encouraged the view that the Government sought a 
confrontation with the labour movement. During the debates Labour MP Eric 
Heffer called it ‘class legislation’,90 which, whilst arguably true, ignored the fact 
that it was very similar to In Place of Strife. Wilson described the Bill as ‘a 
“Trots” charter, because it is the militants who will be encouraged’.91 Castle 
vowed to fight tooth and nail to destroy the Bill, and at the Labour Party 
conference in 1971 a resolution calling for the Act to be ‘completely repealed in 
the first session of a new Labour government’ was passed. These manoeuvres 
were essentially aimed at allowing Labour to mend fences with the trade union 
movement, broken by In Place of Strife, and was also a delay tactic allowing 
Labour to appear radical, whilst relieving them of the need to do anything 
significant at the time.92 The TUC launched a public campaign against the Bill 
with a petition, the production of millions of leaflets, national, regional and local 
meetings and demonstrations, including one at Hyde Park. It rejected proposals 
for strikes, but one-day protests organised by the Broad Left’s Liaison Committee 
for the Defence of Trade Unions (LCDTU) took place involving, three hundred 
and fifty thousand people on 8 December 1970, and around one and a quarter 
million each on 1 and 18 March 1971. The CP, through the LCDTU, had 
motivated significant stoppages, though it remained careful to emphasise that it 
was seeking to move the official movement not to transcend it. Approximately 
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one third of TUC members participated directly in such protests but these failed 
to halt the legislation, though Moran argues that this was not actually the point of 
the campaign, which, rather, ‘kept the rank and file occupied’ and crucially 
rebuffed those calling for strike action.93  
 
 
10.10 Potential for Prosecution  
 
When the 1972 strike began, the law on picketing was contained in the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act 1875 (section 7), and the Trade 
Disputes Act 1906 (section 2). The former made it an offence to compel a person 
to abstain from working through violence or intimidation, through persistent 
following, through watching or besetting his house, or place of work, or through 
following them with two or more persons in a disorderly manner. The latter stated 
that it was lawful for one or more persons to attend at or near house or place of 
work, if merely for the purpose of peacefully communicating or persuading such 
person to abstain from working. The I.R.Act repealed portions of the 1906 Act, 
whilst its section 134 continued the general protection of peaceful picketing, but 
removed protection of such activity from a person’s home, as distinct from their 
place of work.94 The Act was not due to come fully into effect until the end of 
February 1972, though its emergency provisions were available during the 
miners’ strike. The Cabinet were frustrated that they would be unable to curb 
legal picketing during the strike, but were wary about the implications of using 
the newly minted legislation for the first time in such a high-profile case for fear 
of discrediting the Act as a whole.95  
 
The circular sent by the Home Office to the Chief Constables at the beginning of 
the strike requesting notice of disorder was not issued with a view to keeping the 
peace, nor intended to demonstrate that picketing was peaceful, but rather in the 
hope that it would show that the picketing was illegal or violent and that this 
might lead to bad press or, ideally, prosecution. The police, whose primary 
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concern is in keeping the peace, were not necessarily aware of the Government’s 
motives, and Teesside Constabulary responded each week with a general 
assessment of ‘no cause for concern’, which ironically was a cause for concern 
for the Cabinet.96 The Government were frustrated that peaceful picketing, even 
of power stations, was lawful, and were uncertain whether the relevant provisions 
of the Act would significantly change the situation in any case.97 At the end of 
the third week, the Board received an opinion on picketing from its regional legal 
department in Doncaster, which noted that whilst peaceful picketing for the 
purposes of persuading others to abstain from work was legal, there were a wide 
variety of possible offences within each situation, e.g. for assault, that may lead 
to a prosecution.98 A circular sent to NCB Board members subsequently noted 
that given the lack of cooperation from the NUM leadership the Board must 
consider what opportunities might be available for legal action against the 
pickets. It set out areas where picketing might breach criminal law, for example; 
excessive numbers, intimidation, obstructing the highway, obstructing the police, 
or violence.99  
 
In practice, all of the arrests made during the miners’ strike (two hundred and 
sixty-four in England and Wales and twenty-seven in Scotland) were made under 
the general law - obstruction of the highway, obstruction of the police, assault, 
insulting behaviour - rather than under industrial relations law.100 The Cabinet 
also pursued a possible prosecution, and the Solicitor General requested that the 
DTI inform him of any incidents at picketed power stations and industries outside 
of the coal industry so that a plaintiff and defendant might be found for a possible 
case. The DTI noted that the CEGB and oil companies were rather concerned 
about repercussions against their own staffs if any such action were brought.101 
The Home Office subsequently informed the CEGB that they should contact their 
local Chief Constable as soon as possible if and when they had been ‘picketed by 
more than what are considered peaceful (and therefore legal) pickets’.102 The 
CEGB replied that whilst appreciating the intent behind the letter it appeared to 
be founded on a mis-reading of the situation. The problem, it noted, was not 
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whether the picketing was peaceful, but rather that the pickets were obstructing 
the highway leading to the power stations and so preventing delivery of essential 
goods and this situation was becoming urgent.103  
 
 
10.11 A Change in the Law 
 
Following the introduction of a State of Emergency towards the end of the strike, 
Alan Campbell, barrister and Queens Counsellor, claimed that everyone was 
asking ‘What is wrong with the Law?’ He subsequently provided a legal opinion 
entitled ‘Misapprehensions on Picketing’ in which he argued that there was 
nothing much wrong with the Law. The NCB did not invoke the law, he claimed, 
because it wrongly considered itself to have been a Government pawn, and others 
who may have contemplated legal action were discouraged by views expressed 
incorrectly in the House that much of the picketing was legal. The law on 
picketing is complicated, he noted, and peaceful picketing during a trade or 
industrial dispute is legal but even in that circumstance action in breach of a 
commercial contract, or intimidation or violence or similar, renders the picketing 
unlawful. He reasoned that a statement to this effect in the House would have had 
a considerable stabilising effect. His conclusions included that: whilst the I.R.Act 
had ‘Emergency Procedures’ it was desirable to curtail industrial strife before it 
became an emergency; and that it was most desirable to change the law such that 
the procurement of a breach of contract is constituted both by ‘direct’ persuasion, 
which is unlawful in itself, and also by ‘indirect’ methods such as picketing.104 In 
other words it would be most desirable to criminalise elements of picketing. 
Following Campbell’s paper, Heath requested that urgent consideration should 
be given to changes in the law on picketing.105  
 
The Ministerial Committee on the Coalminers’ Pay Dispute had discussed the 
scale and manner of the picketing a week earlier and argued ‘that the bounds of 
the law had so clearly been exceeded as to bring the law into disrepute and the 
capacity to enforce it into question.’ It believed that the uncertainty on the law 
made it impractical for the police to enforce it more effectively, and that it was 
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therefore important to devise much tighter law for the future with regard to places, 
numbers, and authorised personnel legally permitted to be picketed.106 The police 
had in fact earlier made a similar point, following problems with a strike at 
Pilkington’s glassworks at St. Helens in 1970, when its north west regional police 
conference had urged both a review of the law related to picketing and that police 
chiefs should be given guidance on which to base instructions to police forces 
around the country. The Home Office view at that time was that the existing 
legislation was adequate, and that ‘it could be embarrassing if it became known 
that police were seeking additional statutory powers.’107 Following Heath’s later 
request, a number of proposals for changing the law on picketing were suggested, 
though it was noted that most had been considered and rejected during the passage 
of the I.R.Bill. Home Office officials did not consider that any amendment to the 
criminal law was the right way forward, and they advised that police powers 
seemed to be adequate as they were but that it should be made clear, 
unambiguously and publicly, that the police had the right to limit picket numbers 





Relations between pickets and police was shown to have been largely peaceful 
and good natured for the majority of the strike, in which the police balanced their 
obligations to allow both the right to picket and the right to work. The police 
received criticism from the Government and the NCB for not being forceful 
enough in preventing picketing deemed illegal, and for seeming unwilling to 
prosecute such illegality. Changes to policing in the previous period had led to 
larger forces under the control of Chief Constables and greater control from the 
Home Office, and had also paved the way for the use of mutual aid between police 
forces. These changes were seen to have been brought to bear in the policing at 
Saltley, in which an enhanced form of policing was in evidence, including the use 
of mutual aid, provocation and snatch squads. The mass picketing at Saltley was 
instrumental in the Heath Government denouncing the strike as a ‘victory for 
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violence’, but police reports showed that there were in fact few incidents of 
disorder in the picketing of coal stocks or power stations, which were those that 
were instrumental in winning the strike. The hostility that was shown towards 
clerical staff and officials who crossed picket lines can be said to have been 
intimidating. However, the Government increasingly classified mass picketing as 
‘intimidation’, even where the behaviour was peaceful. The use of the term 
intimidation changed during the strike, and was criticised for being used 
essentially as a means to denounce and de-legitimise effective picketing. The 
term also came to include the action of those who sought welfare benefits to 
which they were not entitled, and was part of a wider clampdown on the provision 
of benefits to those on strike, as a means to apply financial pressure on pickets. 
Government records showed that the miners’ victory was not the result of 
violence but was essentially because other trade unionists respected the miners’ 
picket lines.  
 
Union leaders were seen to have been wary of recent changes to the law on 
picketing and keen to avoid prosecution, and therefore encouraged individual 
trade unionists to take action rather than endorsing general union support for the 
miners. The Government and the NCB both sought grounds to prosecute pickets 
in the strike and were frustrated that most of the picketing was legal. The 
frustration at the effectiveness of the picketing, and the debacle of the 
confrontation at Saltley fed into conservative thinking with regard to the need to 
change and strengthen the law on picketing. This thinking had transformed from 
an earlier desire to strengthen the hand of the official leadership as a means of 
controlling the militant element, towards undermining the power of trade unions 
per se, despite the union leadership’s consistent attempts to control, or police, the 
behaviour of the pickets, which was widely acknowledged. The term ‘a victory 
for violence’ was therefore used by the Heath Government both to explain away 
its failure to beat the miners, but also, and perhaps essentially, to justify the need 
to do something about industrial relations, and was informed by a growing belief 
in the subversive nature of picketing. This betrays a politicisation of industrial 
relations, in that the Governmnet was not prepared to tolerate any challenge to its 
rule, particularly from the public sector. In this it declared a desire to alter the 















This thesis has sought to investigate the conduct of the 1972 miners’ strike. It has 
shown that the decline in demand for coal in the mid-1950s led to a contraction 
of the industry and gave impetus to increased mechanisation that required further 
investment funded via Government loans. Though productivity rose due to the 
larger proportion of mechanised production, the Board’s loan repayments were 
drawn from a decreasing pool of collieries and men, and arguably impacted on 
its ability to pay higher wages. The Government (as ultimate employer) preferred 
to keep wages low in order to keep the price of coal at competitive levels for the 
benefit of industry in general. The NUM leadership effectively aided this process 
by arguing that higher wages would lead to a further contraction of the industry 
and that it was better to maintain a lower wage in order to keep more jobs, a 
position that also suited the Union, which had an interest in maintaining a larger 
membership. Conversely, the miners’ interests were in achieving job security and 
a reasonable living wage, though not necessarily in the coal industry. We saw that 
the NUM’s role in maintaining a compliant workforce, during the period of 
significant contraction in the decade before the strike, was very effective. It was 
able to achieve this; by appealing to the miners to defend the nationalised 
industry, in calls to do nothing that would hinder the return of a Labour 
Government, in subsequent appeals for adherence to the ‘new realism’ of the 
Wilson Government’s modernisation agenda, and in encouraging miners to work 
harder to save their pits from closure (as a means to head off any developing 
protest). The thesis has shown that Wilson’s relegation of coal in favour of other 
fuels, and the introduction of the Advanced Closure Programme, led to growing 
discontent amongst miners and anger towards both the Labour Government and 
the NUM leadership, which supported its position. This made the Union’s ability 
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to contain the militancy of the workforce increasingly untenable as the NUM 
were shown to be more allied to the interests of the industry, and therefore the 
Board, than they were to those of the miners.  
 
The coal industry historically had been beset by numerous small-scale strikes 
over conditions and wages, which played out at pit-level. The thesis demonstrated 
that the introduction of the 1955 day-wage system, and in particular the NPLA a 
decade later, had a transformative effect in both increasing the discontent felt by 
many miners and in transferring this discontent from a local stage on to the 
national arena as local wage bargaining diminished to be replaced by national 
wage-bargaining. The NPLA also caused the wages of many relatively higher 
paid miners to stagnate due to their wages increasing more slowly to allow the 
lower paid Areas to catch up as moves were made towards wage parity. Areas 
with higher wages were those primarily in the central coalfield that were the most 
productive, in part due to wider seams, and had therefore been less affected by 
previous pit closures. Thus, the parity aims of the NPLA had the effect of bringing 
discontent into Areas, notably Nottinghamshire and Yorkshire, where it had not 
previously manifested, whilst the national wage-bargaining effectively closed 
local means of expressing this discontent, and thus bottling it up where it might 
previously have had an outlet. The combined effects of the ACP and the NPLA 
led to miners’ frustration and anger spilling on to the national stage in unofficial 
strikes in both 1969 and 1970, which had the effect of preparing the miners for 
the following year’s dispute. 
 
The 1971 NUM conference decision to seek a large percentage pay rise was a 
product of this discontent, and was an attempt to redress the imbalance in miners’ 
wages relative to comparable industrial and public-sector workers. In making the 
claim, the NUM members were effectively in defiance of the position of the 
leadership believing that its advice had worn thin since the industry had 
contracted in spite of their restraint, and that their wages had been held back in 
vain. They consequently decided that a stand must be taken to restore wage levels, 
even if this entailed a further contraction. The higher claim was sanctioned by the 
leadership primarily as a means of containing the growing militancy within the 
membership, and was based on the temporary illusion of better prospects for the 
industry suggested by the Board’s accounts. The thesis has demonstrated that the 
NUM conference decision to decrease the size of the majority required to call an 
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official strike had emerged from an initial proposal for a simple majority put 
forward by the more militant Areas and a subsequent counter-proposal, backed 
by the leadership, which lowered the threshold but by a lesser amount and thus 
made an official strike a little less likely. The subsequent ballot cleared the new 
threshold with a margin of victory that was widely regarded as small, and this 
was taken by the Government to mean that the miners would not be united in the 
conduct of the strike. This gave it a misplaced confidence and informed its 
subsequent strategy, in which it believed it had the upper hand.  
 
The overtime ban, which began the dispute, prepared the miners for the 
subsequent strike by running down coal stocks, forging a unity over the wage 
claim, and creating an organisational structure of liaison committees to deal with 
issues that arose between the unions within the collieries. These proved very 
effective and transformed seamlessly into strike committees, and whilst they had 
been encouraged by the national leadership, they made decisions and controlled 
the picketing at a local level, which increasingly reflected a disconnect between 
the national leadership’s directives and the local branches implementation. There 
was shown to be significant local variation in the approach and attitude of the 
liaison committees, particularly over the issue of safety and maintenance work. 
This initially exacerbated the division between miners and officials during the 
overtime ban, which then grew into open hostility in the subsequent strike.   
 
The Heath Government introduced the N-1 Norm as a means to control public 
sector wage inflation, whilst proclaiming a desire to take on the public sector and 
contain strike activity. In this strike it faced an industry and workforce that was 
arguably ready for such a confrontation, which subsequently showed the 
Government to have been ill-prepared and over-confident. Miners’ wages were 
relatively low in comparison to other public sector and manual workers, and their 
wage claim was a sincere attempt to redress this imbalance. The thesis showed 
that British inflation levels and wage settlements were comparable to those of 
other leading economies, despite suggestions that militant union leaders were the 
cause of Britain’s problems. It demonstrated that the Government’s self-imposed 
limit on public sector wage settlements was inconsistently applied and took no 
account of the merits of the miners’ case. The Cabinet were aware that their 
imposition of the pay norm would provoke a strike, and they not only ignored this 
danger but actively sought such an outcome. This betrayed a strategic desire to 
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take on and beat one union, particularly one as significant as the NUM, in order 
to make other unions think twice about standing up and challenging Government 
policy; echoes of this strategy would ultimately resonate in the 1984-85 miners’ 
strike 
 
The Heath Government’s professed desire to remain detached from the 
negotiations was shown to be merely a public relations exercise since it actually 
dictated the terms and the time-frame within which the NCB could negotiate. The 
withdrawal of the NCB’s final offer was demonstrated to have been imposed on 
the Board by the Government, and exacerbated the situation by hardening the 
resolve of the miners. The issue of arbitration was another in which the 
Government’s public pronouncements were at odds with its actions, and it was 
used in an attempt to swing public opinion against the miners until the 
deteriorating situation forced the Cabinet to establish the Wilberforce Inquiry in 
order to settle the dispute. The thesis exposed the private and secret negotiations 
undertaken by the leaders of both the NUM and the TUC in seeking to resolve 
the dispute on terms less favourable to the miners, and without their knowledge. 
This demonstrates that the real role of trade union leaders is not as defenders of 
their members but as a liaison between the employer and the workers for the 
benefit of the industry. 
 
The thesis showed that the picketing during the strike was not primarily the mass 
and militant picketing that is often portrayed, and that the majority of the 
picketing against coal movement was largely small scale and incident free. The 
picketing of the collieries, power stations and depots was shown to have involved 
negotiations or discussions between pickets and other workers and that whilst this 
was not always successful it mostly did not result in aggression. This picketing 
began with small picket lines and subsequently diverged between small token 
pickets on the one hand and larger scale more interventionist picketing on the 
other, with the use of larger scale and mass picketing developing in part where 
small-scale picketing was found to be ineffectual. The thesis demonstrated that 
the pickets’ appeals to non-unionised drivers, whose wages depended on a 
delivery or collection, or to dock workers paid on piece work, were often found 
to fall on deaf ears. Consequently, the miners found the need to increase the size 
of the pickets in order, in effect, to block the site entrance in situations where 
their appeals were not being accepted. The miners’ victory was shown to have 
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been achieved largely through the blockading of power stations, which, for the 
Government, was unexpected and unforeseen. The NCB initially felt well 
prepared to withstand the strike but faced a problem of coal movement being 
curtailed by pickets leading to a rapid deterioration in the stock position and the 
consequent need for power cuts as some power stations ran short of fuel or 
supplies. The thesis demonstrated that the supply of coal to priority consumers 
remained a key issue throughout the dispute and played a significant role in the 
manipulation of public opinion. It also served to highlight the differing views of 
what should be considered a priority with most miners considering that schools 
should also be included.  
 
The widespread disregard shown by the pickets for the NUM’s national directives 
on maintenance and safety cover reflected a deep anger and frustration against 
the leadership’s implication in the processes of pit closures and wage restraint, 
and ultimately differing views on the future of the industry. The decision to 
withhold safety cover was in part a negotiating tactic, but the anger directed 
towards those who worked during the strike was aimed primarily at their role as 
strike-breakers. This is underlined by the picketing of clerical workers that had 
no real negotiating element, and the picketing against maintenance work being 
primarily focused on NACODS deputies rather than BACM managers implying 
a sense of betrayal by those within the miners’ own community or class. The 
miners’ lack of concern for the state of the pits also appears to reflect a realistic 
view of an industry in decline. The thesis has shown that there were a variety of 
approaches to the picketing of officials and clerical workers, both within and 
between Areas, which points to decision making taking place at the localities. 
The way in which the picketing unfolded in a particular locality was a response 
to what appeared to work in that locality, and where small scale and peaceful 
picketing did not appear to work, picketing became more militant or larger scale 
or both in order to be more effective. The thesis demonstrated that in some 
localities a militant attitude achieved results early on and this therefore became 
the form that was used throughout the strike, whereas in others mass picketing 
when combined with demands to restrict numbers achieved its purpose, and this 
restriction then continued successfully. In some localities NACODS continued to 
attempt to cross the picket lines in accordance with national guidelines and the 
requests of the Board, but in an increasing number NACODS turned back at the 
first sign of resistance. This presumably reflected variously a preference not to 
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have to confront the anger of the pickets daily, some sympathy for the miners’ 
cause, and perhaps also an awareness that they would all soon be back at work 
together. The Board’s exasperation at the apparent lack of determination by some 
officials to pass the picket lines was ultimately an expression of its frustration at 
the development of the strike.  
 
The miners enjoyed broad support from the trade union movement, which largely 
came following direct contact between pickets and fellow trade unionists. The 
TUC showed itself unwilling to actively support the strike and merely restricted 
itself to assurances that members would not cross picket lines, a central tenet of 
trade unionism. The widespread support that the miners received from the 
transport unions was not initiated by the TUC statement, having already begun 
beforehand. It reflected both support for the miners’ cause and conversely 
hostility towards the Government, which built upon protests against the Industrial 
Relations Bill a year earlier. The miners received significant and widespread 
support from students, who identified the miners’ struggle as akin to their own 
dispute with the Government, and were seen to be enthusiastic but less disciplined 
in their actions than were the miners. Significant support for the miners also came 
from their wives, who played an active supportive and political role, and stood 
firmly by the miners in their challenge to the Government. Wide support was also 
received from members of the public, and whilst this was not universal, public 
opinion remained on the miners’ side throughout the dispute. The thesis has 
demonstrated that the miners received substantial support from Birmingham 
engineers at the confrontation at ‘Saltley’ gasworks that forced the closure of the 
depot. Whilst this was not instrumental in the miners’ victory it was seen to have 
been a major blow to the Government, which had chosen to make the site a test 
of strength and drafted police officers from around the country to that end. The 
Government denounced the strike as a victory for violence, in part based on the 
events at Saltley, though we have seen that it was essentially not a particularly 
violent confrontation and the violence such as it existed came from both the 
pickets and the police, with the latter using enhanced tactics and provocations 
akin to the development of a more paramilitary style of policing. The support that 
the miners received from the engineers was shown to have its roots in the ideals 
of trade union solidarity, and the engineers themselves identified it as a unifying 
and emotional experience, which was in part due to the Conservative Government 




We have seen that the accusation of ‘a victory for violence’ was not supported by 
the evidence and was, rather, a way for the Government both to explain away its 
failure to beat the miners, and also, and perhaps essentially, to justify the ‘need’ 
to do something about industrial relations. The picketing of coal stocks was 
shown to be largely peaceful, and relations between pickets and police prior to 
Saltley mostly good. The mass picketing at Saltley in particular, and 1972 miners’ 
strike more generally, fed into Conservative thinking with regard to necessary 
changes to the policing of strikes and to the law on picketing. In this, the use of 
mutual aid by the police was seen by the Government to have been useful and 
necessary and led to its desire to build upon this for future disputes, whilst its 
desire to strengthen the hand of the official leadership as a means of controlling 
the militant element, changed towards a desire to undermine the power of trade 
unions per se. This was in part a recognition that the union leadership, despite its 
best efforts, had been unable to effectively police its own members in this strike. 
The thesis demonstrated the Heath Government’s belief in the subversive nature 
of picketing betrayed the class nature of its approach in its intolerance for any 
challenge to its rule, particularly from the public sector. This was underlined by 
its approach to welfare benefits, which it saw as a means to apply financial 
pressure to the union and those on strike. In this it openly declared a desire to 
alter the balance of industrial power in favour of the Government, whilst seeking 
to criminalise picketing and denouncing as intimidation the actions of those 
seeking benefits. 
 
This thesis has sought to show that in both the causes and conduct of the strike 
the miners were in conflict not only with the Board and the Government, but also, 
and perhaps most significantly, with their own leadership. The initial passivity of 
the miners was a product of the NUM leadership’s machinations over decades, 
and it was in defiance of this that miners came together to strike. The organisation 
and control of the strike largely took place at local level, in the decisions made 
on the picket lines and in the liaison/strike committees. The NUM leadership 
essentially led the strike from the rear, and was found to have led from the front 
only in its efforts to contain the militancy of the discontented miners. The thesis 
has shown that both the right and left wing of the NUM (Labour and CP) played 
significant roles in supporting the Union leadership to contain this militancy, and 
to ensure that the membership remained within the sphere of the Labour Party. 
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The national unity that was unleashed by the NPLA, and manifested in the strikes 
of 1972 and 1974, proved to be unwelcome to the both the Board and the NUM 
leadership. They subsequently conspired to undermine this unity via the 
reintroduction of a productivity element to wages, in the form of the Area 
Incentive Scheme, which was introduced by the Labour Government in 1977, and 
played a crucial role in the defeat of the miners in 1985. The 1972 strike paved 
the way for the 1984-85 strike, but the Government victory in that dispute showed 
that it had learnt the more significant lessons from the earlier strikes, was 
determined not to be beaten again, and was consequently better prepared than 











5  NUM Annual Conference, Aberdeen 
August 
6  Industrial Relations Act passed 
September 
14  NUM wage claim put to Joint National Negotiating Committee 
October 
14  NEC rejected NCB offer of 7% 
21   NUM national delegate conference decided on overtime ban 
November 
1   Overtime ban began 
5   NACODS instructed not to join the liaison committees 
22-24   Ballot on strike action  
December 
2   Ballot resulted in 58.8% majority in favour of strike action 
9   NUM gave notice of strike action for 9 January 
21   NUM rejected final NCB offer 




3   Gormley and Ezra met at coal industry function 
4   Ezra met Gormley and Daly 
   Carr and Davies discussed withholding arbitration 
5  NCB issued revised offer. NEC rejects by 23 votes to 2  
6  NUM met TUC to request support in the strike 
   NUR instructed members not to transport oil to power stations 
7  NCB withdrew all previous offers 
9  Week One: Strike began  
   CEGB estimated 8 weeks of stocks at power stations 
10  TUC made statement on respecting picket lines 
264 
 
11 & 12  Daly issued instructions to pickets 
12  NEC decided to picket power stations 
14  NACODS representatives met with NCB to discuss wages 
   Final pay packets issued to striking miners 
   Electricity supply unions agreed overtime ban from 1 February 
16  Week Two 
17  COSA members officially joined strike 
Barnsley pickets established picketing base in East Anglia 
   Kent miners began picketing of London power stations 
18  House of Commons debate on coal strike 
19  NUM and NCB met with Feather, who reported back to Carr 
   Unofficial combine of power workers met in London 
19-21  Mass picket at NCB offices in Doncaster 
20  Unemployment rose above 1 million 
   Schools began to close due to lack of coal 
   LSE & Essex students joined pickets at docks 
21  Carr met separately with NCB and NUM  
   Daly issued statement on picketing and priority supplies 
23  Week Three 
24  Some London power workers began unofficial overtime ban 
   1,000 Barnsley pickets in East Anglia 
   Mass picket at NCB offices, Tondu 
26  Unofficial one day dockers’ strike 
   24-hour stoppage in Liverpool in support of miners 
 29  CEGB ‘effective’ stocks down to 4 weeks, due to blocked stocks 
29-30  National Union of Students Extraordinary Conference 
30  Week Four 
‘Bloody Sunday’, 13 people killed in (London)Derry 
Weather turned colder, coal demand rose 
31  House of Lords debate on coal strike 
   Mass picket at NCB offices, Ystrad Hengoed 
   Students asked to discontinue help for pickets 
February 
2  50,000 people demonstrated ‘Bloody Sunday’ shootings  
3  Fred Matthews killed on picket line at Keadby power station 
4  Picketing began at Nechells gasworks (Saltley) depot 
5  Pickets at Saltley depot called for reinforcements 
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6  Week Five 
20,000 miners demonstrated in London, joined by students 
7  500 pickets at Saltley depot 
8  800 pickets at Saltley depot 
 9  CEGB stocks down to 2 weeks supply remaining  
   State of Emergency declared 
Carr met with NCB and NUM. Revised offer issued 
   10,000 attended Fred Matthews’ funeral  
   Birmingham engineers agreed to back NUM at Saltley 
   Supplies delivered to Thorpe Marsh power station by helicopter 
   400 schools closed in England 
10  State of Emergency in force 
   Closure of Saltley depot 
   NUM rejected NCB offer, but reduced its claim 
First, unplanned, power cuts 
11  Planned power reductions began  
Restrictions imposed on office heating and display lighting 
 Three-day week imposed 
CEGB stocks at 1.5 weeks normal supply 
Wilberforce Inquiry appointed 
13  Week Six 
14  Mass picket at Longannet power station, 13 pickets arrested 
15  Wilberforce Inquiry opened 
   NUM lobby of Parliament 
   1,000 schools closed in England and Wales 
15-16  Wilberforce public hearings held 
17  Longannet pickets released following Government intervention 
18  1.6 million workers laid off to date 
   Wilberforce findings published 
   NEC extracted further concessions after meetings with Heath 
19  Official end of picketing 
20  Week Seven 
23   NUM ballot on acceptance of settlement held 
28   Miners returned to work 
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